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‘When we look at the future of aviation, 
we must … look at the future of safety.’1 
 
Roberto Kobeh González 




1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
This study is a first comprehensive attempt to analyse, from a legal and institu-
tional point of view, how regional cooperation and more specifically the so called 
Regional Aviation Safety Organisations (RASOs) can contribute to he improve-
ment of civil aviation safety and the achievement of the objective of ‘uniformity 
in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization’ as formulated in Article 37 
of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereinafter ‘Chicago Conven-
tion’).2 
So far the bulk of analysis related to RASOs has been performed by the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).3 With the exception of a few arti-
cles published in air law journals (see Section 1.6), there has so far been no at-
tempt in the academic world to address this phenomenon. 
There is also at present no internationally agreed definition of a RASO, 
and ICAO and its Member States tend to treat this concept as a broad category 
encompassing different forms of regional cooperation. For the purpose of this 
study a specific definition and typology of regional aviation safety bodies is pro-
posed in Chapter 3. 
The scope of this study is limited to civil aviation and primarily focuses on 
commercial air transport. It addresses regulation of civil aviation safety under-
stood in broad terms. This includes functions of: rulemaking, including the devel-
opment and promulgation of civil aviation safety laws and operating regulations; 
certification and continuous oversight, including the issuance of approvals and 
continuous assurance that the certificate holder meets the applicable safety re-
                                                 
1 ICAO, 'Journal', 1 (2012), p. 4. 
2 'Convention on International Civil Aviation', Chicago, 7.12.1944, 15 UNTS 295. 
3 ICAO, 'Safety Oversight Manual, Part B: The Establishment and Management of a Regional 
Safety Oversight Organization', Doc. 9734, (2011). See also: ICAO, 'Manual on Regional Accident 
and Incident Investigation Organization', Doc. 9946, (2011). 
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quirements; and enforcement designed to ensure compliance. In addition, this 
study also analyses regional accident investigation organisation . 
With a view to reaching the study’s primary objective of verifying the ex-
tent to which RASOs meet the expectations vested in them by the international 
aviation community, seven specific research questions have been formulated: 
 
(1) What should be the role of RASOs in global governance of civil aviation 
safety? 
(2) Can the optimal RASO model be identified from a legal point of view? If 
yes, how can it best be defined and structured? 
(3) In which domains can RASOs yield maximum safety benefits, and under 
which legal conditions? 
(4) For which States are RASOs most relevant? 
(5) What is the expected future evolution of RASO type bodies? 
(6) Are there any shortcomings in the current international legal framework 
that pose an obstacle to further development of RASOs?  
(7) What are the international responsibility and civil liability implications re-
sulting from RASOs establishment and functioning? 
 
In addition to addressing the above research questions, this study will also 
propose, in Chapter 5, a practical methodology or a ‘tool-box’ for the setting up of 
RASOs. The author made a preliminary presentation of this concept at the ICAO 
Symposium on Regional Safety Oversight Organisations (Montréal, 26-28 Octo-
ber 2011), which was positively received by the participants, and is reflected in 
the final conclusions of the Symposium.4 
1.2 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AS A GLOBAL CONCERN 
Civil aviation is a global industry that directly and indirectly supports the em-
ployment of 56.6 million people, contributes over 2 trillion USD to global gross 
domestic product, and carries over 2.5 billion passengers and 5.3 trillion USD 
worth of cargo annually.5 
Commercial civil aviation is also a very safe mode of transportation. 
Worldwide the number of passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger-
kilometres flown in commercial air transport has fallen from 0.8 in 1960 to 0.08 in 
1980, 0.03 in 1990, and has ranged between 0.05 and 0.01 since then.6 
Between 2009 and 2013 there were on average 3.7 accidents each year per 
one million aircraft departures, involving both fatalities and non-fatal outcomes, 
in worldwide commercial scheduled air transport.7 Taking into account that the 
average annual volume of commercial traffic in those years was nearly 30 million 
flights, this is a very good safety record.8 
                                                 
4 ICAO, 'Outcomes of the Symposium on Regional Safety Oversight Organisations', Oral report by 
the ICAO Secretary General, (194th session of the ICAO Council, 2011). See also: ICAO, 'Review 
of the outcomes of the Symposium on Regional Safety Oversight Or anizations', C-WP/13810, 
(195th session of the ICAO Council, 2011). 
5 ICAO, 'Global Aviation Safety Plan', Doc. 10004, (2013),  p. 2. 
6 ICAO, 'Outlook for Air Transport to the Year 2025', Circular 313, AT/134, (2007),  p. 15. 
7 ICAO, 'Safety Report', (2014), <www.icao.int> [accessed 17 July 2014], p.8. 
8 ICAO, 'Annual Reports of the Council (2009-2013)'. 
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However, when looked at in detail, the picture is more complex. First of 
all, as Figure I demonstrates, actual safety levels are far from being uniform 
across the world and there are concerns that as the air traffic and complexity of the 
global air transport market grow, the rate of accidents may also start to increase.9 
Figure I: Scheduled Commercial Air Transport Fatal Accident Rate per 10 Million Flights by 
World Region, 2004-2013 
Source of data: European Aviation Safety Agency, Annual Safety Review (2013) 
 
It is predicted that in Europe alone the volume of flights in the European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) area is likely to 
increase to 14.4 million flights per annum by 2035, or 50% more than in 2012.10 
Even more growth is expected in other parts of the world, with ICAO predicting a 
doubling of global aviation traffic in the next fifteen years.11 
Secondly, the level of implementation of international civil avation safety 
requirements mandated by the Chicago Convention and its Annexes,12 although 
improving (see Chapter 2), is still not satisfactory. In August 2014 the global av-
erage level of implementation of the eight Critical Elements (CE)13 of State safety 
oversight, as measured by ICAO under its Universal Safety Oversight Audit Pro-
gramme (USOAP),14 was standing at 62%.15 In addition, there are significant dif-
                                                 
9 'Global Aviation Safety Plan', supra note 5, at p.2. 
10 EUROCONTROL, 'Challenges of Growth 2013: Task 4: European Air Traffic in 2013', (2013). 
11 ICAO, 'ICAO Journal', supra note 1, at p.5. 
12 There are over ten thousand International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) 
promulgated by ICAO in nineteen Annexes to the Chicago Convention. The vast majority of these 
SARPs concern civil aviation safety; see: ICAO, 'Notification and publication of differences: 
Summary of Decisions', C-DEC 177/14, (177th session of the ICAO Council, 2006). 
13 The eight CEs of safety oversight system encompass the whole spectrum of civil aviation activi-
ties. They are the building blocks upon which an effective safety oversight system is based. The 
level of effective implementation of the CEs is an indication of a State’s capability for safety over-
sight; see: ICAO, 'Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Manual', 
Doc. 9735, (2011). See Table I below for an overview of the eightCEs and their correlation with 
actual accident rates. 
14 A more detailed presentation of the USOAP is given in Chapter 2. 
13 
 
ferences in implementation of CEs between the ICAO regions, as well as within 
these regions. As Figure II demonstrates, in 2014 this spread ranged from 4% to 
99% depending on the region. In August 2014, 43% or 79 of ICAO Member 
States were lacking basic safety oversight capabilities to certify their aviation ser-
vice providers.16 
Figure II: USOAP Effective Implementation Level by United Nations Region 
Source of data: ICAO, Regional Performance Dashboards (2014)17 
The wide spread between the ICAO regions in respect to actual safety lev-
els measured by accident rates and fatalities, as well as levels of effectiv n ss of 
States’ oversight systems measured by USOAP, is a concern because aviation 
safety is significantly influenced by the inherently international nature of this sec-
tor - the main consequence of this being that civil aviation is only as safe as the 
weakest link in the system. International cooperation is thusessential to ensure 
network safety and implementation of coordinated policies and globally agreed 
standards as mandated by the Chicago Convention.18 
What can also be observed (see Figure III) is that two of the three Unit d 
Nations (UN) regions which between 2005 and 2012 experienced the hig est rate 
of traffic growth (Latin America and the Caribbean: 17%; Africa: 20%; Asia: 
38%), also demonstrate the lowest level of effective implementatio of the 
USOAP protocols (Latin America and the Caribbean: 68%; Africa: 44%; Asia: 
                                                                                                                            
15 ICAO, 'Regional Performance Dashboards'  <http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/Regional-
Targets.aspx> [accessed 4 August 2014]. 
16 Ibid. 
17 ICAO, 'Regional Performance Dashboards'  <http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/Regional-
Targets.aspx> [accessed 4 August 2014]. This data is the copyrighted property of the ICAO and is 
reproduced here with its expressed knowledge and permission. It may not be cited by or repro-
duced in any other publication without subsequent approval being granted by ICAO. 
18 'Chicago Convention', Article 37. 
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71%). In these regions implementation efforts should be increased to ensure that 
this capacity expansion can be safely accommodated in the years to come.19 
Figure III: Departures in scheduled commercial air transport per UN region 
Source of data: ICAO, State of Global Aviation Safety (2013)20 
 
The monitoring of the level of effective implementation of the eight CEs 
of State safety oversight is important because it was demonstrated by ICAO that a 
correlation exists between accident rates and USOAP results at individual State 
level.21 As Table I demonstrates, this correlation is the strongest for those CEs 
which are directly related to the capacity of a State to ensure effective inial ap-
proval and continuing oversight of its operators, aircraft and aviation personnel 
and to resolve the identified safety deficiencies. 
                                                 
19 Each of the ICAO regions covers a large number of States, with the resulting aggregation of 
USOAP results at a relatively high level. As Figure II demonstrates there are large variations with-
in each of the regions as regards the effectiveness of State safety oversight. Within each region 
there will therefore be States with very good safety records, as well as poor performers. For exam-
ple the African region, which has today the lowest level of effectiv  implementation of the eight 
ICAO CEs, aggregates information regarding both Democratic Republic of Congo which, based 
on the latest ICAO data, has a level of effective implementation of eight CEs significantly below 
the world average, and Kenya which, also based on the latest ICAO data, has a level of effective 
implementation above average for most of the domains. Similarly, the European ICAO region will 
cover the European Union Member States, as well as some of the former USSR republics; see: 
ICAO, 'Safety Audit Information'  <http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/USOAP-Results.aspx> 
[accessed 14 March 2014]. 
20 This data is the copyrighted property of ICAO and is reproduced here with its expressed 
knowledge and permission. It may not be cited by or reproduced in any other publication without 
subsequent approval being granted by ICAO. 
21 Nancy Graham, 'Briefing on the State of global aviation safety', ICAO High Level Safety 
Conference (Montréal, Canada, 2010),  









































Table I: Critical Elements of State Safety Oversight System and their correlation with acci-
dent rates 
Critical Element Correlation with accident rates 
CE-6: Licensing, certification, authorization 
and/or approval obligations 
Very strong 
CE-7: Surveillance obligations Very strong 
CE-3: State civil aviation system and safety 
oversight functions 
Strong 
CE-4: Technical personnel qualifications and 
training 
Strong 
CE-8: Resolution of safety concerns Strong 
CE-1: Primary aviation legislation Medium 
CE-2: Specific operating regulations Medium 
CE-5: Technical guidance, tools and provi-
sion of safety critical information Medium 
Source: ICAO, Report on the USOAP Comprehensive System Approach, Analysis of  
Audit Results, Reporting Period April 2005 to December 2008, Second Edition22 
 
The correlation identified by ICAO means that improving the level of im-
plementation of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), especially in 
States or regions which are expected to experience significant traffic growth in the 
years to come, should effectively contribute to further reduction of global accident 
rates, or at least to maintaining the absolute number of accidents at the current 
levels, while taking into account the ongoing traffic increases. 
In line with the ICAO findings, a study conducted by the Inter ational Air 
Transport Association on accidents which occurred between 1 January 2001 and 
31 December 2008 and involving commercial air transport operators located in 
sub-Saharan African States, showed that ‘deficient regulatory oversight by t e 
States of the operators’ was one of the top contributing factors in the accidents 
analysed.23 
Last but not least, in addition to challenges related to continuous im-
provement of safety performance, States as regulators of civil aviation face an 
ongoing challenge of optimising their working methods. In financially challenging 
times, the regulators have to accept as the ‘new normal’ that budgets for safety 
oversight are not necessarily going to increase and that to safelyaccommodate the 
traffic growth, new methods of oversight, closer international cooperation and 
exchange of information across national borders is no longer nice to have, but has 
become an essential element of doing business.24 The need for close international 
                                                 
22 This data is the copyrighted property of ICAO and is reproduced here with its expressed 
knowledge and permission. It may not be cited by or reproduced in any other publication without 
subsequent approval being granted by ICAO. 
23 Gaoussou Konate, 'Air Safety Situation in Africa, Current Problems: need for innovation', 
Symposium on Regional Aviation Safety Agencies (Livingstone, Zambia, 2009),  
<http://easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/events/symposium-regional-avation-safety-agencies-
rasa> [accessed 21 July 2014]. 




cooperation and exchange of information in order to foster aviation safety has 
most recently been brought to the forefront of the public debate in the aftermath of 
the tragic downing of the Malaysian Flight MH17 in July 2014 and the ensuing 
discussions about assessing risks affecting aircraft operations over conflict zones. 
1.3 THE ICAO GLOBAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN 
The latest edition of the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP), adopted at 
the 38th ICAO Assembly, ‘sets out a continuous improvement strategy for States 
to implement over the next 15 years through the establishment of core, and then 
more advanced, aviation safety systems.’25  
The GASP framework is organised around three high level objectives and 
associated timeframes: 
(1) Near-Term (by 2017): Implementation of an effective safety oversight sys-
tem; 
(2) Mid-Term (by 2022): Full implementation of the ICAO State safety pro-
gramme framework; 
(3) Long-Term (by 2027): Advanced safety oversight system including predic-
tive risk management. 
The logic of the GASP objectives is strongly anchored in the correlation 
that was mentioned in Section 1.2 above between the effectiveness and ophistica-
tion of States’ safety oversight systems and the actual levels of safety. The GASP 
objectives envisage that over the next fifteen years, States will gradually be mov-
ing towards more advanced methods of safety oversight and that this evolution 
should bring further reductions in the number of accidents and associted fatali-
ties. 
The GASP objectives are supported by a number of safety performance 
enablers, which include: more uniform implementation of ICAO SARPs; closer 
collaboration between States, industry and regional initiatives such as Regional 
Aviation Safety Oversight Organisations; continuing investmen by States in 
maintaining, upgrading and replacing aviation infrastructure and investment in 
technical and human resources; and finally exchange of safety information.26 
The implementation challenges faced by States under the GASP will not 
necessarily be smaller than those of implementing the more traditional approaches 
pursued by ICAO so far. Implementation of the GASP targets will necessitate the 
use of sophisticated tools and expertise which is not yet available in all the States, 
as the USOAP results show. It is questionable whether all of the S ates will be 
able to deliver. As pointed out by the Director of ICAO Air Navigat on Bureau, 
during the 2010 High Level Safety Conference (2010 HLSC): 
 
States that have not yet implemented the eight critical elements of a afety oversight sys-
tem effectively must first resolve these deficiencies and develop a sund foundation upon 
which to build their State Safety Programmes. Only those States h ving mature safety 
                                                                                                                            
FAA_International_Aviation_Safety_Conference_2013#tabPresentations> [accessed 11 March 
2014]. 
25 'Global Aviation Safety Plan', supra note 5, at p. 3. 
26 Ibid. at p. 4. 
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oversight systems will be able to realize the benefits associated with safety management 
principles, and achieve further reductions in their accident rates.27 
 
Thus, a further question which needs to be asked is whether States which 
today face difficulties in establishing reasonably functioning safety oversight sys-
tems will be able to overcome these difficulties in the future, as the focus is 
switching more and more towards sophisticated safety management techniqu s.28 
If not, there is a danger that the gap between States with good and poor safety 
performance could widen even more. 
It is in this context that ICAO and the international aviation c mmunity are 
exploring not only new approaches to managing aviation safety, but also looking 
for more efficient and sustainable means of ensuring adequate administrative ca-
pacity of States which is required for overseeing and regulating avation activities. 
Regional cooperation, such as regional safety oversight programmes and RASOs, 
is one potentially promising approach, and is the subject matter of this legal study. 
1.4 TOWARDS REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CIVIL AVIATION 
SAFETY 
The global regulatory framework for civil aviation safety is set out in the Chicago 
Convention and Annexes thereto. Originally this framework was design d chiefly 
to ensure the development of uniform standards and procedures for international 
civil aviation, while the implementation of these requirements has been left to 
individual States.29 
With the establishment of the USOAP, which was launched in 1992,30 
ICAO and its Member States came to a realisation that not only d es the level of 
implementation of SARPs vary across the world, but that there are also States 
which lack the administrative capacity to administer these requirements in an ef-
fective manner. Over the last fifteen years, all but one of ICAO Assemblies31 ex-
pressed concern about the level of implementation of SARPs and safety oversight 
capabilities of some of the ICAO Member States.32 
USOAP results demonstrate that States whose level of effective impl men-
tation of ICAO requirements has been judged as not sufficient oftendo not have 
enough resources or expertise to overcome the safety concerns identified by the 
ICAO audits: 
                                                 
27 Graham, supra note 21.  
28 ICAO, 'Safety Management Manual ', Doc. 9859, (2013). 
29 Jiefang Huang, Aviation Safety through the Rule of Law: ICAO’s mechanism and practices, 
(2009), pp. 24-42. 
30ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A32-11: Establishment of an ICAO universal safety oversight audit 
programme', (32nd ICAO Assembly, 1998). 
31 With the exception of the 34th, extraordinary session of the ICAO Assembly, which dealt with
limited matters related to elections to the ICAO Council and financi g of aviation security. 
32 ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A33-9: Resolving Deficiencies andE couraging Quality 
Assurance', Assembly Resolution A33-9, (33rd ICAO Assembly, 2001). ICAO, 'Assembly 
Resolution A35-7: Unified strategy to resolve safety related deficiencies', (35th ICAO Assembly, 
2004). ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A36-5: International Financil Facility for Aviation Safety 
(IFFAS)', (36th ICAO Assembly, 2007). ICAO, 'Assembly Resoluti n A37-8: Regional 
cooperation and assistance to resolve safety-related deficiencies', (37th ICAO Assembly, 2010). 
ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A38-5: Regional cooperation and assistance to resolve safety 
deficiencies, establishing priorities and setting measurable targets', (38 h ICAO Assembly, 2013). 
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[T]he most common reason a State fails to establish an effective safety oversight capabil-
ity is its inability to provide the required financial and human resources. There is often an 
insufficient number of qualified personnel available for States to fulfil their safety over-
sight responsibilities. In addition, due to a lack of financial resources, training may not be 
adequate to ensure the currency and competency of technical personnel.33 
 
For some States this problem could be a vicious circle, as even though the 
primary and secondary aviation legislation have been promulgated on paper, the 
State still requires appropriate organisation, qualified personnel and the tools for 
effective implementation of the legislation. Similarly, surveillance obligations and 
resolution of identified safety concerns, two elements for which a strong correla-
tion exists with the actual accident rates (see Table I), will need adequ te technical 
and legal tools to ensure effective and efficient implementation. 
With national budgets under pressure, States may find it difficult to secure 
adequate funding for their national civil aviation administrations.34 Even when 
they are able to secure the funds, it is not uncommon that the newly recruited in-
spectors and specialists, once trained and qualified, leave the national dministra-
tions to take up better paid employment opportunities in the private sector.35 
In the African region in particular, the situation is made additionally com-
plicated by the fact that the still low levels of aviation traffic (see Figure III 
above) cannot generate the funds required to support effective national safety 
oversight systems.36 In some African States aviation was heavily subsidised in the 
past, but cannot continue to depend on subsidy any more due to other pressing 
needs in sectors such as health or education.37  
It has also been proved that: 
 
[P]oor safety oversight results in more expensive insurance premiums and the inability to 
develop code sharing and other business arrangements, and that it also scares away poten-
tially high-yield international customers and potential private sector investors.38 
 
The problems associated with effective implementation of ICAO safety re-
quirements can also lead to international tensions. This is because States with a 
good safety record, such as the United States (US), or Member States of th  Euro-
pean Union (EU) have developed programmes to protect their citizens from un-
safe operators, which in practice lead to operating bans or restrictions on operators 
or States which have been found, under these programmes, not to be compliant 
with the minimum ICAO requirements.39 
                                                 
33 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3, at Paragraph 2.1.3. 
34 Ibid., at Paragraph 1.1.2. 
35 ICAO, 'Report of ARRB – Report of the Audit Results Review Board (ARRB): Summary of 
Decisions', C-DEC 191/2, (191st session of the ICAO Council, 2010). 
36 Haile Belai, 'Air Transport Safety: Africa', Symposium on Regional Aviation Safety Agencies 
(Livingstone, Zambia, 2009),  <http://easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/events/symposium-
regional-aviation-safety-agencies-rasa> [accessed 10 August 2014]. 
37 Charles Schlumberger, Open Skies for Africa: Implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision, 
(2010), p. 165. 
38 Ibid. at p. 174. 
39 Aviassist, 'Insight into the EU Blacklist', Safety Focus: Quarterly Journal on African aviation 
safety, (2010), <http://www.aviassist.org/> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
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The above considerations have led ICAO and the international aviation 
community to look for new ways to assist States, especially those in regions with 
higher than average accident rates, in resolving the identified safety deficiencies. 
USOAP is obviously at the centre of this strategy, as a main diagosis tool. This 
strategy also involves technical assistance and safety promotion initiatives that 
ICAO coordinates through a Safety Collaborative Assistance Network which was 
established following the 2010 HLSC.40 
Most importantly however, ICAO has in recent years been carefully fol-
lowing the development of regional organisations dealing with civil aviation safe-
ty matters. The Secretary General of ICAO observed during the 2010 HLSC that 
these organisations are seen by ICAO as an ‘alternative solution’ to national based 
safety oversight, and one which can play a ‘strategic role’ in the new global safety 
approach.41 
The concept of regional cooperation in civil aviation is not new. The Inter-
national Civil Aviation Conference in 1944 discussed a number of p inciples with 
a view to making regional cooperation an integral part of the post-war aviation 
institutional and regulatory order.42 Organisations such as the European Civil Avi-
ation Conference (ECAC), African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) or Latin 
American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC) today constitute w ll established 
landmarks on the worldwide aviation horizon. The Chicago Convention makes 
reference to regional cooperation in its Articles 55, 77 and 78. 
Similarly, the regional civil aviation safety bodies have already established 
a certain tradition. The history of some of the organisations functioning today can 
be traced back to as early as the 1970s, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate.  
The current renaissance and renewed attention to these bodies can however 
be attributed to a number of new factors. First of all, the general trend towards 
regionalisation of governance, which has particularly accelerated in the second 
half of the twentieth century,43 secondly the increased visibility and success of 
some of these organisations such as the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
in the EU (see Chapter 4), thirdly the increasing pressure on the budg ts of many 
authorities which necessitate sharing and optimisation in the use of resources, and 
                                                 
40 ICAO, 'State of Global Aviation Safety', (2013), <www.icao.int> [accessed 6 March 2014], p.22. 
41 Raymond Benjamin, 'Closing remarks, Final Report of the Confere ce', ICAO High Level 
Safety Conference (Montreal, 2010),  
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/AMC/HLSC/Pages/default.aspx> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
42 ‘Canadian Revised Preliminary Draft of an International Air Convention’, proposing to establish 
Regional Councils of the International Air Authority, which were to be responsible for regional 
aviation matters and certification of international air operators established in States of a given 
region; see: 'Canadian Revised Preliminary Draft of an International Air Convention', Volume I, 
Part II – Work of the Committees, Committee I – Multilateral Aviation Convention and 
International Aeronautical Body, International Civil Aviation Conference (Chicago, USA, 1944),  
<http://www.icao.int/ChicagoConference/Pages/vI_pII_ctteeI.djvu> [accessed 17 July 2014]. 
43 For a general overview of the relationship between the universal and regional international or-
ganisations and the role of regionalism in global governance see: Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes, 'Les relations entre organisations régionales et organisations universelles', in: 
L'Académie de droit international de la Haye: Recueil des Cours, (2010), pp. 79-406. For an over-
view of regionalisation trends in civil aviation governance see: 'EC-ICAO Symposium on 
Regional Organisations',  (Montréal, Canada, 2008),  
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/international_aviation/european_community_icao/ec-
icao_symposium_en.htm> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
20 
 
finally the increased awareness of the international aviation community of the 
global safety picture as a result of the implementation of the USOAP. 
ICAO has been encouraging the development of regional aviation safety 
bodies for some time, but it has really been since 2010 that its pol cy on this sub-
ject gained additional momentum with the adoption of the new ICAO ‘Policy on 
Regional Cooperation’. This new policy aims at integrating the ‘regional dimen-
sion’ more closely with the overall ICAO strategic objectives, in particular in the 
area of aviation safety.44  
The current ICAO position with regard to regional aviation safety coopera-
tion was reconfirmed by the 2013 Assembly, which recognised that: 
 
[E]stablishment of subregional and regional aviation safety and safety ov rsight bodies, 
including regional safety oversight organizations (RSOOs), has great potential to assist 
States in complying with their obligations under the Chicago Convention through econo-
mies of scale and harmonization on a larger scale resulting from the collaboration among 
Member States in establishing and operating a common safety oversight system.45 
 
By mid-2014 a number of more or less successful examples of regional 
cooperation in civil aviation safety matters existed in many regions of the world. 
As will be demonstrated in this study, these regional initiatives take many differ-
ent legal forms and have different scopes of activity and objectives. They also 
attract increasing attention, as expectations concerning their added value have 
been raised by ICAO and the international community.  
At the same time the legal conditions under which such regional schemes 
or bodies are able to provide optimal benefits for States and regions concerned, 
and thus to lead to the actual enhancement of aviation safety, have not yet been 
subject to comprehensive research. 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND MAIN SOURCES USED 
The methodology used in this study is in the first place based on analysing case 
studies of existing RASOs. In this respect a ore sample of fourteen organisations 
was selected, the list of which is attached as Appendix. Where a RASO function-
ing today had a predecessor or an institutional forerunner, this has also been stud-
ied to the extent necessary. For this purpose the founding documents of all RASOs 
from the core sample were obtained and studied, as well as other available docu-
ments relevant to the organisations in the sample. 
References to other RASOs, that are not included in the core sample, or 
their institutional forerunners, are also made in the study when needed to extrapo-
late the findings or illustrate a certain observation. 
A more detailed case study has been performed on the EASA and the EU 
aviation safety system in general, as it can be considered at present as the most 
comprehensive regional civil aviation safety system in operation. In this respect 
the archives of the EU Council in Brussels have been consulted. A selection of 
materials has also been obtained from the archives of ECAC in Paris for the pur-
pose of the analysis of EASA’s predecessor - the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA). 
                                                 
44 ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A37-21: Cooperation with regional organizations and regional 
civil aviation bodies', (37th ICAO Assembly, 2010). 
45 Assembly Resolution A38-5, supra note 32. 
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Primary material to supplement the case studies was also derived from the 
2010 HLSC which took place in Montréal, 29 March - 1 April 2010, and in which 
the author participated, and the following symposia and conferences o  regional 
aviation cooperation: 
 
(1) Symposium on Regional Organisations organised jointly by ICAO and the 
European Commission, Montréal, 10-11 April 2008; 
(2) Symposium on Regional Aviation Safety Agencies organised by EASA, 
AFCAC and the Civil Aviation Authority of Zambia, Livingstone, 13-15 
July 2009 (author participated); 
(3) ICAO Symposium on Regional Safety Oversight Organisations (RSOOs), 
Montréal, 26-28 October 2011 (author participated); 
(4) ACAC/ICAO Seminar/Workshop on Regional Safety Oversight Pro-
grammes, Rabat/Morocco, 10-12 December 2012. 
 
In addition ICAO documentation related to regional cooperation and RA-
SOs, including the relevant ICAO Assembly and ICAO Council documentation, 
has been analysed, as well as the new ICAO manuals on the ‘Establishment and 
Management of a Regional Safety Oversight System’,46 and ‘Regional Accident 
and Incident Investigation Organization’.47 Reports on the implementation of the 
USOAP programme and other ICAO as well as EASA safety reports have been 
used to support the study with up to date and reliable aviation safety data and sta-
tistics. 
A number of interviews were conducted with people involved in the estab-
lishment and running of RASOs in Europe and other parts of the world. The list of 
interviews conducted is included in the bibliography of the study. All the inter-
viewees contributed in their private capacity.  
A review of relevant international, EU and national case law and legisla-
tion was conducted to support the discussion on international responsibility and 
civil liability of States and RASOs for safety regulation and neglig nt safety over-
sight. 
A review of the literature was conducted focusing mainly on previous writ-
ings concerning legal and institutional aspects of civil aviation safety regulation, 
Chicago Convention and ICAO. The main aviation law journals, including Air and 
Space Law Journal (ASL), Annals of Air and Space Law (AASL), Journal of Air 
Law and Commerce (JALC), and ICAO Journal, were reviewed.  
In addition, university theses on aviation safety regulation were consulted 
in the libraries of the Law Schools of Leiden University in the Netherlands, and of 
McGill University in Montreal, Canada. A summary of the main literature con-
cerning the subject of international law and aviation safety is presented in Section 
1.6 below. 
A review of the main contemporary writings was undertaken concerning 
the theory of international organisations, State and international org nisations’ 
responsibility, delegation of powers under international law, and enforcement of 
international law, mainly for the purpose of Chapter 6. 
                                                 
46 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3. 
47 ICAO Doc. 9946, supra note 3. 
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Available reports on the effectiveness of the functioning of EU agencies 
have been also consulted for the purpose of the case study of EASA and the EU 
system. 
Last but not least, the author draws on personal experience of over ele n 
years of work as a civil servant in both national and regional civil aviation safety 
administrations in Europe, including in the Civil Aviation Administration of Po-
land, the Air Safety Unit of the Directorate General for Mobility andTransport of 
the European Commission, and in the International Cooperation Department of 
EASA. 
The research was finalised in mid-2014, and unless indicated otherwise, 
the study reflects the situation which existed at that time 
1.6 REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL LITERATURE ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AVIATION SAFETY 
REGULATION 
In the existing literature, the regulation of international civil aviation safety is 
usually addressed as part of the broader discussion of the general ICAO frame-
work. These studies focus on the presentation of the ICAO regulatory functions, 
especially the development of the SARPs, and the oversight of their implementa-
tion through the USOAP.48 
As part of the discussion on the effectiveness of ICAO in ensuring ‘the 
highest practicable degree of implementation of SARPs’, there are also studies 
dedicated to the subject of transparency mechanisms, which are used by ICAO as 
a quasi-enforcement tool, and which together with technical cooperation and as-
sistance have contributed to the improvement of civil aviation safety.49 
One of the most comprehensive works to date addressing the international 
legal framework for civil aviation safety is the dissertation of Dr. Jiefang Huang, 
focusing on the notion of aviation safety as an obligation erga omnes under inter-
national law, and which also advocates closer regional collaboration between 
States, in order to counterbalance the dominance of the main powers in the ICAO 
decision making machinery.50 
In the European context the question of the regulation of Air Traffic Man-
agement (ATM) and more generally the implementation of the Single European 
Sky (SES) has also been addressed in recent studies.51  
In addition, from the perspective of this study, of particular importance is 
the work undertaken by Dr. Niels van Antwerpen related to the delegation of tasks 
and responsibilities in the area of Air Navigation Services (ANS), and the need for 
safeguarding transparent lines of State responsibility in case of delegation.52 
As far as the specific issue of RASOs is concerned, some work has been 
undertaken on describing the process of establishing EASA in the EU and the re-
                                                 
48 Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO, (2012); Ludwig Weber, International Civil 
Aviation Organization: An Introduction, (2007). 
49 Jimena Blumenkron, Transparency and the International Civil Aviation Organisation: 
Implications of increased transparency in safety audit information, (2011). 
50 Huang, supra note 29. 
51 Daniel Calleja Crespo and Pablo Mendes de Leon, 'Achieving the Single European Sky: Goals 
and challenges', (2011). 
52 Niels van Antwerpen, Cross-Border Provision of Air Navigation Services with Specific 
Reference to Europe: Safeguarding Transparent Lines of Responsibility and Liability, (2008). 
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lationship between this agency and its predecessor - the JAA.53  very limited 
number of articles have been published on the RASO concept and their relation-
ship with ICAO.54 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
This study is composed of seven chapters, including this Chapter 1 with introduc-
tory remarks, five chapters describing the research findings and their analysis, as 
well as the final Chapter 7 with general conclusions and recommendations. 
Chapter 2, which follows, summarises the main principles of the Chicago 
Convention and assesses their impact on safety regulation at national level. It 
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the ICAO regime and offers explana-
tions on how they influence the effectiveness of the global aviation safety system. 
Chapter 2 then presents the regional aviation policy of ICAO, including on avia-
tion safety. It argues that regional cooperation should not only be seen as a tool for 
helping States to raise their level of compliance with SARPs and increase the ef-
fectiveness of their safety oversight systems, but also as a way to change the ar-
chitecture of the current - predominantly national based and largely inefficient – 
system, into a more efficient Global Aviation Safety Oversight Network 
(GASON). 
Chapter 3 is based on case studies of RASOs and pre-RASOs from differ-
ent parts of the world, including Africa, South America, the Pacific Region, and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States. It introduces the notion of a RASO and 
pre-RASO, presents different types of such organisations and categorises them on 
the basis of the specific features of their legal and organisational set-ups. Chapter 
3 also proposes a RASO definition, taking into account the elements which would 
stimulate the introduction of the most efficient forms of such organisations. 
Chapter 4 is a detailed case study of EASA providing a specific example 
of a RASO which is part of and relies for its functioning on a Regional Economic 
Integration Organisation (REIO). This chapter demonstrates how EASA, which is 
currently the RASO of reference for many other similar organisations, contributes 
to the improvement of aviation safety and efficiency of regulatory processes, no-
tably by taking advantage of the EU’s legally binding and directly applicable legal 
framework. It demonstrates, from the Chicago Convention point of view, the con-
sequences of the far reaching delegation of safety functions from EU Member 
States to EASA, and considers the feasibility of transforming this agency into a 
single civil aviation authority for Europe. 
Chapter 5 offers more general observations and conclusions on the extent
to which the various functions of RASOs and the continuing evolution of these 
organisations contribute to the improvement of global aviation safety and 
achievement of the objectives of uniformity in regulations, procedures and opera-
tions in civil aviation. This chapter in particular offers a classification of the dif-
                                                 
53 Frank Manuhutu, 'Aviation Safety Regulation in Europe: Towards  European Aviation Safety 
Authority', ASL, 25 (2000). Thaddée Sulocki and Axelle Cartier, 'Continuing Airworthiness in the 
framework of the transition from the Joint Aviation Authorities to the European Aviation Safety 
Agency', ASL, 28 (2003). 
54 Michael Jennison, 'Regional safety oversight bodies deliver economies of scale and greater 
uniformity', ICAO Journal, 61 (2006). Ruwantissa Abeyratne, 'Ensuring regional safety in air 
transport', ASL, 35 (2010). Mikołaj  Ratajczyk, 'Regional Safety Oversight Organisations: an 
overview', The Aviation and Space Journal, X (2011). 
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ferent levels of delegation arrangements that States use when creating RASOs. It 
also presents the different types of safety functions that RASOs may exercise, and 
analyses key trends that can be observed around the world regarding the setting up 
and functioning of these organisations. It also addresses the functioni g of RASOs 
as international actors. 
Chapter 6 examines the consequences that the establishment of RASOs 
may have in terms of international responsibility and civil liabity for wrongful 
acts in relation to the Member States of the RASO, and third countries, as well as 
the regional body itself. It clarifies and systematises the general principles and 
concepts concerning the attribution and delegation of State safety functions to 
aviation authorities from the perspective of domestic and international law. Chap-
ter 6 also examines whether there are any provisions in the Chicago Convention 
or its Annexes which could limit the possibility of delegating State safety func-
tions to RASOs, or more generally to exercising these functions on a non-national 
basis. On this basis it considers the conditions which would have to be met in or-
der to trigger international responsibility of the RASO or its Member States. 
Chapter 6 also conducts a review of case law and principles related to ort law 
liability of civil aviation authorities and extrapolates the findings of this review to 
RASOs functioning. Finally, it assesses the need for amending the Chicago Con-
vention in view of the emergence of RASOs. 
Chapter 7 formulates general conclusions of the study, makes recommen-




Towards a Global Aviation Safety Oversight 
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‘Greater regional cooperation can improve the efficiency  
of air transport operations and simultaneously generate economic  
growth for States and Regions alike.’1 
 
Roberto Kobeh González,  






Regional cooperation on aviation safety has visibly intensified since the beginning 
of the twentieth first century, as evidenced in particular by the new ICAO policy 
on regional cooperation, which is presented in Section 2.4 of this Chapter, and the 
establishment of a significant number of new RASOs.2 
This intensification of regional cooperation has been to a large ext nt 
stimulated by the conviction of the international aviation community that, by fo-
cusing efforts at regional levels, States will be better able to meet their obligations 
stemming from the Chicago Convention and to overcome certain of itsalleged 
weaknesses, such as lack of a legally binding nature of ICAO Annexes or weak 
enforcement competences of ICAO. For some regions, such as Africa, regional 
cooperation has emerged as an indispensable element of ICAO strategy for ad-
dressing aviation safety problems that they face.3 
Before presenting and analysing selected cases of regional cooperation on 
civil aviation safety in different parts of the world, it is therefo necessary to put 
regional cooperation in the broader context of the Chicago Convention and global 
jurisdiction of ICAO.  
                                                 
1 ICAO, 'Agreements on Regional Cooperation to Promote Efficiency and Sustainability of Air 
Transport', Press Release No. 09/10, (2010). 
2 See Chapters 3 and 5 for detailed statistics. 
3 ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A38-7: Comprehensive Regional Imple entation Plan for Aviation 
Safety in Africa', (38th ICAO Assembly, 2013). See also: ICAO, 'Comprehensive Regional 
Implementation Plan for Aviation Safety in Africa, 12th meeting of the steering committee: report', 
AFI SC/2013/12, (2013), <http://www.icao.int/safety/afiplan/Documents/AFI-SC12-
Report%202013.pdf> [accessed 15 March 2014], at Paragraph 2.1. 
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This chapter will firstly summarise the main principles of the Chicago 
Convention and its impact on safety regulation at national level. Th  strengths and 
weaknesses of the ICAO regime will be reviewed and explanations offered on 
how they influence the effectiveness of the global aviation safety system (Section 
2.2). This will include a demonstration of how States have traditionally dealt with 
inefficiencies stemming from the system of the Chicago Convention, including in 
particular through Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements (BASAs). 
Following on from that, the oversight and enforcement mechanisms ued 
by ICAO will be concisely compared with the mechanisms used in the interna-
tional maritime sector, in which States and the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO) faced similar problems with effective implementation ande forcement 
of maritime safety requirements and ultimately reached a conclusion that regional 
cooperation can be a good way of addressing some of these problems (Section 
2.3). 
This chapter will also present the regional aviation policy of ICAO. 
Against this backdrop it will be argued that regional cooperation should be seen 
not only as a tool for helping States in raising their level of compliance with 
ICAO SARPs and increasing the effectiveness of their safety oversight systems, 
but also as a way to change the architecture of the current – predominantly nation-
al based and arguably largely inefficient – system (Section 2.4). 
Finally, this chapter will propose the concept of a ‘Global Aviation Safety 
Oversight Network’ or GASON, and will demonstrate that by working more 
closely with and relying on robust and appropriately empowered RASOs, ICAO 
could not only help individual States to increase their compliance with interna-
tional requirements, but also to ensure more uniformity in their implementation 
and to better harmonise actual safety levels in regions across the world (Section 
2.5). 
2.2 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CHICAGO 
CONVENTION FROM AN AVIATION SAFETY PERSPECTIVE 
The Chicago Convention is a very successful treaty if looked at from the perspec-
tive of its global acceptance. In 2014, 191 States were parties to hi instrument.4 
Yet views on the effectiveness of the Chicago Convention in addressing 
contemporary problems of international civil aviation are divided. Leaving aside 
the economic aspects of aviation regulation, which are not the subjct matter of 
this study, the arguments used by practitioners and academic writers usually point 
out that while ICAO has been quite successful in developing SARPs concerning 
civil aviation safety and security, it has somewhat failed in ensurig global uni-
formity in their implementation and especially enforcement.5 
It is further pointed out in the literature that the alleged deficiencies of 
ICAO and the Chicago Convention in ensuring effective implementatio  of inter-
national requirements, particularly in the domain of aviation safety, led to the de-
velopment of unilateral oversight and enforcement schemes6 such as the US Inter-
                                                 
4 ICAO, 'Member States'  <http://www.icao.int/about-icao/Pages/member-States.aspx> [accessed 5 
August 2014]. 
5 Olivier Onidi, 'A critical perspective on ICAO', ASL, 33 (2008), pp. 38-45. Gilbert Guillaume, 
'ICAO at the beginning of the 21st century ', ASL, 33 (2008), pp. 313–317. 
6 Milde, supra note 48 in Ch.1, at pp. 177-178. 
27 
 
national Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) programme,7 or the EU’s regulation 
on the list of air carriers subject to an operating ban.8 
While not wanting to repeat the discussion on the above issues, the alleged 
weaknesses of the system of the Chicago Convention do appear paradoxically to 
have also contributed to its success in terms of global acceptance and endurance. 
This is because the authors of the Chicago Convention have managed to strike a 
relatively good balance between, on the one hand, the desire to secure ‘the highest 
practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organi-
zation in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services’,9 which is 
necessary for aviation as a global industry, and on the other hand, t e principle 
that ‘each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above 
its territory’,10 which at the time of the adoption of the Chicago Convention was 
of fundamental importance to States in the aftermath of the second world war. 
The predecessor of the Chicago Convention, the 1919 Convention Relating 
to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (hereinafter the ‘Paris Convention’),11 was 
much more ambitious, if looked at from the objective of achieving harmonisation 
of aviation standards, yet it failed to achieve universal acceptance.12 The novel 
elements of the Paris Convention, such as the legally binding nature of its tech-
nical annexes,13 qualified majority voting used for their adoption,14 and inequality 
of States in the International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN) in terms of 
their voting power,15 combined with the post first world war politics, led to a situ-
ation where a number of important States, including the Soviet Union and the US, 
declined to become parties to it, while other States started to expl r  alternative 
                                                 
7 For an overview of IASA see: Anthony J. Broderick and James Loo , 'Government Aviation 
Safety Oversight: trust but verify ', JALC, 67 (2002), pp. 1039-1044, 1053-1055. Paul S. Dempsey, 
'Compliance and enforcement in international law: achieving global uniformity in aviation safety', 
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, 30 (2004), pp. 27-33. 
FAA, 'IASA website'  <www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/iasa/> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
8 EU, 'Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
December 2005 on the establishment of a Community list of air carrers subject to an operating 
ban within the Community and on informing air transport passengers of the identity of the 
operating air carrier, and repealing Article 9 of Directive 2004/36/EC', (OJ L 344, 27.12.2005). 
EC, 'List of airlines banned within the EU'  <http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/safety/air-
ban/index_en.htm> [accessed 5 August 2014]. See also: Alan D.  Reitzfeld and Cheryl S. Mpande, 
'EU Regulation on Banning of Airlines for Safety Concerns', ASL, 33 (2008), pp. 132-154. Paul S. 
Dempsey, 'Blacklisting: Banning the unfit from the heavens', AASL, XXXII (2007), pp. 29-63. 
9 'Chicago Convention', Article 37. 
10 Ibid. Article 1. 
11 'Convention Relating to International Air Navigation Agreed to by the Allied and Associated 
Parties', Paris, 13 October 1919, LNTS (1922) No. 297. 
12 Duane W. Freer, 'Regionalism is asserted: ICAN’s global prospect  fade (1926 to 1943)', ICAO 
Bulletin, Special Series 4 (1986), pp. 66-68. 
13 'Paris Convention', Article 39: ‘The provisions of the present Convention are completed by the 
Annexes A to H, which, subject to Article 34 (c), shall have the same effect and shall come into 
force at the same time as the Convention itself.’ 
14 Ibid. Article 34: ‘Any modification of the provisions of any one of the Annexes may be made by 
the International Commission for Air Navigation when such modification shall have been ap-
proved by three-fourths of the total possible votes which could be cast if all the States were repre-
sented and shall become effective from the time when it shall have been notified by the Interna-
tional Commission for Air Navigation to all the contracting States.’ 
15 Ibid. Article 35. 
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courses.16 This in practice put a halt, until 1944, to all serious attempts to develop 
a global legal regime for civil aviation. 
The subsequent parts of this section will therefore critically analyse select-
ed elements of the system of the Chicago Convention in order to verify if, at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, it is still fit for purpose, as far as aviation 
safety is concerned. The elements selected for this analysis include: 
(1) The principle of State sovereignty under the Chicago Convention (Section 
2.2.1); 
(2) Implementation of SARPs and notification of differences (Section 2.2.2); 
(3) Recognition of certificates and licences, including of those not e visaged 
under the Chicago Convention (Section 2.2.3); 
(4) Role of ICAO in global safety oversight (Section 2.2.4);  
(5) ICAO enforcement efforts and competences (Section 2.2.5). 
 
2.2.1 THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE 
CHICAGO CONVENTION 
The Chicago Convention is based on the principle of complete and xclusive sov-
ereignty of a State over the airspace above its territory,17 and where this territory is 
defined as ‘land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sover ignty, 
suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.’18 
Although the meaning and scope of the concept of State sovereignty is 
highly contested in modern studies of international law,19 for the purpose of this 
study a simple meaning of this notion, as proposed by Steinberger, has been 
adopted: 
 
Sovereignty in the sense of contemporary international law denotes the basic international 
legal status of a State that is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to the govern-
mental, executive, legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign State or to foreign law 
other than public international law.20 
 
From a general perspective it is important to distinguish between State 
sovereignty as a principle of international law, and the exercise of this sovereign-
ty. This distinction has been present in legal discourse from the beginning of con-
stitutional theory. For example, Hobbes in De Cive observes: 
 
We must then distinguish between the Right, and the exercise of upreme authority, for 
they can be divided; as for example, when he who hath the Right, either cannot, or will 
not be present in judging trespasses, or deliberating of affaires: For Kings sometimes by 
reason of their age cannot order their affaires, sometimes also though they can doe it 
                                                 
16 Such as the development of the competing Ibero-American Aviation Convention and the Pan-
American Convention on Commercial Aviation; see: Freer, 'Regionalism is asserted: ICAN’s 
global prospects fade (1926 to 1943)', supra note 12, at p. 67. 
17 'Chicago Convention', Article 1. 
18 Ibid. Article 2. 
19 Dan Sarooshi, International organizations and their exercise of sovereign powers, (2005), pp. 3-
14. 
20 Helmut Steinberger, 'Sovereignty', in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. by Rudolf 
Bernhardt (2000), p. 501. 
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themselves, yet they judge it fitter, being satisfied in the c oyce of their Officers and 
Counsellors, to exercise their power by them.21 
 
The practical significance of the above distinction is that, althoug  it is 
generally recognised that, from the perspective of international law, State sover-
eignty as such cannot be transferred, the exercise of sovereign powers by States 
can be subject to limitations, conditions or delegations.22 As observed by Wassen-
bergh, State sovereignty as the principle of customary international law recalled 
by Article 1 of the Chicago Convention ‘applies only in so far as it is not express-
ly restricted by other provisions of the Convention or by engagements entered into 
elsewhere.’23 
From the perspective of this study, the above means that although under 
the Chicago Convention a State has the overall responsibility for regulating civil 
aviation safety, the actual exercise of this responsibility, in whole or in part, can be 
delegated to other entities, including to RASOs, as will be demonstrated in Chap-
ters 3-6. 
2.2.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF SARPS AND NOTIFICATION OF 
DIFFERENCES 
One of the key objectives of the Chicago Convention is to secure ‘the highest 
practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organi-
zation in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all mat-
ters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigat on.’24 Such 
uniformity is essential given the global nature of international avition. 
The provisions of the Chicago Convention have a mandatory character, 
which, as demonstrated by Milde, stems from its very text, as well as State prac-
tice.25 This ensures uniformity in relation to basic aviation safety requiments 
contained in the Convention such as an obligation to issue or validate airworthi-
ness certificates and pilot licences,26 or to investigate aviation accidents.27 
On the other hand, States have been given flexibility, under Article 38 of 
the Chicago Convention, to file differences with Standards adopted by the ICAO 
Council and designated for convenience as Annexes to the Convention.28 Whilst it 
could be argued that this flexibility opened the gates to the erosion of the system 
in terms of its uniform implementation, it also undoubtedly contributed, as the 
example of the earlier Paris Convention shows, to worldwide acceptance of th
Chicago Convention, and success of ICAO in developing a comprehensive set of 
SARPs contained all together in nineteen Annexes.  
The reality is that ICAO is not a supranational organisation like the EU, 
empowered to adopt by qualified majority legally binding and directly applicable 
                                                 
21 Thomas Hobbes, 'De Cive', (1651). 
22 Sarooshi, supra note 19, at p. 18. 
23 Henri A. Wassenbergh, Post-War International Civil Aviation Policy and the Law of the Air, 
(1962), p. 100. 
24 'Chicago Convention', Article 37. 
25 Milde, supra note 48 in Ch.1, at p. 18. 
26 'Chicago Convention', Articles 31-32. 
27 Ibid. Article 26. 
28 For a detailed overview of Article 38 of the Chicago Convention see: Huang, supra note 29 in 
Ch.1, at pp. 58-65. 
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legislation for its Member States and it is not likely that it will ever be given such 
supranational competences. It is an intergovernmental organisation lrgely subor-
dinate to the will of its Member States. With only 19% of the contracting States to 
the Chicago Convention represented at the ICAO Council and 10% of them repre-
sented at the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) which prepares th proposals for 
SARPs,29 the right to file a difference, is intended to safeguard the interests of 
those States which may not wish, for whatever reasons, the minority to impose its 
views on them. 
In addition to the right of filing differences under Article 38, there is also a 
provision for any Annex to the Chicago Convention or amendment th reto to be 
rejected by a majority of ICAO Member States during the adoption pr cess.30 Yet 
in practice, at least by the end of 2013, there has not been a single case of the ma-
jority of States blocking adoption of new SARPs in the ICAO Council.31 This 
proves that the process of adopting ICAO SARPs is overall well balanced and that 
its preparatory steps ensure that major controversies are eliminated before a pr -
posal reaches the level of the ICAO Council. 
As far as the legal status of SARPs is concerned, one important aspect has 
to be underlined. Upon their entry into force, Standards32 are binding upon ICAO 
Member States, unless a difference has been filed. ICAO underlines ths principle 
it its ‘State Letters’ which announce adoption of new SARPs by repeatedly stating 
that ‘international Standards in Annexes have a conditional binding force, to the 
extent that the State or States concerned have not notified any difference th reto 
under Article 38 of the Convention.’33 
Following on from the above, if a notification under Article 38 has not 
been made, other ICAO Member States are entitled to presume that full comp i-
ance with a Standard has been achieved. As pointed out by Van Antwerpen, ‘fail-
ure by the State to comply with the notification obligation should be considered as 
a breach of treaty obligations.’34 Therefore, if as a result of non-notification, a 
safety incident occurs this could arguably lead to State responsibility under inter-
national law, although this study did not identify any case l w in this respect.35 
Another important aspect related to notification of differences is the fact 
that although by filing a difference a State releases itself from the obligation of 
compliance with an ICAO Standard, this does not mean that other States are 
obliged to respect that non-compliance. For example, if a State has filed differ-
ences related to airworthiness standards of aircraft on its register, then other ICAO 
Member States would have a right to consider such aircraft as not complying with 
minimum requirements set for the purpose of recognition of airworthiness certifi-
cates under Article 33 of the Chicago Convention. 
                                                 
29 Ibid. p. 58. 
30 'Chicago Convention', Article 90. 
31 Based on a review of voting results in the ICAO Council (2009- 2013). For an overview of the 
situation prior to 2009 see: Huang, supra note 29 in Ch.1, at p. 55. 
32 Only ‘Standards’ have a mandatory character, unless a difference is filed under Article 38 of the 
Chicago Convention. For a definition of ‘Standards’ and ‘Recommended Practices’ see ‘Forward’ 
to any of the ICAO Annexes. 
33 See for example: ICAO, 'State letter concerning the adoption of Amend ent 16 to Annex 6, Part 
III, Attachement D: Note on the notification of differences', AN 11/32.3.8-11/46, (2011). 
34 Van Antwerpen, supra note 52 in Ch.1, at p. 31. 
35 See Chapter 6 for further discussion about State responsibility for breaches of obligations stem-
ming from international law, including the Chicago Convention. 
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The practical consequence of the above could be a denial of over-flight or 
landing rights for the aircraft of the notifying State in accordance with the appli-
cable provisions of bilateral Air Services Agreements’ (ASA) clauses dealing with 
the issuance of operating authorisations and technical permissions.36 Such situa-
tions have for example occurred in the past in Europe following adoption by 
ICAO of SARPs concerning the maximum age of pilots, and where France, which 
was strictly adhering to the ICAO set limit of sixty years, on certain occasions did 
not allow British operators to fly in French airspace if one of the pilots was older 
than sixty years.37 This particular aspect of the SARPs’ status has led commenta-
tors to argue that in practice at least some of the ICAO Standards h ve a value of 
law or ‘law of gravity’ with which compliance is simply unavoidable in practice,38 
or that some of the Standards ‘are of such fundamental importance that the depar-
ture from them may not be tolerated.’39 
The main objective of notification of differences however is transparency, 
especially towards operational personnel, such as pilots, who need to be aware if 
national rules and practices in a given State differ in any respect from those pre-
scribed by ICAO. This function of SARPs can be illustrated by the following ex-
ample: if State ‘A’ does not follow the ICAO standards concerning markings of 
runways and taxiways of international airports, it should notify other States ac-
cordingly, as otherwise aircrews from other parts of the world may be confused 
when using airports located in State ‘A’. Because of that inherent safety link, 
ICAO, in addition to differences notified by States under Article 38, also gathers 
information on differences under the USOAP.40 
Looking at practical aspects related to application of Article 38 of the Chi-
cago Convention, the main deficiencies in this respect have so far been largely 
associated with the lack of mechanisms in the ICAO Member States for systemat-
ic identification of differences as new SARPs and national legislation re promul-
gated. By the end of 2013 over 70% of the ICAO Member States had not estab-
lished or implemented a mechanism for the identification and notification of dif-
ferences to ICAO.41 
In addition, ICAO methods used so far for the management of the differ-
ences have not been very efficient. Originally, the process of reporting differences 
was handled entirely by correspondence between States and ICAO. This was a 
‘laborious and time-consuming activity’ which required substantial resources from 
both ICAO and its Member States.42 In addition the dissemination of differences, 
                                                 
36See Article 3 of a Template Bilateral Air Services Agreement in: ICAO, 'Policy and Guidance 
Material on the Economic Regulation of International Air Transport', ICAO Doc. 9587, (2008). 
37 Former President of the ICAO Air Navigation Commission, 'Interview No 1', (2013). 
38 Milde, supra note 48 in Ch.1, at p. 164. 
39 Huang, supra note 29 in Ch.1, at p. 61. 
40 Under the individual Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) signed between ICAO and its Mem-
ber States for the conduct of the USOAP-CMA activities, States undertake to supply information 
on their compliance with SARPs in the form of the ‘Safety Oversight Compliance Checklists’. 
Copy of a generic MoU is attached as Appendix B to: ICAO Doc. 9735, supra note 13 in Ch.1. 
41 Official of the European Aviation Safety Agency, 'Interview No 4', (2014). This situation re-
mains largely unchanged since 2011, see: ICAO Secretariat, 'Known Issues and Difficulties', 1st 
Meeting of Filing of Differences Task Force (Montreal, Canada, 2011), slide 3. 
42 ICAO, 'Notification and publication of differences: Report to Council by the President of the Air 




which is an obligation of ICAO under Article 38, was fulfilled by appending them 
as Supplements to the latest edition of each Annex. This procedure created delays 
and could not always ensure that the situation described in a given Annex corre-
sponded to reality in the ICAO Member States.43 In 2013 ICAO admitted that this 
is still largely the case today.44 
Similar problems with identification of differences were revealed under the 
USOAP. In the course of audits conducted by ICAO between April 2005 and Au-
gust 2010, only 49% of the USOAP compliance checklists had been duly com-
pleted by the 165 States audited. The remaining 51% were either left blank or not 
appropriately completed, as Figure IV demonstrates. 
Figure IV: Differences identified through USOAP Compliance Checklists (April 2005 to Au-
gust 2010) 
Source of data: ICAO, 'USOAP-CSA: Reporting of audit results - April 2005 to August 
2010', (2010)45 
 
Even more importantly, the differences are largely invisible to operational 
personnel as the Aeronautical Information Publications (AIPs) of ICAO Member 
States do not include material relating to all Annexes and approximately 76% of 
States did not publish significant differences in their AIPs, as required under An-
nex 15.46 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 ICAO, 'Formulation and implementation of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) 
and Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) and notification of differences', A38-WP/48, 
(38th ICAO Assembly, 2013),  at Paragraph 2.8. 
45 This data is the copyrighted property of ICAO and is reproduced here with its expressed 
knowledge and permission. It may not be cited by or reproduced in any other publication without 
subsequent approval being granted by ICAO. 
46 'Known Issues and Difficulties', supra note 41. 
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Overall, ICAO admitted in 2013 that the ‘status of the notification and 
publication of differences is far from satisfactory.’47 
In order to remedy the above deficiencies, in 2011 ICAO embarked on a 
reform program. At its core lies a new system for Electronic Filing of Differences 
(EFOD).48 The objective of EFOD is to create a single process through which 
States could satisfy the obligation of filing differences under Article 38 of the 
Chicago Convention, as well as to provide information on the lev l of implemen-
tation of SARPs for the purpose of USOAP.49 ICAO expects all States to complete 
EFOD as an essential part of the new USOAP Continuous Monitoring Approach 
(CMA), which commenced in January 2013.50 
Although implementation of EFOD is a big step forward, States will still 
need to have internal processes and necessary technical expertise for the identifi-
cation of differences and to dedicate resources to this activity. In addition, ICAO 
Member States are not obliged to use EFOD as a means for formal notificati n of 
differences under Article 38 of the Chicago Convention. By the end of 2013, only 
38 ICAO Member States declared that they will be using EFOD for formal notifi-
cation of differences under Article 38 of the Chicago Convention.51 The effective-
ness of EFOD in remedying the current problems remains therefore to be assessed 
as experience with its use is gained. 
More importantly however, beyond new technical tools for the reporting 
and dissemination of information on differences, ICAO should provide States with 
a clearer policy, including guidelines, on the application of Article 38 in order to 
ensure that standardised information is available in EFOD. At the ime of writing 
this study ICAO has been in the course of reviewing its guidance mat rial on the 
notification of differences.52 
Some consideration also needs to be given as to the exact need for collect-
ing significant amount of information from 191 States about all their differences 
with SARPs, which today, in safety and environment related Annexes alone, 
amount to over ten thousand.53 Although under Article 38 of the Chicago Conven-
tion States are only required to notify the differences with Standards, in practice 
the ICAO Assembly has been urging States to also notify differenc s with Rec-
ommended Practices.54 Recommended Practices are also covered by the USOAP 
compliance checklists.55  
Finally ICAO requires States to notify a difference not only when a a-
tional standard is less demanding but also when it is more demanding or even 
                                                 
47ICAO, 'Progress Report on Comprehensive Study on Known Issues in Respect of the 
Notification and Publication of Differences', C-WP/13954, (198th session of the ICAO Council, 
2013),  Paragraph 3. 
48 ICAO, 'State Letter', Ref. AN 1/1 - 11/28, (2011). 
49 ICAO, 'Progress report on the implementation of the electronic filing of differences (EFOD) 
system ', C-WP/13803, (195th session of the ICAO Council, 2012). 
50 ICAO, 'Policy and Principles on the Use of the Electronic Filing of Differences (EFOD) 
System', C-WP/13803, (195th session of the ICAO Council, 2012),  Appendix C. 
51 Source: 'Interview No 4', (2014), supra note 41. 
52 A38-WP/48, supra note 44, at Paragraph 2.2. 
53 C-DEC 177/14, supra note 12 in Ch.1. 
54 ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A38-11: Formulation and implementation of Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs) and Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) and 
notification of differences', (38th ICAO Assembly, 2013),  Associated Practice n. 7. 
55 ICAO Doc. 9735, supra note 13 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 1.3. 
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when it is simply achieving the same objective by other means than required by 
ICAO.56 In practice therefore the scope of obligation to notify differences under 
Article 38 has been significantly extended by ICAO. 
Similar to regulations adopted at national level, the safety relevance of 
each SARP is not the same, and some of them establish administrat ve require-
ments only.57 It can be argued that focusing on differences with those SARPs 
which contain requirements most relevant from the safety perspective of interna-
tional air navigation would be more efficient and in line with a risk based ap-
proach to safety management.58 This would also be more manageable for States 
with limited resources. 
Whether narrowing the scope of the obligation to notify differences would 
be feasible de lege lata, is however not clear. The language of Article 38 does not 
seem to leave much space for such interpretations. It speaks about the need to 
comply ‘in all respects’, and to bring domestic regulations and practices ‘into full 
accord’ with ICAO requirements, and to notify a difference if such domestic regu-
lations and practices were to differ ‘in any particular respect’, from those set by 
ICAO. This broad formulation can be a source of various interpretations by ICAO 
Member States.59 
This straight jacket is made even more restrictive by the fact that ICAO is 
encouraging its Member States to use in their own national regulations, as far as 
practicable, the precise language of Standards that are of a regulatory character.60 
As ICAO is moving towards performance based standards – where only what is 
defined by the requirements, while the ow is left to States, assisted by appropri-
ate guidance material - this inflexible approach to Article 38 of the Chicago Con-
vention may prove difficult to be maintained in the future.61 
The ICAO Assembly recognised in its resolutions a need for a more fo-
cused approach to notification of differences and mandated the ICAO Council to 
encourage ‘the elimination of those differences that are important for the safety 
and regularity of international air navigation or are inconsistent withthe objec-
tives of the international Standards.’62 It is not certain whether such resolutions 
could be a way to narrow the scope of application of Article 38, in particular by 
constituting a ‘subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the iterpreta-
tion of the treaty or the application of its provisions’, as envisaged under Article 
                                                 
56 C-WP/12412, supra note 42, at Appendix A (as approved by ICAO Council by C-DEC 177/14). 
57 For example the layout of certificates, see: ICAO, 'Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention: 
Operation of Aircraft, Part I - International Commercial Air Transport with Aeroplanes', (2010),  
Appendix 6. 
58 ICAO Doc. 9859, supra note 28 in Ch.1. 
59 'Interview No 1', (2013), supra note 37. In this interview an example was given of Spain, France 
and United Kingdom, three EU Member States, which have assessed the same provision of ‘EU 
OPS’ – a regulation of the European Commission dealing with safety of air operations - which was 
different from an ICAO Standard contained in Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention, and each of 
them came to a different conclusion (i.e. that the EU requirement is more demanding, less de-
manding and finally different in character from the ICAO Standard). 
60ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A29-3: Global Rule Harmonization', (29th ICAO Assembly, 1992). 
Similar encouragement is included in all the Annexes to the Chicago Convention. 
61A38-WP/48, supra note 44, at Paragraph 2.6. 
62 Assembly Resolution A38-11, supra note 54, at Paragraph 13. 
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31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties63 – the practice of 
ICAO so far seems to indicate that this is not the case. 
In view of the above, beyond an amendment of the Chicago Convention 
with a view to updating Article 38, which is currently not on the table and unlikely 
in the foreseeable future, ICAO, when adopting Standards, could exp icitly indi-
cate which of them are of particular importance for the ‘safety and regularity of 
international air navigation’. Although this would not change th obligation to 
notify the differences, it would give more visibility to those requirements which 
are safety critical. 
The second issue on which additional work is needed, is clarity as to what 
exactly constitutes a difference and especially a ‘significant difference’ which 
States are obliged to publish in their AIPs under Paragraph 4.1.2 (c) of Annex 15 
to the Chicago Convention. ICAO has been trying to address this issue through 
provision of guidance material, which however is still quite generic and does not 
address the ‘significant difference’ issue. 64 
To summarise, and as pointed out by a former president of the ICAO 
ANC,65 Article 38 is at the same time both a strength and a weakness of the Chi-
cago Convention. Although this study does not question the need to have a mech-
anism for filing of differences, it nevertheless argues that States and ICAO need to 
change the way this provision is used in practice. 
Beyond the migration from paper-based notifications to EFOD, which in 
itself is a big step forward, ICAO should in the first place do less but better when 
it comes to implementation of Article 38. Today ICAO finds it difficult even to 
find the resources necessary to translate the differences received into all ICAO 
working languages.66 It would be unrealistic then to expect that ICAO will be able 
to dedicate the necessary time and resources to analyse the details of the language 
used and possible ways of implementation of over ten thousand SARPs in 191 
States. ICAO should, instead of expanding, be in practical terms narrowing the 
scope of the obligation to notify the differences and focusing especially on differ-
ences with those SARPs which are of particular relevance for the safety and regu-
larity of air navigation. 
ICAO should also, rather than expecting States to use the precise language 
of Standards that are of a regulatory character, be primarily focusing on whether 
the objective of a Standard is met while leaving to States flexibility as to the 
means to achieve compliance – this would be more in line with the shift towards 
performance based regulation. ICAO should also be providing more standardisa-
tion as to what constitutes a difference, and especially a significant one. Such 
standardisation should be promoted not only through provision of guidance mate-
rial to States but also at a practical level through the USOAP and provision of 
technical training to State specialists dealing with identification and notification of 
differences. 
Finally RASOs have great potential to help ICAO and States in achieving 
more harmonisation and efficiencies in the way Article 38 is applied in practice. 
This will be demonstrated in detail using the example of EASA in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                 
63 'Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties', Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 33. 
64 C-WP/12412, supra note 42, at Appendix A (as approved by ICAO Council by C-DEC 177/14). 
65 'Interview No 1', (2013), supra note 37. 
66 A38-WP/48, supra note 44, at Paragraph 2.10. 
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2.2.3 RECOGNITION OF CERTIFICATES AND LICENCES 
 
2.2.3.1 CERTIFICATES AND LICENCES ENVISAGED UNDER THE 
CHICAGO CONVENTION 
The drafters of the Chicago Convention were aiming at maximum possible facili-
tation of international air navigation from a technical point of view. This was sup-
posed, inter alia, to be achieved through Article 33 of the Convention which pro-
vides that:  
 
Certificates of airworthiness and certificates of competency and licenses issued or ren-
dered valid by the contracting State in which the aircraft is registered, shall be recognized 
as valid by the other contracting States, provided that the requirements under which such 
certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum 
standards which may be established from time to time pursuant to this Convention. 
 
The above provision is the only exception in the Chicago Convention from 
the principle that:  
 
[T]he laws and regulations of a Contracting State relating to the admission to or departure 
from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and 
navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of all 
Contracting States without distinction as to nationality, and shall be complied with by 
such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within the territory of that State.67  
 
Obviously as aircraft cross multiple jurisdictions in international opera-
tions, it would be impracticable to expect that with each crossing of the border 
aircraft and crew would have to comply with the different rules of the overflow or 
served countries.  
The multilateral recognition regime of Article 33 has two dimensions. 
Firstly it gives a right to the ‘State of Registry’ to demand recognition of its certif-
icates if they have been issued in accordance with the minimum standards estab-
lished by ICAO.68 Secondly, with this right comes an obligation of other ICAO 
Member States to grant the recognition if the conditions envisaged in this article 
are met by the ‘State of Registry’. 
ICAO has clarified in Annex 869 and Annex 170 to the Chicago Convention 
that, as far as the certificates of airworthiness and pilot licences are concerned, the 
minimum standards to which Article 33 makes reference will be the ones con-
tained in those Annexes. In addition Articles 39 and 40 of the Chicago Convention 
                                                 
67 'Chicago Convention', Article 11. 
68 Where a ‘State of Registry’ has transferred some of its responsibilities under Article 83bis of the 
Chicago Convention, these rights apply also to the ‘State of Operator’. 
69 ICAO, 'Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention: Airworthiness of Aircraft', (2010). Paragraph 3.2.2 
states: ‘A Contracting State shall not issue or render valid a Certificate of Airworthiness for which 
it intends to claim recognition pursuant to Article 33 of the Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion unless it has satisfactory evidence that the aircraft complies with the applicable Standards of 
this Annex through compliance with appropriate airworthiness requirements’. 
70 ICAO, 'Annex 1 to the Chicago Convention: Personnel Licensing', (2011). See ‘Forward’, which 
states: ‘Annex 1 contains Standards and Recommended Practices adopted by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization as the minimum standards for personnel licensing’. 
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stipulate that an aircraft or a pilot which has failed to meet in any respect these 
international standards should have this clearly indicated on the certificate or li-
cense and that in such case other contracting States are entitled to restrict the op-
erations of such aircraft or personnel in their territories. This, similar to the proce-
dure of filing of differences, underlines the importance of the principle of trans-
parency which, although not directly articulated in the Chicago Convention, is 
nevertheless present in a number of its provisions, as well as numero s Assembly 
resolutions.71 
2.2.3.2 RECOGNITION OF AN AIR OPERATOR’S CERTIFICATE 
What can be quickly noticed is that Article 33 does not address th  Air Operator’s 
Certificate (AOC), which, in addition to the certificate of airworthiness and li-
censes of the aircrew, is an essential prerequisite for international air vigation in 
commercial air transport according to Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.72 This 
is because amongst the first twelve annexes that were developed during the Chi-
cago Conference in 1944, there was no separate Annex concerning safety of ir-
craft operations.73  
ICAO has clarified the link between Article 33 and AOC through interpre-
tative Assembly Resolutions,74 and provisions in Annex 6, which require: 
 
Contracting States to recognize as valid an air operator certificate issued by another Con-
tracting State, provided that the requirements under which the certificate was issued are at 
least equal to the applicable Standards specified in Annex 6.75 
 
However, given the fact that this requirement is set out in an Annex a d not in the 
Chicago Convention, its legal value is not as strong as that of Ar icle 33, and noti-
fication of differences is, at least theoretically, possible. 
In order to safeguard the recognition of certificates in the context of com-
mercial air transport operations, States also incorporate appropriate povisions 
dealing with this issue in bilateral ASA. Such provisions usually reproduce in the 
ASA the text of Article 33 of the Chicago Convention, and make the issuance of 
operating authorisations and technical permissions, which are necessary to utilise 
the traffic rights, conditional upon the maintenance of minimum safety standards, 
established under the Chicago Convention, by the State designating the airline. 
ASA clauses also allow the State which has issued the operating auhorisations 
and technical permissions to withhold, revoke or limit them if the other party does 
not have or does not maintain safety oversight programmes in compliance with 
                                                 
71 ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A37-5: The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme 
(USOAP) continuous monitoring approach', (37th ICAO Assembly, 2010); ICAO, 'Assembly 
Resolution A37-1: Principles for a code of conduct on the sharing nd use of safety information', 
(37th ICAO Assembly, 2010); Assembly Resolution A32-11, supra note 30 in Ch.1. 
72 Annex 6, Part I to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 4.2.1.1 which states: ‘An operator shall 
not engage in commercial air transport operations unless in possessi n of a valid air operator cer-
tificate issued by the State of the Operator’. 
73 The notion of AOC was introduced only in 1990; see: Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention, at 
‘Forward’. 
74 ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A36-6: State Recognition of the Air Operator Certificate of 
Foreign Operators and Surveillance of their Operations', (36th ICAO Assembly, 2007). 
75 Annex 6, Part I to the Chicago Convention, supra note 108, at Paragraph 4.2.2.1. 
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ICAO standards or if the designated airline is no longer compliant with the mini-
mum ICAO safety requirements.76 
The question of recognition of AOCs is a somewhat controversial subject, 
as States such as the US, Australia, Canada, China and the Member States of the 
EU, require under their legislation that foreign operators obtain a prior safety au-
thorisation in order to be able to fly to and from their territories.77 Such schemes 
have been developed largely because the results of the USOAP have shown in the 
past that States ‘cannot reasonably assume without verification that the condition 
for recognition Stated in Article 33 is actually being met by another State.’78 Be-
cause of this reason, ICAO encouraged States to put in place mechanisms to veri-
fy that the conditions for such recognition are met, before recognisin  AOCs as 
valid.79 Requirements and guidance material concerning surveillance of foreign 
aircraft operations have also been adopted by ICAO.80 
Although the existence of AOC authorisation schemes can be justified 
from the perspective of ICAO requirements, they should be seen as a tool to be 
used by States exclusively for assessing if the rules under which AOC was issued 
were at least equal to the applicable Standards specified in Annex 6 to the Chicago 
Convention. Following on from that, it should not be thpurpose of authorisation 
schemes to dilute the responsibilities of the ‘State of the Operator’, who should 
remain the primary authority responsible for the AOC, or to impose on operators  
additional requirements which go beyond the minimum standards provided for in 
Annex 6.  
In the EU for example, the regulation establishing EASA stipulates that 
third country operators flying to the EU may have to comply with EU require-
ments to the extent that there are no applicable ICAO standards.81 Although ini-
tially EASA proposed including requirements over and above ICAO SARPs in 
implementing rules on third country operator authorisations,82 it finally decided 
not to do so, as it faced criticism from operators for not respecting the Chicago 
Convention.83 It is important that ICAO remains vigilant to such initiatives which 
risk eroding the consistency of the international framework for aircraft operations. 
If there are deficiencies which would justify development of additional minimum 
                                                 
76 For standard clauses concerning designation, authorisation, safety and recognition of certificates 
see ICAO Template Bilateral Air Services Agreement in: ICAO Doc. 9587, supra note 36, at 
Appendix 5. 
77 These are sometimes referred to as Foreign Aircraft Air Operator’s Certificates. 
78 ICAO, 'Mutual Recognition', DGCA/06-WP/8, Directors General of Civil Aviation Conference 
on Global Strategy for Aviation Safety (Montréal, Canada, 2006), at Paragraph 1.2. 
79 Ibid. at Paragraph 3.  
80 Annex 6, Part I to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraphs 2.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.2 which require 
States to establish programmes with procedures for the surveillance of op rations in their territory 
by a foreign operator and for taking appropriate action when necessary to preserve safety. Guid-
ance on the surveillance of foreign operators can be found in: ICAO, 'Manual of Procedures for 
Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance', Doc. 8335, (2010). See also: 
Assembly Resolution A36-6, supra note 74.  
81 EU, 'Regulation (EU) No 216/2008 of 20 February 2008 on comm n rules in the field of civil 
aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 
91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC', (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008), 
Article 9(1). 
82 EASA, 'Notice of Proposed Amendment relating to rules on thirdcountry operators for 
commercial air transport', (NPA No 2011-05), at Paragraph 21. 
83 EASA, 'Comment Response Document to NPA No 2011-05',  at Par graph 15. 
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requirements for international aircraft operations, this should be don through the 
ICAO rulemaking machinery. 
The above does not mean that any requirement imposed unilaterally on 
aircraft operators would be in contradiction with the Chicago Convention and its 
Annexes. Certain requirements, especially airspace related, may have to be im-
posed on a country or region specific basis. For example, if a State has introduced 
reduced separation minima in order to increase airspace capacity, all aircraft may 
have to be required, in order to use that airspace, to carry equipment which is not 
necessarily envisaged under minimum ICAO requirements. This would be fully in 
line with Article 11 of the Chicago Convention, however in such a case a differ-
ence should be notified with ICAO indicating a requirement which is more de-
manding than the minimum ICAO SARPs.84 
2.2.3.3 OTHER CERTIFICATES NOT ENVISAGED UNDER THE 
CHICAGO CONVENTION 
Limiting the analysis related to recognition of certificates to AOCs, pilot licences 
and certificates of airworthiness only - however important these three categories 
of certificates are – would however not be sufficient. Today the concept of ‘State 
of Registry’ or even ‘State of the Operator’ introduced through Article 83bis of the 
Chicago Convention, is no longer at the centre of the aviation regulatory world. 
In addition to certificates of airworthiness, licenses of the aircrews, and 
even the AOC, aviation has seen a real proliferation of certificates and approv ls. 
Certificates are issued for the design of aircraft and its components, organisations 
responsible for aircraft manufacture, aircraft maintenance, training of aircrew, 
international aerodromes, and other activities and organisations.85 Some of those 
certificates, such as the design organisation approval,86 are not even envisaged in 
ICAO Annexes. Such certifications are considered as ‘safety barriers’ erected by 
States to maintain safety levels which are expected from aviation activities by the 
general public.87 
The problem is that international standards governing the conditions for is-
suance of some of those other certificates are not always precise or comprehen-
sive. This is for example the case for production organisation approvals which are 
subject to only three general standards set out in Annex 8 to the Chicago Conven-
                                                 
84 For example the EU mandated the carriage of Aircraft Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) II 
version 7.1 within the EU airspace earlier than the dates stipulated by ICAO in Annex 10 to the 
Chicago Convention; see: EU, 'Commission Regulation (EU) No 1332/2011 of 16 December 2011 
laying down common airspace usage requirements and operating procedures for airborne collision 
avoidance', (OJ L 336, 20.12.2011). 
85 Annex 1 to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 1.2.8.2 for Approved Training Organisations; 
Annex 6, Part I to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 8.7.1.1 for Approved Maintenance 
Organisations; Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 2.4.1 for Approved Production 
Organisations; ICAO, 'Annex 14 to the Chicago Convention: Aerodromes, Volume I - Aerodrome 
Design and Operations', (2013),  Paragraph 1.4.1 for certified aerodromes. 
86 The concept of a design organisation approval (DOA) is, for example, envisaged under the EU 
regulatory framework, see: EU, 'Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 of 3 August 2012 
laying down implementing rules for the airworthiness and enviromental certification of aircraft 
and related products, parts and appliances, as well as for the certification of design and production 
organisations', (OJ L 224, 21.8.2012). 
87 ICAO Doc. 9859, supra note 28 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.3.4. 
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tion.88 Similarly guidance for the issuance of an approval to maintenance or train-
ing organisations is not as detailed as that available for an AOC for example.89 
This leaves States with little option but to develop the detailed requirements on 
their own. In addition, as the Chicago Convention is limited to recognition of air-
worthiness certificates and pilot licences, and through Annex 6 also the recogni-
tion of AOCs, there are no internationally agreed conditions under which such 
other certificates should be recognised between States. This results in differences 
between jurisdictions and duplication of oversight and approval schemes for in-
dustry and regulators. 
The paradox of this situation is the fact that proliferation of certifica es and 
associated audits and inspections, although having as its objective the safeguard-
ing of civil aviation safety, at the same time goes directly in opposition to the 
main objective of the Chicago Convention, namely promotion of uniformity and 
efficiency in international air navigation. It also disperses the precious resources 
of the aviation community which could be used in a more efficient manner. 
A very striking example of this situation can be observed in the domain of 
aircraft maintenance organisations (AMOs). Many States, including for example 
Singapore, Canada, Japan, Brazil, US or the EU Member States, require foreign
AMOs working on aircraft registered in their registries to hold an approval issued 
by these States in addition to an approval from a local authority.90 This means that 
an AMO which has clients from different parts of the world, may have to hold 
several approvals for performing exactly the same business only because the air-
craft it maintains are registered in different countries. It is not rare tht an AMO 
holds up to twenty approvals from different States.91  
The consequence of the above is that AMOs may be subject to repetitiv  
audits from many different States, in addition to internal quality udits and audits 
by customers, and may have to comply with different sets of requirements. This is 
not only costly, but also means that AMO personnel is required to use different 
procedures depending upon the ‘State of Registry’ of the aircraft, which adds an 
element of safety risk.92 The justification for such schemes is that each ‘State of 
Registry’ wants to be sure that the same standard is being achieved as if the air-
craft was maintained by an AMO which is under its domestic jurisdict on. 
Another example of inefficiencies comes from the domain of product certi-
fication. Article 33 of the Chicago Convention covers recognition of certificates of 
airworthiness for the purpose of day-to-day operations only, that is when an air-
craft registered in one State temporarily enters the airspace of another State.93 
                                                 
88 Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention, at Chapter 2. 
89 ICAO, 'Recognition and validation of approvals and certificates issued by other States', HLSC 
2010-WP/9, ICAO High Level Safety Conference (Montréal, 2010), Paragraph 2.4.2. 
90 For examples of AMO certificates issued by various authorities see certificates held by the Air-
bus company at: Airbus, 'Airbus policy and certificates'  <http://www.airbus.com/tools/policy/> 
[accessed 15 March 2014].  
91 Singapore, 'Recognition and validation of foreign AMO approvals', HLSC 2010-WP/73, ICAO 
High Level Safety Conference (Montréal, 2010), Paragraph 1.1. 
92 ICAO, Recognition and validation of approvals and certificates issued by other States, upra 
note 89, at Paragraph 1.1. 
93 Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention, at 'Forward' which states that: ‘The requirements governing 
the issuance of Type Certificates in accordance with applicable provisions of Annex 8 are not part 
of the minimum standards which govern the issuance or validation of Certificates of Airworthi-
ness, and lead to the recognition of their validity pursuant to Article 33 of the Convention’. 
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However, when an aircraft changes registry, it is up to the new ‘State of Registry’ 
to determine its airworthiness and issue appropriate certificate.94 In such cases 
ICAO, through Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention, promotes acceptance of a 
previous certificate of airworthiness as satisfactory evidence that the aircraft com-
plies with applicable ICAO standards.95 This is however theory.  
In practice, because Annex 8 sets only broad airworthiness performance 
objectives for different categories of aircraft, States still have to adopt etailed 
codes of airworthiness at the national level. This means that the conditions to be 
met before a certificate of airworthiness is issued vary between States. Stt s with 
important manufacturing industries, such as the US, Russia through the Interstate 
Aviation Committee (IAC), or the EU Member States through EASA, adopt de-
tailed airworthiness codes which, despite harmonisation efforts, may contain dis-
similar requirements. For example the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
has identified forty significant and twenty-three non-significant standards differ-
ences between the US and EU certification requirements for transport category 
aeroplanes.96 
Multiple sets of similar but differing certification requirements may lead to 
repetitive certifications of the same product, resulting in additional administrative 
burden and cost for authorities and industry in import and export. Large manufac-
turing States, including the US, Brazil, Canada or the EU Member States acting 
through EASA, would use a specific method of certification called validation, to 
determine compliance with their airworthiness requirements. Validations are sup-
posed to limit the involvement of the importing State to checking compliance with 
their unique import requirements only, while in other respects to rely on the de-
terminations already made by the primary certificating authority.97 Other States, 
for example Australia, would not perform validation of a foreign type certificate 
but simply accept it following familiarisation with the product, if they have confi-
dence in the foreign authority which issued the original certificate.98 
Although validation contributes to the reduction of unnecessary repetitive 
checks and determinations in export and import of aeronautical products, it has 
not been able to eliminate the duplication of work and dissimilar regulatory re-
quirements which represent a burden and cost for the authorities and the manufac-
turers. Major manufacturing States like the US recognise that ‘multiple sets of 
similar yet differing certification requirements among Civil Aviation Authorities 
                                                 
94 Ibid. at Paragraph 3.2.1 which states that: ‘A Certificate of Airworthiness shall be issued by a 
Contracting State on the basis of satisfactory evidence that the aircraft complies with the design 
aspects of the appropriate airworthiness requirements.’ 
95 Ibid. at Paragraph 3.2.4 which states that: ‘The new State of Registry, when issuing its Certifi-
cate of Airworthiness may consider the previous Certificate of Airworthiness as satisfactory evi-
dence, in whole or in part, that the aircraft complies with the applicable Standards of this Annex 
through compliance with the appropriate airworthiness requirements’. 
96 FAA, 'List of FAA Significant and Non-Significant Standards Differences'  
<http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/transport/transport_intl/sd_list/ssd_nonssd
_list> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
97 See for example: Type Validation Principles under the Technical Implementation Procedures 
(TIP) to 'Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community on 
cooperation in the regulation of civil aviation safety', 30 June 2008, (OJ L 291, 9.11.2011). At: 
EASA, 'Bilateral Agreements'  <http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/il teral-agreements> 
[accessed 5 August 2014]. 




can lead to a significant burden when certifying and validating aeronautical prod-
ucts and parts for import and export.’99 A study conducted by the Aviation Work-
ing Group in 2011 estimates that dissimilar technical requirements affecting trans-
fers of aircraft between various jurisdictions cost the aviation industry p to 369 
million USD per annum, and that the projected cost over the next tw nty years of 
such dissimilar requirements may be as much as 7.286 billion USD.100 
In the past, efforts were undertaken by the US, European countries, and 
other major ‘States of Design’ to harmonise their airworthiness codes.101 ICAO 
has also tried to take up this work at the global level, but today an old and in prac-
tice never implemented Assembly resolution on a ‘globally harmonized design 
code’ is the only remainder of that ambitious initiative.102 
The duplication of certifications and associated audits and inspections nec-
essary for their recognition is currently one of the greatest inefficiences in the 
ICAO system and the source of a significant waste of resources of the internation-
al aviation community. This ‘death by audit’ situation, as it was referred to at the 
2013 FAA/EASA International Aviation Safety Conference, needs to be ad-
dressed, as in the longer term it is simply unsustainable.103 
RASOs have a great potential for reducing redundant audits and certifica-
tions by allowing large scale, multilateral programmes for acceptance of certifica-
tion findings or even the certificates themselves, as will be demonstrated in detail 
on the example of EASA in Chapter 4. 
2.2.3.4 INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY AGREEMENTS 
The discussion about recognition of aviation safety certificates under international 
law would not be complete without also addressing the international aviation safe-
ty agreements. These agreements, which are usually of a bilateral nature, consti-
tute a traditional tool through which States address limitations f the Chicago 
Convention in terms of acceptance of certificates. International aviation safety 
agreements were used as early as the 1930s to approve aeronautical products in 
                                                 
99 United States of America, 'Improving international cooperation in certification and validation of 
products and parts', HLSC 2010-WP/33, ICAO High Level Safety Conference (Montréal, 2010), 
Summary. 
100 Aviation Working Group, 'Economic impact assessment and select r commendations: dissimilar 
technical regulatory requirements impacting cross border transfer of aircraft', (2011), 
<www.awg.aero/assets/docs/Report%20v%201.02.pdf> [accessed 5 August 2014], p. 2. 
101 For many years the US FAA and the European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) have been 
implementing a Harmonization Work Program which was launched as a re ult of the commitment 
made by the FAA and the JAA at the 9th FAA/JAA Harmonization Meeting (1992). The harmoni-
sation programme has been stopped following the dissolution of the JAA in 2009, and recently 
taken up again by EASA and FAA in the framework of the EU – US Agreement on Cooperation in 
the Regulation of Civil Aviation Safety. 
102 ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A33-11: A global design code for aircraft', (33rd ICAO Assembly, 
2001). 
103 Author’s notes from the  2013 EASA/FAA International Aviation Safety Conference; In addi-
tion see: '2013 EASA/FAA International Aviation Safety Conference',  
<http://easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/events/easa-faa-international-aviation safety-
conference-2013> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
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export and import.104 In Europe a rare example of a multilateral aviation safety 
agreement was signed in 1960, but is no longer applicable.105 
Bilateral aviation safety agreements or BASAs aim at reducing redundant 
certifications and oversight. Such agreements require a high degree of mutual con-
fidence, as their provisions usually do not relieve parties from finding compliance 
with their own requirements, but allow reliance on the equivalency of the other 
party’s regulatory system in order to find such compliance.106 
Compliance with at least the minimum ICAO requirements, in addition to 
more specific confidence building exercises and regulatory special conditions, 
will therefore be a necessary pre-requisite for concluding a BASA.107 
Aviation safety agreements can cover various domains of aviation safety, 
such as initial and continuing airworthiness, pilot licensing, or qualification of 
flight simulation training devices.108 In the area of initial aircraft certification, for 
example, they allow for more efficient aircraft design approval processes, ome-
times even relieving the parties altogether from an obligation to issue an addition-
al approval. In areas such as production, maintenance, pilot licensing or qualifica-
tion of flight simulation training devices, they allow reliance on each other’s mon-
itoring of facilities and devices, and thereby limit the technical work to those 
regulatory areas which are significantly different.  
The benefits of BASA agreements can be very well illustrated with the ex-
ample of the maintenance annex to the EU–US BASA.109 In 2014, there were over 
                                                 
104 Mary Cheston, 'U.S. Perspective on Bilateral Safety Agreements: where e’v  been and where 
we’re going', Europe/U.S. International Aviation Safety Conference  
<http://www.easa.europa.eu/conferences/conference2005/presentations/day1/Bilaterals/us_bilatera
ls_cheston.pdf> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
105 'Multilateral Agreement Relating to Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft', 22 
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107 See the US process and requirements for concluding a bilateral air safety agreement at: FAA, 
'Generic Steps for Obtaining a Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement'  
<http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/international/bilateral_agreements/media/BASAProcess.pdf> 
[accessed 5 August 2014].  The policy of the US FAA is also to require that a potential BASA 
partner country has been positively assessed under the FAA IASA program. 
108 For examples of BASA agreements concluded by the EU and US see: EASA, 'Bilateral 
Agreements'  <http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/bilateral-agreements> [accessed 5 August 
2014]; FAA, 'List of BASA agreements'  
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109 'EU-US BASA', supra note 97. 
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1400 EASA approved AMOs located in the US,110 which is a significant number 
of organisations. It would be impossible for EASA to ensure ovrsight of all of 
them with the resources available without relying on the help of the FAA. Under 
the ‘Maintenance Annex’ to the EU-US BASA, the bilateral partners have agreed 
that EASA’s involvement will be limited only to those aspects of AMO monitor-
ing which are significantly different in the US compared with the EU. In addition, 
even for areas identified as significantly different, the EU has delegatd compli-
ance verification to the US, where the FAA makes recommendations to EASA for 
the issuance and continuation of AMO approvals. Therefore instead of inspecting 
every single AMO, EASA monitors only the overall quality of the inspection work 
done by the FAA through a system of sampling inspections.111 The result is a sig-
nificant leveraging of EASA’s resources and less cost for the industry. The same 
procedure is applied to AMOs located in the EU and seeking FAA certifi ation. 
As indicated above, BASAs are concluded on the premise of equivalency 
of regulatory systems of the bilateral partners. This means that altough the re-
quirements do not have to be exactly the same, they have to produce eq ivalent 
results.112 Therefore although full harmonisation of requirements between the 
BASA partners is not absolutely necessary, the benefits of a BASA will be larger 
where differences are smaller. Under a BASA, once the significant differences are 
identified, they are addressed through, so called ‘special conditions’.113 The ICAO 
objective of achieving ‘the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, 
standards, procedures’114 is therefore also very relevant for such agreements. 
BASAs however also have limitations. Traditionally they address ac-
ceptance of technical findings only, with limited possibility of certificate ac-
ceptance. Even under the EU-US BASA, which is based on many years of regula-
tory harmonisation between Europe and US, the scope of certificate acceptance is 
very limited. In 2014 only certain design (minor changes, repairs, design organisa-
tions) and production (production organisations) approvals were being accepted 
by the parties without re-issuance of a separate approval. Beyond technical differ-
ences, there are also legal reasons for such limitations. The EU–US BASA is con-
sidered by the US government as an ‘executive agreement’ concluded without the 
‘advice and consent’ of the US Senate.115 This means that it cannot derogate from 
domestic US law. From the EU perspective, an international agreement that has 
                                                 
110 EASA, 'Maintenance organisations located in the USA: Part-145 US Approvals (MOA)'  
<http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/USA_EASA_145.pdf> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
111 EASA-FAA Maintenance Annex Guidance (MAG Change 4 - 29 January, 2014) ,  
<http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/bilateral-agreements> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
112 EASA, 'Aviation Safety Agreement between  the United States and the European Community' 
2011) <www.faa.gov/aircraft/repair/media/EASA_US_roadshows.pdf> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
113 In the EU-US BASA, supra note 97, special conditions are defined as: ‘those requirements in 
the EU and US regulations that have been found, based on a regulatory comparison, not to be 
common to both systems and which are significant enough that they must be addressed.’ 
114 'Chicago Convention', Article 37. 
115 Under US law, a treaty is an agreement negotiated and signed by the executive branch that 
enters into force if it is approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate and is subsequently rati-
fied by the President. However, the great majority of internationl agreements that the US enters 
into are not treaties but executive agreements, meaning agreements entered into by the executive 
branch, that are not submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. Congress generally requires 
only notification upon the entry into force of an executive agreement. For further information see: 
Congressional Research Service, 'International Law and Agreements: Their Effect Upon U.S. 
Law', RL32528, (2010). 
45 
 
been ratified by the European Parliament and the Council has status above EU 
regulations.116 A practical consequence of that difference is that although the EU 
could directly accept FAA issued certificates, this is not possible for the US.117 
Development of BASAs also takes time and resources, as they involve de-
tailed regulatory comparisons and confidence building exercises. For example, it 
took seven years for the EU and US to develop and conclude their BASA.118 The 
effort involved will therefore only make their conclusion worthwhile between 
States exchanging high volumes of aeronautical products, personnel and services. 
Finally, because they are bilateral in nature, BASA do not necessarily contribute 
to unification of the international regime, and sometimes may even contribute to 
its further fragmentation. This is because the requirements for acceptance of prod-
ucts, services or personnel may be different in each bilateral case. 
Beyond the BASAs, other methods used by States to reduce redundant 
regulatory oversight and accepting certifications made by other authorities is 
through multilateral harmonisation and cooperation initiatives, including at re-
gional levels. Such cooperation can take various forms, such as joint inspection 
schemes, development of common regulatory requirements, or establishing a RA-
SO type body. 
2.2.4 ROLE OF ICAO IN GLOBAL SAFETY OVERSIGHT  
The role of ICAO in overseeing implementation of international civil a iation 
safety standards has already been subject to analyses by many authors.119 Today 
consensus seems to exist that the most successful instrument that ICAO has at its 
disposal in this respect is its USOAP, and the associated transpare cy mecha-
nisms, which have even been referred to as ICAO’s ‘quasi-enforcement’ tool.120 
The main strength of the USOAP comes from the fact that it is a mandato-
ry programme with a standardised methodology applicable to all ICAO Member 
                                                 
116 Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe, and Alexander H. Türk, Administrative Law and 
Policy of the European Union, (2011), pp. 78-79. For an overview of the legal status of interna-
tional agreements in the internal EU legal order see also: 'Case C-366/10, Air Transport 
Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change', in: [2011] ECR  I-
13755, (CJEU,2011),  (paragraph 50). 
117 Michael Jennison, 'The Future of Aviation Safety Regulation: New US-EU Agreement 
Harmonizes and Consolidates the Transatlantic Regime, but What is t e Potential for Genuine 
Regulatory Reform', ASL, 38 (2013), p. 344. 
118 The negotiating mandate was granted to the European Commission on 9 March 2004, the 
Agreement entered into force on 1 May 2011; see: EASA, 'Information Note: Agreement between 
the United States of America and the European Union on cooperation in he regulation of civil 
aviation safety'  <http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/bilateral-agreements/eu-usa> [accessed 5 
August 2014]. 
119 Blumenkron, supra note 49 in Ch.1, at pp. 12-24; Huang, supra note 29 in Ch.1, at pp. 68-81; 
Weber, supra note 48 in Ch.1, at pp. 90-92; Meglena Boteva, 'A new century and a new attitude 
towards safety oversight in air transportation', in Master Thesis, (McGill University: Institute of 
Air and Space Law, 2000), pp. 64-85; Zachary D. Detra, 'The legitimacy of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme', in Master Thesis, (McGill 
University: Institute of Air and Space Law, 2006); Broderick and Loos, 'Government Aviation 
Safety Oversight: trust but verify ', supra note 7 in Ch.2, at pp. 1047-1054; Michael Milde, 
'Aviation Safety Oversight: Audits and the Law', AASL, XXVI (2001), pp. 173-176.  
120 The most comprehensive overview of transparency as ICAO’s enforcement tool has been given 
Blumenkron, supra note 49 in Ch.1, at p. 87; see also Milde, supra note 48 in Ch.1, at p. 180. 
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States. It is used by ICAO for assessing the level of implementation of ICAO 
SARPs, and more generally States’ overall capability for ensuring effective safety 
oversight. In practice USOAP has proved to be a powerful diagnosis tool for 
global aviation safety. 
The worldwide level of effective implementation of USOAP protocols an
justifiably be criticised as still too low, as Figure V demonstrates. However, 
USOAP reports show that generally ICAO Member States make consistent pro-
gress in the level of effective implementation of SARPs and in increasing their 
overall safety oversight capabilities. 
Figure V: Level of Effective Implementation of the eight ICAO CEs of State safety oversight 
(ICAO Member States, August 2014) 
Source of data: ICAO, Regional Performance Dashboards (2014)121 
 
In order to verify the progress that States make in improving their level of 
effective implementation of the eight CEs, the ICAO USOAP information related 
to a sample of 35 States was analysed (see Table II). The Statesin th  analysed 
sample were audited by ICAO in the years 2005-2010, and their corrective a on 
plans were subsequently verified by ICAO during the ICAO Coordinated Valida-
tion Missions (ICVM) in the years 2011–2013.122 This analysis has shown that all 
States in the sample have improved the level of effective implementation of 
USOAP protocols. On average the improvement has been almost 15%. The high-
est improvements were observed for CEs 1-5 (between 16.3% and 17.5%), fol-
lowed by CEs 6-7 (12.8% - 10.4%), and finally CE 8 (9.8%). 
                                                 
121 ICAO, 'Regional Performance Dashboards'  <http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/Regional-
Targets.aspx> [accessed 4 August 2014]. This data is the copyrighted property of the ICAO and is 
reproduced here with its expressed knowledge and permission. It may not be cited by or repro-
duced in any other publication without subsequent approval being granted by ICAO. 
122 The purpose of the ICAO ICVM is to ascertain whether previously identified safety deficien-
cies have been satisfactorily resolved by assessing the status of corrective actions or mitigating 
measures taken by ICAO Member States to address findings and recommendations, including 







































































The above analysis shows that States, at least those in the sample, were 
able to achieve the highest improvement for those CEs which are related to devel-
opment of legislation and procedures, while it has been most difficult for them to 
achieve improvements in CEs related to safety oversight and enforcement obliga-
tions. In other words, the greatest improvement has been achieved for CEs which 
are related to the stablishment of a State’s safety oversight system, while the low-
est improvement is for CEs related to its implementation, including with respect to 
enforcement obligations.  
Table II: Improvement in the level of effective implementation of the eight ICAO CEs of 
State safety oversight (sample of 35 ICAO Member States) 
Critical Elements of 
Safety Oversight 
System (correlation 
with actual safety 
performance) 
Lack of effective 
implementation 
during the USOAP 
CSA cycle  
(2005-2010) 





Improvement in the 
level of effective im-
plementation  
CE-1 (medium) 39.4 % 22.6 % 16.8 % 
CE-2 (medium) 48.9 % 32.3 % 16.6 % 
CE-3 (strong) 61.1 % 44.8 % 16.3 % 
CE-4 (strong) 80.4 % 63.0 % 17.4 % 
CE-5 (medium) 54.5 % 37.0 % 17.5 % 
CE-6 (very strong) 45.3 % 32.5 % 12.8 % 
CE-7 (very strong) 56.1 % 45.7 % 10.4 % 
CE-8 (strong) 65.8 % 56.0 % 9.8 % 
Source of data: ICAO, Regional Performance Dashboards and USOAP reports123 
 
The conclusions of the above analysis are important in view of the existing 
correlation between effective implementation of USOAP protocols and actual ac-
cident rates, which is the highest for CEs 6 and 7 (very strong correlation) and 
CEs 3,4,8 (strong correlation). 
In addition, as has already been demonstrated in Chapter 1 (Figure II), re-
view of the USOAP data shows that levels of implementation of CEs differ across 
the ICAO regions, as well as within the regions, which means that the Chicago 
Convention’s objective of ‘the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regula-
tions, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, 
airways and auxiliary services’ is still far from being met.124 
Finally, it is clear that the implementation of USOAP has not yet resulted 
in elimination or significant decrease in the practice of additional safety assess-
ment schemes. The US continues with its IASA programme, while the EU main-
tains its list of unsafe operators. There are also reciprocal inspections onducted 
                                                 
123 ICAO, 'Regional Performance Dashboards'  <http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/Regional-
Targets.aspx> [accessed 4 August 2014]. This data is the copyrighted property of the ICAO and is 
reproduced here with its expressed knowledge and permission. It may not be cited by or repro-
duced in any other publication without subsequent approval being granted by ICAO. 
124 'Chicago Convention',  Article 37. 
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within the framework of BASAs,125 special purpose assessments conducted on the 
basis of national or regional requirements,126 or technical cooperation and assis-
tance programmes assessments.127  
Although each of such audits or assessments has its own distinct objective 
and merits, there are overlaps between them which result in duplication of audit-
ing effort and inefficiencies in the use of resources. The objective of some of 
them, such as the US IASA, or the EU ‘safety list’ is the same s of USOAP – 
namely to verify compliance of States with ICAO requirements. 
One of the major steps towards improving and optimising the auditing ef-
fort at the global level is the ICAO transition towards the CMA. Endorsed by the 
ICAO Assembly in 2010,128 the CMA is the most recent step in the development 
of USOAP and, as of January 2013, is being used to monitor safety oversight ca-
pabilities and safety performance of ICAO Member States on a continuous basis, 
using a risk based approach.129  
The main reason behind the transition to CMA has been the fact that per-
formance of full scale USOAP audits for all 191 ICAO Member States has be-
come a very expensive and burdensome exercise. At the same time it provided 
only a ‘snap-shot’ reflecting the situation at the moment of the audit. Given that 
under the traditional approach each State was audited only every five or six years, 
USOAP was not able to provide up-to-date information regarding global safety 
oversight performance.130 Under USOAP CMA, ICAO should be able to provide 
more reliable, real time information about safety oversight performance of States. 
This in turn should offer more possibilities for using this information for the pur-
pose of defining corrective actions, taking enforcement actions and certificates 
acceptance. 
In addition to gathering information through remote means, on-site audits 
will continue to be used under the CMA approach as they provide the possibility 
to verify, on the ground, information provided by States. They will however be 
deployed on a more selective basis, essentially in those cases where information 
provided by States or obtained from other sources by ICAO would indicate a dete-
riorating safety situation.131 
From the perspective of this study, the transition to CMA, and the flexibil-
ity that it offers in terms of the use of different sources of information to verify 
compliance with ICAO requirements is of major importance. Of particular re e-
vance, is the fact that when authorising the transition to the CMA, the ICAO As-
sembly directed the Council to: 
  
                                                 
125 Such as the Sampling Inspection Scheme (SIS) under Annex 2 of the ‘Agreement between the 
United States of America and the European Community on cooperation in the regulation of civil 
aviation safety’ (supra note 97). 
126 For example when EASA in the EU validates a type certificate issued by a third country, it will 
normally conduct an assessment of its regulatory system concerning aircraft design and continuing 
airworthiness. 
127 It is standard practice to commence a technical assessment project by conducting a gap analy-
sis, which takes ICAO or regional standards as a point of reference. 
128 Assembly Resolution A37-5, supra note 71. 
129 For an overview of the USOAP-CMA see: ICAO Doc. 9735, supra note 13 in Ch.1. 
130 ICAO, 'Evolution of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) beyond 
2010', C-WP/13356, (187th session of the ICAO Council),  Paragraph 5.2. 
131 ICAO Doc. 9735, supra note 13 in Ch.1, at Paragraphs 3.4 - 3.5. 
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[F]oster coordination and cooperation between USOAP and audit programmes of other 
organizations related to aviation safety…in order to reduce the burden on States caused 
by repetitive audits or inspections and to decrease the duplication of monitoring activi-
ties.132  
 
Chapter 4 will demonstrate, using the EU and EASA as examples, how 
elimination of monitoring activities can be achieved in practice by relying on a 
regional aviation safety system. Increasing reliance on RASOs by ICAOfor moni-
toring States’ compliance with the Chicago Convention and its Annexes is one of 
the key elements of the GASON concept as proposed in Section 2.5 of this chap-
ter. 
2.2.5 ICAO ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AND COMPETENCES 
In addition to being a monitoring tool, USOAP has also become ICAO’s main 
enforcement instrument. Although the evolution towards full transp rency of 
USOAP results has been slow,133 overall the progress made by ICAO in this re-
spect over the years is encouraging. Today, not only are the USOAP audits shared 
between all the ICAO Member States, but even the levels of implementation of 
USOAP protocols per domain of aviation safety are available to the general pub-
lic.134  
In addition, at the end of 2012, ICAO Council took a decision to share 
with the general public, as of January 2014, so called ‘Significant S fety Con-
cerns’ (SSC).135 This decision in practice means the establishment of a global list 
of States which allow their certificate holders to exercise the privileges attached to 
the certificate ‘although the minimum requirements established by the Stat  and 
by the Standards set forth in the ICAO Annexes are not met, resulting in an im-
mediate safety risk to international civil aviation.’136  
The decision of ICAO to publish SSCs has important practical and legal 
consequences. So far the SSCs had been available to States only through a secure 
ICAO website. This meant that SSCs constituted confidential iformation which 
States normally should not disclose to the general public. In practice States did 
take this information into account when deciding whether to authorise operators 
from States with SSCs to perform operations to and from their territories, and 
even disclosed such information to the general public.137  
With the SSCs made officially public, it is now possible for States to make 
direct references to them without any risk of violating ICAO confidentiality ar-
rangements, and even automatically ban affected operators, by refusing to recog-
                                                 
132 Assembly Resolution A37-5, supra note 71. 
133 Blumenkron, supra note 49 in Ch.1, at pp. 26-49. 
134 ICAO, ‘Safety Audit Information'  <http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/USOAP-Results.aspx> 
[accessed 14 March 2014]. 
135 ICAO, 'Significant Safety Concerns (SSCs) – A mechanism for the sharing of SSCs with the 
public: Summary of decisions', C-DEC 197/4, (197th session of the ICAO Council, 2012). 
136 Definition of ‘SSC’ can be found in: ICAO Doc. 9735, supra note 13 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 1.3.  
137 This is for example the case with the EU, which makes reference to th SSCs in decisions ban-
ning operators from operating in the airspace of EU Member States, see: EU, 'Commission 
implementing Regulation (EU) No 659/2013 of 10 July 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 
474/2006 establishing the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban 
within the Community', (OJ L 190, 11.7.2013), at Paragraph 16. 
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nise their certificates on the basis of Article 33 and Annex 6. Such a tomatic bans 
would be an efficiency gain, as resources would not have to be spent on i vesti-
gating cases where clear evidence of non-compliance exists and had been mad 
public by ICAO. Passengers and charterers are now also able to directly consult 
the SSC list when taking travel or business decisions. 
In practical terms, although a number of SSCs have been successfully re-
solved over the past years,138 overall the number of SSCs and States affected by 
them has remained stable since 2010. At the end of 2013 there were seventeen 
SSCs attributed by ICAO to thirteen States, as Table III demonstrate , half of 
them from Africa.139 This shows that there seems to be a group of between eleven 
and thirteen States which find it very difficult to maintain compliance with even 
the minimum safety standards of the Chicago Convention. In 2012the airlines of 
these States carried in total 1.4 billion of revenue tonne kilometres (RTK) in inter-
national scheduled air navigation, which represents only around 0.3% of world-
wide traffic registered by ICAO.140 This can be considered as a marginal risk to 
global aviation safety. 
Table III: ICAO Member States with Significant Safety Concerns (SSC) 
End of the year Number of SSC and ICAO Member States with SSC 
2013  17 unresolved SSCs attributed to 13 States 
2012 16 unresolved SSCs attributed to 11 States 
2011 16 unresolved SSCs attributed to 12 States 
2010 19 unresolved SSCs attributed to 13 States 
Source of data: ICAO, Electronic Bulletins (2010-2013) 141 
 
In addition to using transparency, ICAO has tried to secure operational en-
forcement competences, but so far with mixed success. During the 2010 HLSC 
the ICAO Secretariat proposed that the attribution of three letter designator codes 
used for radiotelephony purposes could be denied by ICAO to aircraft operators 
registered in States with SSC.142 Such competence would effectively allow ICAO 
to freeze the number of AOC holders in affected States. The 2010 HLSC rejected 
this proposal on the grounds that granting such competences to ICAO could con-
stitute an undesirable precedent for the future in terms of enforcement powers.143 
The ICAO Secretariat has only been able to convince the ICAO Council to agree 
                                                 
138 ICAO, 'Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach  
(USOAP CMA)', A38-WP/50, (38th ICAO Assembly, 2013),  Paragraph 3.3. 
139 ICAO, ‘Safety Audit Information'  <http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/USOAP-Results.aspx> 
[accessed 14 March 2014]. 
140 ICAO, 'Civil Aviation: 2012 International RTK by State of Air Operator Certificate (AOC)' 
2013) <http://www.icao.int/Meetings/a38/Pages/documentation-reference-documents.aspx> 
[accessed 14 March 2014]. 
141 This data is the copyrighted property of the ICAO and is reproduced here with its expressed 
knowledge and permission. It may not be cited by or reproduced in any other publication without 
subsequent approval being granted by ICAO. 
142 ICAO, 'Improving ICAO Transparency Policy: Sharing and Using Information in a Transparent, 
Consistent and Fair Manner', HLSC 2010-WP/12, ICAO High Level Safety Conference (Montréal, 
2010), Paragraph 4.4. 
143 'Personal notes of the author', (ICAO High Level Safety Conference, 2010). Author participated 
in the conference as the European Commission’s coordinator for the EU d legation. 
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to a recommendation that ‘States with OPS-related SSCs postpone any request for 
a new three-letter designator for use in international operations as long as the 
SSCs remain unresolved.’144 This demonstrates that possibilities for stronger en-
forcement measures exist, but in the first place depend on political will rather than 
legal limitations. 
There are also other potential enforcement instruments available, such as 
the competence of the ICAO Council under Articles 86-87 of the Chicago Con-
vention to determine if an ‘international airline is operating in conformity with the 
provisions of this Convention.’ In practice the banning by ICAO of an internation-
al airline under these provisions seems to be a theoretical possibility only, and has 
so far never been used.145 This procedure is part of the dispute settlement mecha-
nism and involves the ICAO Council. Past experiences show that ICAO Council 
is generally reluctant to take formal decisions in the case of disputes between 
Member States and prefers consultations and negotiations as a tool for resolution 
of differences.146 This is scarcely acceptable in cases involving aviation safety, 
which should be kept as a strictly technical matter and acted upon ra idly. 
Past criticism concerning ICAO’s lack of enforcement competences in the 
domain of aviation safety is not entirely justified, especially given ICAO’s inter-
governmental status. As pointed out by Milde, currently none of the UN special-
ised organisations actually have the competence to take real enforcement 
measures.147 Discussions in other UN specialised agencies show that even very 
serious incidents do not change the general principle of supremacy of State sover-
eignty in traditional inter-governmental organisations.148 In terms of achieving 
improvements ICAO stands out in a relatively positive way. 
ICAO will never become a true global enforcer of aviation safety requir -
ments, but also does not have to be. It is in the first place the responsibility of 
States, individually or jointly, where individually they are too weak, to ensure 
effective safety oversight and act decisively to address identified deficiencies. 
ICAO’s role should be to monitor States’ compliance and to step in with determi-
nation if they fail to discharge their responsibilities. In thisre pect transparency is 
likely to remain the main enforcement tool of ICAO at the global level, and States 
should demonstrate the political will to continue providing it with a clear mandate 
to further develop and enhance this tool.  
The main problem today when it comes to safety oversight and enforce-
ment is the fact that with 191 Member States ICAO does not have t e resources 
and capacity to devote equal attention to all of them. The transition to the CMA is 
supposed to address this issue by allowing ICAO to focus on those States which 
                                                 
144 ICAO, 'Encouraging the improvement of safety oversight in States wi h significant safety 
concerns (SSCs): Summary of decisions', C-DEC 195/6, (195th session of the ICAO Council, 
2012). 
145 Huang, supra note 29 in Ch.1, at p. 203. 
146 Weber, supra note 48 in Ch.1, at pp. 41-44. 
147 Milde, supra note 48 in Ch.1, at p. 180. 
148 See in particular the largely non-conclusive discussions on the ex ension of inspection and 
enforcement competences of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the aftermath of 
the nuclear incidents in the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan in 2011, at: The Associated Press, 
'IAEA's nuclear-disaster measures stay voluntary' <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iaea-s-nuclear-
disaster-measures-stay-voluntary-1.1078542> [accessed 13 March 2014]. For more general discus-
sion about IAEA enforcement competences see also: Jack I. Garvey, Nuclear Weapons 
Counterproliferation: A new grand bargain, (2013), p. 103. 
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present the greatest risk to the international aviation safety system. It remains to 
be seen, however, if all States will have sufficiently reliable information to sup-
port the CMA. One way of addressing this issue is for ICAO to rely more on re-
gional organisations, which could feed USOAP-CMA with information about the 
safety performance of their Member States and ultimately allow ICAO to better 
prioritise the use of its resources. Relying more on regional orgnisations could 
also help ICAO in addressing the enforcement issue. Here a useful analogy with 
the international maritime sector can be made. 
2.3 LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME SECTOR  
ICAO is not the only universal organisation responsible for regulating transport 
matters. In the maritime sector a similar organisation was established - t  IMO. 
Created in 1948 as a specialised agency of the UN, IMO has global membership 
and is responsible for the safety and security of international shipping and the 
prevention of marine pollution by ships.149 IMO has been facing problems similar 
to ICAO in terms of ensuring uniform implementation and enforcement of its 
safety standards. The approach of the maritime sector to tackling these probl ms 
has been by setting standards at the global level and relying on regional coopera-
tion to ensure their correct implementation and enforcement. 
In contrast to ICAO, IMO regulates maritime safety by means of interna-
tional conventions which are legally binding. In practice however it also experi-
enced problems with their implementation. Maritime conventions, although rati-
fied by the majority of the world tonnage States, still need imple entation into 
national legal orders and proper enforcement.150 Given that not all States have the 
same expertise, experience and resources to do this properly, the ‘origination of an 
IMO convention does not always translate into its implementatio  and effective 
enforcement’151 by the ‘Flag States’. These experiences suggest that even if ICAO 
Annexes had a legally binding nature - meaning without the possibility of filing 
differences - it is not likely that this would actually translate into their better im-
plementation at national levels. 
The problem with implementation of IMO safety standards became very 
acute in the 1950s, with the emergence of the so called ‘open registries’ or ‘flags 
of convenience’, which offered ship-owners much more favourable registration 
conditions than those in traditional national ‘Flag States’, including tax incentives 
and the ability to hire non-national, usually cheaper, crews.152 Such ‘open regis-
tries’, by focusing on maximising the number of registrations and associated reg-
istration fees, attracted significant criticism from both inside and outside the mari-
time industry for not being able to exercise sufficient oversight over the safety 
standards of ships carrying their flags.153 This in turn put into question the legiti-
macy of the exclusivity of ‘Flag State’ jurisdiction - which has been a traditional 
                                                 
149 IMO, 'IMO website'  <http://www.imo.org> [accessed 14 March 2014]. 
150 Oya Z. Özçayır, 'The use of port State control in maritime industry and the application of the 
Paris MoU', OCLJ, 14 (2009), pp. 201-204. 
151 Ibid. See also: IMO, 'Implementation, Control and Coordination'  
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principle of IMO, similar to the ‘State of Registry’ jurisdiction uder the Chicago 
Convention. The situation thus called for ‘supplementary jurisdiction over ships 
by port and coastal States.’154 
A turning point in the attitude of the international community to enforce-
ment of international maritime safety standards was when a massive oil spill oc-
curred off the coast of Brittany, France, as a result of the grounding of the ‘MV 
Amoco Cadiz’, which flew the Liberian flag.155 This incident caused ‘a strong 
political and public outcry in Europe for far more stringent regulations with regard 
to the safety of shipping.’156 Following these developments, a number of Europe-
an countries together with the European Commission, the IMO, and the Interna-
tional Labour Organization agreed that ‘the elimination of substandard shipping 
would be best achieved by coordination of port States.’157 This resulted in the 
signing in 1982, of the first regional memorandum of understanding on Port State 
Control (PSC) - the ‘Paris MoU’.158 
PSC involves the inspection of foreign ships in national ports t  verify that 
the condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of inter-
national regulations and that the ship is manned and operated in compliance with 
these rules.159 At the time of the signing of the Paris MoU, the concept of PSC 
was not new - many of the IMO conventions already contained provisions for 
ships to be inspected when they visit foreign ports to ensur  that they met re-
quirements prescribed by these instruments.160 It was however the regional ap-
proach to port control that gave this traditional instrument a completely new, ‘ex-
tremely effective’ dimension.161 As observed by a commentator:  
 
[T]he wide-scale adoption of port State control is an attempt to develop an exception to 
the competitive relationship of ports within the same region. Where the ports cooperate by 
agreeing to apply the same rules in a similar manner, then no single port seeks or acquires 
competitive advantage by offering to overlook sub-standard vessels.162  
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Following the Paris MoU other regions followed suit. At present ni e regional 
MoUs on PSC are in place in different parts of the world, all based on the Paris 
MoU model.163 The Paris MoU is considered the most stringent one, as in addition 
to the detention of sub-standard vessels - which is a feature of all PSC MoUs - it 
also envisages banning those ships persistently found not tobe in compliance with 
IMO standards from the ports of the participating States.164 All regional MoUs 
also publish white, gray and black lists of States, according to the safety perfor-
mance of the vessels carrying their flag.165 
Although originally intended to be a back up to ‘Flag State’ imple enta-
tion, PSC has become an indispensable instrument in enforcing international mari-
time conventions, and a reaction of the international community against the weak-
nesses in the enforcement of IMO rules.166 
 However, the emergence of regional MoUs on PSC has been a bottom-up 
process.167 Although IMO encouraged and promoted this system, notably throug  
the adoption of common requirements for PSC,168 it was not directly involved in 
coordinating such schemes or taking measures on the basis of the results of the 
inspections conducted by the ‘Port States’. The largest ‘Flag States’ h ve in fact 
been sceptical about a more active role for IMO in PSC.169 
The PSC system is not an ideal solution. First of all, it is not a substitute 
for the proper exercise of ‘Flag State’ responsibility. As in the aviation sector, 
ramp inspections cannot be a substitute for proper oversight by te ‘State of Reg-
istry’ of an aircraft. Also, as observed by another commentator, PSC do not have 
uniform application in all regions and sometimes not even within the same region, 
which may result in varied standards of inspectors and inspections.170 
Despite the above, the data available as well as the opinions of the com-
mentators indicate that PSC is overall an effective instrument. A study conducted 
in Sweden on the PSC data collected by the Swedish Maritime Administration in 
the years 1996-2001 indicates a high percentage of vessels exhibiting a reduction 
in the total number of reported deficiencies between earlier and subseq ent in-
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spections.171 Similarly at the level of Paris172 and Tokyo MoUs,173 and in the US 
(US Coast Guard’s Port State Control)174 the ratio of ship detentions in the years 
2001-2010 has decreased, although the overall number of inspections in these 
three regions has increased during that period. It is believed that the PSC, despite 
some of its shortcomings, will ‘remain as the most effective control systems for 
shipping in a progressing world.’175 
The PSC system, and in particular the Paris MoU, are important for this 
study because they inspired the EU rules concerning the banning of unsafe air-
craft.176 Similar to the Paris MoU region, in the EU, the ratio of findings177 under 
the Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft (SAFA) programme178 has been de-
creasing over time, suggesting that the overall safety compliance of aircraft land-
ing at European airports has improved (Figure VI).179  
The SAFA data has however to be interpreted with caution, as it does not 
necessarily mean that all sub-standard aircraft affected by the SAFA inspections 
have improved their performance. The observed improvement can in part be t-
tributed to the fact that some of the aircraft stopped operating to the EU because 
of operating restrictions imposed on them as a result of identified deficiencies. If 
however SAFA, like PSC, had global or nearly global coverage, the sub-standard 
aircraft would find it more difficult to relocate their operations to regions more 
tolerant to safety deficiencies. The EU is leading in this respect with its SAFA 
programme, covering by the end of 2013 not only the 28 EU Member States but 
also most ECAC States and a number of non-European countries including Mo-
rocco, Singapore, Canada, and United Arab Emirates (UAE). 180 Another example 
of a regional aircraft ramp inspection programme is the Safety Ramp Inspection 
Data Exchange Programme - IDISR operated by the Regional System on Safety 
Oversight in Latin America (SRVSOP), and which is very similar to the EU SAFA 
programme.181 
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Figure VI: Evolution of the SAFA inspections ratio on a regional basis 
 
Source: European Commission, Annual EU SAFA programme reports (2006-2010) 
 
The legal basis for such a global ramp inspection safety network is set out 
in Article 16 of the Chicago Convention, which gives States th right to search, 
without unreasonable delay, aircraft of the other contracting States on landing or 
departure, and to inspect the certificates and other documents prescribed by the 
Chicago Convention. This provision could be used by ICAO to promote the de-
velopment of regional ramp inspection schemes similar to PSC MoUs. The practi-
cal implementation of such schemes at regional levels could be coordinated by 
RASOs, as is the case in Europe or in Latin America. 
This is just one example of how regional cooperation can contribute to bet-
ter implementation and enforcement of international safety requirements and help 
ICAO to achieve a more uniform application in different parts of the world. The 
subsequent chapters of this study will demonstrate how RASOs, and regional co-
operation initiatives more generally, can be used to develop and promote these and 
other safety initiatives, or even to exercise safety functions on behalf of States or 
aviation authorities. Before that, it is however necessary to briefly analyse the role 
of ICAO in promoting regional cooperation on aviation safety in ge eral. 
2.4 ICAO AND THE REGIONAL GOVERNANCE OF CIVIL 
AVIATION SAFETY 
 
2.4.1 DEVELOPMENT OF ICAO REGIONAL POLICY 
The idea of regional collaboration in international civil aviation has a long tradi-
tion. The Chicago Conference in 1944 discussed the concept of ‘Regional Coun-
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for regional aviation matters and certification of international air operators estab-
lished in States of a given region.’182 
From the perspective of the Chicago Convention, the main provision ad-
dressing the issue of regional cooperation is Article 55(a), which gives the ICAO 
Council the possibility of: 
 
[E]stablishing subordinate air transport commissions on a regional or other basis and de-
fine groups of States or airlines with or through which it may deal to facilitate the carry-
ing out of the aims of this Convention. 
 
In practice the above article has not been used much, as ICAO prefers in-
stead to rely on Assembly resolutions to cooperate with regional civil aviation 
bodies.183 This is the traditional way which ICAO uses to develop policy and pro-
grammes in areas which are not explicitly addressed in the Chicago Conven-
tion.184 
In 1956 the ICAO Assembly adopted a policy framework to govern rela-
tions with ECAC – the oldest regional aviation body in existence today.185 This 
cooperation was subsequently extended to other regional aviation orga isations or 
bodies such as the AFCAC, LACAC and the Arab Civil Aviation Commission 
(ACAC).186 
These very first arrangements between ICAO and regional civil aviation 
bodies were largely of an administrative nature, and covered issues such as provi-
sion of secretarial services, coordination of meeting agendas or exchange of doc-
umentation and studies on technical subjects.187 Under these arrangements, re-
gional offices of ICAO were also used to provide assistance, especially in the ini-
tial phase of setting up a regional body.188 
This initial ICAO policy was consolidated in 1989 following adoption of 
the ICAO Assembly Resolution on general principles of cooperation w th regional 
civil aviation bodies. The objective of this policy was to:  
 
[S]upport the work and activities of any existing or future regional civil aviation bodies 
wherever such support is requested by the regional body concerned and duly approved, 
taking into account the resources of ICAO and the implementation of its Work Pro-
gramme.189  
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The 1989 policy helped to give more predictability and stabiliy to the 
planning of financial support to regional bodies, whilst at the same time providing 
a generic, formal basis for cooperation in the shape of working arrangements to be 
concluded by the Council on behalf of ICAO. 
At present much of the ICAO work is organised on a regional basis, with the 
Headquarters responsible for defining the overall policy, and relying on regional 
meetings and offices for implementation and feedback: 
(1) From the air navigation perspective ICAO divided the world into nine air 
navigation regions, with their boundaries corresponding more or less with 
the geography of major continental/sub-continental and oceanic masses.190 
Each of the regions has its corresponding Regional Air Navigation Meet-
ing, responsible for planning of air navigation services and facilities which 
are then set out in Regional Air Navigation Plans (RANP). The monitoring 
of the implementation of RANPs is conducted through Planning and Im-
plementation Regional Groups, established by the ICAO Council.191 
 
(2) Going beyond air navigation matters, the implementation of ICAO policies 
in the regions is the responsibility of the seven regional offices located in 
Bangkok, Cairo, Dakar, Lima, Mexico, Nairobi, and Paris. Regional ffic-
es are the yes and ears of ICAO in the regions and the main tool through 
which support is provided ‘on the ground’ to ICAO Member States. Their 
activities involve, in particular: 
 
(a) developing plans of actions to assist States with significant s fety 
concerns, or facing difficulties in resolving safety-related deficien-
cies, as well as following them up through dedicated USOAP activ-
ities; 
(b) organisation of regional symposia, workshops and training activi-
ties; 
(c) support to implementation of air navigation plans and programmes 
such as performance based navigation; 
(d) helping States to develop action plans for mitigating impact of avi-
ation on environment; 
(e) providing technical support with a view to enhancing the capacity 
of States to effectively implement SARPs.192 
Most recently, in the area of aviation safety a dedicated regional frame-
work with global coverage has been also put in place – the Regional Aviation 
Safety Groups (RASGs), which will be addressed in more detail in Section 2.4.3 
below. 
                                                 
190 Asia (ASIA), Pacific (PAC), Middle East (MID), African Ocean (AFI), North America (NAM), 
Caribbean (CAR), South America (SAM), Europe (EUR) and North Atlantic (NAT); see: ICAO, 
'Directives to Regional Air Navigation Meetings and Rules of Procedure for their Conduct', ICAO 
Doc. 8144-AN/874, (1991). 
191 For a more detailed overview of the ICAO regional air navigation planing mechanisms see: 
Van Antwerpen, supra note 52 in Ch.1, at pp. 25-27. 
192 For an overview of ICAO regional offices’ activities see: ICAO, 'Annual Report to Council on 
Regional Offices' activities during 2012 and Work Programmes for 2013', C-WP/13919, (2013). 
59 
 
To conclude, although the Chicago Convention only very scarcely ad-
dresses the issue of regional cooperation, this has in practice not prevented ICAO 
from basing its operations largely on a regional basis, and developing active coop-
eration with a number of regional civil aviation bodies. This policy however has 
been built incrementally and largely on an ad hoc basis. With the increasing role 
of regional organisations such as the EU and the African Union (AU) in regulating 
civil aviation, ICAO felt that there was a need to review its policy and to make its 
cooperation with regional civil aviation organisations and bodies more operational 
and much deeper. This was a trigger for the development of a completely n w 
comprehensive policy and framework for regional cooperation which is presented 
in the following section. 
2.4.2 THE 2010 ICAO POLICY AND FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL 
COOPERATION 
In 2009 ICAO started reviewing its policy on cooperation with regional aviation 
bodies. There were two main drivers behind that development. Firstly, the grow-
ing significance of regional cooperation in different parts of the world meant that 
there was a need for closer coordination between ICAO and these bodies, with a 
view to avoiding duplication of work or even conflicting developments. Secondly, 
the emergence of specialised regional aviation bodies with regulatory, oversight 
and even enforcement competences was being increasingly seen by ICAO and the
international aviation community as a way to address some of the pressing prob-
lems especially in the area of aviation safety. 
The trigger for the commencement of this review work was a Symposium 
on regional organisations organised in 2008 by ICAO and the European Commis-
sion.193 The objective of the Symposium was to discuss the experiences of r gi n-
al aviation bodies, their contributions to international civil aviation, and how to 
strengthen their relationship with ICAO.194 
The Symposium concluded that ‘Regional Organisations in civil aviation 
are already a positive reality and that a clear trend towards more regional overn-
ance can be observed.’195 It also underlined that, ‘while ICAO has historically 
always been positively inclined to the role of regional organisations, more should 
be done in strengthening the cooperation and relationship of reginal civil avia-
tion bodies with ICAO.’196 The Symposium made a number of recommendations, 
which were in particular related to: 
 
- The need for ICAO to continue to use cooperative arrangements with re-
gional organisations such as Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) or 
Memoranda of Cooperation (MoC); 
- The contribution of regional safety organisations to a more effective im-
plementation of ICAO’s SARPs; and 
- The development of a regular dialogue between ICAO and regional organ-
isations. 
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The recommendations of the 2008 Symposium were further developed by 
a multidisciplinary group comprised of members of the ICAO Secretariat, repre-
sentatives of the ICAO Council and interested representatives of international 
organisations.197 The multidisciplinary group delivered its final report for the 188th 
session of the ICAO Council.198 
The work of the multidisciplinary group resulted in a far reaching overhaul 
of the ICAO policy on regional cooperation, including a recommendation that 
more involvement of ICAO and States at a high level was necessary to implement 
the policy of regional cooperation.199 The multidisciplinary group developed three 
documents, which were subsequently endorsed by the ICAO Council,200 and the 
Assembly:201 
- ICAO’s policy on regional cooperation; 
- ICAO Framework of Regional Cooperation, and a Strategic Plan of 
Action for ICAO Headquarters and Regional Offices; 
- Template Agreement for Regional Cooperation. 
Analysis of the above documents, and the discussions held by the multi-
disciplinary group, show that the key concern of ICAO has been to avoid, or at 
least to minimise, the duplication between its activities, at the headquarters’ and 
regional offices’ levels, and those of the regional organisations competent in civil 
aviation, as well as to ensure better harmonisation in all regions of implementa-
tion of SARPs and related policies.202  
In order to achieve the objectives of the new policy, and to make sure that 
all areas of regional cooperation are covered, the above mentioned ‘ICAO 
Framework of Regional Cooperation’ proposes ‘eight strategic thrusts’: 
(1) common efforts at harmonizing, between States, operational regula-
tions requirements and procedures based on ICAO SARPs implemen-
tation; 
(2) understanding each other’s roles and responsibilities; 
(3) establishment of improved mechanisms for consultation and coopera-
tion, including electronic information sharing; 
(4) coordinated programme planning and implementation between ICAO 
and the regional civil aviation bodies; 
(5) periodic review of regional issues; 
(6) maximising the effective use of resources at ICAO; 
(7) benefiting from each other’s competence and expertise; and 
(8) joint training and capacity building. 
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Following its endorsement by the Assembly, the policy is being imple-
mented by ICAO through regional operational plans, consistent with the overall 
ICAO Business Plan.203 As indicated above, one of the key objectives of the new 
policy is to better define the roles and responsibilities of ICAO and regional civil 
aviation bodies and organisations in the various ICAO regions with a view to 
avoiding overlap and optimising the use of resources. This is being achieved by 
formalising the cooperation through MoUs.  
Although ICAO in the past used different instruments to formalise cooper-
ation with regional bodies, the new regional policy envisages a more systematic 
and standardised approach. Based on a ‘Template Agreement for Regional Coop-
eration’, by the end of 2013 ICAO had signed MoUs with all the main regional 
civil aviation bodies and organisations, including: AU, EU, ACAC, AFCAC, 
ECAC and LACAC.204 
The MoUs address issues such as improved mechanisms for consultation 
and cooperation, including electronic information sharing; coordinated pro-
gramme planning and implementation by ICAO and the regional civil aviation 
bodies; and joint training and capacity building.  
The MoUs provide a general framework of cooperation between ICAO 
and regional organisations and regional civil aviation bodies, including in respect 
of safety matters, where the RASOs play an increasingly important role. 
2.4.3 ICAO VIEWS ON REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY 
ORGANISATIONS 
The global picture of regional cooperation on aviation safety matters is currently 
quite complex and involves a number of layers and forms of cooperation.  
Following the establishment of USOAP in the 1990s, ICAO realised that 
SARPs are far from being applied in a uniform manner across the world, and that 
in addition some of the States do not have the necessary expertise or resources to 
establish effective safety oversight systems. In response to these probl ms it start-
ed setting up technical assistance programmes on a regional basis known as 
COSCAPs (Cooperative Development of Operational Safety and Continuing Air-
worthiness Programme).205 
The main objective of COSCAPs is to assist States in the development of a 
harmonised regulatory framework and effective implementation of the CEs of 
safety oversight as identified by ICAO.206 Their scope was originally limited to 
pilot licensing, flight operations and airworthiness matters, that is Annexes 1, 6 
and 8 to the Chicago Convention, but over time extended to other areas of avia-
tion safety, including ATM, aerodromes, and accident investigation, in line with 
the CSA of USOAP.207 At the beginning of 2014 seven COSCAP projects were 
still in operation.208 
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Finally, in 2010 ICAO decided to create another structure - the RASGs - 
‘to address and harmonize all flight operations safety issues on an ICAO region-
wide basis.’209 When establishing the RASGs ICAO argued that both COSCAPs 
and RASOs created by States are established on a sub-regional basis only and 
focus mainly on oversight issues. The main objective behind ICAO creating 
RASGs is to have a system with world-wide coverage (see Figure VII) to monitor 
and coordinate the implementation of the GASP. 
 
Figure VII: ICAO Regional Aviation Safety Groups (RASGs) 
Source: ICAO, State of Global Aviation Safety (2013)210 
 
What we can therefore see is that, although the Chicago Convention is al-
most silent about regional cooperation, the concept itself is very much supported 
by ICAO as far as aviation safety matters are concerned. This is especially visible 
when it comes to RASOs – which in the ICAO jargon are referred to as Regional 
Safety Oversight Organisations (RSOO) or Regional Accident Investigation Or-
ganisations (RAIO) depending on the type of activity they undertake.211 
RASOs are specialised bodies tasked with assisting States in r gulating 
and overseeing civil aviation activities, or even taking over some or all of such 
functions from the national governments. A limited number of such bodies 
evolved from COSCAP projects as Chapter 3 will demonstrate. Althoug  some of 
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these organisations have history dating back as far as the 1970s, a significant 
number of them have only been set up in the last twelve years. 
The concept of establishing RASOs was endorsed by ICAO Assembly in 
2004212 and since then has become an official part of ICAO policy, currently re-
flected in a number of Assembly resolutions,213 ICAO Annexes214 and manuals, 
two of which are dedicated entirely to the establishment of RSOOs and RAIOs.215 
One of the Assembly resolutions even puts RSOOs almost on an equal footing 
with States, when it comes to the USOAP.216 
Under the current policy established by the Assembly, the ICAO Council is 
directed to ‘promote the concept of regional cooperation for the purpose of en-
hancing safety and safety oversight, including the establishment of regional safety 
oversight organizations.’217 Similarly, ICAO Member States are encouraged ‘to 
participate in, or provide tangible support for, the strengthening and furtherance of 
sub-regional and regional aviation safety and safety oversight bodies, including 
regional safety oversight organizations.’218 In general, ICAO believes that: 
 
[E]establishment of sub-regional and regional aviation safety and safety ov rsight bodies, 
including regional safety oversight organizations, has great potential to assist States in 
complying with their obligations under the Chicago Convention hrough economies of 
scale and harmonization on a larger scale.219  
 
In particular RASOs are believed to be an important element of ICAO’s 
response to safety oversight problems faced by Africa, which is currently the east 
performing ICAO region in terms of aviation safety. As highlighted by AFCAC: 
 
[M]any African States do not have adequate aviation activities that could generate the 
necessary resources. This low volume of activity is not enough to run a workable safety 
oversight system. To overcome this problem a Regional Safety Oversight Organization 
(RSOO) can provide access to the necessary expertise through the sharing and pooling of 
resources.220 
 
The limited available research by aviation experts on RASO type bodi s 
suggests that, under certain conditions, they can provide economies f scale to 
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‘conserve precious human and fiscal resources’, and ‘promote harmonisation of 
safety requirements, reducing the burden…on struggling airlines.’221  
In addition to providing policy and guidance material on RASOs, ICAO is 
also involved, hands-on, in the development and management of some of these 
organisations, especially in the initial phase of their operations. Such support in-
cludes: drafting of RASO constituent documents, assistance in their management 
and technical operations, consultation services, training of personnel, provision of 
information and documents that a RASO may need, and even financial ssis-
tance.222 Finally ICAO also promotes transition of COSCAP projects to RASO 
type bodies, but in 2014 this process was still ongoing, as Chapter 3 will demon-
strate. 
Overall, the picture which emerges from a review of ICAO documents and 
programmes is that of a well-established policy favouring regional cooperation 
and in particular RASO type bodies as one of the key answers to global safety 
oversight problems. On the other hand the implementation of this policy is not yet 
complete, as for example the transition of COSCAPs to RASO is still ongoing. In 
addition the parallel existence of RASGs, COSCAPs and RASOs creates a risk of 
duplication of activities and resulting waste of resources. 
The biggest test case for RASOs will be in Africa. Only if RASOs manage 
to achieve tangible results in helping African States to resolv  significant safety 
concerns and raise the level of implementation of their safety oversight systems to 
world-average levels, will the real value of these bodies be demonstrated. So far 
this is not yet the case. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, the ben fits of establishing 
RASOs cannot always be taken for granted. 
Finally, from the perspective of global governance of civil aviation, the 
ICAO new policy on regional cooperation, and the emergence of RASOs can be 
seen as exemplification of the phenomenon which is referred to by Boisson de 
Chazournes as ‘dualisme fonctionnel’.223 This concept, characterises the regional 
trends which have been taking place since the middle of the twentieth century, and 
where the regional organisations are seen as vehicles not only to address issues of 
regional concern but also to tackle global problems, and thus to con ribute to bet-
ter implementation of international law in general. 
2.5 PROPOSAL FOR A GLOBAL AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT 
NETWORK 
ICAO needs to reflect on what the ultimate role should be of the RASOs or more 
generally of regional aviation safety systems, in global safety governance. So far 
their role has mainly been seen as a way to address deficiencies in safety oversight 
systems of States which are unable to deal with these deficiencies on their own.  
This study argues that, looking from a global perspective, in the short term 
the most important function of RASOs should continue to be to assist States in 
resolving their safety oversight deficiencies and setting up sustainable s fety over-
                                                 
221 Jennison, 'Regional safety oversight bodies deliver economies of scale and greater uniformity', 
supra note 54 in Ch.1, at pp. 9-12, 34-35. 
222 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 6.2. 
223 Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 43 in Ch.1, at p. 145-146. 
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has good tools for global safety oversight, it is unlikely that it will ever become a 
true global enforcer of SARPs. 
The architecture of the proposed GASON should be based on ICAO rely-
ing on and working closely with a number of strong RASOs, which could ensure 
harmonised implementation of SARPs at regional levels and organise regional 
enforcement mechanisms, such as ramp inspection schemes. 
In a GASON, the RASOs would be an intermediary between the ICAO 
and States, feeding USOAP-CMA with information about the level of implemen-
tation of SARPs and eight CEs in the regions, without prejudice to the right of 
ICAO to reach out directly to a State if it deemed it necessary. 
Such a system would not only allow ICAO to be more efficient in the use 
of its resources, but would also contribute to more uniform imple entation of 
SARPs as, instead of a multitude of national regimes, the system could ultimately 
provide for just a few dozen regional schemes which would be much easierfor 
ICAO to standardise. The regions could also conclude multilatera  aviation safety 
agreements enabling large scale recognition of audit results and certifications and 
thus greatly contributing to the facilitation of aviation busine s. 
As part of the GASON, the regions, through regional safety plans and pro-
grammes to be coordinated by ICAO RASGs, could also move in a more concert-
ed manner towards harmonising their actual safety performance, thus contributing 
to more uniform implementation of safety targets agreed at the global level, in 
particular in the GASP. From the perspective of an air passenger, the aviation sec-
tor should offer not only high but also as uniform as possible level of safety re-
gardless of the points of departure and destination. 
The concept of a GASON would of course require a high level of confi-
dence by ICAO in the robustness of the regional systems which it would be moni-
toring and relying on. This in turn requires the RASOs to be strong and appropri-
ately empowered. This is not yet the case because, as will be demonstrated in sub-
sequent chapters, the vast majority of RASOs currently have only advisory or 
support functions, with only a few of them having competence to take legally 
binding decisions or to enforce aviation standards. 
Based on the above considerations, this study proposes the following defi-
nition of the GASON: 
 
A worldwide system for the standardisation and monitoring of ICAO Member States’ lev-
el of effective implementation of eight Critical Elements of State safety oversight, relying 
on information generated by Regional Aviation Safety Organisations; which are empow-
ered, through international agreements or supranational law, to ensure uniform compli-
ance of their Member States with the Chicago Convention and Standards and Recom-
mended Practices laid down in the Annexes to this Convention. 
 
The first enablers of the GASON are already coming into place. The As-
sembly Resolution introducing the USOAP-CMA226 envisages the possibility of 
ICAO relying on information provided by RASOs. In Europe, the EU has already 
concluded a special arrangement with ICAO which will allow for an interaction 
between the ICAO USOAP-CMA and EASA standardisation inspections with a 
view to ultimately relieving EU States of ICAO audits, and for ICAO to rely on 
standardisation inspections to verify the level of implementation of the eight CEs 
                                                 
226 Assembly Resolution A37-5, supra note 71. 
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and ICAO SARPs in the EU Member States.227 Other regional organisations, such 
as the IAC, which will be presented in the next chapter, have entered into ar-
rangements with ICAO to share safety oversight information.228 Although, still 
very preliminary, these developments could be seen as small building blocks for 
the future GASON. 
As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, there is also a clearly visible trend 
for RASOs to evolve over time into more formalised structures with legal person-
ality and stronger oversight and enforcement competences, which should all w 
them over time to be able to demonstrate to ICAO that they are able to eff ctively 
ensure oversight and discharge other safety functions required by the Chicago 
Conventions and its Annexes on behalf of States, and thus hopefully to prove ef-
fective components of the GASON. 
2.6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The Chicago Convention is a very successful international treaty, if looked at from 
the perspective of its global acceptance, and predominantly focuses on the regula-
tion of technical aspects of international civil aviation. Yet, in the past it had been 
subject to some criticism with regard to the effectiveness of global implementa-
tion of aviation safety standards, and the enforcement competences of ICAO. 
In reality, the very fact that the Chicago Convention achieved such a broad 
degree of acceptance can be largely attributed to the fact that its drafters managed 
to strike a good balance between, on the one hand a desire to achieve ‘the highest 
practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organi-
zation in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services’, which is 
necessary for aviation as a global industry, and on the other hand, t e principle 
that ‘each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above 
its territory.’ 
The greatest paradox of the system of the Chicago Convention is hat over 
time it has become the victim of the original compromise which allowed the sys-
tem to be born in the first place. With ICAO’s membership increasing teadily to 
191 participating States, and based on the principle of individual State responsibil-
ity for safety oversight, it has become virtually unavoidable that t e level of im-
plementation of SARPs and eight CEs will be variable across the world. 
With the differences - sometimes significant - in safety oversight between 
individual national jurisdictions revealed thanks to USOAP transparency, States, 
especially those with a good safety record, started to increasingly ri-fence their 
airspaces and territories with requirements for additional certifications, authorisa-
tions, audits and checks. Unilateral inspection schemes started to emerge duplicat-
ing the USOAP efforts. Today even the recognition of very basic certifiates nec-
essary for day-to-day cross border operations of airlines, such as AOCs, and cer-
tificates of airworthiness is being increasingly made conditional upon additional 
authorisations and surveillance programmes. 
It is really hard not to criticise a system which requires, for example, a r -
pair station to obtain up to twenty different certificates to perform exactly the 
                                                 
227 See Paragraph 7 of: 'Annex on aviation safety to the Memorandum of Cooperation between the 
European Union and the International Civil Aviation Organization providing a framework for 
enhanced cooperation', (OJ L 232, 9 September 2011). 
228 A38-WP/50, supra note 138, at Appendix, Paragraph 5.1. 
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same work, only because the aircraft it works on are registered in twenty different 
States and which, at least in theory, should follow the same set of minimum inter-
national requirements. This ‘death by audit’ and, one could also add, ‘ eath by re-
certification’, has today become a major source of inefficiency in the global sys-
tem, in addition to problems that some States experience in setti g up effective 
safety oversight arrangements. 
States are of course aware of these inefficiencies and try to address them, 
in particular through the BASAs, in the hope that this will bring them back to 
achieving the objective of ‘the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regula-
tions, standards, procedures’. However, because they are only bilateral in nature, 
BASAs, whilst giving benefits to a specific pair of States, from a more general 
perspective actually contribute to the fragmentation of the global regulatory sys-
tem. 
At the same time, it cannot be denied that ICAO has drawn lessons from 
the past and is making good progress in helping States to impr ve their compli-
ance with international requirements, within the scope of its mandate and taking 
into account the legal and political limitations that it has as an intergovernmental 
organisation. Differences in safety oversight performance between and within 
ICAO regions persist, but the review of ICAO audit results show that States are 
consistently managing to improve the level of effective implementatio  of 
USAOP protocols. The overall trend is therefore positive. 
At the end of 2013, States with SSCs represented overall only 0.3% of the 
worldwide international air traffic and ICAO is very committed to further reduc-
ing this figure. ICAO is also working on improving the implementation of Article 
38 on filing of difference, and has managed to secure a competence to publish, as 
of 2014, a publicly available list of States with the most serious safety deficien-
cies. This is not a bad result compared to other intergovernmental organisations, 
such as the IAEA which is still struggling to convince its Member States to agree 
to a mandatory system of inspections, even after accidents as terrible as the one at 
the nuclear plant in Fukushima, Japan in 2011. 
There are of course elements which can be further improved, such as more 
standardisation and uniformity in application of Article 38 on the filing of differ-
ences, where ICAO should, in addition to offering an EFOD system, conduct a 
more general review as to the scope and purpose of notifying the differ nces.  
What is however certainly clear today, is that ICAO, with its 191 Member 
States, will not be able to continue working as it did in the past with the resources 
available. The recent shift to the USOAP–CMA methodology is a telling example 
of that new reality. 
ICAO therefore needs to find a way which would allow it, in addition to 
monitoring State safety performance and helping States in addressing the detected 
deficiencies and enforcing global standards, to also address more decisively the 
ongoing erosion of the aviation safety system in terms of redundant regulatory 
oversight and waste of resources deriving from duplicate certifications. Regional 
cooperation can be seen as one of the principal answers to these challenges. 
Regional cooperation, although only scarcely addressed in the Chicago 
Convention, is not a new subject for ICAO, who in 2010 adopted a comprehen-
sive ‘Policy and Framework for Regional Cooperation’. An integral part of this 
policy is recognition of the value and support that regional aviation safety organi-
sations or RASOs can provide. Today there is a strong conviction amongst the 




[E]stablishment of subregional and regional aviation safety and safety oversight bodies, 
including regional safety oversight organizations, has great potential to assist States in 
complying with their obligations under the Chicago C nvention through economies of 
scale and harmonization on a larger scale.229  
 
The main test case for the effectiveness of RASOs will be in Africa, where 
many States do not individually have the necessary resources ‘to run a workable 
safety oversight system’, and where the overall safety levels – despite im rove-
ment – remain the lowest in the world. ICAO should also finalise the transition of 
COSCAPs into RASO type bodies where it is possible, as the parallel existence of 
RASGs, COSCAPs and RASOs creates the risk of duplication of effort and waste 
of resources. This duplication will be further demonstrated in Chapter 3. 
Experiences from the international maritime sector and the European SA-
FA programme demonstrate that regional cooperation can be an effective way to
ensure more uniform implementation and enforcement of international safety 
standards. It can be argued however that ICAO should not be looking at RASOs 
merely from the perspective of tools to be deployed to address deficiencies i  
safety oversight systems of States which are unable to deal with such problems on 
their own. Instead RASOs should be fully integrated into the way ICAO manages 
safety and used as building blocks for a future GASON.  
The architecture of the GASON should be based on ICAO relying on and 
working closely with a number of strong RASOs, which could ensure harmonised 
implementation of SARPs at regional levels and organise regional enforcement 
mechanisms. Such a system would not only allow ICAO to be more efficient in 
the use of resources, but would also contribute to more uniform implementation of 
SARPs, as instead of a multitude of national regimes, the system could ultimately 
provide for a more limited number of regional schemes which would be much 
easier to standardise and control. The regional approach would also contribute to 
harmonisation of actual safety performance through regional safety performance 
planning at RASG level and consistent with globally agreed GASP targets. 
The concept of the GASON would however require a high level of confi-
dence by ICAO in the robustness of the regional systems which it would be moni-
toring and relying on. This in turn would necessitate strong and appropriately em-
powered RASOs which is not yet always the case, as the following chapters - pre-
senting and analysing these organisations in detail - will show. 
                                                 









‘The establishment of regional civil aviation bodies with regulatory and/or 
executive tasks and responsibilities should not be seen as a threat to the global 
framework for civil aviation, but as an opportunity to reinforce it and to make it 
work better.’ 
 
Daniel Calleja Crespo 







Following a presentation and analysis of the international aviation safety frame-
work as established by the Chicago Convention, as well as of the regional aviation 
safety policy of ICAO, this chapter will introduce the notion of a RASO (Section 
3.2) and propose a definition of this kind of organisation (Section 3.3). It will also 
propose a typology of regional aviation safety bodies based on specific f atures of 
their legal and organisational set-ups, and illustrate this typology with examples of 
RASOs and pre-RASOs from different parts of the world (Section 3.4 and 3.5). 
Finally it will introduce the notion of a Regional Civil Aviation Authority 
(RCAA), and present and analyse the only existing example of such organisation, 
the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority (ECCAA, Section 3.6). 
3.2 THE RASO CONCEPT IN STATE AND ICAO PRACTICE 
At present there is no internationally agreed definition of a RASO as understood 
in the ICAO context. As was explained in the previous chapters, in practice each 
of these organisations falls into one of the two basic categories, that is RSOO and 
RAIOs, depending on whether its function is safety regulation and oversight, or 
investigation of aviation accidents and incidents. 
The present approach of ICAO and of the international aviation communi-
ty is to treat RSOOs and RAIOs as broad concepts covering different forms of 
cooperation, even including technical cooperation projects. The common denomi-
nator which is used by ICAO and States to define an organisation or form of co-
operation as a RSOO or a RAIO is its general objective of strengthening safety 
                                                 
1 Former Director of the Air Transport Directorate of the European Commission speaking on the 
occasion of the EC-ICAO Symposium on Regional Organisations,supra note 43 in Ch.1. 
71 
 
oversight and investigation capabilities of States located in the same geographical 
region, rather than being defined by the particular institutional r legal setup.2  
The above understanding is confirmed by ICAO manuals, which in the 
case of RSOOs explain that this term: 
 
[C]overs, in a general sense, a number of legal forms and institutional structures that 
range from highly formalized international intergovernmental organizations…to less insti-
tutionalized projects established under the ICAO Cooperative Development of Operation-
al Safety and Continuing Airworthiness Programme.3  
 
ICAO further explains in its RSOO manual that: 
 
Assembly resolutions essentially leave it up to each group of States that wishes to estab-
lish an RSOO to determine the legal form and institutional structure that best fits the 
needs and characteristics of their specific region.4 
 
In the case of a RAIO, the ICAO manual on this subject simply describes 
the different functions that such organisations may undertake without offering any 
specific definition.5 
There are at least two reasons for this current broad approach of ICAO. 
Firstly, from a policy point of view, ICAO does not want to exclude from its re-
gional safety framework any initiative, even if institutionally not very formalised, 
which contributes to the improvement of aviation safety. Most importantly how-
ever, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, regional aviation safety bodies have a 
general tendency to evolve over time into more institutionalised forms. Therefore, 
an organisation which today is only a loose association of national aviation safety 
authorities could tomorrow be a fully-fledged regional aviation safety agency with 
legal personality and executive competences. ICAO wants to follow and support 
such evolutions. 
The practical result of the current broad approach is that RASOs differ a 
lot in the tasks they undertake, their legal status and organisatio al set ups. At the 
same time the notion of a RASO, and especially of a RSOO, is being used in-
creasingly in ICAO documentation, including Assembly resolutins and Annexes 
to the Chicago Convention. In recent years a tendency can be observed to include 
in ICAO documents provisions which address specific requests directly to RA-
SOs, or even envisage a possibility of attributing to them functions which tradi-
tionally, under the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, have been the exclusive 
domain of States. Two examples can be given to illustrate this trend: 
 
- Under the 2010 Assembly resolution on the USOAP-CMA, RSOOs are 
considered as States where applicable.6 This is the first instance of an 
                                                 
2 See: ICAO, Symposium on regional safety oversight organizations (Montreal, Canada, 2011),  
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/RSOOSYMPO/Pages/default. spx> [accessed 18 March 2014]. 
3 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Forward. 
4 Ibid. 
5ICAO Doc. 9946, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Chapters 2-3. 
6 See: Assembly Resolution A37-5, supra note 71 in Ch.2, which provides that because RSOOs 
‘have an important role in the USOAP CMA’, wherever applicable, the word ‘States’ as used in 
that Resolution ‘should be read to include RSOOs.’ 
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ICAO Assembly resolution which explicitly places RSOOs on equal foot-
ing with States. 
 
- Under Amendment 13 to ICAO Annex 13 adopted in 2010, States now 
have a possibility to ‘delegate the whole or any part of the conducting of ... 
investigation to … a regional accident investigation organization by mutu-
al arrangement and consent.’7 
 
In situations like the two examples cited above, lack of a definition makes 
it difficult to understand to whom exactly such documents are addressed. In the 
future, more references to RASOs are expected to find their way into ICAO doc-
umentation. It would thus be desirable to eliminate any ambiguity as to who is the 
addressee of the provisions contained in ICAO documents, especially where such 
documents grant to a RSOO or a RAIO a right to carry out functions s  far nor-
mally exercised only by States. 
3.3 PROPOSAL FOR THE DEFINITION OF A RASO  
In view of the above, it would be advisable for ICAO to develop a definition, or at 
least basic criteria, to classify RASOs from the perspective of regulatory, over-
sight or investigative functions they can carry out. 
A desire for a definition and classification criteria for RASOs was also ex-
pressed in 2011 by the ICAO RSOO symposium, which felt that such a definition 
would allow all stakeholders, including ICAO and technical cooperation partners, 
to ‘better adapt their activities to the different types of RASOs.’8 By mid-2014 
such a definition has not been developed. 
The purpose of a RASO definition should not only be to codify the current 
ICAO and State practice, but also to stimulate the most efficient forms of such 
organisations. In this respect, from a legal point of view, the most significant crite-
ria that should be highlighted in such a definition would be a possession by a RA-
SO of a competence to carry out, on behalf of States, safety related functions and 
duties set out by the Chicago Convention, in a legally binding manner. Such com-
petence ‘provides the best dividend in terms of efficiency and the effective use of 
resources’,9 which strengthens the RASO mandate and makes it more suitable to 
be an effective part of the GASON, as was proposed in the preceding chapter. 
From an international law point of view, and as will be demonstrated in Chapters 
4 and 6, the granting of such powers means that a relationship of an international 
agency is established between a RASO and the States on behalf of which it carries 
out the subject matter functions and duties. The research done for the purpose of 
this study (see Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4) shows that such a relationship presup-
poses the possession by the organisation in question of a separate international 
legal personality. 
The building of a RASO definition is, however, not an easy t k due to the 
much diversified nature of RASOs’ legal basis and institutional set ups. Neverthe-
less, for the purpose of this study the following definition is proposed: 
 
                                                 
7 Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 5.1 and Paragraph 5.1.2. 
8 Outcomes of 2011 RSOO Symposium (C-WP/13810), supra note 4 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.1.1. 
9 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at paragraph 3.1.1. 
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A Regional Aviation Safety Organisation is: An organisation established by States from 
the same geographical region, which has legal personality under international law and 
whose principal purpose is the provision of support f r the carrying out of safety-related 
functions and duties set out by the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, and preferably 
the actual carrying out of some or all of such functions and duties on behalf of its partici-
pating States. 
 
The main elements of the proposed definition requiring additional com-
ments are as follows: 
- Participants: Although the majority of RASOs have members, some of 
them, such as the EASA which is a specialised agency of the EU, do not 
have State membership (see Chapter 4). The proposed definition covers
the different types of relationships that may exist in this respect. The pro-
posed definition also does not differentiate between RSOOs and RAIOs 
but it is understood that a RASO can have either regulatory and oversight 
functions or accident investigation competences. 
 
- International legal personality: As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, there is a 
general trend for RASOs to evolve into organisations with legal personali-
ty under domestic or international law. This is because possession of a le-
gal personality gives to a RASO the possibility to hire and fire staff and to 
contract services and facilities, which in turn makes the functioning of a 
RASO more efficient. In addition, where a RASO implements, on behalf 
of States, the provisions of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes this 
presupposes a possession by the RASO of international legal personality, 
as Chapters 4 and 6 will demonstrate. The inclusion of the requirement of 
international legal personality intends therefore to promote those forms f 
RASOs which are able to accept the most advanced forms of delegations. 
On the other hand this requirement excludes from the definition 
COSCAPs, which should not be treated as RASOs given the ICAO policy 
of transforming COSCAPs into RSOOs (See Section 3.4.1.1), as well as 
associations of aviation authorities (See Section 3.4.2), which are not ca-
pable of changing the rights and obligations of their member authorities 
under international law. 
 
- Delegation of safety functions and duties: From the point of view of the 
Chicago Convention and as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, States can 
delegate to RASOs the carrying out of safety functions and duties only, 
while the ultimate legal responsibility for these functions and duties re-
mains with the States. This is also in line with the division between State 
sovereignty and the practical exercise of this sovereignty as was demon-
strated in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2. The proposed definition remains con-
sistent with these principles by underlining that, when delegation takes 
place, this concerns only the functions and duties and must be done at the 
State level.10 
                                                 
10 This is without prejudice to the fact that in practical terms there are also numerous pre-RASOs 
(see Section 3.4), which are composed of the national authorities, and which perform technical 
74 
 
Having analysed the notion of a RASO and provided a definition of this 
kind of organisations, a typology and classification of regional aviation safety 
bodies will now be proposed. 
3.4 TYPOLOGY OF REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY BODIES 
States do not follow a universal template when establishing regional aviation safe-
ty bodies. In practice such initiatives differ a lot in terms of their legal basis, func-
tions, funding principles, scope of work and relationship with the Member States 
or member authorities. 
In 2014 over twenty initiatives in almost all parts of the world could be 
considered as RASOs if looked at from the perspective of the broad approach fol-
lowed at present by ICAO. This includes initiatives ranging from projects of a 
merely technical cooperation nature, to fully fledged regional aviation safety 
agencies with legal personality and competences to create legally binding effects 
for the aviation industry. In addition, a number of projects aiming at establishing 
additional RASOs were ongoing at the time of the finalisation of this study. In 
total, by mid-2014, over 100 ICAO Member States have been members of such 
organisations, and this not counting the COSCAP projects and RASO initiatives 
under consideration. 
The typology proposed in the following sections distinguishes between 
two main categories of regional aviation safety bodies: (i) RASOs and (ii) pre-
RASOs. While pre-RASOs do not strictly speaking fall within the scope of the 
RASO definition proposed in the preceding section because of their lack of inter-
national legal personality, they have however been included in this typology for 
the sake of completeness, and because such pre-RASOs have a tendency to evolve 
into RASOs proper, as Chapter 5 will demonstrate. 
The below typology (Figure IX) is primarily focused on RSOOs, which are 
the dominant types of RASOs today, and uses the legal form and institutional sta-
tus of the regional body as main distinguishing factors. 
The typology of RAIOs is briefly addressed in Section 3.5. RAIOs are dif-
ferentiated by ICAO into basic and complex, depending on whether they carry out 
accident investigation functions and duties on behalf of their Member States, or 
have only advisory and coordination functions. This ICAO distinction between 
basic and complex RAIOs broadly corresponds to the pre-RASO and RASO di-
chotomy proposed by this study. In 2014 RAIOs were still very rare. 
The typology proposed in this chapter was developed for the purpose of 
this study and is by no means the only one possible. Althoug  every type of a pre-
RASO and RASO has its pros and cons, the purpose of the proposed classification 
is not to present better or worse types, but rather to systematise the knowledge 




                                                                                                                            
tasks, such as aircraft certification, centrally to the benefit of those authorities. International law 
treats such situations ‘as if the States were acting themselves’ and not the RASO. This has been 
confirmed by the ICJ in: 'Certain Phosphate Lands i Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary 
Objections', in: [1992] ICJ Reports 240, (ICJ,1992),  (p. 258). See also: Sarooshi, supra note 19 in 
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COSCAPs are cooperative regional projects established under ICAO auspices 
with the objective of enhancing
State
gerial and administrative services.
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and therefore cannot conclude, in their own name, agreements with other enti-
ties.13 COSCAPs are usually set-up by a project document signed between ICAO 
and the participating States, and containing details of the objectives of the project, 
its governance, sources of funding, and duties and responsibilities of all the par-
ties.14 
From a practical point of view, COSCAPs support participating States in 
the harmonisation of legislation and procedures, training of inspectors, and can 
also provide safety oversight services for the benefit of the national aviation au-
thorities. Given however that a COSCAP does not possess separate legal personal-
ity, the certification and surveillance services provided by the inspectors recruited 
through the project are considered as performed by the beneficiary national via-
tion authorities, that is, COSCAP inspectors are considered as members of the 
staff of the national authorities when performing their assistance funtions.15 
The above also means that COSCAPs do not have own enforcement com-
petences, and COSCAP inspectors can only propose enforcement actionsto par-
ticipating authorities based on the technical work performed on behalf of these 
authorities.16 Similarly the regulations developed under COSCAP projects only 
have the status of recommendations and need to be considered and adopted by 
States in accordance with their domestic procedures.17 
Although not possessing legal personality, COSCAPs can play a role in es-
tablishing fully-fledged RSOOs, and it is the policy of ICAO to promote the tran-
sitioning of COSCAPs into RSOO type bodies, where appropriate.18 By mid-2014 
this process was most advanced in Africa, where two COSCAP projects had al-
ready transitioned into a RSOO,19 and where two additional COSCAPs were in 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.at Paragraph 3.2.3. 
15 See for example: COSCAP-SA, 'Model bilateral agreem nt between COSCAP South Asia and 
States for obtaining Services of Technical Experts from COSCAP South Asia to perform Safety 
Oversight functions' 2009) <http://www.coscapsa.org/Manuals/ifapmanual.pdf> [accessed 6 
August 2014]. Under Paragraph 2(i) of the this model agreement COSCAP-SA Member States 
take full responsibility for the work, tasks or activities performed by the COSCAP-SA technical 
experts at their behest or on their behalf and undertak  to hold the COSCAP-SA and any of its 
staff or ICAO harmless, not-liable and/or not responsible against potential third party action aris-
ing out of such work, tasks or activities. COSCAP-SA Member States also undertake, under Para-
graph 2(c) of the model agreement, to treat the COSAP-SA technical experts as part of their 
technical staff when performing safety oversight activities and accord to such technical experts due 
respect, status and protection as provided to its own staff. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See for example: ICAO, 'Cooperative Development of Operational Safety and Continuing 
Airworthiness Programme – South Asia (COSCAP-SA) Phase III'  
<http://www.coscapsa.org/maindocuments.php> [accessed 6 August 2014]. This programme doc-
ument (Paragraph 4.3(e)) envisages ‘Assisting Member States in the development of rules, regula-
tions and procedures for harmonization of civil aviation regulatory affairs in the region.’ 
18 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Forward. 
19 This is the case for the COSCAP-BAG, which transitioned into ‘Banjul Accord Group Safety 
Oversight Organisation (BAGASOO)’, which is presented in Section 3.4.3.4 of this Chapter, and 
the COSCAP–CEMAC, which evolved into ‘Agence De Supervision De La Sécurité Aérienne En 
Afrique Centrale (ASSA-AC)’ (see: CEMAC, 'Reunion des ministres des transports des etats 
membres de la cemac et sao tome et principe - communique final'  <http://www.cemac.int/press-
release/reunion-des-ministres-des-transports-des-etat membres-de-la-cemac-et-sao-tome-et> 
[accessed 7 August 2014]. 
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the process of doing so.20 In respect to other regions, this launching pad function 
of COSCAPs has so far been very limited, as Table IV demonstrates. 
Table IV: Transition of ICAO COSCAPs into RSOOs (2014) 
COSCAP (start of operations)21 RSOO transition arrangements 
COSCAP – BAG (2005) 
Transition completed into: Banjul Accord Group Safety 
Oversight Organisation (BAGASOO) 
COSCAP – CIS (2001) No transition planned 
COSCAP Latin America (2001) 
Today known as ‘SRVSOP’, but operating still as an ICAO 
programme 
COSCAP – North Asia (2003) No transition planned 
COSCAP – SADC (2008) 
Transition on-going into: Southern African Development 
Community Aviation Safety Organisation (SASO) 
COSCAP – SEA (2001) No transition planned 
COSCAP – UEMOA (2005) In the course of transition into a RSOO 
COSCAP – Gulf States (2006) Transition into a RSOO considered 
COSCAP – South Asia (1998) No transition planned 
COSCAP – CEMAC (2008) 
Transition completed into: Agence De Supervision De La 
Sécurité Aérienne En Afrique Centrale (ASSA-AC) 
 
Although the transitioning of COSCAPs into RSOOs is most advanced in 
Africa, the situation there is also most complex, as some of the Stat s are mem-
bers of multiple organisations, as Figure X demonstrates. 
For example, the Republic of Tanzania is a member of COSCAP-SADC, 
which in 2014 was being transitioned into SASO - a RSOO of the Southern Afri-
can Development Community.22 At the same time it is a member of the East Afri-
can Community Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency (CASSOA), 
by virtue of Tanzania’s membership of the East African Community (EAC).  
Similarly Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo are members of the West African Economic and Monetary Un-
ion (UEMOA), which is currently in the process of setting up a RSOO,23 and in 
parallel members of the Autorités Africaines et Malgache de l’Aviation Civile 
(AAMAC), which is a RSOO set up in 2012 (see Section 3.4.3.1). Madagascar is 
a member of AAMAC and at the same time one of the future members of SASO. 
Finally there is an overlap in membership between AAMAC and Agence De Su-
pervision De La Sécurité Aérienne En Afrique Centrale (ASSA-AC), although 
these two RSOOs have different areas of competence.24 
 
                                                 
20 AFI Plan Steering Committee Report, AFI SC/2013/12, supra note 3 in Ch.2, at Paragraph 1.4. 
21 Len Cormier, 'Cooperative Arrangements Under ICAO Modalities - Safety', ICAO Symposium 
on Regional Safety Oversight Organizations (Montréal, C nada, 2011),  
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/RSOOSYMPO/Pages/default. spx> [accessed 18 March 2014]. 
22 AFI Plan Steering Committee Report, AFI SC/2013/12, supra note 3 in Ch.2, at Paragraph 1.4. 
23 Ibid. 
24 This concerns Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Ga-
bon. While AAMAC is responsible for ATM/ANS matters, ASSA-AC covers the matters dealt 




Figure X: Existing and planned RASOs in Africa (2014) 
 
In addition some of the African States have also delegated regulatory com-
petences to Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which may regulat  avia-
tion safety matters at supranational level. This is the case for example with 
UEMOA, which adopted a number of aviation safety regulations.25 
The multiple membership of some of the African States in regional org ni-
sations and projects dealing with aviation safety makes it more difficult to achieve 
– or even goes against - the objectives of regional cooperation which is intended 
to streamline the use of resources and achieve economies of scale. ICAO and 
AFCAC have been repeatedly urging African States to avoid membership in mul-
tiple organisations, but the problem persists.26 It is not easy to find an optimal 
solution to this issue, as some of the African RASO projects are linked to suprana-
tional RECs, and thus have to be seen in the context of the general political aim of 
regional integration in Africa. 
In addition to the issue of the transition of COSCAPs into RASO type bod-
ies in Africa, consideration should also be given in the longer term o consolida-
tion of RASO type bodies on the African continent. According to the ICAO AFI 
                                                 
25 Schlumberger, supra note 37 in Ch.1, at Appendix D. 
26 ICAO, 'Progress in Africa – report on the Comprehensive Regional Implementation Plan for 




Plan, it is ultimately envisaged to have between eleven and thirteen RASO type 
bodies (half of them RSOOs and half RAIO),27 in addition to the AFCAC regional 
cooperative inspector scheme (see Section 3.4.1.2). Most of these RASOs will 
have no more than ten Member States,28 and none of them is designed to replace 
the national authorities, which means that they will be functioning in parallel with 
national aviation administrations. Whether this will be sustainable in the long term 
remains to be seen, but experience so far demonstrates that achieving sustainabil-
ity in safety oversight cannot be guaranteed by simply setting up a regional safety 
body (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3). 
Figure XI: RASOs in Latin and Central America 
Duplication of membership in regional aviation organisations is not only 
characteristic of Africa. In Europe, for historic reasons, a number of organisations 
with overlapping mandates and membership exist which creates inefficiencies. 
The closure of the JAA in 2009 and the taking over of its functios by EASA has 
eliminated some of such inefficiencies, but in 2014 overlaps still existed between 
EASA, EUROCONTROL and ECAC. The recent independent evaluation of 
EASA conducted on the tenth anniversary of its functioning suggests that such a 
situation may not be sustainable in the long term, and recommends the establish-
ment of a single European body responsible for all aspects of aviation s fety, simi-
lar to the FAA.29 The feasibility of such a proposal will be analysed in more detail 
in Chapter 4. 
The least duplication exists today in Latin and Central America, where on-
ly two organisations encompass the vast majority of the States wi hout any over-
laps, as Figure XI demonstrates. 
                                                 
27 AFI Plan Steering Committee Report, AFI SC/2013/12, supra note 3 in Ch.2, at Appendix B. 
28 Ibid. 
29 EASA, 'Article 62 Panel Evalutation: final report', (2013),  p. 29. 
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3.4.1.2 REGIONAL COOPERATIVE SAFETY INSPECTOR SCHEMES  
The availability of technically competent aviation inspectors is currently o e of 
the biggest challenges for aviation authorities in ensuring effective safety over-
sight. The USOAP results indicate that out of the eight CEs of safety oversight, 
CE number four, that is ‘Technical Personnel Qualification and Training’, has the 
lowest level of effective implementation and in mid-2014 stood at only 45%.30  
This problem is true not only for regions like Africa - where aviation still 
does not yet generate revenues large enough to ensure appropriate staffing of the 
aviation authorities, and where aviation has to compete for resources with other 
sectors with equally pressing or even greater needs, such as health or ducation31 - 
but also in Europe, where the public administrations also find it i creasingly diffi-
cult to finance aviation safety oversight.32 
One of the most difficult problems to resolve in this respect is the fact that, 
as pointed out by ICAO, ‘although many donor States provide aluable financial 
support for training, recipient States had difficulty keeping staff once they had 
been trained’.33 With the overall economic situation bleak in many regions of the 
world, the problem of availability of resources starts to affect even th  strongest 
aviation authorities.34 
Although the establishment of RASOs is often put forward as a possible 
solution for the problem of the shortage of technical resources,35 xperience 
shows that establishing regional bodies does not always help in this respect, be-
cause a RASO can also compete for resources with national aviation au horities 
(see Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5). This is especially the case if safety tasks are car-
ried out in parallel at national and regional levels. Another way of addressing the 
problem of availability of qualified staff is by creating regional pools of aviation 
safety inspectors. 
In 2014 one of the most prominent examples of such initiatives was the 
Cooperative Inspectorate Scheme (AFI-CIS) developed jointly by ICAO and 
AFCAC within the framework of the Comprehensive Regional Implementatio  
Plan for Aviation Safety in Africa (AFI Plan).36 The objective of this AFI-CIS 
                                                 
30 Regional Performance Dashboards, supra note 15 in Ch.1. 
31 Schlumberger, supra note 37 in Ch.1, at p. 165; Belai, supra note 36 in Ch.1. 
32 LePoint.fr, 'Derrière le zéro accident mortel, la sécurité aérienne peut encore mieux faire en 
Europe'  <http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/derriere-le-z ro-accident-mortel-la-securite-aerienne-peut-
encore-mieux-faire-en-europe-27-02-2014-1796120_23.php> [accessed 1 June 2014].  
33 C-DEC 191/2, supra note 35 in Ch.1. 
34 In mid-2013 the US FAA initiated furlough of its 47,000 employees, including nearly 13,000 air 
traffic controllers, as part of a plan to meet $637 million in spending cuts required by the federal 
budget legislation. Even though the furloughs of air tr ffic control personnel were subsequently 
stopped by Congress at the end of April 2013, the FAA continued with spending cuts, including in 
parts of the organisation responsible for safety oversight and certification activities (Source: CNN, 
'FAA furloughs over, air traffic controllers back on the job'  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/02/travel/faa-furlough/> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
35 'Main conclusions and follow-up to the Symposium', Symposium on Regional Aviation Safety 
Agencies (Livingstone, Zambia, 2009),  <http://easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-
events/events/symposium-regional-aviation-safety-agencies-rasa> [accessed 10 August 2014]; 
Outcomes of 2011 RSOO Symposium (C-WP/13810), supra note 4 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.1.1; 
ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.1.4. 
36 AFI Plan was adopted in September 2007 by the ICAO Assembly; see: ICAO, 'Assemby 
Resolution A36-1: Comprehensive Regional Implementation Plan for Aviation Safety in Africa', 
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programme, which was launched in 2010,37 is to ‘assist and complement the ef-
forts of States to resolve their safety oversight deficiencies in certification and 
surveillance.’38 This is achieved by creating a pool of certified inspectors from a 
number of African States. The programme is managed by AFCAC with technical 
support from ICAO. 
From a legal point of view, the AFI-CIS programme is established on the 
basis of a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter ‘AFI-CIS MoU’) 
signed between AFCAC and the civil aviation authorities of each participating 
State.39 The AFI-CIS MoU is essentially a service and secondment agreement, 
whereby the national authority agrees to designate and to make available for the 
scheme its appropriately qualified national inspectors. The AFI-CIS MoU clarifies 
that:  
 
[A]t all time material during the performance of his duties under [the] cooperative inspec-
torate programme, the National Inspector shall be deemed an official of AFCAC working 
under the authority of the Director General of the Civil Aviation Authority of the host 
State.40  
 
This is a solution similar to the one used by COSCAP projects as was 
demonstrated under Section 3.4.1.1 above. 
In addition, one RSOO, namely the Banjul Accord Group Aviation Safety 
Oversight Organisation (BAGASOO), cooperates with the AFI-CIS and has 
signed the AFI-CIS MoU. As a result of this cooperation, BAGASOO makes 
available and receives inspectors, augmenting its own inspection pote tial and 
helping its member authorities to benefit from a broader pool of resou ces availa-
ble in the region.41 
From a legal point of view, the AFI-CIS inspectors enjoy delegated uthor-
ity from host States, that is, States in which they perform inspection activities. The 
national authority - signatory of the AFI-CIS MoU - agrees to grant such authority 
to the programme inspectors when acting as a host receiving their services.42 
Formally speaking the delegated authority is granted not on the basis of the AFI-
CIS MoU but on the basis of the national aviation legislation of the hosting au-
                                                                                                                            
(36th ICAO Assembly, 2007). To give effect to the AFI Plan, ICAO created a special programme - 
the AFI Comprehensive Implementation Programme (ACIP). 
37 The AFI-CIS was approved by the 22nd AFCAC Extraordinary Plenary Session held in Dakar 
(Senegal) on 8-10 December 2010. The first pilot prjects were launched in August 2011. For a 
detailed overview of AFI-CIS see: AFCAC, 'Report on progress made in the areas of Safety, 
Security, Implementation of Yamoussoukro Decision and Environment: Progress Report on the 
Implementation of AFI-CIS', WP/3, (22nd AFCAC Plenary Session, 2013). 
38 AFCAC, 'Circular Letter No 14/10', (2010). 
39AFCAC, 'Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the African Civil Aviation 
Commission (AFCAC) and African States for the use of national inspectors under the AFI 
Cooperative Inspector Scheme', (2013), 
<http://www.afcac.org/en/documents/conferences/october2012/15afi.pdf> [accessed 5 August 
2014]. 
40 Ibid. Paragraph 4. 
41 AFI-CIS progress report (2013), supra note 37, at Paragraph 5.1. 
42 This authority is confirmed by credentials issued to an inspector by the Director General of the 
hosting Civil Aviation Authority. The credentials indicate that the individual was endorsed by the 
Secretary General of AFCAC as a member of CIS. See:AFI-CIS MoU, supra note 39, at 
Appendix 5.  
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thority. The scope of the authority is limited to inspection fu ctions, and the AFI-
CIS MoU makes it clear that the ‘host State remains responsible for the issuance 
of any document, certificate or license issued as a result of the activities and rec-
ommendations of the AFI-CIS Inspectors.’43 
The AFI-CIS MoU is a simple and practical tool to organise inspector ex-
change from a formal point of view. As of May 2014, thirty-four Af ican States 
have signed the AFI-CIS MoU with AFCAC, and eighteen assistance missions 
have been conducted to nine States.44 At the same time, the programme has not 
completely removed the problem of shortage of qualified resources for the 
AFCAC States. Although the AFI-CIS MoU allocates the responsibility of fund-
ing the AFI-CIS missions to the hosting States,45 in practice very few of the recip-
ient States have been able to fund missions, and AFCAC has had to fund all but 
two of the missions that were conducted up to May-2014.46 In addition, the short-
age of qualified flight operations inspectors in general and non-English speaking 
in particular has also held up the conduct of some of the planned missions.47 The 
shortage of resources at national levels also hampers the ability of S ates to ensure 
follow-up of the AFI-CIS missions.48 
Finally, national authorities need to allocate internal resources to coordi-
nate the work with the AFI-CIS, and ultimately to be able to release their own 
inspectors for the programme missions when they are needed in other Stat s, 
which is not always easy.49 Indeed, up to September 2013, out of the 32 States 
which were signatories of the AFI-CIS MoU at the time, only seven States actual-
ly contributed inspectors to the scheme.50 
3.4.2 PRE-RASO (TYPE II): A REGIONAL ‘ASSOCIATION’ OF 
AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITIES 
A simple but practical way of organising regional cooperation on aviation safety 
regulation and oversight can also be through a network of aviation safety authori-
ties. One of the most prominent examples of this type of cooperation, lthough no 
longer existing today, was the JAA in Europe.51 
From a legal point of view, JAA was not an international organisation, and 
its constituent document, the ‘Cyprus Arrangements’ did not have the status of an 
                                                 
43 Ibid.at Paragraph 4. 
44  AFCAC, 'AFI Cooperative Inspectorate Scheme (AFI-CIS)', Africa-Indian Ocean (AFI) 
Aviation Safety Symposium (Dakar, 2014),  
<http://www.icao.int/meetings/afisymposium2014/Pages/d fault.aspx> [accessed 5 August 2014]. 
45 AFI-CIS MoU, supra note 39, at Paragraph 6. 
46 AFCAC, AFI Cooperative Inspectorate Scheme (AFI-CIS), supra note 44. 
47 AFCAC, 'Progress report on the implementation of AFI Cooperative Inspectorate Scheme (AFI-
CIS)', A38-WP/214, (38th ICAO Assembly, 2013),  at P ragraph 6. 
48 AFI-CIS progress report (2013), supra note 37, at Paragraph 7.1. 
49 Ibid.at Paragraph 7.3. 
50 Mam Sait Jallow, 'Progress on key activities of the comprehensive regional implementation plan 
for aviation safety in africa (AFI PLAN)', AFI Ministerial briefing (Montréal, 2013),  
<http://www.icao.int/safety/afiplan/Documents/AFI%20Ministerial/AFI%20Ministerial-
RDWACAF%20En.pdf> [accessed 14 August 2014]. 
51 The JAA system was disbanded on 30 June 2009 following the extension of the competences of 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to flight operations and crew licensing; see: ECAC, 
'Press Release No 192E', (2007). 
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international treaty.52 This was a pragmatic approach which allowed JAA to be set 
up and developed without affecting the rights and obligations of participating 
States under international law. This however meant that the JAA could n t man-
date any legislation, or issue regulatory documents, such as certificates or licenc-
es, on behalf of its participating States. Similarly, the Joint Aviation Requirements 
(JARs) developed by the JAA had to be transposed into national legal orders of 
the participating States, which also had a right to adopt national variants of the 
JARs.53 Similarly the JAA could only make recommendations for mutual recogni-
tion of certificates issued by the national authorities. Such recommendations re-
ferred to different levels of JAR amendments, and were not recognised i  a uni-
form manner by all the participating authorities. This in practice led to a patch-
work of mutual recognition arrangements.54 Finally the JAA did not have en-
forcement competences which remained at the national level. 
Despite the weaknesses identified above, JAA managed to build quite a 
successful system for aircraft certification, which allowed making use of only one 
set of technical findings to the benefit of all the participating authorities.55 It also 
developed a system of standardisation inspections, or audits, to verify the level of 
implementation of JARs in JAA States.56 
Whilst not being an international organisation, JAA still needed a budget 
and a more solid legal standing for the purposes of day to day administrat ve man-
agement. Thus, in parallel to the ‘Cyprus Arrangements’, a JAA foundation under 
Dutch law - ‘Stichting Beheer JAA’  -  was set up to enable this organisation to 
have a legal personality and on this basis to contract the necessary staff, services, 
facilities and receive seconded personnel.57 This was a pragmatic solution which 
enabled the practical problems stemming from a lack of legal personality under
the ‘Cyprus Arrangements’ to be overcome. 
A solution similar to JAA was used in Western Africa for the establi hment 
of the initial version of AAMAC. This organisation was set up on the basis of a 
Memorandum of Understanding signed in December 2001 in Dakar by the partic-
ipating aviation authorities. Subsequently AAMAC was transformed into an asso-
ciation under the law of the Republic of Chad, which gave it a legalpersonality 
under private law.58 In 2012 the AAMAC association was further upgraded into a 
                                                 
52 'Arrangements concerning the development, the acceptance and the implementation of Joint 
Aviation Requirements', (Cyprus, 1990), <http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/working-
arrangements/working-arrangement-archive-jaa> [accessed 8 August 2014]. 
53Ibid.at Paragraph 3(c). 
54 See for example the last version of JAA mutual recognition recommendations for aircrew licens-
ing at: EASA, 'Mutual recognition of certificates'  <http://easa.europa.eu/mutual-recognition> 
[accessed 8 August 2014].  
55 Because of the non-binding nature of the ‘Cyprus Arrangements’, the Type Certificates (TC) for 
products had still to be issued individually by national authorities, which could also introduce 
national variants; see: Filippo De Florio, Airworthiness, An Introduction to Aircraft Certification: 
A guide to understanding JAA, EASA and FAA standards, (2006), pp. 108-109. 
56 Manuhutu, 'Aviation Safety Regulation in Europe', supra note 53 in Ch.1, at p. 267. 
57 ECAC, 'Report on JAA activities, presented by the Chairman of JAA Committee', (ECAC 
DGCA/16, ECAC archives in Paris, 1994). See also: ECAC, 'Roadmap for JAA', (2005),  at 
Attachement 4. 
58 Guelpina  Ceubah, 'Autorités Africaines et Malgaches de l'Aviation Civile', Symposium on 
Regional Aviation Safety Agencies (Livingstone, Zambia, 2009),  
<http://easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/events/symposium-regional-aviation-safety-agencies-
rasa> [accessed 6 August 2014]. 
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RSOO with international legal personality. This will be presented under Section 
3.4.3.1. 
Finally, EUROCONTROL, which is currently an international organis -
tion, in the period between the signature and entry into force of its constituting 
agreement,59 was implemented through an association set up under the French 
law.60 
To conclude, experience shows that establishing an association of aviation 
safety authorities can be a practical first step to launch a RASO. The advant ge of 
this form of cooperation is that it can be set up relatively quickly as no interna-
tional agreement is necessary. It may also be easier to accept for decision makers 
from a political point of view, as it does not affect the rights and obligations of 
States under international law.  
At the same time the legal form of an association gives a basic structure 
and legal personality under private law which in turn allows the organisation to 
have its own budget, conclude contracts and hire personnel. On the other hand, 
lack of a binding legal status does not permit an association to mandate common 
requirements or to deliver certificates on behalf of the Member States. This, over 
time, can result in a heterogeneous regulatory environment. 
3.4.3 RASO (TYPE I): REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 
SAFETY ORGANISATION 
Having reviewed the pre-RASOs, this chapter will now present the two types of 
RASO forms. The first one is the Regional International Aviation Safety Organisa-
tion. This type of RASO is established on the basis of an international agreement 
and may exercise, in a legally binding manner, safety functions and duties on be-
half of its Member States. For the purpose of this study, and as opposed to the 
next category described in this chapter, a Regional International Avition Safety 
Organisation will also be normally established outside the institutional framework 
of a REIO.61 Four examples of this type of a RASO can be given. 
3.4.3.1 AUTORIT ÉS AFRICAINES ET MALGACHE DE L’AVIATION 
CIVILE 
i. Legal basis and organisational set-up 
AAMAC was formally established in 2012, as a successor of an association of 
aviation safety regulators of the same name (see Section 3.4.2 above). It was es-
tablished on the basis of an international agreement, signed on 20 January 2012 by 
                                                 
59 'Convention relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) with 
Annexes and Protocols', 13 December 1960, UK Treaty Series No. 39 (1963). 
60 L’Association pour le perfectionnement des méthodes de contrôle aérien, established on 10 
December 1960. For more details see: John McInally, 'EUROCONTROL: History Book', (2010), 
<http://www.eurocontrol.int/news/eurocontrol-history-book> [accessed 12 August 2014], pp. 51-
56. 
61 Examples of REIOs include European Union (EU), the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS) and some Regional Economic Commissions (RECs) in Africa. REIOs have their own 
supranational institutions such as legislative or judiciary bodies and are authorised in certain do-
mains to adopt legislation which is binding for its Member States and directly applicable in their 
domestic legal orders. 
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seventeen States, mostly from central and western Africa but including also Mad-
agascar.62 Its headquarters is located in N'Djamena - the capital city of the Repub-
lic of Chad. At the beginning of 2014, the AAMAC Treaty was not yet in force, 
due to the lack of ratification by the signatory States.63 
The two main purposes of the establishment of AAMAC were to streng h-
en the regulatory capabilities of AAMAC Member States following negative re-
sults of ICAO USOAP audits,64 and secondly to have an independent authority for 
the surveillance of the ASECNA65 - a regional air navigation service provider 
(ANSP) originally established by seventeen AAMAC States and France in 195466 
- in line with the ICAO recommendations for the separation of service provision 
and regulatory functions,67 and following negative results of the ICAO audits in 
this respect.68 
The AAMAC Treaty was inspired by the provisions of an EU regulation 
establishing EASA, however due to the fact that AAMAC is currently ot linked 
to a REIO similar to the EU, AAMAC retained a number of features typical for an 
intergovernmental body, such as lack of competence to adopt legally binding avia-
tion safety legislation on behalf of its Member States (see below), as well as the 
inability to issue certificates with a legally binding force. 
AAMAC has both domestic and international legal personality, both ex-
plicitly envisaged under its founding agreement.69 
ii.  Main safety functions 
From a legal point of view the scope of the AAMAC mandate is very broad and 
covers all main domains of civil aviation safety covered by ICAO Annexes, that 
is: airworthiness of aircraft, flight operations and crew licensing, ATM, and aero-
drome safety.70  
As far as its rulemaking competences are concerned, although AAMAC 
has both domestic and international legal personality, it is not e titled to issue 
regulatory documents with binding effect, but only prepares proposals of such 
regulations which need to be subsequently transposed by the AAMAC ember 
                                                 
62 'Traité relative aux Autorités Africaines et Malgache de l’Aviation Civile (AAMAC Treaty)', 
N’Djaména, 20 January 2012, LOI n°2012 012 of 29 July 2012, Le Congrès de la Transition et le 
Conseil Supérieur de la Transition, République de Madagascar. 
63 Former Rulemaking Director of EASA, 'Interview No 11', (2014). 
64 Ibid. 
65 République de Madagascar Le Congrès de la Transitio  e  le Conseil Supérieur de la Transition, 
'LOI n°2012012: Autorisant la ratification du Traité relatif aux Autorités Africaines et Malgache 
de l’Aviation Civile signé à N’Djaména le 20 janvier 2012, Exposé des motifs'. 
66 ‘Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA)’, 
originally established in 1954. Today ASECNA’s legal b sis is: 'Convention relative a l’Agence 
pour la Securite de la Navigation Aerienne en Afrique et Madagascar (ASECNA)', Ouagadougou, 
28 avril 2010, Official Journal of the Republic of Senegal N° 6641, 28 January 2012. 
67 In those States where the State is both the regulatory uthority and an air traffic service provider, 
the requirements of the Chicago Convention will be met, and the public interest be best served, by 
a clear separation of authority and responsibility between the State operating agency and the State 
regulatory authority, Source: ICAO, 'Safety Oversight Manual, Part A: The Establishment and 
Management of a State’s Safety Oversight System', Doc. 9734, Part A, (2006),  at paragraph 2.4.9.  
68 Supra note 65. 
69 'AAMAC Treaty', supra note 62, Article 7. 
70 Ibid. Article 5. 
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States into their national legal orders, either directly or through a REIO to which 
they may belong.71 
Similarly, concerning implementation of regulations and oversight of regu-
lated entities, AAMAC cannot issue certificates or licences on behalf of its Mem-
ber States, but can only make recommendations for their issuance on th basis of 
the technical work done on behalf of its Member States.72  
At the same time the AAMAC Treaty imposes stricter obligations  its 
Member States than for example documents constituting associations of aviation 
safety authorities, such as the JAA. This is because the AAMAC Member States 
undertook to issue certificates on the basis of recommendations madeby 
AAMAC, where it is the competent authority in a given domain,73 and to incorpo-
rate into their national legal systems regulations developed by this organisation 
without the possibility of filing regulatory differences.74 
Similar to the JAA Cyprus Arrangements, and the regulation establishing 
EASA in the EU, the AAMAC Treaty provides for a system of standardis tion 
inspections. These inspections are to be performed by AAMAC, and their main 
objective is to verify the level of implementation of the common AAMAC re-
quirements in its Member States.75 Where inspections show that the requirements 
are implemented correctly, Member States are under an obligation to recognise 
certificates issued by the compliant State without any further verification.76 
iii.  Practical aspects of implementation 
From a legal point of view, AAMAC should be seen as an enhanced version of a 
regional association of aviation safety authorities, however falling short of a 
RSOO which could create direct and binding legal effects in the legal systems of 
its Member States. 
At the beginning of 2014 AAMAC, was not yet operational. The funding, 
as well as staffing issues were not resolved. Once these points are addressed, 
AAMAC should focus, as a first step, on ATM/ANS issues, while regional coop-
eration in other domains, such as airworthiness, flight operations and pilot licens-
ing, were expected to be dealt with by ASSA-AC, which is a successor to the 
COSCAP-CEMAC project.77 There is also some overlap in the membership of 
AAMAC and, SADC and UEMOA,78 which are also considering establishment of 
                                                 
71 'Interview No 11', (2014), supra note 63. 
72 'AAMAC Treaty', supra note 62, Article 6(d). 
73 This is the case for organisations providing ANS, including in particular ASECNA, as well as in 
other domains where a Member State has decided to delegate to AAMAC the making of technical 
findings for the purpose of initial approval and surveillance of an organization. The possibility of 
such delegation is envisaged under Article 6 (e) of the AAMAC Treaty. 
74 'AAMAC Treaty', supra note 62, Article 10(b)-(c). 
75 Ibid. Article 6(f). 
76 Ibid. Article 10(d). 
77 ICAO, 'Second meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group for Africa and the Indian Ocean 
region (RASG-AFI/2):Update on the AFI Plan and Other Safety Initiatives', RASG-AFI/2 – 
WP/13, (2013). 
78 This concerns Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
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RASO type bodies, as was demonstrated under Section 3.4.1.1. Clearly some ra-
tionalisation of RASOs in this part of Africa should be considered.79 
3.4.3.2 THE PACIFIC AVIATION SAFETY OFFICE 
i. Legal basis and organisational set-up 
PASO was established80 on the basis of a Pacific Islands Civil Aviation Safety and 
Security Treaty (hereinafter ‘PICASST’), an international treaty which was 
opened for signature on 7 August 2004 and entered into force on 11 June 2005.81 
It is a ‘centralized technical advisory organization’82 serving a number of small 
island countries of the Pacific,83 and its main objective is to provide harmonisa-
tion of aviation regulation, training, technical advice, planning a d the delivery of 
a wide range of surveillance oversight services to its Member States.84 PASO has 
both international and domestic legal personality.85 Its headquarters is in Vanua-
tu.86 
ii.  Main safety functions 
The scope of the PASO mandate covers airworthiness, flight operations, airports, 
personnel licensing, as well as aviation security.87 PASO is essentially a service 
provision organisation and its primary activities include routine inspection, audit 
and certification activity of industry within Member States and can extend to larg-
er projects such as the technical management and certification processes associat-
ed with the introduction of new types of aircraft.88   
                                                 
79 A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in June 2014 between the three parties concerned 
to clarify their respective roles in the region. 
80 PASO was established with the help of the Asian Development Bank regional loan. See: Asian 
Development Bank, 'Institutional Strengthening for Aviation Regulation'  
<http://www.adb.org/projects/43429-012/details> [accessed 10 August 2014]. 
81 'Pacific Islands Civil Aviation Safety and Security Treaty', Apia, 7 August 2004, ICAO 
Registration No. 5381. PICASST was subsequently amended by a Protocol of 20 June 2006 which 
came into force on 20 July 2006 (ICAO Registration No.  5382) 
82 Ibid. Article 4. 
83 In 2014 PASO Member States were as follows: the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Fiji and Vanuatu. 
84 PASO, 'Regional approach to aviation through harmonised regulatory application in the south 
west pacific', Working Paper WP/23, (First Meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group - Asia 
and Pacific Regions - RASG-APAC/1, 2011),  at Paragraph 1.1. 
85 'PICASST', supra note 81, at Paragraph 4.3. 
86 On 3 August 2007 the government of Vanuatu and PASO entered into a formal ‘Host State 
Agreement’. PASO and its staff were accorded diplomatic privileges and immunities by order 
made under the ‘Vanuatu Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act’ on 24 October 2005. Vanuatu 
confirmed ratification of PICASST by enacting the ‘Pacific Islands Civil Aviation Treaty (Ratifica-
tion) Act (2005)’. See: Kimball Murray, Ron Bartsch, and Max Foon, 'Legal and Technical Review 
Report for the Pacific Aviation Safety Office', (AvLaw Aviation Consultants, 2007), 
<http://www.avlaw.com.au/Legal%20and%20Technical%20Review%20_PASO.pdf> [accessed 14 
August 2014], p. 6. 
87 'PICASST', supra note 81, Article 3. 
88PASO, Regional approach to aviation (WP/23), supra note 84, at Paragraph 2.2. 
88 
 
The services provided by PASO are similar to those available on the mar-
ket from commercial companies such as Bureau Veritas, which specialise, 
amongst other things, in assisting civil aviation authorities around the world in 
running aircraft registries, performing oversight of aviation industry, training of 
inspectors and even drafting of regulations and procedures.89 
Given the fact that PASO possesses international legal personality explicit-
ly envisaged under its founding agreement, it would be possible for its Member 
States to delegate to PASO the exercise, in a legally binding manner, of safety 
oversight or regulatory tasks on their behalf. This is however not the case and 
PASO remains for the time being de facto and de lege their technical adviser on-
ly.90 In this capacity PASO provides technical advice, carries out inspections and 
submits reports to the requesting member authorities on a cost recovery basis. 
Once recommendations proposed by PASO are agreed with a national authority, 
their implementation may also be monitored by PASO.91 The legal basis for the 
services provided, in addition to the PASO founding treaty, are se vice level 
agreements concluded with Member States.92 
PASO Member States ‘retain at all times full responsibility for all matters 
related to aviation safety and security in their respective territories.’93 The conse-
quence of that approach is that PASO inspectors, when carrying out their tasks on 
behalf of Member States, are deemed to be officers of the national civil aviation 
administration and have rights, privileges and responsibilities no less favourable 
than those granted to civil aviation officers of the State concerned.94 
Although the technical advice and oversight services are provided by 
PASO using the legal environment of the requesting State,95 the PASO Member 
States strive to harmonise their legislation using as a basis the law of New Zea-
land.96 
iii.  Practical aspects of implementation 
 
Since its establishment, PASO has been experiencing serious difficulties in stabi-
lising its budget, and at one point was almost bankrupt.97 A  the end of 2011 
PASO reported to ICAO that it was experiencing financial restrictions which: 
                                                 
89 Bureau Veritas, 'Civil Aviation Authority '  
<http://www.bureauveritas.com/wps/wcm/connect/bv_com/group/home/your-
industry/aerospace/civil-aviation-authority> [access d 13 August 2014]. 
90 'PICASST', supra note 81, Article 4(2). 
91 Seiuli A.W. Tuala, 'Regional cooperation for the enhancement of safety oversight', ICAO 
Symposium on Regional Safety Oversight Organizations (Montréal, Canada, 2011),  
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/RSOOSYMPO/Pages/default. spx> [accessed 12 August 2014]. 
92 'PICASST', supra note 81, Article 1(i). See also: PASO Legal and Technical Review Report, 
supra note 86, at pp. 27-28. 
93 'PICASST', supra note 81, Article 5(a). 
94 Ibid. Article 8(2). 
95 Ibid. Article 7(b). 
96 PASO, Regional approach to aviation (WP/23), supra note 84, at Paragraph 2.6. 
97 Radio New Zealand International, 'Pacific Aviation Safety Office in financial strife'  
<http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/205665/pacific-aviation-safety-office-in-
financial-strife> [accessed 22 March 2014].  
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[I]mpact on the ability of some Member States to complete annual pre-planned activity 
and often results in States not completing the wider range of recommended oversight ac-
tivity within their pre-planned work such as regulatory training and education pro-
grammes.98  
 
In addition to inefficient funding mechanisms,99 one of the reasons for 
these difficulties has been, as the Asian Development Bank has identifie , lack of 
a standardised regulatory framework in the PASO Member States, which in turn 
increases the costs of the inspections and technical advices provided by PASO.100 
As a result, at the end of 2013 a reform of the organisation was launched with the 
support of the international financial institutions.101 
A report prepared by the World Bank in the second half of 2013 states that: 
 
PASO has operated at an annual financial loss since its inception. Should PASO disap-
pear, or its operations further weaken, several Member States would confront significant 
challenges in meeting national and international regulatory obligations with practical and 
affordable service alternatives in the short to medium term.102 
 
The aforementioned World Bank report further observes that PASO’s business 
model: 
 
[H]as not proven to be sustainable since: (i) countries have not purchased the necessary 
safety oversight services; (ii) there is a real, or pe ceived, lack of qualified technical spe-
cialists in PASO to perform the technical services, affecting demand; (iii) some countries 
are in arrears on member subscription fees; and, (iv) salaries and cost structures for PASO 
exceeded income.103 
 
Based on the above information concerning PASO, it can be concluded that the 
key problem which has created such challenges is the fact that this organisation 
has not in fact been set up as a RASO type body, but rather as a provider of safety 
oversight services. These can also be affordably contracted from the ark t or 
from some of the mature civil aviation authorities in the region which may have 
spare technical capacity, such as the New Zealand or Australian CAAs.104 PASO 
                                                 
98 PASO, Regional approach to aviation (WP/23), supra note 84, at Paragraph 2.3. 
99 Seiuli A.W. Tuala, 'Establishment of a funding mechanism to ensure the sustainability of an 
RSOO', ICAO Symposium on Regional Safety Oversight Organizations (Montréal, Canada, 2011),  
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/RSOOSYMPO/Pages/default. spx> [accessed 14 August 2014]. 
100 Asian Development Bank PASO project, supra note 80. 
101 World Bank, 'Pacific Aviation Safety Office Reform, project No. P145057'  
<http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P145057/pacific-aviation-investment-program?lang=en> 
[accessed 14 August 2014]. 
102 World Bank, 'Pacific Aviation Safety Office Reform Project', Report No: PAD532, (2013), 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18246423/pacific-islands-pacific-aviation-
safety-office-reform-project> [accessed 14 August 2014], p.2. 
103 Ibid. 
104 In 2010 the government of the Cook Islands reported that, although it recognises that the objec-
tive of PASO was to ‘provide in the long-term an improvement in quality and extension of ser-
vices, at a lower total cost than is currently faced by the…industry and member governments’, it 
believed that in practice ‘the contrary has occurred’. The Cook Islands government has further 
underlined that it intends to rely on the services provided by the Civil Aviation Authority of New 
Zealand. (Source: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 'P cific Plan Annual Progress Report Annex', 
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will most probably have to reinvent itself in the future into another type of a RA-
SO. 
3.4.3.3 THE INTERSTATE AVIATION COMMITTEE 
i. Legal basis and organisational set-up 
IAC was established following the dissolution of the Union of S viet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) on the basis of the Agreement on Civil Aviation and Airspace 
Utilization which was signed at Minsk on 30 December 1991 (hereinaft r the 
‘Minsk Agreement’) and has been in force since that date.105 IAC has a sui generis 
legal and institutional set up which deserves a more detailed presentation, not 
least because in 2014 it was one of only three RASOs in the world empowered to 
take legally binding decisions on behalf of its Member States.106  
The Minsk Treaty describes IAC as an executive body of the Council for 
Aviation and Airspace Utilization,107 which in turn is an organ of the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS).108 IAC considers itself as an international 
organisation.109 
The IAC has legal personality within the domestic legal orders of the 
Member States, which extends to all issues which are necessary for the perfor-
mance of its functions.110 The organisational structure of the IAC comprises eight 
permanent commissions (Figure XII) which also ‘possess the rights of a juridical 





                                                                                                                            
(2010), <http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/documents-publications/programme-
project-reports/pacific-plan-progress-reports.html> [accessed 14 August 2014], p. 55. 
105 'Agreement on Civil Aviation and Airspace Utilization ', Minsk, 30 December 1991, ICAO 
Registration No. 3720. The original signatories of the Minsk Agreement were the Russian Federa-
tion, the Republic of Armenia, Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Georgia, 
Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Republic of Tajikistan, 
Republic of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine. 
106 The other two are EASA which is presented in Chapter 4, and ECCAA which is addressed 
under Section 3.6 of this Chapter. 
107 'Statute of the Council for Aviation and Airspace Utilization and the Statute of the Interstate 
Aviation Committee', 19 February 1992, ICAO Registration No. 3720, p. Article I.3. 
108 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is annternational organization formed in 
1991 by the Russian Federation and some other republics that were formerly part of the USSR. 
Following the withdrawal of Georgia from the CIS in August 2009, it is now comprised of nine 
Member States which are the Russian Federation, the Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Ukraine and Turkmenistan do not 
consider themselves as Member States of CIS. 
109 IAC, 'The Role of a Regional International Civil Aviation Organization in Ensuring Flight 
Safety', DGCA/06-IP/16, Directors General of Civil Aviation Conference on Global Strategy for 
Aviation Safety (Montréal, Canada, 2006), at paragraph 1.1. 
110 'IAC Statute', supra note 107, at Article II.6. 
111 Ibid. at Article III.13. 
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Figure XII: Organisational structure of the Interstate Aviation Committee 
 
Source: Interstate Aviation Committee112 
ii.  Main safety functions 
The Minsk Agreement sets out the general mandate of the IAC and its possible 
functions and responsibilities, however the precise competences of the IAC in the 
territories of the contracting parties, including the delegation of the exercise of 
safety functions and duties, are defined in specific agreements, or protocols, con-
cluded between the IAC and the States concerned. 
For example in the case of the Russian Federation this relationship is de-
fined in a protocol signed between the IAC and the Ministry of Transport in 
2006.113 Under this protocol, IAC is responsible for developing rules for the Rus-
sian Federation in the areas of airworthiness of civil aircraft, certification of inter-
national aerodromes and their equipment, impact of aircraft on the environment 
and investigation of aircraft accidents. Moreover, under the protocol, the IAC is 
responsible for performing, on behalf of the Russian Federation, certification of 
aircraft and their components, approval of production organisations, certification 
of international aerodromes and their equipment, and organisation and realisation 
of the investigation of aircraft accidents occurring within the territory of the Rus-
sian Federation or involving Russia as the ‘State of Design’, the ‘Sate of the Op-
erator’ or the ‘State of Registry’ outside the Russian territory. 
                                                 
112 IAC, 'Interstate Aviation Committee: presentation', (personal archives of the author, 2004). 
113 Protocol No. 4/01-92 signed on 20 February 2006. 
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- The role of IAC in aviation safety rulemaking 
In accordance with its statute, IAC ‘shall issue inter-State regulatory instruments 
which shall be subject to mandatory compliance on the territory of allthe found-
ing States….’114 
In practice the rule-making process within the IAC is based on the work of 
Commissions established in each relevant subject domain, that is e Commission 
for certification and aviation regulations - the Aviation Register, the Commission 
for aerodrome and equipment certification, and the Commission for accident in-
vestigation. Draft regulations are submitted by the Commissions to the Council 
for Aviation and Airspace Utilization for approval by consensus. 
The regulations adopted by the Council for Aviation and Airspace Utiliza-
tion, although legally binding under the Minsk Agreement, are not directly appli-
cable in the domestic legal orders of the IAC Member States and need to b  given 
such effect through enabling national legislation. For example, the Russian Feder-
ation has divided the responsibility for developing its aviation safety rules be-
tween the Ministry of Transport and the IAC,115  with the latter authorised by the 
government116 to develop and amend aviation rules on behalf of the Russian Fed-
eration, within the scope of the delegation protocol.  
In addition to regulations, the IAC also issues detailed technical require-
ments for the design and certification of aircraft and their components, as well as 
aerodrome and navigation equipment and facilities used in the CIS.117 
- The role of IAC in aviation safety certification and oversight 
Under the Minsk Agreement the IAC has competence to issue certificates and 
other documents on behalf of its Member States. There is a two stage process to 
enable this. Firstly there needs to be an additional protocol concluded between the 
IAC and any of its Member State wishing to delegate certification competences. 
Secondly enabling State legislation must be adopted to implement the delegation 
into a national legal system. For example, in the Russian Federation the IAC was 
given legal status as an authorised organ through the protocol concluded with IAC 
in 2006118 and corresponding Presidential Decrees and Governmental Resolu-
tions.119 Accordingly, IAC acts on behalf of the Russian Federation for issues re-
lated to airworthiness, aerodromes, and environmental certification, including: 
 
- certification of aircraft and their components (including aircraft noise typ
certification); 
- approval of design and production organisations for aeronautical products; 
- certification of international aerodromes and their equipment; 
                                                 
114 'IAC Statute', supra note 107, Article III.14. 
115 Governmental Resolution No. 360 of 27 May 1998 provides that the rules of the Russian Fed-
eration that have been approved by the Council for Aviation and Airspace Utilization are enacted 
by the corresponding federal bodies. 
116 Governmental Resolution No. 367 of 23 April 1994. 
117 IAC, 'Авиационные Правила (Aviation Regulations)'  
<http://www.mak.ru/russian/russian.html> [accessed 10 August 2014]. 
118 Protocol No. 4/01-92, supra note 113. 
119 Presidential Decrees No. 439 of 5 May 1992 and No. 904 of 13 June 1996, as well Governmen-




- accreditation of ‘certification centres’. 
 
For those States which have delegated to IAC aircraft certification compe-
tences, IAC will also be acting as a technical agent under BASAs or working ar-
rangements concluded with third countries or foreign aviation authorities.120 
- The role of IAC in air accident investigation 
Under the Minsk Agreement, and the IAC Statute, the IAC can accept delegation 
of State functions and duties related to aviation accident investigations.121 A num-
ber of Contracting Parties to the Minsk Agreement, including the Russian Federa-
tion and Belarus have taken advantage of this possibility.122 The legal modalities 
for the exercise of such delegations are presented in detail in Section 3.5 dealing 
with RAIOs. 
iii.  Practical aspects of implementation 
Originally twelve States signed the Minsk Agreement, but today the level of par-
ticipation of the original signatories in IAC varies. For example since the estab-
lishment of IAC in 1991, countries such as Georgia,123 Moldova124 and Ukraine125 
have concluded, or are in the course of negotiations, of aviation agreements with 
the EU. These agreements provide or will provide for the participation of the civil 
aviation authorities of these countries, to various degrees, in the work of EASA. 
In practice today the Russian Federation, in whose territory IAC has its headquar-
ters, is the most closely associated Member State of this RASO from a regulatory 






                                                 
120 See Section 5.5 of Chapter 5 for discussion about international activities of IAC and other RA-
SOs. 
121 'Minsk Agreement', supra note 105, Article 7(e); 'IAC Statute', supra note 107, Article II.5(e); 
IAC presentation (2004), supra note 112.  
122 For Belarus see for example report issued by IAC, as the competent investigating authority, 
concerning the accident of BAe-125-800B, registration number RA-02807, which occurred on 26 
October 2009 in the proximity of the Minsk airport. 
123 'Common Aviation Area Agreement between the European Union and its Member States and 
Georgia', 2 December 2010, (OJ L 321, 20.11.2012). 
124 'Common Aviation Area Agreement between the European Union and its Member States and 
the Republic of Moldova', 26 June 2012, (OJ L 292, 20.10.2012). 
125 EC, 'EU and Ukraine skies to join forces', Press rlease IP/13/1181, (2013). 
126 Conclusion reached based on the review of the ICAO US AP reports for the signatories of the 
Minsk Agreement, as well as experiences of the author w o was responsible in EASA for interna-




3.4.3.4 THE BANJUL ACCORD GROUP AVIATION SAFETY 
OVERSIGHT ORGANISATION 
i. Legal basis and organisational set-up 
BAGASOO was established by seven West African States127 on the basis of an 
international agreement signed on 30 June 2009,128 within the broader framework 
of the Banjul Accord Group (BAG) Agreement.129 Its predecessor was the 
COSCAP-BAG – a technical cooperation project established by ICAO to enhance 
the safety oversight capabilities of the BAG States.130 BAGASOO is one of the 
RSOOs which evolved from a COSCAP project (see Table IV). 
Its founding agreement establishes BAGASOO as a self-accounting insti-
tution of the BAG. This in practice means that the BAG Council of Ministers and 
BAG Secretariat are involved in the review of the annual financial accounts of 
BAGASOO131 through an audit, and facilitate dispute settlement procedures be-
tween the BAGASOO Member States.132 At the same time, the Director Generals 
of the seven BAGASOO Member States, together with the Executive Director of 
BAGASOO constitute the governing Board of Directors which reviews and ap-
proves the budget of this RSOO.133 
BAGASOO has legal personality under its founding agreement.134 I s 
headquarters is located in Abuja, Nigeria. 
ii.  Main safety functions 
BAGASOO became operational in July 2010.135 Under its founding agreement, the 
key objective of this RASO is the: 
 
Promotion of the safe and efficient use and development of civil aviation, and the provi-
sion of assistance to States for meeting their safety oversight obligations and responsibili-
ties under the Chicago Convention and its related safety Annexes.136 
 
                                                 
127 Republic of Cape Verde, the Republic of Gambia, the Republic of Ghana, the Republic of 
Guinea, the Republic of Liberia, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the Republic of Sierra Leo-
ne. 
128 'Banjul Accord Group Aviation Safety Oversight Organisation Agreement', Montreal, 30 June 
2009 ICAO Registration No. 5462. The BAGASOO agreemnt entered into force upon signature. 
129 'Agreement for the establishment of the Banjul Accord Group', Banjul, 29 January 2004, ICAO 
Registration No. 5455. The main objective of the BAG greement is to accelerate the implementa-
tion of the Yamoussoukro Declaration and the Yamouss kro Decision which aim at the liberaliza-
tion of air transport in Africa. For further details on the BAG Agreement see: Schlumberger, supra 
note 37 in Ch.1, at pp. 82-86. 
130 Emmanuel  Akatue, 'Institutionalization of the Banjul Accord Group Safety Oversight 
Organization', RASG-AFI/1 - IP/7, (First meeting of the Africa - Indian Ocean Regional Aviation 
Safety Group, RASG-AFI/1, 2012). 
131 'BAGASOO Agreement', supra note 128, Article 15(6). 
132 Ibid. Article 18. 
133 BAGASOO official, 'Interview No 6', (2014). 
134 'BAGASOO Agreement', supra note 128, Article 2.2. 
135 Institutionalization of BAGASOO (RASG-AFI/1 - IP/7), supra note 130, at Paragraph 5. 
136 'BAGASOO Agreement', supra note 128, Article 4(1). 
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BAGASOO’s founding agreement does not specify the domains of aviation 
safety for which it is competent which means that in practice it can develop coopera-
tion in any of the areas covered by ICAO Annexes. In 2013 its activities covered the 
areas of personnel licensing, airworthiness, flight operations and aero romes, with 
the intention to extend its scope in the future to security and ATM.137 
BAGASOO’s functions are relatively broad and include development of 
harmonised safety requirements, procedures and manuals for adoption and use by 
the Member States, providing support to certification and surveillance, develop-
ment and implementation of training programs and other. BAGASOO can also 
evaluate the safety oversight capabilities of its Member States and help with the 
implementation of USOAP corrective action plans, as well as accept delegation of 
certification and surveillance tasks.138 
In the area of rulemaking, BAGASOO prepares regulations, guidance ma-
terial, policies and procedures and submits them for adoption and use by the 
Member States. The regulations are not directly applicable and need to b  trans-
posed into the national legal systems.139 The objective of BAGASOO is to ensure 
a harmonised regulatory environment in line with the ICAO SARPs.140 
As far as implementation of legislation is concerned, BAGASOO does n t 
enjoy delegated executive powers directly under its founding agreement. Howev-
er, in accordance with its Article 5, BAGASOO can accept delegation of certifica-
tion and surveillance functions when so requested by a Member Stat . A  the time 
of writing this study in 2014 BAGASOO had not concluded any such delegation 
agreements.141 In addition the BAGASOO is mandated to partake, with respect to 
all its Member States, and irrespective of the status of their safety ovrsight capa-
bility, in all initial certification exercises ‘for the purpose of monit ring and ensur-
ing the uniform application of common standards within the BAG Sub-Region.’142 
So far BAGASOO focused primarily on human capacity building, iclud-
ing in particular the development of qualifications and training of aviation safety 
inspectors in the region. It has also been developing aviation safety ov rsight da-
tabases, participating in the AFI-CIS, and conducting visits to its Member States in 





                                                 
137 BAGASOO, 'Revised Brochure'  
<http://www.bagasoo.org/en/images/docs/downloads/bagasoo_brochure_revised.pdf> [accessed 10 
August 2014]. 
138 'BAGASOO Agreement', supra note 128, Article 5. For a more detailed overview of BA-
GASOO’s work see: Institutionalization of BAGASOO (RASG-AFI/1 - IP/7), supra note 130. 
139 'BAGASOO Agreement', supra note 128, Article 8(f)-(g). 
140 Ibid. Article 14(b). 
141 'Interview No 6', (2014), supra note 133. 
142 'BAGASOO Agreement', supra note 128, Article 5(f). 
143 Institutionalization of BAGASOO (RASG-AFI/1 - IP/7), supra note 130, at Paragraph 7.2. See 
also: The Aviation & Allied Business Journal (12.10.2 12), 'BAGASOO: Future Regional Safety 
Pivot’, Interview with Mr Emmanuel Akatue, Executive Director of the BAGASOO'  
<http://www.aviationbusinessjournal.aero/2012/10/12/bagasoo-future-regional-safety-pivot.aspx> 
[accessed 23 July 2014]. 
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iii.  Practical aspects of implementation 
BAGASOO has limited personnel and, at the moment of writing this study, did 
not expect to develop the capacity to act as a fully-fledged civil aviation authori-
ty.144 Instead it intended to rely on inspectors from the region throug a co-
operative inspectorate scheme, similar to the one established by AFCAC and pre-
sented under Section 3.4.1.2. BAGASOO expects that the co-operative inspec-
torate scheme will enable it to maintain staffing levels that will ensure the effec-
tiveness of its work programmes whilst, at the same time, significa tly reduce 
operational cost.145 
Since its establishment in 2010 BAGASOO has experienced financial 
challenges. This is because although the BAGASOO founding agreement envis-
ages that BAGASOO is to be principally financed through a Passenger Service 
Charge to be collected from its Member States, as well as revenues deriving from 
BAGASOO’s operational activities, in practice this scheme has not worked as 
planned, primarily because of Member States’ different charging policies which 
proved difficult to harmonise.146 BAGASOO had therefore to resort to sharing the 
budget amongst its Member States on a pro rata basis, but in practice only some 
States have actually been contributing fully to the budget.147 At the beginning of 
2014 BAGASOO was considering reverting back to the implementatio  of a Pas-
senger Service Charge instead of relying on State contributions.148 
Overall BAGASOO can be characterised as a RSOO with mainly expert 
advisory, consultancy and technical support functions, but which from a legal 
point of view also has the necessary mandate to exercise safety oversight func-
tions on behalf of its Member States. It remains to be seen to what extent this 
mandate will actually be used in practice in the future. 
3.4.4 RASO (TYPE II): A SUPRANATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY 
AGENCY  
The second type of RASOs is a supranational aviation safety agency. In compari-
son with the previous category, the main feature of this type is that it evolves 
within the broader institutional and legal framework of a REIO.149 From a policy 
point of view this means that a RASO is used by the REIO as its technical arm for 
the implementation of a single regional air transport market. 
The extent to which a RASO can rely on the REIO’s institutional frame-
work and legislation is directly proportional to the level of integration of the latter. 
If a REIO has truly supranational character and can adopt through its inst utions 
legally binding legislation, this legislation will also bind the RASO and will form 
                                                 
144 BAGASOO Brochure, supra note 137. Also confirmed through: 'Interview No 6', (2014), supra 
note 133. 
145 BAGASOO, 'Framework of the Banjul Accord Group Aviation Safety Oversight Organization 
(BAGASOO) and The Banjul Accord Group Accident Investigation Agency (BAGAIA)', C-
WP/13396, (187th session of the ICAO Council, 2009),  at Paragraph 1.4. 
146 BAGASOO: Future Regional Safety Pivot’, Interview with Mr Emmanuel Akatue, Executive 
Director of the BAGASOO, supra note 140. Also confirmed through: 'Interview No 6', (2014), 
supra note 133. 
147 Institutionalization of BAGASOO (RASG-AFI/1 - IP/7), supra note 130, at Paragraph 6.1.  
148 'Interview No 6', (2014), supra note 133. 
149 For examples of REIOs supra note 61. 
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the foundation of a single regional safety system. This is for example the case 
with the EU and EASA, which is currently the most prominent example of a su-
pranational aviation safety agency and will be subject to a detailed presentation 
and analysis in the following chapter. A similar relationship is being developed 
between the Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the EC-
CAA, which is addressed in Section 3.6 of this chapter. 
If the level of the integration of a REIO is less deep, a RASO may be rely-
ing on the former to a lesser extent, as is the case with the CASSO  presented 
below. By mid-2014 there have still been very few truly supranatio l aviation 
safety agencies, but it can be expected that additional ones will be established, in 
particular in Africa, where some of the RECs have legislative competences a d 
envisage establishing RASOs. This is the case for example with UEMOA which, 
as discussed under Section 3.4.1.1, is planning to establish its own RASO type 
body. 
3.4.4.1 EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AND 
SECURITY OVERSIGHT AGENCY 
 
i. Legal basis and organisational set-up 
CASSOA was established in 2007 as a self-accounting institution of the EAC. Its 
legal basis is a protocol signed by the three founding States, namely Kenya, Tan-
zania and Uganda on 18th April 2007, 150 and adopted under Article 92 of the EAC 
Treaty on 18th June 2007 (hereinafter the ‘CASSOA protocol’).151 Subsequently 
two more States, Rwanda and Burundi, have joined the EAC and became parties 
to the CASSOA protocol.152 CASSOA is therefore a specialised institution of the 
EAC responsible for aviation safety and security. 
Although CASSOA is an institution of the EAC, in practice t relies to a 
small extent on the EAC institutional framework. With the exception of the privi-
leges and immunities which CASSOA derives from the EAC Treaty, and the EAC 
Court of Justice, which is the designated forum for dispute resolution nder the 
CASSOA protocol, CASSOA works largely independently. For example, the 
rules, procedures and manuals are developed by CASSOA Technical Commit-
tee(s) and following their endorsement by CASSOA’s Board of Directors, pre-
sented to the Member States for enactment in their national legal systems.153 
                                                 
150 'Protocol on the establishment of the East African Community Civil Aviation Safety and 
Security Oversight Agency’, signed on 18 April 2007 and approved during the 5th Extraordinary 
Summit of EAC Heads of State held in Kampala, Uganda on 18th June 2007', 
<http://www.cassoa.org/docs/Documents/protocol.pdf> [accessed 10 August 2014]. 
151 Article 92 of the EAC Treaty requires, among others, that the EAC partner States harmonise 
their policies, rules and regulations on civil aviation in order to promote the development of a safe, 
reliable, efficient and economically viable air transport system in the region in compliance with the 
international standards. 
152 Treaties of Accession of the Republic of Rwanda and Burundi to the East African Community, 
both signed on 18 June 2007 are available at 
<http://www.eac.int/legal/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=28> [accessed 10 August 
2014]. 
153 CASSOA Protocol, supra note 150, Article 7(d)-(e). 
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CASSOA has legal personality.154 Its headquarters is based in Entebbe, 
Uganda.155 
ii.  Main safety functions 
Under its founding protocol, the mandate of CASSOA covers both aviation safety 
and security oversight, without however distinguishing further t  specific do-
mains of aviation safety for which it is competent.156  In practice it has been sup-
porting its Member States in the areas of flight safety standards, including air op-
erations, airworthiness and crew licensing, as well as aerodromes and ANS.157 
The primary role of CASSOA is to assist the EAC Member States in meet-
ing their safety and security oversight obligations under the Chicago Convention 
and its Annexes, as well as to provide a forum and structure to discuss, plan and 
implement common measures for the enhancement of safety and security of civil 
aviation.158 From a legal point of view the structure and contents of the CASSO  
protocol is similar to the BAGASOO founding agreement, with a major difference 
that CASSOA’s mandate also covers security issues. 
In contrast to BAGASOO, the CASSOA currently does not have a man-
date to accept delegation of safety oversight functions from its Member States. 
For the time being CASSOA performs mainly advisory and support functions. 
Since its establishment it has been focusing primarily on harmonisation of regula-
tions and procedures, providing assistance to States in reaching compliance with 
ICAO SARPs,159 provision of training to national inspectors, exchange of safety 
information and implementation of operational projects, such as a common exam-
ination scheme for aviation personnel or EAC centre for aviation medicine.160 It 
has also established – with mixed results - a system for the sharing of aviation 
safety inspectors.161  
iii.  Practical aspects of implementation 
Similar to BAGASOO, CASSOA has been facing challenges in respect to its 
funding. The CASSOA protocol envisages various sources of funding, including a 
                                                 
154 Ibid. Article 3. 
155 CASSOA, 'Regional cooperation for the enhancement of safety oversight: obstacles and lessons 
learnt', ACAC/ICAO Seminar/Workshop on Regional Safety Oversight Programmes, (Rabat, 
Morocco, 2012). 
156 CASSOA Protocol, supra note 150, Article 2. 
157 Regional cooperation for the enhancement of safety oversight: obstacles and lessons learnt, 
supra note 155. 
158 CASSOA Protocol, supra note 150, Article 4(c). For a more detailed overviw of CASSOA’s 
activities see: Regional cooperation for the enhancement of safety oversight: obstacles and lessons 
learnt, supra note 155; and: CASSOA, 'Safety Initiatives and Regional Organizations in the AFI 
Region', RASG-AFI/1 – IP/8, (First meeting of the Africa Indian Ocean Regional Aviation Safety 
Group, 2012). 
159 With some success, as for example Rwanda was removed in 2012 from the ICAO list of States 
with ‘Significant Safety Concerns’. See: Regional cooperation for the enhancement of safety 
oversight: obstacles and lessons learnt, supra note 155. 





fees and charges scheme and sources provided by EAC.162 In practice the organi-
sation is largely dependent on the funding from its Member States, which have 
their own priorities and whose contributions proved to be uneven.163 This has re-
sulted in difficulties in attracting and retaining sufficient number of qualified 
technical personnel, in particular pilots.164 
Another challenge has been the difficulty in implementing an effective 
scheme for the sharing of inspector resources amongst the Member States due o 
‘relatively few qualified and skilled inspectors within the region.’165 CASSOA has 
also highlighted resistance from civil aviation authorities based on perceptions of 
competition for safety oversight responsibilities, differences in legal frameworks, 
drafting principles and regulatory promulgation procedures of Member States, as 
some of the problems in discharging its mandate.166 
It is the objective of CASSOA to evolve in the future into a RASO with 
some of the safety and security oversight competences formally delegated to it by
the Member States. To this end an organisational development plan has been pre-
pared,167 and expert assistance sought from ICAO as to how such a future man-
date might best be structured.168 However, as CASSOA is an institution of the 
EAC, such evolution would ultimately depend on the decision taken at the EAC 
level and would require a change to the CASSOA protocol. This in turn may de-
pend on the future integration path of the EAC.169 
3.5 REGIONAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION ORGANISATIONS  
 
3.5.1 INTRODUCTION  
Beyond regulation and oversight of civil aviation, which is the domain of RSOOs 
dealt with in the previous section, civil aviation accident investigation170 is also an 
area where regional cooperation can bring regulatory efficiencies and economies 
of scale. This study would therefore not be complete without also referring to 
RAIOs, which, although not yet as numerous as RSOOs, have also been gaining 
increasing attention in recent years. 
Today commercial aviation is overall a very safe sector of transport with 
fatal accidents occurring rarely as Chapter 1 demonstrated. This means that main-
                                                 
162 CASSOA Protocol, supra note 150, Article 15. 
163 Regional cooperation for the enhancement of safety oversight: obstacles and lessons learnt, 
supra note 155. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Safety Initiatives and Regional Organizations in the AFI Region, supra note 158, at Paragraph 
3.2.  
166 Regional cooperation for the enhancement of safety oversight: obstacles and lessons learnt, 
supra note 155. 
167 CASSOA, 'Organisational Development Plan 2010/11–20 4/15'  
<http://www.cassoa.org/docs/Approved%20CASSOA%20Organisation%20Evolution%20Plan%2
0R2.pdf> [accessed 10 August 2014]. 
168ICAO, 'Cooperation with Regional Organizations and Regional Civil Aviation Bodies', C-
WP/13885, (197th session of the ICAO Council, 2012),  at Paragraph 8.1. 
169 Safety Initiatives and Regional Organizations in the AFI Region, supra note 158, at Paragraphs 
2.1.4 and 5.1. 
170 According to Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, States have an obligation to ensure the 
investigation of both accidents and serious accidents. This section, for the sake of brevity, will 
refer only to accident investigation and accident investigation bodies or authorities. 
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taining a permanent accident investigation authority with qualified staff and ade-
quate facilities can be costly even for wealthy regions. When in 2009, the Europe-
an Commission presented its proposal for a new EU regulation on air accident 
investigations, it highlighted, as one of the drivers for its initiative ‘lack of a uni-
form investigating capacity in the EU’,171 and underlined that ‘especially for 
smaller Member States it is difficult to mobilise the necessary expertise for more 
complex investigations and to be on par with large manufacturers or operators.’172 
and that ‘in practice, only Member States with big manufacturing industry can 
justify budgets necessary to maintain a properly staffed and equipped [authori-
ties].’173 
The difficulties that States in general experience in meeting their legal ob-
ligations related to aviation accident investigations are best illu trated with the 
ICAO USOAP results. According to 2014 ICAO data concerning the lev l of ef-
fectiveness of safety oversight systems, accident investigation is a area where 
overall the States’ capabilities are the weakest, with the level of effective imple-
mentation at only 50%.174 
States can try to mitigate these difficulties through various means. This can 
include technical activities such as joint planning and conduct of training for in-
vestigators, or provision of assistance within the framework of a particul r inves-
tigation. It may also entail formalisation of cooperation by means of memoranda 
of understanding, letters of intent or international agreements. The 2006 ECAC 
Code of Conduct on Co-operation can be given as an example of a non-legally 
binding arrangement providing a convenient framework for co-operation outside 
the context of a specific investigation.175 The ECAC Code of Conduct addresses 
issues such as: collaboration during an investigation, management of resources, 
exchange of information and training activities. 
States can also establish multimodal investigating agencies176 or joint civ-
il-military 177 aviation accident investigation bodies, in order to reduce the costs, 
and provide for efficiencies deriving from aggregation of knowledge and experi-
ence related to investigation of transport accidents. 
In order to help States in meeting their accident investigation obligations 
ICAO started to promote the RAIO concept. This idea was formally introduced 
into the ICAO regulatory framework in 2010 with the adoption of an amendment 
to Annex 13 envisaging the possibility of delegation of investigations to RAIOs:  
                                                 
171 EC, 'Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal of the European Commission for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on investigation and prevention of 
accidents and incidents in civil aviation', COM(2009) 611 final, (Brussels, 2009),  p. 14. 
172 Ibid. at p. 15. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Regional Performance Dashboards, supra note 15 in Ch.1. 
175 ECAC, 'Code of Conduct on co-operation in the field of civil aviation accident/incident 
investigation'  <https://www.ecac-
ceac.org//publications_events_news/ecac_documents/codes_of_conduct> [accessed 7 August 
2014]. 
176 Multimodal boards operate for example in the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Latvia and Sweden 
177 In Sweden for example, the Swedish Accident Investigation Board, which is a multimodal safe-
ty board reporting to the Ministry of Defence, is re ponsible for investigating accidents involving 
not only civil but also military aircraft, including Swedish military aircraft subject to an accident 
abroad unless stipulated otherwise in international agreements. See: Piotr Kasprzyk, 'Legal 
Ramifications of the Investigations of the 2010 Polish President’s Aircraft Accident', ASL, 36 
(2011), p. 214. 
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The State of Occurrence shall institute an investigation into the circumstances of the ac-
cident and be responsible for the conduct of the inv stigation, but it may delegate the 
whole or any part of the conducting of such investigation to another State or a regional 
accident investigation organization by mutual arrangement and consent.178 
 
The concept of a RAIO is not a new one. In Commonwealth of the Inde-
pendent States, the IAC, in addition to being a RSOO as was presented in the pre-
vious section, also acts as a RAIO. Overall however, and in contrast to the 
RSOOs, the practical application of the RAIO concept has so far been rather lim-
ited. Until 2014, in addition to the IAC, only one other such organisation had been 
established – the Banjul Accord Group Accident Investigation Agency 
(BAGAIA). 179 In 2010, the EU established the European Network of Civil Avia-
tion Safety Investigation Authorities (ENCASIA), but this organis tion has only a 
supporting and coordinating role, and does not conduct investigations on behalf of 
EU Member States.180 ENCASIA can be at best qualified as a pre-RAIO. 
 
According to ICAO the key benefits of a RAIO are to:  
 
- Eliminate duplication of efforts by pooling human, technical and fi ancial 
resources; 
- Achieve economies of scale leading to effectiveness and efficiency, 
- Demonstrate, as a responsible regional organisation, improved regional 
solidarity; 
- Enable investigators in the region to gain experience more quickly, 
- Facilitate the recruitment and retainment of investigators by States;  
- Help achieve the independence of investigations.181 
 
The ICAO RSOO Symposium of 2011 similarly concluded that ‘there are 
benefits to be derived from the establishment of Regional Accident and Incident 
Investigation Organizations (RAIOs) and from close collaboration and coordina-
tion between RSOOs and RAIOs.’182 
In the context of aviation accident investigations, the issue that must be 
particularly underlined, and which is fully applicable to a RAIO, is the require-
ment of independence and separation of the accident investigation process. Under 
Annex 13, the sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident is the 
prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to ap-
portion blame or liability.183 There are a number of consequences of this basic 
                                                 
178 Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraphs 5.1 and 5.1.2. 
179 'Banjul Accord Group Accident Investigation Agency Agreement', Montreal, 30 June 2009, 
ICAO Registration No. 5463. The Member States of BAGAIA are: Republic of Cape Verde, the 
Republic of Gambia, the Republic of Ghana, the Republic of Guinea, the Republic of Liberia, the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the Republic of Sierra Leone 
180 EU, 'Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Prliament and of the Council of 20 
October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and 
repealing Directive 94/56/EC', (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010), Article 7. 
181 ICAO Doc. 9946, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.2. 
182 Outcomes of the Symposium on Regional Safety Oversight Organisations (oral report to ICAO 
Council), supra note 4 in Ch.1. 
183 Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 3.1. 
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requirement at the legal, as well as operational and organisational levels, including 
that: 
 
- The accident investigation authority shall have independence in the con-
duct of the investigation and have unrestricted authority over its conduct; 
- Air accident investigations shall be separate from any judicial or adminis-
trative proceedings to apportion blame or liability; 
- Air accident investigations should have unrestricted access to all evidential 
material without delay and are not impeded by administrative or judicial 
investigations or proceedings.184 
Similar to accident investigation authorities at national level, a RAIO must 
be independent in its actions, impartial and be perceived as such. According to 
ICAO guidelines on RAIOs, ‘it should be established in such a way that it can 
withstand political or other interference or pressure.’185 
Today an aviation accident, especially in commercial air transport, is rarely 
a mono-national event, and almost routinely multiple States will be involved in 
the investigation either as a result of their technical interest, that is as a ‘State of 
Registry’, ‘State of the Operator’, ‘State of Manufacture’, ‘State of Design’, or by 
being a State whose citizens were injured or killed in the accident.186 Press and 
politicians from the victims’ countries, as well as the families and relatives, will 
also routinely follow the investigation and may try to exert pressure on the inves-
tigators or prematurely speculate about the probable cause(s).187 
In this complex environment, establishing a RAIO can be beneficial from 
the perspective of strengthening independence of safety investigations, especially 
in States which do not have resources necessary to organise accident investigation 
individually at national level. In such cases, a technically competent RAIO would 
represent a strong counterpart to regulators and would be more likely to have re-
sources adequate to be on a par with manufacturers and airlines. 
In addition, in the case of States which already have independent accident 
investigation authorities, regional cooperation can offer benefits. In he EU, one of 
the reasons behind the 2010 establishment of ENCASIA (see Section 3.5.2.3 be-
                                                 
184 For an overview of legal aspects of the independence of air accident investigations see: Paul S. 
Dempsey, 'Independence of Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities: Keeping the Foxes from the 
Henhouse', JALC, 75 (2010). 
185 ICAO Doc. 9946, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Forward. 
186 Under ICAO Annex 13, Standard 5.27, the rights of the State which has a special interest in an 
accident by virtue of fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens are formally more limited compared 
to the rights of States which have a technical interest in the investigation, and which are entitled to 
appoint an accredited representative. However there are cases where the interest of the State repre-
senting the fatally injured passengers will be so str ng that this State may even take over the re-
sponsibility for the conduct of the investigation, upon delegation by the State of occurrence. This 
has been the case with the shooting down of the Malaysian flight MH17 over Ukraine on 17 July 
2014, and where Ukraine, as the ‘State of Occurrence’, delegated the conduct of the investigation 
to the Netherlands, as the State which represented the majority of the fatally injured passengers on 
that flight. For further details on this case see: Dutch Safety Board, 'Dutch Safety Board heads 
investigation: investigation effort in full swing, black boxes currently being read out', Press 
Release, (2014). 
187 For a very good analysis of the general public, media and policy makers’ reactions to aviation 
accidents (case studies from the US), see: Roger W. Cobb and David M. Primo, The plane truth: 
Airline crashes, the media and transportation policy, (2003). 
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low) was to ‘improve the quality of investigations conducted by safety investiga-
tion authorities and to strengthen their independence.’188  
According to IAC, it is also ‘much easier to prevent conflicts of interests 
within the framework of regional organizations, as such an organization will, in a 
significant number of cases, present [sic] several States, which will make interac-
tion as well as information exchange and publicity easier’.189 
3.5.2 ESTABLISHING A RAIO LEGAL FRAMEWORK: CURRENT 
EXAMPLES AND PRACTICE 
According to ICAO, the most important consideration in setting up a RAIO is that 
it be established ‘on a legal basis that clearly indicates its legal standing and the 
level of its responsibility within Member States’.190 In 2014 there were two main 
types of RAIO in operation: 
 
- With the competence to conduct the safety investigations on behalf of its 
Member States; and 
- Having a mainly coordinating and supporting role. 
 
These are also the two types distinguished by ICAO in its RAIO manual as 
‘basic’ and ‘complex’:191 
 
- In a basic set-up, the national accident and incident investigation authority 
retains full responsibility for investigation activities within a Member 
State, while RAIO develops and provides common regulations, policies 
and procedures for accident and incident investigation, provides oversight 
of the implementation of such requirements, as well as advice, guidance 
and assistance to Member States; 
- In a more complex set-up, the national accident investigation authorities 
may delegate the whole or part of their functions and responsibilities con-
cerning accident and incident investigation to a RAIO, which conducts in-
vestigations on behalf of Member States.  
 
The ICAO classification of RAIOs into basic and complex, broadly corre-
sponds to the classification into pre-RASOs and RASOs which was proposed in 
Section 3.4.  
The first type of RAIO is currently represented by ENCASIA in the EU.
The second type is represented by IAC and BAGAIA. Some other projects to es-
tablish RAIOs are under consideration in different parts of the world, including in 
the Gulf Region192 and Central America,193 but by mid-2014 had not yet material-
ised. 
                                                 
188 Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, supra note 180, Article 7. 
189 IAC, 'Regional Organizations in Accident and Incident Investigations', AIG/08-WP/22, (ICAO 
Accident Investigation and Prevention (AIG) Divisional Meeting, 2008),  at Paragraph 2.3.5. 
190 ICAO Doc. 9946, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 3.4.2. 
191 Ibid. at Paragraph 3.10.1.3. 
192 In addition to RAIOs which are envisaged in Africa, as presented under Section 3.3.1.1 of 
Chapter 3, a RAIO is also being considered by the Gulf Region. For more details see: UAE 
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The key implication of the above distinction is that, if the delegation of the 
conduct of investigations is envisaged, it implies the granting of a legal personali-
ty to a RAIO. This is because, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 6, the 
carrying out by a RASO on behalf of its Member States of the functions and du-
ties envisaged under the Chicago Convention presupposes the establishment of a 
relationship of an international agency between the RASO and its Member States. 
In such cases, the founding document of a RAIO will have to be an international 
agreement or a binding supranational legal framework. 
Even if States do not delegate the conduct of investigations to a RAIO, 
they may decide to adopt common accident investigation regulations, with a view 
to ensuring uniform implementation of relevant Annex 13 SARPs. The EU regula-
tion on air accident investigations can be given as an example here. Such regional-
ly adopted legislation also offers an opportunity to organise some of the Annex 13 
obligations in a collective manner. A good example in that respect is the European 
Database of Safety Recommendations.194 Managed by the European Commission 
with the support of ENCASIA, the database constitutes a single repository of all 
the safety recommendations issued or received by the EU accident investigation 
authorities according to Annex 13. It allows information to be aggre ated at the 
regional level with a view to identifying recommendations of EU-wide concern, 
or specific safety patterns emerging from the data which may not otherwise be 
visible.195 
It is advisable that where States delegate the conduct of investigations to a 
RAIO, the investigations are based on common regional regulations, p licies and 
procedures. Uniform regulatory framework is easier to apply from the perspective 
of a RAIO than a patchwork of national regulations. This may however not al-
ways be possible. For example in the case of interactions between the RAIO and 
local police and judiciary officers, the RAIO will have to abide by some, if not all, 
local regulations. 
In addition, the ‘State of Occurrence’ may not always be able to delegat  
all of its responsibilities to a RAIO. For example the initial response responsibili-
ties, such as ensuring the security of the accident site and protection of evidence, 
will have to be undertaken by the ‘State of Occurrence’, pending arrival of the 
RAIO investigation team and assumption of responsibility for the investigation by 
the RAIO.196 
The founding document of a RAIO should ensure its independence from 
any other organisation whose interests or tasks may be in conflict with he objec-
tive of air accident investigations, and in particular the natiol civil aviation au-
thorities or a RSOO if it has also been established. According to ICAO such sepa-
ration should be achieved as a minimum at a functional level.197 In the EU, the 
                                                                                                                            
General Civil Aviation Authority, 'Regional Accident Investigation Organization', ACAC/ICAO 
Seminar/Workshop on Regional Safety Oversight Programmes (Rabat, Morocco, 2012),  
193 El Salvador, 'Establishment of a central american accident and incident investigation 
organization', A38-WP/232, (38th ICAO Assembly, 2013). 
194 Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, supra note 180, Article 18. 
195 European Network of Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities (ENCASIA), 'Annual 
Report', (2013), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/safety/accident_investigation/authorities_en.htm> 
[accessed 30 March 2014]. 
196 ICAO Doc. 9946, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 3.10.1.5. 
197 Ibid.at Paragraph 2.4.9. 
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members of ENCASIA - even though this organisation does not condu t investi-
gations - are legally prohibited to ‘accept instructions from anybody which could 
affect the independent status of safety investigations.’198 
The fact that a RAIO needs to meet the requirements of independence, 
does not mean that it should not be administratively supervised and accountable to 
governments of its Member States, or their supranational representatives, in r la-
tion to sound financial management, good administrative practices, and proper 
implementation of policies, working methods, and regulations. In fact, in the case 
of RAIOs which conduct safety investigations on behalf of their Member States, 
such supervision and accountability is necessary, given the fact that i s Member 
States will continue to be ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance with 
their obligations under the Chicago Convention. The question of RASO oversight 
by its Member States will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
Where a RAIO may offer particular advantages is in the area of the protec-
tion of safety information coming from the accident investigation process or ac-
quired under safety data collection and processing systems. If a RAIO is estab-
lished in the form of an international organisation or supranatio l agency, its sta-
tus – through the immunities and privileges granted by the Member States – may 
offer enhanced protection to the safety information it collects. For example in the 
EU, the protocol on privileges and immunities attached to the EU founding trea-
ties and which ensures the inviolability of EU’s archives, applies to EU agen-
cies.199 Such protection should be balanced by ‘access to information’ rules allow-
ing the release of information to the public if it does not je pardise the ability of 
the RAIO to gather such information in the future.200 
In assessing the feasibility of a RAIO, practical aspects of multinatio al 
cooperation such as language issues and knowledge of local circumstances should 
also be taken into account. RAIO inspectors will need to be n the ground to in-
terview the witnesses, or to interact with the local police. They will also need 
rights, recognised and enforced by all the RAIO Member States, to take the neces-
sary measures to ensure the effective conduct of the investigation. This may in-
clude the right to have access to the site of the accident, aircraft wreckage and 
flight recorders, to call and examine/interview witnesses, request the medical ex-
amination of the pilots, or to require the conduct of autopsy examination of the 
bodies of the fatally injured persons. 
At the national level, experience shows that in some countries,201 the rights 
of the air safety investigators can be in conflict with corresponding privileges of 
the justice authorities and police conducting a parallel investigation. This is a le-
gally complex issue, and ICAO advises States to use a combination of legislation, 
                                                 
198 Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, supra note 180, Article 7(5). 
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protocols or agreements between the accident investigation and judicial authori-
ties to ensure that the former are not ‘impeded by administrative or judicial inves-
tigations or proceedings.’202 A RAIO may similarly want to develop a template of 
advance arrangements to be used for the purpose of coordinating its investigations 
with judicial and police authorities of Member States. In the EU for example the 
use of such advance arrangements has been made mandatory for all the EU Mem-
ber States.203  
3.5.2.1 THE INTERSTATE AVIATION COMMITTEE 
In 2014, the only example of a RAIO actually entitled to conduct ac ident investi-
gations on behalf of its Member States was the IAC. This organisation, which is 
also a RSOO, has already been addressed under Section 3.4.3.3, so here only its 
RAIO functions will be further presented. 
IAC should be seen as part of a regional system for air accident investiga-
tions for the CIS States. This is because, in addition to the possibility to conduct 
the actual investigations on behalf of some of its Member States, it is also respon-
sible for developing regional rules, procedures, manuals, training of investigators, 
checking compliance with such rules and procedures, as well as assisting the 
Member States in the conduct of investigations in case the delegation h s not tak-
en place.204 Its objective is to ensure the greatest possible harmonisation of acci-
dent investigation procedures and requirements, and efficient application of An-
nex 13 at the regional level.205 
 The delegation mechanism used by IAC is based on a combination of ts 
founding agreement, which is the Minsk Treaty presented under Section 3.4.3.3, 
and a bilateral delegation agreement concluded with a specific Member State. 
 For example the Russian Federation delegated to IAC investigation func-
tions in the event of any aircraft accident occurring in the territory of the Russian 
Federation and involving a foreign operated or registered aircraft, or an accident 
occurring in the Russian Federation and involving an aircraft or aircraft engine of 
foreign design or manufacture.206 The IAC also has responsibility for providing 
the Russian Accredited Representatives to investigations of accidents occurring on 
foreign territory and involving a Russian operated or registered aircraft or n acci-
dent/incident occurring in the foreign territory and involving an aircraft or aircraft 
engine of Russian design or manufacture.207  
As far as the issue of independence of investigations is concerned, the sit-
uation of IAC is quite specific because, as mentioned above, it also acts as a 
RSOO with competences such as aircraft and aerodrome certification. Ideally both 
regulatory and investigative functions should be performed by separate org nisa-
                                                 
202 Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 5.4.3. 
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the implementation of this provision was still ongoing. For further details see: ENCASIA 2013 
Annual Report, supra note 195, at p. 23. 
204 'Minsk Agreement', supra note 105, Article 7(b). 
205 For a further overview of IAC accident investigation functions see: Sergey V. Zayko, 'Russia’s 
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206 See for example: 'Memorandum of Understanding betwe n the government of the United States 
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tions, and this is what this study recommends. However, according to ICAO, the 
separation should be ensured at least at the functional level.208 In the case of IAC, 
the certification/regulatory functions, that is the Aviation Register, and accident 
investigations are performed by separate commissions, which are organisational 
units within the IAC with separate legal personalities, as was explained under 
Section 3.4.3.3. 
3.5.2.2 THE BANJUL ACCORD GROUP ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
AGENCY 
BAGAIA was formally established in 2009 on the basis of an international agree-
ment. It has a status of an ‘independent body under the Banjul Accord Gr up’. 
Contrary to IAC, BAGAIA's mandate is limited exclusively to air ccident inves-
tigation matters. 
 At the time of writing this study in 2014, BAGAIA was not yet fully oper-
ational. It was therefore not possible to analyse practical aspects related to its 
functioning. 
 From a legal point of view, BAGAIA's founding agreement gives to this 
RAIO, at least formally speaking, the possibility to accept from its Member States 
the delegation of accident investigation functions and duties. Article 5(k) of the 
founding agreement states that BAGAIA can: 
 
[C]onduct, either in whole or any part of, an investigation into an aircraft accident or seri-
ous incident upon delegation be a State of Occurrence ... by mutual agreement and con-
sent between the State of Occurrence and the BAGAIA.209 
 
So far no such delegation agreements have been concluded, or are envis-
aged.210 State sovereignty has been mentioned as one of the main principles to b  
taken into account when discussing possible future delegation greements be-
tween BAGAIA and its Member States. It is also possible that such delegation 
agreements could be concluded between BAGAIA and its Member States on an ad 
hoc basis for the purpose of investigating specific accidents.211 The fact that the 
conclusion of such delegation agreements, of either general or ad hoc nature, is 
foreseen in the BAGAIA founding agreement, presupposes that the BAGAIA's 
Member States envisaged, or at least did not exclude, this organisatio  having a 
certain degree of international legal personality, which is not explicitly envisaged 
under BAGAIA's founding agreement. 
Similar to IAC, BAGAIA should be seen as part of a regional system for 
air accident investigations. This is because, beyond the possibility to conduct the 
actual investigations on behalf of its Member States, BAGAIA's founding agree-
ment envisages this organisation also being responsible for a wide array of func-
tions related to the strengthening of accident investigation capabilities of its 
Member States.212 
                                                 
208 ICAO Doc. 9946, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 3.10.1.5. 
209 'BAGAIA Agreement', supra note 179, Article 5(k). 
210 Official of the BAGAIA, 'Interview No 10', (2014). 
211 Ibid. 
212 'BAGAIA Agreement', supra note 179, Article 5. 
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Finally, concerning independence of investigations, the situation of 
BAGAIA is different from that of IAC, as it does not regulate civil aviation activi-
ties. 
3.5.2.3 THE EUROPEAN NETWORK OF CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY 
INVESTIGATION AUTHORITIES 
ENCASIA has a different legal and organisational setup from that of the IAC or 
BAGAIA. It is essentially a coordination platform for national accident investiga-
tion authorities of the EU Member States. It does not have any supranational 
competences, and its main function is to ‘encourage high standards in investiga-
tion methods and investigator training.’213 To this end activities of ENCASIA in-
clude: coordinating and organising ‘peer reviews’; training activities and skills 
development programmes for investigators; promoting best safety invest gation 
practices; developing and managing a framework for sharing resources; and advis-
ing EU institutions on policy and regulation for safety investigations and the pre-
vention of accidents and incidents.214 
ENCASIA's Annual Report for 2013215 and the ENCASIA work pro-
gramme for 2014,216 provide examples of a wide range of activities which this 
organisation coordinates, such as: 
- Developing procedures for asking and providing assistance between th 
member authorities; 
- Establishing an inventory of best practices of investigation in Europe; 
- Developing a guidance manual on investigator training, and providing 
training courses on issues such as management of on-site hazards for in-
vestigators or responding to a major aviation accident; 
- Analysing information in a central EU database of safety recommenda-
tions; 
- Developing a programme of ‘peer reviews’ to help national authorities to 
increase their investigative capabilities and raise awareness of best prac-
tice. 
From a legal point of view, the establishment of ENCASIA has been man-
dated by EU law, but the actual responsibility for the act of establi hment has been 
given to the EU Member States.217 This means that in legal terms the ENCASIA is 
not an EU agency or other body of the EU, and does not have legal p rsonality 
under the EU legal system. This was a deliberate policy choice, because EU 
                                                 
213 Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, supra note 180, Article 7. 
214 Ibid. 
215 ENCASIA 2013 Annual Report, supra note 195. 
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Member States were concerned that establishing ENACSIA through an act of EU 
law could make the organisation more subordinate to EU institutions and this in 
turn could weaken the independence of the national accident investigation bod-
ies.218  
The EU Member States quickly realised however that lack of legal person-
ality can be a serious impediment to the effectiveness of ENCASIA, especially as 
they were intending to rely on the European Commission for its financial support. 
In order to overcome these difficulties, the concept of an association has been 
used, and in 2012 ENCASIA was registered in Belgium as an association sans but 
lucratif.219 This was a solution similar to the one used in the past by JAA and 
some other pre-RASOs which were presented under Section 3.4.2, and allowed 
ENCASIA to set up a bank account and receive grants from the EU.220 
It remains to be seen if in the future ENCASIA will evolve into an EU Air 
Accident Investigation Board, replacing the national investigation authorities. 
Such an evolution would in the first place depend on the political will of the EU 
Member States, and a clear demonstration by the European Commission that such 
an EU body would be a more efficient way of conducting air accident investiga-
tions than through the national authorities. In the Impact Assessment accompany-
ing the proposal for the regulation mandating the establishment of ENCASIA, the 
European Commission considered, as one of the possible options, the establish-
ment of such a Board, but finally decided that it would not be the best solution 
given the high implementation risks and associated costs for the EU budget.221 
3.6 TOWARDS A REGIONAL CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY 
 
3.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
So far this chapter has been presenting examples of regional aviation safety bodies 
functioning in parallel with the national authorities of their Member States. To a 
certain extent, and especially in cases where regulatory competences are exercisd 
in parallel by national authorities and a RASO, this is a model in which there is a 
risk of duplication of activities. This risk concerns not only the exercise of regula-
tory and oversight functions, but equally importantly the potential competition 
between a regional body and national authorities for resources and qu lified per-
sonnel. Some of the experiences of CASSOA referred to in the preceding s ction 
illustrate well such difficulties. 
Yet, there is another model of a RASO which eliminates the risk of such 
duplication. This is the concept of a RCAA, which acts as an aviation authority 
for multiple States. From a legal point of view a RCAA is a single entity, although 
organisationally it may operate on the basis of a headquarters office and loc l of-
fices in the participating States. In the RCAA model there is a complete delegation 
of safety oversight functions from a national to regional level. 
                                                 
218 Source: Personal files of the author, who was respon ible in the European Commission for 
coordinating the legislative process for the development of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of 20 
October 2010. 
219 Association Sans But Lucratif ‘ENCASIA’, ‘Statuts et Acte de désignation des premiers admi-
nistrateurs’, Monitor Belge, 1 October 2012. 
220 ENCASIA 2013 Annual Report, supra note 195, at p. 7. 
221 EC Impact Assessment COM(2009) 611 final, supra note 171, at p. 59. 
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The potential benefits of RCAA are economies of scale and associated sav-
ings for the governments on the one hand, and a single regulatory framework for 
the aviation industry on the other. This approach would best serve large groupings 
of small States with limited resources and/or States with low level of aviation ac-
tivities which are unable to generate revenues big enough to support fully fledged 
national civil aviation authorities. 
Putting in place a RCAA requires in the first place the political will of the 
States, which may be reluctant to transfer, to that extent, the exercise of their sov-
ereign competences to an international organisation. It also requires a single legal 
framework and operating procedures to ensure that a RCAA operates as a truly 
unique aviation authority. How such a legal framework is to be achieved is a mat-
ter of choice. It is proposed here that a supranational REIO with binding legisla-
tive powers, such as the EU, would be the best solution for delivering a legal 
framework for a RCAA. Alternatively, instruments of traditional public interna-
tional law could also be used. 
In any case, the establishment of a RCAA requires an organisation estab-
lished in a form which allows for large scale delegation of safety functions and 
duties by multiple States, and where such functions and duties can be exercised by 
a RCAA in a legally binding manner. In this respect RCAA cannot be established 
in a pre-RASO form, but must have a legal status of either RASO Type I or RASO 
Type II in the typology proposed in Section 3.4. 
Finally, the feasibility of a RCAA would also depend on local ircum-
stances such as the language(s) used, geographical considerations - which are im-
portant for the industry which needs to interact with the authority n a daily basis 
- and the presence, or lack, of a common administrative and legal culture/heritage. 
In 2014 there was only one example of an operational RCAA – the EC-
CAA, established in October 2003 by Member States of the OECS as an interna-
tional intergovernmental organisation with legal personality. The subsequent sec-
tions will present and analyse this organisation in more detail.222 
3.6.2 THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY 
 
3.6.2.1 ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 
The ECCAA is a unique organisation shaped by the history and geo-political sta-
tus of the eastern Caribbean region in the second half of the twentieth century, 
when the Caribbean States gradually moved away from being British colonies 
towards full independence. 
The origins of the ECCAA come from the ‘Directorate of Civil Aviation - 
Eastern Caribbean States’ which was established in 1957 by the United Kingdom: 
 
                                                 
222 The concept of a RCAA has also been briefly presented at the: ICAO, 'Symposium on Regional 
Safety Oversight Organisations' 2011) 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/RSOOSYMPO/Pages/default. spx> [accessed 6 August 2014]. See 
in particular: Michael Jennison, 'Is the RSOO a success story?', ICAO Symposium on Regional 
Safety Oversight Organisations (Montréal, Canada, 2011),  
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To advise the Governments of the Windward and Leeward Islands on all matters relating 
to Civil Aviation including airfields and airport developments, the implementation of 
ICAO conventions and the adequacy of air services.223  
 
In 1982, the Directorate of Civil Aviation became an institution of the 
OECS through the Treaty of Basseterre.224 Subsequently a decision was taken to 
transform it into ‘a fully autonomous body ... with the responsibility to regulate 
civil aviation activities within OECS Member States.’225 This decision gave the 
necessary political momentum for the conclusion of the ECCAA founding agree-
ment which was signed at 21 October 2003.226 
Although the OECS comprises nine States, including seven full members 
and two associated members,227 these are very small entities with small economies 
and populations. According to the UN data, in 2013 the combined population of 
the nine OECS States was 640.000 people,228 which is comparable with the popu-
lation of Washington D.C. in the US. It therefore made little economic or opera-
tional sense for these States to establish separate national civil viation authorities, 
particularly in a context where civil aviation is indispensable for these island na-
tions to maintain links with each other and the outside world. 
In 2010 the legal status of ECCAA was further strengthened, as it hbeen 
formally listed as one of the institutions of the OECS, next to the Eastern Carib-
bean Supreme Court and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, under the Revised 
Treaty of Basseterre.229 This in itself demonstrates the importance that the OECS, 
as an organisation of island nations, attaches to civil aviation. 
Under the Revised Treaty of Basseterre, the OECS enhanced its suprana-
tional character and decided that in a number of areas, one of them being civil 
aviation, the Member States will exercise their legislative competences at the re-
gional level. As far as civil aviation is concerned, this competence will be ‘exer-
cised on the recommendation of the Board of Directors of the Eastern Caribbean 
Civil Aviation Authority.’230 In accordance with Article 5.3 of the Revised Treaty 
of Basseterre, such legislation should take precedence over the national laws of 
                                                 
223 OECS, 'Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority'  <http://www.oecs.org/about-the-
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224 'Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States', Basseterre, 18 June 1981, 
1338 UNTS 97. 
225 ECCAA website, supra note 223. 
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OECS Member States, and be directly applicable.231 Yet in practice, at least for 
the time being, the regulations still have to be transposed into the national legal 
systems of the ECCAA Member States.232 
In addition, being an institution of the OECS, means for the ECCAA that: 
 
- The Heads of Governments of the OECS can override the Board of Direc-
tors of ECCAA;233 
- The Director General of the ECCAA is appointed by the Heads of Gov-
ernments of the OECS;234 
- The amendments to the ECCAA Agreement have to be agreed by the 
Heads of Governments of the OECS;235 
- The OECS institutions shall be exercising their legislative competence in 
matters of civil aviation on ‘the recommendation of the Board of Directors 
of the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority’.236 
3.6.2.2 ECCAA LEGAL AND ORGANISATIONAL STATUS 
The ECCAA, whose mandate covers both aviation safety and security,237 is set up 
as ‘an autonomous regional regulatory organization’ and is responsible for ‘regu-
lating civil aviation and fostering competitiveness in the aviation industry in the 
Eastern Caribbean and for harmonising the application of the standards and rec-
ommended practices adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organisation’.238 
It is a ‘body corporate, having a perpetual succession’.239   
Under its founding agreement the ECCAA has legal personality,240 and fi-
nancial autonomy guaranteed by revenue from the fees and charges levied for th  
provision of its services, including issuance of certificates, as well as air naviga-
tion fees collected for the use of airspace of the OECS States.241  
The ECCAA is located in St. John’s at Antigua and has ‘outstations’ in 
Member States. It is the only authority responsible for safety oversight of civil 
aviation activities in its Member States, meaning that there are no s parate nation-
al civil aviation authorities. To this end the ECCAA has the competence, inter 
alia, to: 
 
- Regulate civil aviation in the participating States on behalf of and in col-
laboration with them; 
                                                 
231 Alfred Schipke, Aliona Cebotari, and Nita  Thacker, The Eastern Caribbean Economic and 
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241 Ibid. Article 17. 
113 
 
- Issue civil aviation documents under the national aviation legislation of the 
participating States; 
- Recommend to the participating States, rules, regulations and aviation 
standards; 
- Enforce existing rules, regulations and aviation standards and impose ad-
ministrative fines and penalties for violations of the rules, regulations and 
aviation standards; 
- Require the payment of fees.242 
 
From a legal point of view, the technique that was used to set up this RA-
SO and empower it to act on behalf of its Member States was a combination of an 
international agreement and national laws. At the public international law evel, 
the ECCAA founding agreement created the organisation, defined its mandate and 
functions, determined the organisational structure and funding prciples, as well 
as granted to it the necessary privileges and immunities. The founding agreement 
was subsequently incorporated into the national laws of the ECCAA Member 
States through enabling legislation.243  
In addition there was a need to internalise the general competences of the 
ECCAA created under international law into the specific aviation lawsand regula-
tions of its Member States. This was achieved through the adoption by each of the 
Member States of similar primary aviation legislation - the Civil Aviation Act - 
defining how the ECCAA would act on behalf of each of them. This includes the 
competence to issue certificates to personnel and organisations, as well to conduct 
the necessary oversight and enforcement activities.244 For example, through such 
legislation the ECCAA Member States granted to ECCAA employees authorisa-
tions to act as their national aviation safety inspectors, including the rights to ac-
cess buildings and facilities of the inspected entities, or to p event an aircraft from 
flying if it were to be found in an unsafe condition.245 The ECCAA has been so 
deeply integrated into the legal systems of its Member States that it has de facto 
and de lege become their organ. 
Although ECCAA is an authorised agency for the conduct of safety over-
sight activities, issuance of certificates and enforcement of rules, including 
through imposition of administrative penalties, its competences in respect to 
rulemaking are more limited. This is because the mandate of the ECCAA is only 
to ‘develop and seek approval for harmonized civi1 aviation regulations, policies 
and practices to be adopted by Participating States …,’246 while the responsibility 
for the adoption of such recommended regulations lies with the Member States, 
and since the entry into force of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre, with suprana-
tional institutions of the OECS.247 
From the perspective of the Chicago Convention, the fact that ECCAA 
performs all safety oversight and certification functions on behalf of its Member 
States has a number of consequences. First of all, ICAO needs to audit ECCAA 
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amended by Act No. 18 of 2006; 'Civil Aviation Regulations', Laws of Grenada, SRO 12 of 2005.  
245 'Civil Aviation Regulations of Grenada', supra note 244, at Part XIII. 
246 'ECCAA Agreement', supra note 226, Article 4(b). 
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which is the only competent aviation authority of OECS States. By mid-2014 two 
such audits have been performed, in 2007,248 and in 2013.249 
Secondly, where safety related non-compliances have been identified by 
ICAO with respect to the ECCAA, it is also this RSOO which will need to follow-
up these findings. This in turn requires close coordination between the ECCAA 
and all its Member States. Indeed, it is the ECCAA that prepares and ubmits re-
sponses to ICAO on behalf of the OECS Member States in a single corrective 
action plan.250 
The ECCAA, as a single aviation authority, is the beneficiary of all the 
revenues generated from the provision of safety oversight services, and does not 
have to share them with national authorities. It can also finance its activities from 
navigation service fees which are usually an adequate and stable sourc of reve-
nue. This would imply that overall it should have sufficient fi ancial resources to 
perform the required regulatory activities. The interview performed for the pur-
pose of this study suggests however that ECCAA has experienced ‘challenges in 
recruiting staff due to the small size of the aviation industry in the region.’251 
These challenges have also been confirmed by ICAO.252 
ECCAA provides an example in which, even if sufficient financial re-
sources are available to a RASO, it may be difficult for it to recruit, even on a 
regional basis, suitably qualified personnel, if they are simply not available in the 
region in sufficient numbers. Still, the ECCAA confirms that it has ‘permitted 
OECS States to achieve effective civil aviation safety oversight at a fr ction of the 
cost of establishing their own civil aviation authorities.’253 
To conclude, the ECCAA is both de lege and de facto, part of a regional 
civil aviation safety system based on the sharing of tasks and responsibilities be-
tween the national and supranational levels. It is currently the only example of an 
organisation functioning as a single aviation authority for more than one State.  
In the future, it will be interesting to see how the OECS institutions will 
exercise their newly acquired competences to regulate civil aviation at the supra-
national level, and how ECCAA will be involved in this process. Potentially the 
OECS has an opportunity to become the first region in the world to both regulate 
aviation safety and to implement the regulations exclusively through supranation-
al institutions. 
Another question that needs to be asked is whether any of the other RA-
SOs, and in particular EASA which is currently the only RASO which has been 
operating  for over ten years in a supranational legal environment, could potential-
ly evolve into a RCAA type organisations in the future. This question will be ad-
dressed in Chapter 4 which deals with the EU and EASA. 
 
                                                 
248 ICAO, 'Final report on the safety oversight audit of the civil aviation system of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (Antigua and Barbuda; Grenada; St. Kitts and Nevis; 
Saint Lucia; and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)', (2007). 
249 ICAO, 'Final Report on the ICAO Coordinated Validat on Mission in the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States', (2013). 
250 'Interview No 7', (2014), supra note 232. 
251 Ibid. 
252 ICAO ICVM report on the OECS (2013), supra note 249, at Appendix 2.1 (used with the 
permission of the ECCAA).  
253 'Interview No 7', (2014), supra note 232. 
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3.7 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
So far ICAO has not developed a definition of a RASO and the current approach 
of ICAO and of the international aviation community is to trea  this type of organ-
isation as a broad concept covering a wide range of very different forms of coop-
eration. In practice RASOs fall into two general categories - RSOO and RAIO - 
depending on whether their function is safety regulation and oversight, or investi-
gation of aviation accidents and incidents. 
In 2014 there were over twenty initiatives in almost all parts of the world, 
which could be considered as RASOs, if looked at from the perspective of the 
broad approach currently followed by ICAO. In addition, a number of pr jects 
aimed at establishing additional RASOs were also ongoing at the time of the fina-
lisation of this study, in particular in Africa, South America and Middle East. 
This study has found that the recent boom in the establishment of RASOs 
has resulted, in particular in Africa, in establishment of significant number of such 
organisations, sometimes with overlapping membership, and functioning in paral-
lel with national authorities. Similar duplications exist, to a certain extent, in Eu-
rope where a number of regional aviation organisations, for historical reasons, 
continue to function in parallel, as the next chapter will show in more detail. 
In line with the recommendations for greater clarity of the RASO concept 
expressed by the international civil aviation community at the 2011 ICAO Sym-
posium on regional aviation safety oversight organisations, this chapter proposes 
the following definition of a RASO: 
 
An organisation established by States from the same geographical region, which has legal 
personality under international law and whose principal purpose is the provision of sup-
port for the carrying out of safety-related functions and duties set out by the Chicago 
Convention and its Annexes, and preferably the actual carrying out of some or all of such 
functions and duties on behalf of its participating States. 
 
The development of such a definition is considered necessary for two main 
reasons.  
Firstly it is necessary because the notions of RSOO and RAIO are being
used increasingly often in ICAO documentation, including Assembly resolutions 
and Annexes to the Chicago Convention. Such definition would he p in ensuring 
clarity as to who exactly is an addressee of these documents, especially where 
they give to a RSOO or a RAIO a right to carry out functions or duties so far nor-
mally exercised only by States. 
Secondly, the proposed definition was constructed in a way to promote the 
most efficient forms of RASOs, and notably those which have the competence to 
carry out, on behalf of States, safety related functions and duties se  out by the 
Chicago Convention, in a legally binding manner. As will be demonstrated in 
Chapters 4 and 6, the granting of such powers results in a relationship of an inter-
national agency between the organisation and the States concerned, and pre-
supposes the possession by the organisation in question of international legal per-
sonality. 
The objective of the proposed definition is therefore, in addition to clarify-
ing the roles of States and RASOs, to promote those forms of RASOs which are 
able to accept the most advanced forms of delegations. This capability will make 
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RASOs more suitable to constitute strong building blocks of the GASON, which 
was proposed in the preceding chapter. 
In addition to proposing a RASO definition, this chapter has also intro-
duced a RASO typology. For the sake of completeness, and because regional avia-
tion safety bodies have tendency to evolve over time (see Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 
5), this typology distinguishes between pre-RASOs, which do not fall, strictly 
speaking, within the scope of the definition as proposed above, and RASOs prop-
er. 
Although every type of a pre-RASO and RASO has its pros and cons, the 
purpose of the proposed classification is not to present better or worse types, but 
rather to systematise knowledge about these organisations and to study their 
achievements and problems that they have encountered, so that lessons may be 




The first type of pre-RASO forms are regional cooperation projects of a 
technical nature. They are considered as a pre-RASO form, due to the fact that 
some of such projects have a tendency to evolve into a RASO with legal personal-
ity under international law. Two main categories of this type have been distin-
guished, that is COSCAPs and cooperative inspector schemes: 
- COSCAPs can play a role in establishing RASOs by upgrading the safety 
oversight capabilities of its member authorities and building confide ce 
between them in working together. So far the process of transitioning 
COSCAPs into RASOs is still ongoing, and in the first half of 2014, out of 
the nine ICAO COSCAP projects only three had transitioned into RASOs, 
with one of them still being dependent on ICAO for management. ICAO 
and States need to accelerate the transition of COSCAPs into RASOs, 
where it is possible; 
 
- Cooperative inspector schemes, with the most prominent example of them 
being currently the AFI-CIS, are a simple and practical tool to organise 
pooling and sharing of aviation safety inspectors. Experience of AFI-CIS 
showed however that cooperative inspector schemes do not seem to be a
total remedy for the problem of shortage of qualified resources for the 
AFCAC States. This is mainly due to the inability of the participating au-
thorities to finance the costs of the assistance missions, and the overall 
shortage of qualified inspectors in the region. 
The second type of pre-RASO forms are regional associations of aviation 
safety authorities. Whilst not having the status of an international organisation, 
such associations can have legal personality under the domestic law of some of 
their member authorities, and experience shows that this form can be a practical 
way to launch cooperation, which over time can evolve into a legally more solid 
structure with international legal personality. The main shortcoming of this type is 
the fact that lack of a binding legal status under international law does not permit 
an association to mandate common requirements or to deliver certificates on be-




RASO proper typology: 
 
The first type of RASOs proper can be referred to as international regional 
aviation safety organisations. In 2014 this was the most common RASO category. 
This type is established on the basis of an international agreement and may exer-
cise, in a legally binding manner, certain safety functions on behalf of its Member 
States. This type of RASO, as opposed to the next category, will also normally be 
established outside the institutional framework of a REIO. 
The second type of RASOs proper is the supranational aviation safety 
agency. The main difference between this and previous category is that a suprana-
tional aviation safety agency evolves within the broader legal and institutional 
framework of a REIO. The extent to which a RASO can rely on the REIO institu-
tional framework and legislation is directly proportional to the leve  of integration 
of the latter. If a REIO has supranational character and can adopt, thr ugh its insti-
tutions, legally binding legislation, this legislation will also bind the RASO and 
will form the foundation of a single regional safety system. So far there are very 
few RASO in operation which could be truly considered as falling within this cat-
egory. 
 
The RAIO typology: 
 
This chapter also presented the concept of a RAIO, which in theory can be 
established in a pre-RASO form as an association of accident investigation au-
thorities (Pre-RASO Type II), or a RASO proper. In practice, in 2014, only two 
RAIOs were actually in operation (IAC: RASO Type I; and ENCASIA: Pre-
RASO Type II), with only one of them, that is IAC, being able to conduct accident 
investigations on behalf of its Member States. In addition one more RAIO has 
been formally established, but in 2014 was not yet fully operational (BAGAIA: 
RASO Type I), and a number of other RAIO projects were under consideration in 
Africa, South America and Middle East. 
 
The RCAA model: 
 
Finally, this chapter distinguished a very specific sub-group of RASOs, 
namely the RCAA. In 2014 there was only one example of such an authority – the 
ECCAA. The main feature of the RCAA is that, whilst the RASOs normally do 
not replace the national authorities and function in parallel with them, under a 
RCAA model there is almost a complete delegation of safety oversight functions 
and duties from a national to regional level. RCAA eliminates therefore the risk of 
duplication of functions and resources. This approach would best serve large 
groupings of small States with limited resources and/or States wi h low levels of 
aviation activities, and which are unable to generate revenues large enough to 
support fully fledged national civil aviation authorities. RCAA can be established 
either as a RASO Type I or a RASO Type II. 
Having proposed a RASO definition and typology of RASO and pre-
RASO forms, the following chapter will present a detailed case study of the EU 
civil aviation safety system, and of EASA – a Type II RASO, which is currently a 
point of reference for many such organisations around the world, and has a num-
ber of features which make it very well placed to form one of the building blocks 




The European Aviation Safety Agency: Case Study 




‘This Europe must be born. And she will, when Spaniards say ´our Chartres´, 
Englishmen say ´our Cracow´, Italians ´our Copenhagen´ 
and Germans ´our Bruges´. Then will Europe live.’ 
 








This chapter presents a case study of the European Union’s Aviation Safety Agen-
cy, which is considered as a supranational aviation safety agency (RASO Type II) 
from the perspective of the RASO typology proposed in Chapter 3. This means 
that EASA is part of and relies for its functioning on a REIO – the EU. 
Although EASA is not a single aviation authority for EU Member States, 
similar to the ECCAA described in the preceding chapter, the volume of aviation 
activity for which it is responsible together with the EU national aviation authori-
ties (NAAs),2 the legal powers it enjoys as part of the supranational EU system, 
and the resources it has at its disposal3 definitely makes it the most relevant RA-
SO functioning today. 
The EU aviation safety system, including EASA, has over the last twelve 
years undergone a dynamic evolution, including two extensions of it  scope.4 This 
evolution is expected to continue in the years to come and thus provides a lot of 
interesting material for analysis.5 
                                                 
1 Salvador de Madariaga y Rojo was a Spanish diplomat, writer, historian and pacifist. He was also 
a co-founder of the College of Europe and a promoter of the vision of a united Europe. 
2 EASA, 'Annual Safety Review', (2013), 
<http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/199751_EASA_ASR_2013_ok.pdf> [accessed 6 August 
2014], at Chapter 3. 
3 EASA, 'Annual General Report', (2013), 
<http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/TOAC14001ENN.pdf> [accessed 6 August 2014], at 
Annexes 6 and 8. 
4 EASA, '10th Anniversary Chronicle', (2013),  p. 36 
5 EC, 'Roadmap for a policy initiative on aviation safety and a possible revision of Regulation 
(EC) No 216/2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European 
Aviation Safety Agency', (2014), <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
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Europe has also been, for many years, an arena for a number of regional 
aviation organisations, which in addition to the EU included or still includes 
ECAC, JAA and EUROCONTROL. As a result of the interactions betwe n these 
organisations some of them ceased to exist (JAA) or had to reform (ECAC, EU-
ROCONTROL), while others benefitted and increased their influence o the Eu-
ropean aviation scene (EASA). From this perspective, Europe as a whole is an 
interesting laboratory for studying regional cooperation in civil aviation matters 
and its impact on aviation safety. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate to what extent and how ex-
actly EASA contributes to the improvement of global aviation safety and to the 
objective of uniformity in civil aviation, as set out by the Chicago Convention 
(Section 4.4). Particular emphasis will be placed on the on fact th t EASA func-
tions within the legal and institutional framework of the EU as a upranational 
REIO (Section 4.2). The role of EASA in international relations and its status un-
der the Chicago Convention will be also addressed (Section 4.3). Finally the ques-
tion of whether EASA could one day become a single aviation authority f r Eu-
rope and the impact this could have on aviation safety will be addressed (Section 
4.6). 
For the purpose of this chapter, when referring to Europe this means - un-
less otherwise indicated - the geographical boundaries of Member States of 
ECAC.6 In 2014 ECAC consisted of 44 Member States, which is much broade  
than the membership of the EU.7 This ECAC area is an arena for a number of avi-
ation organisations, which in addition to ECAC, EU and EASA include also EU-
ROCONTROL,8 as shown on Figure XIII. Up to June 2009, there was also the 
JAA, which was a predecessor of EASA and which will be briefly addressed in 
the following section. 
While non-EU States also participate in the work of EASA on the basis of 
international agreements or working arrangements, this chapter will refer p imari-
ly to the EU Member States. The question of associating non-EU States with the 











                                                                                                                            
regulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2015_move_001_revision_easa_regulation_en.pdf> [accessed 
19 April 2014]. 
6 ECAC was established in 1955 following a recommendation of the Council of Europe. See: 
ECAC, 'About ECAC'  <https://www.ecac-ceac.org//about_ecac> [accessed 3 January 2014]. 
7 In addition to the 28 Member States of the EU, ECAC membership consists also of: Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(fYROM), Turkey and Ukraine. 
8 EUROCONTROL, 'About EUROCONTROL'  <http://www.eurocontrol.int/about-eurocontrol> 
[accessed 3 January 2014]. 
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* Island, Norway, Switzerland
and Liechtenstein participate in 
the EU internal market and are 
bound by the EU aviation 
legislation including on safety.
** Estonia is planning to join
EUROCONTROL on 1 January
2015
 
4.2 EASA AS PART OF THE EU CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY SYSTEM  
4.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is not possible to understand the functioning of EASA andthe benefits that it 
brings for aviation safety without apprehending the fact that it is an integral part 
of the EU legal and institutional framework and could not exist w thout the EU. In 
this respect it is appropriate to refer to this system as the ‘EU civil av ation safety 
system’ rather than the ‘EASA system’. 
The EU civil aviation safety system encompasses not only EASA and EU 
institutions,9 but also EU Member States which have the primary responsibility 
for the implementation of the EU aviation safety legislation.10 I  this respect it is a 
multi-layered and multifaceted system, with the tasks and responsibilities shared 
between all its actors. 
The establishment of the EU civil aviation safety system should also not be 
seen in isolation from other EU policies, but as a logical consequence of the de-
velopment of the single EU aviation market which started in the 1990s, and which 
in itself constituted an element of a greater effort to create a single internal market 
for the EU.11 
                                                 
9 Primarily the European Commission, which has the monopoly of the legislative initiative, the 
European Parliament and the Council which act as co-legislators, and the European Court of Jus-
tice, which exercises the judiciary control. 
10 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, at Preamble clause 3. 
11 Isabella H. Ph.  Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Air Law, (2006), pp. 72-77. 
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The necessity of a linkage between the EU civil aviation safety sysem and 
other EU policies was essential for the establishment of EASA. EASA’s predeces-
sor, the JAA, lacked this linkage whilst it was regulating issues at the crossroads 
of aviation safety and socio-economic matters, such as aircrew flight and duty 
time limitations, certification of cabin crew or leasing of aircraft.12 Whilst clearly 
having a safety dimension such issues were also linked to the singl aviation mar-
ket and thus required greater involvement of the EU institutions.13 The existence 
of this disharmony was used by the EU as one of the arguments against the JAA 
and in favour of EASA which ultimately replaced the former.14 
4.2.2 THE INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH EASA IN THE FORM 
OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION 
Initially there were attempts to establish EASA as an international org nisation by 
means of a treaty.15 However these attempts failed, largely as a result of the inabil-
ity of EU Member States to find a politically acceptable and legally sound solu-
tion which would allow EASA to adopt binding and directly applicable decisions 
and regulations.16  
Finding such a solution was necessary to address the shortcomings of the 
previous system, where the JAA - because of its legally non-binding status - could 
only recommend the adoption of harmonised regulations and was not able to de-
liver certificates on behalf of its member authorities. This was not considered as 
sufficient by the industry,17 and was criticised by the European Commission 
which believed that the JAA ‘has not produced the single system ought by the 
industry.’18  
At that time, some EU Member States argued that direct applicability of 
rules adopted outside the EU framework would require a change to their constitu-
tions and possibly also a referendum.19 From the EU law point of view, and based 
on the principles established by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
                                                 
12 Sulocki and Cartier, 'Continuing Airworthiness in the framework of the transition from JAA to 
EASA', supra note 53 in Ch.1, at p. 313; Jon Pierre and Guy B. Peters, 'From a club to a 
bureaucracy: JAA, EASA, and European aviation regulation', JEPP, 16 (2009), p. 350. 
13 Pierre and Peters, 'From a club to a bureaucracy: JAA, EASA, and European aviation 
regulation', supra note 12, at p. 350. 
14 Ibid. 
15 EU, 'Recommandation de décision du Conseil autorisant la Commission à engage des 
négociations en vue de la création d’une organisation européenne pour la sécurité de l’aviation 
civile', SEC(96) 2152 final, (EU Council archives, Brussels, 1996). 
16 EASA 10th Anniversary Chronicle, supra note 4, at p. 9. 
17 In December 1992, the JAA Board held a meeting with the European aviation associations to 
discuss the concept of a single European airworthiness organisation, which the industry saw as 
urgently needed; see: ECAC, 'Report on ‘JAA activities’', DGCA/86, (ECAC archives, Paris, 
1992). See also: Pierre and Peters, 'From a club to a bureaucracy: JAA, EASA, and European 
aviation regulation', supra note 12, at p. 351. 
18 Neil Kinnock, Member of the European Commission responsible for Transport, 'Meeting the 
global challenge: the outlook for civil aviation in the EU', SPEECH/98/1, (Forum Europe, 
Brussels, 1998). 
19 See: Interventions of the Irish and Italian delegations during the 2108th Council (Transport) 
meeting, 17-18 June 1998, (EU Council archives, Brussels, 1998). 
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(CJEU), it was also questionable if it is possible to delegate such broad regulatory 
competences to an external organisation,20 as this could amount to: 
[A] surrender of the independence of action of the Community in its external relations 
and a change in the internal constitution of the Community by the alteration of essential 
elements of the Community structure as regards boththe prerogatives of the institutions 
and the position of the Member States vis-à-vis one another.21 
 
The EU could agree to such delegation only if the provisions of a future 
EASA treaty defined and limited the powers in question so clearly that they would 
be exclusively executive powers.22 In the context of the EASA treaty, this meant 
that the EU could probably only agree to the transfer of competences to take indi-
vidually binding decisions, but not to adopt directly applicable regulations of a 
general nature. This in practice meant that the main legal flaw of the JAA, namely 
its inability to ‘produce the single system sought by the industry’ would persist. 
As a result, alternative proposals started to emerge, with some EU Member 
States arguing that an EU-type organisation ‘would solve the legal and political 
problems arising from the setting up of an international organisation ...’.23 All in 
all, the idea of establishing EASA by means of a treaty was finally abandoned and 
it became clear that an alternative solution had to be found within the institutional 
framework of the EU. To this end the European Commission presented a  outline 
for the setting up of EASA as an EU agency.24 This was soon after followed by a 
proposal for the ‘Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council set-
ting up the European Aviation Safety Agency’.25 
4.2.3 THE BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING EASA IN THE FORM OF 
AN EU AGENCY 
EASA is one of the EU’s regulatory agencies and, like most of the o er such 
agencies, was created by an act of EU secondary legislation - regulation of the 
European Parliament and the Council (hereinafter the ‘EASA Basic Regula-
                                                 
20 EU, 'European Organisation Responsible for Civil Aation Safety: Report on the Work of the 
Expert Group on Legal Issues', Working Party on Aviation of 19 February 1998, Working 
Document AER/98/17, (EU Council archives, Brussels, 1998). 
21 'Opinion 1/76 concerning the draft agreement establi hing a European laying-up fund for inland 
waterway vessels', in: [1977] ECR I-741, (CJEU,1977),  (p. 758). 
22 Ibid. at p. 759. See also: EC, 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation and creating a European 
Aviation Safety Agency', (COM(2000) 595 final), p. 4. 
23 See: Intervention of the German delegation during the 2074th Council (Transport) meeting of 17 
March 1998, (EU Council archives, Brussels, 1998). On the other hand the UK, fearing further 
transfers of power from London to Brussels, continued to back the original concept of an interna-
tional organisation, see: Airline Business, 'EASA delayed by debate over powers'  
<www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/easa-delayed-by-debate-over-powers-63801/> [accessed 7 
August 2014]. 
24 EC, 'Commission Working Document: In view of the discussions within the Council on the 
creation of the European Aviation Safety Authority in the Community framework', COM (2000) 
144 final, (Brussels, 2000). 
25 EC proposal for the 'EASA Basic Regulation' (COM(2000) 595 final), supra note 22. 
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tion’),26 which is of general applicability and binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all EU Member States by virtue of Article 288 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).27  
Under its Basic Regulation, EASA was given the status of an ‘EU body’ 
with legal personality.28 This means that it has independent legal standing under 
public EU law, can conclude contracts with EU institutions,29 and can be a party 
to the proceedings in the CJEU.30 Its legal personality extends to domestic legal 
orders of all EU Member States, where EASA enjoys ‘the most extensive legal 
capacity accorded to legal persons under their laws.’31 
Thus two main benefits stem from EASA’s legal basis: 
- The legally binding and directly applicable nature of the regulatory 
framework on the basis of which EASA was established and in which it 
operates together with the EU Member States, and 
- The possession of a legal personality which is valid in the domestic legal 
orders of all EU Member States.  
These two benefits address the shortcomings of the previous JAA system 
which was based on a non-binding arrangement between national aviation auth ri-
ties of the ECAC Member States and where the JAA executed legal personality 
through a foundation which was established under the Dutch law.32 However, as 
Section 4.2.4 below demonstrates, the fact that EASA is based on a legally bind-
ing and directly applicable legal framework does not mean that it can itself adopt 
rules with similar status. This is not unusual for RASOs. In fact this study did not 
identify a single RASO with competence to adopt legally binding a d directly 
applicable measures of general applicability which would be of legislative nature 
(see Chapter 5 for further details). 
4.2.4 THE LIMITS OF EASA POWERS AS AN EU AGENCY 
The main consequence of EASA being an EU agency is that its competences have 
to fit ‘within the EU’s existing institutional structure and balance of powers.’33 
This means that EASA itself cannot adopt legally binding acts of general applica-
bility other than of executive nature, as the competence to adopt legislative 
                                                 
26 EU, 'Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 of 15 July 2002 on common rules in the field of civil 
aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency', (OJ L 240, 7.9.2002). 
27 EU, 'Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)', in: Consolidated Treaties and 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, (2010). 
28 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 28. 
29 For example EASA concludes agreements with the European Commission under which it pro-
vides technical assistance to third countries in the area of aviation safety. See: EASA, 
'Management Board Decision 02-2014 adopting the first 2014 amending budget (Annex)' 2014) 
<http://easa.europa.eu/the-agency/governance/management-board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-05-
2014-adopting-2014-first> [accessed 7 August 2014]. 
30 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 50. 
31 Ibid. Article 28(2). 
32 Roadmap for JAA (2005), supra note 57 in Ch.3. 
33 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Preamble clause 12. 
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measures is, under Article 288 of the TFEU, reserved exclusively for the EU insti-
tutions.34 
The question of whether EU institutions can delegate to agencies the pow-
ers to adopt legally binding acts of general applicability is subject to jurisprudence 
of the CJEU. Of key importance to this debate is the Meroni doctrine, which stems 
from the 1956 case law.35 It is to date consistently applied by EU institutions,36 
and re-confirmed in subsequent rulings of the CJEU.37 
The Meroni doctrine is based on the concept of institutional balance, 
which requires that ‘the powers of any rule-making body ultimately should be 
traced back to the authority of a democratically elected parliament.’38 On this ba-
sis, the CJEU developed a number of principles which the EU institutions must 
respect when delegating powers to bodies not established by the Treaties: 
 
- The delegating institution cannot delegate broader powers than it itself 
possesses or allow their exercise under the conditions other than it would 
have to observe itself; 
- Only clearly defined, executive powers can be delegated, the exercise of 
which can be subject to strict review in the light of objective criteria de-
termined by the delegating authority; 
- Delegation of discretionary powers implying a wide margin of discretion 
is not allowed, since by replacing the choices of the delegator by the 
choices of the delegate it would bring about an actual transfer of responsi-
bility; 39 
 
The Meroni doctrine does not in itself prohibit EU agencies from adopting 
acts of general application, as this possibility is explicitly envisaged by the 
TFEU.40 What it does however prohibit is adoption by an EU agency of an act of 
general application which would be of legislative nature, as this would amount to 
                                                 
34 TFEU, Article 288: ‘To exercise the Union’s competences, the institutions shall adopt regula-
tions, directives, decisions, recommendations and opini ns.’ 
35 'Case C-9/56 Meroni and Co., Industrie Metallurgiche S.p.A. v. Highly Authority', in: [1957-
1958] ECR I-133, (CJEU,1958). 
36 EC, 'European Governance: A White Paper', (COM (2001) 428 final),  p. 35; EC, 
'Communication from the Commission to the European P rliament and the Council: European 
Agencies: The Way Forward', COM (2008) 135 final,  pp. 9-10; EC, 'Draft Interinstitutional 
Agreement on the operating framework for the European r gulatory agencies', COM (2005) 59 
final,  p. 5. 
37 'Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, The Queen  v. Secretary of State for Health and National 
Assembly for Wales', in: [2005] ECR I-06451, (CJEU,2005),  (p. 6514). See also: 'Case C-270/12, 
United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council ', in: notye  published (available on-line), 
(CJEU,2014),  (Paragraphs 41-53). 
38 Koen Lenaerts and Amaryllis Verhoeven, 'Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in 
EU Governance', in: Good Governance in Europe's Integra ed Market, ed. by Christian Joerges and 
Renaud Dehousse (2002),  p. 37; Ellen I. L. Vos, 'Reforming the European Commission: What 
Role to Play for EU Agencies?', CMLR, 37 (2000), p. 1123. 
39 'Case C-9/56, Meroni', supra note 35, (pp.150-152). 
40 See in particular Article 277 of the TFEU. The CJEU has also recalled in its rulings that ‘institu-
tional framework established by the TFEU, in particular the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU 
and Article 277 TFEU, expressly permits Union bodies, offices and agencies to adopt acts of gen-
eral application’ (See: 'Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council ', supra note 
37, (Paragraph 65)).  
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the transfer of responsibility, which is prohibited by Meroni.41 It is therefore per-
fectly consistent with the EU institutional framework to delegate to an EU agency 
such as EASA the powers to adopt legally binding measures of general applicabil-
ity which would be of executive nature. 
Although the Meroni doctrine excludes giving EASA powers to adopt leg-
islative acts, the practical necessities of regulating aviation safety challenged this 
principle. This is because the EASA Basic Regulation is built on a hierarchy of 
norms, which distinguishes between, the binding measures of general applicability 
which are contained in EU regulations, and more detailed texts: certification spec-
ifications (CS), acceptable means of compliance (AMC) and guidance material 
(GM). 
While the measures of the first type are adopted through the EU legislative 
machinery,42 the other type can be adopted directly by EASA.43 This distinction 
was necessary to enable technical standards to be adapted quickly in view of op-
erational experience and rapid scientific progress which characterises the aviation 
sector. 
Although formally non-binding, it can be asserted that some of the measures 
adopted by EASA, and especially CS, have in practice, a value of law. This rea-
soning is based on the following: 
- In some jurisdictions, the CSs used to approve aircraft design are legally 
binding requirements. For example, in the US they are contained in Feder-
al Aviation Regulations.44 This was also the case in Europe before the es-
tablishment of EASA, when the JARs had to be transposed into the na-
tional legal orders of JAA member authorities;45 
- In addition, although general in nature, the CS are t ilor-made by EASA 
for each individual product and notified to the applicant as a final certifi-
cation basis, which makes the CS binding in individual cases.46 The objec-
tive of this notification is to create certainty for the applicant, and  clear 
reference against which demonstration of compliance can take place; 
                                                 
41 See also the ‘Romano Case’ where the CJEU Stated that an EU body such as an administrative 
commission  may not be empowered by the Council to adopt acts having the force of law ('Case C-
98/80, Giuseppe Romano v. Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité', in: [1981] ECR I-
1241, (CJEU,1981), (p. 1256)). 
42EASA prepares proposals for binding measures of general applicability. These proposals, which 
are formally referred to as ‘opinions’, are submitted o the European Commission, who on this 
basis formulates proposals to the European Parliament and Council, or, in case of implementing 
measures, directly to the Member States. See: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in 
Ch.2, Article 19(1). 
43 Ibid. Article 19(2). 
44 See for example 14 CFR, Part 25 in the US, which establishes airworthiness standards for 
transport category airplanes. 
45 For example in Poland the JARs were transposed into the national legal system by means of 
implementing regulations issued by the minister of infrastructure. See: Regulation of the Minister 
of Infrastructure of 5 October 2004 concerning the introduction of European requirements of avia-
tion safety ‘JAR’ and European requirements concerning facilitation of civil aviation (Official 
Journal Nr 2004.224.2282 of 15 October 2004). 
46 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 20. See also: EASA, 'General 
Principles Related to the Certification procedures to be applied by the Agency for the issuing of 
certificates for products, parts, and appliances (Product Certification Procedures) ', (Decision of 
the EASA Management Board No 07-2004, and amended by Decision No 12-2007). 
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- Similarly, the AMCs although not legally binding, create a presumption of 
compliance with essential requirements of the EASA Basic Regulation, 
implementing rules and CS.47 By following them, the applicant’s task of 
demonstrating compliance is thus greatly facilitated. 
The CS and AMC issued by EASA can be considered as measures, which 
in legal studies are sometimes referred to as quasi-law48 or soft law49. This some-
what controversial concept is based on the premise that certain normative material 
such as codes of practice, guidelines or resolutions can produce legal ff cts,50 or 
in practice 'influences State and corporate behaviour but lacks judicial enforcea-
bility'.51  
In addition there are sui generis measures that EASA can adopt, such as 
the Airworthiness Directives (ADs), which EASA issues on behalf of EU Member 
States,52 as part of its responsibility for continuing airworthiness of aircraft de-
sign.53 ADs apply to all aircraft of a given type or model, and therefore have a 
status which puts them between an individual decision and a regulation of general 
applicability. An EASA AD is a powerful tool and can even be used to ground all 
aircraft of a given type on the registries of the States on behalf of which it was 
issued.54 
It could be argued that the competence of EASA to issue ADs, which have 
a general scope of application, is not compatible with Meroni. In the case of 
EASA however, this competence stems from the relationship of international 
agency which exists between EASA and EU Member States, as will be demon-
strated in the following section. Under this relationship, it is the EU Member 
States not the EU institutions which delegate to EASA the exercise of certain 
competences.  
EASA competence to issue ADs is therefore a Europeanization of certain 
domains of national competence, rather than a delegation from an EU istitution 
to an EU body, which would be governed by the M roni doctrine. In addition, as 
was pointed out in preceding paragraphs, the EU institutional framework explicit-
ly permits EU agencies to adopt legally binding acts of general applicability if 
they are of executive nature only and do not replace the choices which have been 
made by the EU legislator.55  
                                                 
47 See for example: Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012, supra note 86 in Ch.2, Article 10. 
48 Huang, supra note 29 in Ch.1, at p. 187. 
49 Gregory Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, 'Hard and Soft Law', in: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and 
Mark A. Pollack (2013),  pp. 197-218. 
50 Ingo  Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and 
Normative Twists, (2012), p. 228. 
51 Laurence Boulle, The Law of Globalization: An Introduction, (2009), p. 363. 
52 For examples of EASA Airworthiness Directives see: EASA, 'Airworthiness Directives 
Publishing Tool'  <http://ad.easa.europa.eu/> [accessed 02 March 2014]. 
53 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 20(1); Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 748/2012, supra note 86 in Ch.2, at Annex I (Part 21), Paragraph 21A.3B. 
54 See for example: Aviation Safety Network, 'EASA grounds all Dassault Falcon 7X aircraft 
pending incident investigation'  <http://news.aviation-safety.net/2011/05/26/easa-grounds-all-
dassault-falcon-7x-aircraft-pending-incident-investiga ion/> [accessed 14 June 2014]. 
55 Supra note 40 
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4.3 THE ROLE OF EASA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
ITS STATUS UNDER THE CHICAGO CONVENTION 
 
4.3.1 THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY 
OF EASA 
As was described under Section 4.2.2, initially there was an attempt o establish 
EASA by means of an international treaty and in the form of an interna ional or-
ganisation, which was however ultimately abandoned.56 
The fact that EASA was established in the form of an EU agency did not 
diminish the importance of international cooperation for the functioing of this 
agency. Indeed one of the main objectives set by the EASA Basic Regulation, is to 
‘promote [EU] views regarding civil aviation safety standards and rulesthrough-
out the world by establishing appropriate cooperation with third countries and 
international organisations’.57 In this respect the primary role of EASA is to: 
 
[A]ssist the [EU] and its Member States in the field of international relations, including 
the harmonisation of rules, recognition of approvals and technical cooperation, and be en-
titled to establish the appropriate relations with the aeronautical authorities of third coun-
tries and international organisations … .58 
 
The use of the word assist above is symptomatic of the fact that EU insti-
tutions and Member States do not consider EU agencies, including EASA, as be-
ing entitled to represent the EU position to an outside audience or commit the EU 
to international obligations.59 This is yet another consequence of EASA being part 
of the EU legal system. In practice however the situation is more complex, espe-
cially if one tries to analyse the question of EU agencies’ legal status not from the 
perspective of EU law, but from the perspective of public international law. 
 While EASA’s legal personality in the territories of EU Member States is 
explicitly envisaged under its Basic Regulation,60 the question of EASA’s interna-
tional legal personality is not so clear. This is not a surprise as the question of in-
ternational legal personality of EU agencies in general is subject to divergent 
views in academic writings.61 The controversies around legal status of EU agen-
                                                 
56 The EU institutional practice also provides examples of bodies which were established in a form 
of an international organisation but functioning under close control of EU institutions. This was 
the case with Europol, which was originally created by an international convention concluded by 
EU Member States and subsequently transformed into a  EU agency. For further discussion see: 
Andrea Ott, Ellen I. L. Vos, and Florin Coman-Kund, 'European Agencies on the Global Scene: 
EU and International Law Perspectives', in: European Agencies in between Institutions and 
Member States, ed. by Michelle Everson, Cosimo Monda, and Ellen I. L. Vos (2014). 
57 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 2(d). 
58 Ibid. Preamble clause 23. 
59 EU, 'Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European 
Commission on decentralised agencies', (2012), 
<http://europa.eu/agencies/documents/joint_Statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf> 
[accessed 9 January 2014]. 
60 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 28. 
61 See in particular: Gregor Schusterschitz, 'European Agencies as Subjects of International Law', 
IOLR, 1 (2004), pp. 163-188; Andrea Ott, 'EU regulatory agencies in EU external relations: 
Trapped in a legal minefield between European and International Law', European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 13 (2008), pp. 515-540; Fink Melanie, 'Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and 
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cies as international actors62 can be viewed as an emanation of a more general 
discussion on the relationship between international law and the EU law, which 
‘to some extent still remains quite an esoteric issue’.63 
 The question of international legal personality of EU agencies is primarily 
approached in the academic writings from the perspective of potential treaty mak-
ing powers of these bodies. While there are differences of opinion concerning the 
international status of some working arrangements concluded by EU agencies, 
including EASA64 (this issue will be further addressed under Section 4.3.4), it has 
been demonstrated in the literature that a limited international legal p rsonality of 
EU agencies can be established in case they conclude headquarters agreements 
with their host States.65 
Indeed, by the end of 2013 over eighteen EU agencies had concluded 
headquarters agreements,66 and from the analysis of their provisions and State 
practice it is clear that they are governed by international law, which was demon-
strated by Schusterschitz.67 However, so far EASA has not been granted the ca-
pacity to conclude a headquarters agreement, although in 2013 a proposal to this 
end was made by the European Commission.68 
In any case, headquarters agreements are one of the very few exceptions to 
the general principle under the EU Treaties according to which only the ‘Union 
may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international or-
ganisations’.69 It could be argued that it is not legally possible to delegat  to 
EASA, or any other EU Agency, broader treaty making powers, as it would be 
inconsistent with the Meroni doctrine presented in the previous section. 
EASA also does not have its own privileges and immunities on the interna-
tional field, but relies on the privileges and immunities of the EU, which have 
been granted to the EU on the basis of its founding Treaties.70 
                                                                                                                            
Human Rights Concerns Regarding 'Technical Relationships'', Utrecht Journal of International and 
European Law,  28 (2012), pp. 25-26.  
62 The question of international activities of EU agenci s has so far been studied only scarcely. At 
the time of writing this study a research project was being finalised on this topic at the Maastricht 
University, and the author has consulted one of the res archers involved in that project when pre-
paring this section of Chapter 4. 
63 Enzo Cannizzaro, Peolo Palchetti, and A. Ramses Wessel, 'International law as law of the 
European Union', (2012). 
64 See in particular: Melanie, 'Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and Human Rights 
Concerns Regarding 'Technical Relationships'', supra note 61, at pp.25-26; Ott, Vos, and Coman-
Kund, supra note 56, at pp.104-105. 
65 Schusterschitz, 'European Agencies as Subjects of International Law', supra note 61, at p. 188. 
66 EC, 'Decentralised agencies: 2012 Overhaul (analitical fiches)'  
<http://europa.eu/agencies/documents/fiche_3_sent_to_ep_cons_2010-12-15_en.pdf> [accessed 9 
January 2014]. 
67 Schusterschitz, 'European Agencies as Subjects of International Law', supra note 61, at pp. 176-
177. 
68 EC, 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 in the field of aerodromes, air traffic management and air 
navigation services', (COM(2013) 409 final). 
69 TFEU, Article 216. 
70 The application of the ‘Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the EU’ to EASA is con-
firmed by Article 30 of Regulation (EU) No 216/2008. This means, in particular, that the premises, 
buildings and archives of EASA are inviolable and exempt from search, requisition, confiscation 
or expropriation. Also the property and assets of EASA cannot be the subject of administrative or 
legal measures without the authorisation of the CJEU. 
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In view of the above it could be concluded that EASA, at this stage, does 
not have any features indicating possession of international legal prsonality. This 
study argues however that this is not the case, and that a limited legal personality 
can be attributed to EASA. This is justified by the safety functio s which were 
given to EASA by EU Member States as is demonstrated below. 
4.3.2 THE RELATIONSHIP OF ‘INTERNATIONAL AGENCY’ 
BETWEEN EASA AND EU MEMBER STATES 
The fact that EASA has been established in the form of an EU agency and not 
international organisation is not necessarily, on its own, a show topper to this 
body having competences, the execution of which would pre-suppose a certain, 
even very limited, degree of international legal personality. 
As explained by Brownlie in his principles of public international law, ‘en-
tities acting with delegated powers from States, may appear to enjoy a separate 
personality and viability on the international plane’,71 and that ‘joint agencies of 
States ... may have restricted capacities and limited independence but be regarded 
as a separate legal person’.72 
The question of international legal personality is today primarily ap-
proached from a functional perspective, meaning that it is important to look at the 
totality of the factors, including the powers and competences that were given to a 
given organisation, as well as its relevant practice, and on this basi  to assess 
whether these powers, competences and practice pre-suppose that the organisation 
is a separate legal person under international law.73 This approach is in-line with 
the famous Reparation for Injuries ruling of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).74 
When looking at EASA from the functional perspective, of primary im-
portance are Articles 17(e) and 20(1) of the EASA ‘Basic Regulation’, which pro-
vide that the Agency shall: 
 
[I]n its fields of competence, carry out, on behalf of Member States, functions and tasks 





With regard to the products, parts and appliances …, the Agency shall, where applicable 
and as specified in the Chicago Convention or its Annexes, carry out on behalf of Mem-
                                                 
71 James Crawford, Brownlie's principles of public inter ational law, (2012), p. 120. 
72 Ibid. at p. 169-170. 
73 See: Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, (2011), pp. 989-
990; Crawford, supra note 71, at p. 170; Jan Klabbers, An Introduction o International 
Institutional Law, (2009), pp. 49-50. 
74 In this case the ICJ concluded that UN is an international legal person because its member States 
‘by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities have clothed it 
with the competence required to enable those functio s to be effectively discharged’ ('Reparation 
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion', in: [1949] ICJ 
Reports 174, (ICJ,1949),  (p. 179).  
75 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 17(e). 
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ber States the functions and tasks of the State of d sign, manufacture or registry when re-
lated to design approval.76 
 
The legal and practical consequence of the above provisions is that, when-
ever the EASA Basic Regulation grants to the Agency competences which are also 
covered by international conventions and in particular the Chicago Convention, 
then EASA in this respect will be acting as an authorised representativ  of all EU 
Member States. 
Following the establishment of EASA, each EU Member State has notified 
ICAO, through diplomatic channels, that EASA is ‘now its authorised representa-
tive for the fulfilment of its obligations, as State of design or manufacture, as 
specified in Part II of Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention’.77 Subsequently EASA 
has been implementing and enforcing the relevant provisions of the Ann xes to 
the Chicago Convention on behalf of EU member States, including through the 
issuance of Type Certificates to aircraft, and following the continui g airworthi-
ness of the aircraft which it has certified. 
Following on from the above, it is clear that a relationship of agency has 
been established between EASA and EU Member States. 
The concept of direct delegation of the exercise of competences from EU 
Member States to an EU agency has so far been addressed in the literature only 
scarcely and primarily from the perspective of EU law. Hofman and Moroni in 
their analysis of ‘pluralisation of EU executive’ observe that the model of direct 
delegation: 
 
[M]ight seem at first sight attractive in that it could be capable of explaining the most far-
reaching delegations of powers to EU agencies such as t e power to take externally bind-
ing implementing acts and engage in international rel tions in absence of any clear Treaty 
authorisation to do so.78 
They conclude however that the consequence of direct delegation from EU Mem-
ber States to EU agencies: 
[W]ould result in EU agencies, which are established under EU law, and apply EU proce-
dural law, exercising Member State competences. This concept and mix of approaches 
would lead, in effect, to nothing less than the creation of agencies as bodies, legally 
speaking, occupying a place in between EU and Member States law. Conceptualising del-
egation to agencies in the European Union as direct or horizontal delegation – although it 
might be an apt description of delegation of powers from a political scientist’s point of 
view – is thus difficult to establish in terms of EU law (emphasis added).79 
The question of direct delegation from EU member States to EU agencies, 
in the specific context of EASA, has also been looked at by Vos, Ott and Koman-
Kund, who came to a conclusion that this construction ‘… is qu te peculiar, as we 
see that Member States “borrow” EASA for tasks relating to powers for which 
                                                 
76 Ibid. Article 20(1). 
77 EC, 'Template for EU Member States démarche to ICAO on the transfer of regulatory tasks to 
EASA', (EU Council archives, Brussels, 14 November 2003). 
78 Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alessandro Morini, 'The Plura isation of EU Executive - 
Constitutional Aspects of "Agencification"', ELR, 37 (2012), p. 431. 
79 Ibid. p. 432. 
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they are responsible. Consequently this necessitates more empirical research on 
this matter (emphasis added)’.80 
The difficulty that researchers experience in fully explaining the legal ba-
sis and consequences of the direct delegation of implementing powers from EU 
member States to an EU agency, or more specifically to EASA, suggests that a 
different approach may be necessary. In particular, given the fact that in the case 
of EASA the delegation concerns powers to implement international law, namely 
the Chicago Convention, the public international law perspective has to be em-
ployed, in addition to the EU law perspective.  
This study argues that Articles 17(e) and 20(1) and subsequent practice re-
lated to the implementation of these provisions establish a relationship of agency 
between EASA and EU Member States not only from the perspective of public 
EU law, but also from the perspective of public international law.81 
This is because EASA has been authorised to implement and enforce, on 
behalf of EU Member States, international law, and in particular the C icago 
Convention. This includes EASA having the powers to make decisions that are 
binding for EU Member States under the Chicago Convention.82 A  example of 
such a decision would be the issuance by EASA of a Type Certificate confirming 
that an aircraft design complies with an appropriate certification basis.83 Such a 
decision creates effects under Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention, i cluding the 
triggering of obligations which this Annex attributes to the ‘State of Design’.84  
The concept of international agency is recognised in the rulings of interna-
tional courts, by practitioners as well as in academic writings, as was demonstrat-
ed by Sarooshi.85 Sereni describes this relationship as follows: 
 
In the field of international law every subject generally acts in person, through its own or-
gans, without resorting to cooperation with other subjects. However, international practice 
shows that members of the community of nations sometimes act on behalf of other mem-
bers, with the legal effect that the transactions performed by the acting subject in the 
name and for the account of the other person have for the latter the same legal conse-
quences as if it had acted in person. … This legal phenomenon implies a split between the 
                                                 
80 Ott, Vos, and Coman-Kund, supra note 56, at p. 105 
81 For an overview of the concept of agency in international law see in particular: Sarooshi, supra 
note 19 in Ch.2, at pp. 33-51; Angelo P. Sereni, 'Agency in International Law', American Journal 
of International Law, 34 (1940), pp. 638-660; Curtis A. Bradley and Judith G. Kelley, 'The concept 
of international delegation', Law and Contemporary Problems, 71 (2008), pp. 1-36.  
82 The relationship of an international agency between a State and organisation, as described in this 
section, has to be distinguished from the notion of a ‘joint organ’, which is a different category of 
State cooperation under international law. A ‘joint organ’ is a body composed of the States, and 
does not have a separate legal personality. Two most pr minent examples of such joint organs, 
often referred to in the literature, are the Nauru Administering Authority established under the 
'Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru', New York, 1 November 1947, UN General 
Assembly Resolution 140(II); and the Intergovernmental Commission under the 'Treaty between 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic concerning the 
Construction and Operation by Private Concessionaires of a Channel Fixed Link', Canterbury, 12 
February 1986, UKTS No. 15 (1992). 
83 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 20. 
84 See for example: Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 4.2.1.1. 
85 Sarooshi, supra note 19 in Ch.2, at p. 33. 
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immediately acting international person and the person to whom the legal effects of these 
acts are imputed.86 
 
Given the fact that the international agency concerns the performance of 
international activities, it is governed by international law, and can therefore exist 
‘only between parties recognised as subjects of international law’.87 
 
Similar view is expressed by Sarooshi:  
 
[A]n important precondition for the existence of an gency relationship in both interna-
tional and domestic law is that the principal and agent are separate legal entities. This 
flows from the principle of representation inherent in an agency relationship: that an agent 
acts on behalf of its principal to change certain of its rights and obligations.88 
 
It has also to be underlined that in this case we are dealing with a constitu-
tional agency, and not a factual agency which ‘does not hinge specifically on the 
nature of personality of the organisation nor does it flow from the constitutional 
relationship between the organization and its members’.89 
The requirement that the principal and agent are separate international le-
gal persons when it comes to the implementation of the Chicago Convention and 
its Annexes may also be derived from the practice of ICAO, which in its Resolu-
tion on nationality and registration of aircraft operated by internatiol perating 
agencies, had defined international aircraft registration as: 
 
The cases where the aircraft to be operated by an international operating agency would be 
registered not on a national basis but with an international organization having legal per-
sonality, whether or not such international organiztion is composed of the same States as 
have constituted the international operating agency. 
 
As EASA acts today on behalf of EU member States as a ‘State of Regis-
try’ for all issues related to aircraft design, and this has been found acceptable by 
ICAO as the subsequent section demonstrates, it should not be excluded that it 
could similarly act on behalf of EU Member States for the purpose of internation-
al aircraft registration. 
To conclude, while EASA has legal personality under public EU law,
which is separate from EU Member States and the EU itself, this personality reso-
nates also at the international plane through the relationship of international agen-
cy on the basis of which EASA was authorised to act on behalf of EU Member 
States, including by taking binding decisions, under the Chicago Convention. This 
international legal personality is however limited by scope of Articles 17(e) and 
20(1) of the EASA ‘Basic Regulation’. 
The existence of EASA’s limited legal personality does not mean however, 
as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, that EU Member States ceased to be respon-
sible for compliance with their obligations as contracting parties to the Chicago 
                                                 
86 Sereni, 'Agency in International Law', supra note 81, at p.638. 
87 Ibid. p. 639. 
88 Sarooshi, supra note 19 in Ch.2, at p. 34. 
89 Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe in: Institute of Inter ational Law (IIL), 'Yearbook', Volume 66, 
Part I, Session of Lisbon, (1995),  p.353. 
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Convention. Neither does this legal personality negate the general principle that 
agencies do not represent the EU position to an outside audience or commit the 
EU to international obligations.90 
4.3.3 PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF 
‘INTERNATIONAL AGENCY’ BETWEEN EASA AND EU 
MEMBER STATES 
The relationship of international agency between EASA and EU Member Stat s is 
in the first place a consequence of a decision which was driven by arguments of 
safety and efficiency - namely to perform certain certification tasks centrally, on 
behalf of all EU Member States, and with binding legal effects. Given that these 
tasks are also governed by the Chicago Convention, meant that the creation of 
EASA necessarily had to have effects under international law.  
From the Chicago Convention point of view there are a number of practi-
cal consequences of the establishment of the international agency relationship 
between EASA and EU Member States.  
First of all, under Article 83 of the Chicago Convention ICAO Membr 
States:  
 
[M]ay make arrangements not inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention. Any 
such arrangement shall be forthwith registered withthe Council, which shall make it pub-
lic as soon as possible.91 
 
Because the relationship of international agency between EASA and EU 
Member States alters the way in which the latter discharge their responsibilities 
under the Chicago Convention, such relationship falls within the scope of Article 
83. The analysis of State practice indicates that this is also the understanding of 
the EU Member States which have notified ICAO about the fact that EASA exer-
cises on their behalf the ‘functions and tasks of the State of design, manufacture 
or registry when related to design approval.’92 This is in line with the theory of 
international agency: 
 
Since international agency is intended to function with relation to third parties, it is neces-
sary that they be informed of the extent of the authori y conferred upon the agent. … Eve-
ry international transaction is so closely connected with the special characteristics and 
qualities of each subject involved that each of them must necessarily know the other par-
ties to whom rights and duties are to be assumed. There is no place in international law 
for the doctrine of the undisclosed principal.93 
 
The second consequence of EASA acting on behalf of EU Member States 
is the fact that this reflects on the scope of the ICAO USOAP activities. As a re-
                                                 
90  EU Joint Statement on decentralised agencies (2012), supra note 59. 
91 'Chicago Convention', Article 83. 
92 ICAO, 'Final Report on the safety oversight audit of he civil aviation system of the European 
Aviation Safety Agency', (2008), 
<http://cfapp.icao.int/fsix/AuditReps/CSAfinal/EASA_USOAP_Final%20Report_en.pdf> 
[accessed 9 August 2014], at Paragraph 1.1.10. 
93 Sereni, 'Agency in International Law', supra note 81, at p.649. 
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sult, ICAO had to conduct audits of EASA to verify the compliance of EU Mem-
ber States with the relevant ICAO SARPs, in particular Annex 8 to the Chicago 
Convention.94 This was a major benefit for ICAO and EU Member States, as in-
stead of conducting an audit of each individual State, ICAO could conduct just 
one audit of EASA and subsequently link its results with the USAOP reports of 
each EU Member State.95 
The Chicago Convention is not the only international legal instrument 
which is impacted by the agency relationship existing between EASA and EU 
Member States. The other two instruments are BASAs concluded by the EU, and 
working arrangements concluded by EASA. The following section will look at the 
benefits of these two instruments and associated legal problems. 
4.3.4 LEGAL STATUS OF EASA UNDER BASAs AND WORKING 
ARRANGEMENTS  
When it comes to the conclusion of BASAs, which were addressed in Chapter 2, 
the role of EASA is only to assist the European Commission in their negotiations - 
this is clear from the provisions of EU Treaties,96 EASA Basic Regulation,97 and 
practice.98 
Compared with the situation under the JAA, EU BASAs offer considerable 
benefits from a safety and efficiency perspective. Whilst in the past not all EU 
Member States had such agreements, today when the EU concludes a BASA, it 
applies, in principle, to all EU Member States.99  This is because EU BASAs, alt-
hough being bilateral in form – that is they are concluded between the EU and the 
third country only – have a multilateral effect. 
The EU BASAs also create a level playing field by replacing the national 
BASAs, which EU Member States were allowed to continue using even after the 
adoption of the EASA Basic Regulation.100 In addition, because they are above 
secondary legislation in the hierarchy of EU laws, EU BASAs allow derogating 
from the provisions of EASA Basic Regulation and its implementing rules.101 This 
brings benefits such as automatic acceptance of foreign approvals,102 or the possi-
bility to issue certificates in a simplified manner, that is by checking only the dif-
ferences between the EU and foreign requirements.103 Not all countries have this 
                                                 
94 ICAO USOAP report on EASA (2008), supra note 92. 
95 Ibid. at Paragraph 1.1.9. 
96 TFEU, Article 218. 
97 In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 27: ‘the Agen-
cy shall assist the Community and the Member States in their relations with third countries in 
accordance with the relevant Community law.’ The Agency shall, in particular, ‘[A]ssist in the 
harmonising of rules and mutual recognition regarding approvals attesting the satisfactory applica-
tion of rules.’ 
98 EASA Information Note on the EU-US BASA, supra note 118 in Ch.2. 
99 For examples of BASA concluded by the EU with third countries see: List of EU Bilateral 
Aviation Safety Agreements, upra note 108 in Ch.2. 
100 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 12(2). 
101 Ibid. Article 12(1). 
102 This is the case for example under the EU-US BASA with approvals of production and design 
organisations, and certain minor repair and design change approvals. See: Annex I to 'EU-US 
BASA', supra note 97 in Ch.2. 
103 This is the case for example in respect of the approval of repair stations under the EU-US BA-
SA. See Annex 2, Paragraph 4.4 of the EU-US BASA, supra note 97 in Ch.2. 
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possibility. For example in the US, BASAs are treated as executiv agreements 
only which means that they cannot derogate from the national requirements.104 
In addition to assisting in BASA negotiations, EASA also plays an im-
portant role in their implementation. Each of the agreements concluded so far by 
the EU designates EASA as a technical agent of the EU and its Member States for 
matters falling within the scope of EASA’s competence.105 This role of EASA as a 
technical agent implies that it may act in the international arena as a body desig-
nated by the EU under a BASA. 
The legal situation is different in the case of working arrangements (WA), 
which EASA can conclude with third country aviation authorities or international 
organisations under Article 27(2) of its Basic Regulation. Such WAs require how-
ever prior approval of the European Commission, to ensure their consistency with 
EASA’s mandate and EU’s international aviation policy. 
The legal status of EASA WAs creates some difficulties for academic writ-
ers. For example Ott observes that certain formulations they use, such a  the entry 
into force clauses, suggest that EASA WAs could be considered as internationally 
legally binding and that this results: 
 
[I]n a grey area which is legally not acceptable and creates problems of legal uncertainty 
with regard to their implications and consequences for the internal and external division 
of [EU] competences in external relations.106  
 
Also other sources suggest that, looking from the international law per-
spective, some of the EASA WAs could be considered as having the status of an 
international agreement.107 
The above uncertainties regarding the legal status of EASA WAs can be 
explained by referring to the relationship of international agency which exists be-
tween EASA and EU Member States. The fact that a WA stipulates that EASA 
acts on behalf, or represents EU Member States, is a recognition of the delegation 
provisions already contained in the EASA Basic Regulation, and should not be 
understood as implying that a WA in any way binds the EU institutions or EU 
Member States under international law. In this situation the WA is a tool used by 
EASA to exercise the implementing powers which have been given to it as a tech-
nical agent. 
It is however true that EASA is not always consistent in clarifying the le-
gal status of its WAs, and some of them do not explicitly State that they are with-
out prejudice to international agreements.108 Divergences of interpretations also 
do happen, as was the case in 2013 when the Turkish aviation auhority argued in 
a case involving aircraft certification that it delegated to EASA the exercise of its 
                                                 
104 Jennison, 'The Future of Aviation Safety Regulation: New US-EU Agreement Harmonizes and 
Consolidates the Transatlantic Regime, but What is the Potential for Genuine Regulatory Reform', 
supra note 117 in Ch.2, at p. 344. 
105 See for example Article 1F of the EU-US BASA, supra note 97 in Ch.2. 
106 Ott, 'EU regulatory agencies in EU external relations: Trapped in a legal minefield between 
European and International Law', supra note 61, at p. 539. 
107 Ott, Vos, and Coman-Kund, supra note 56, at p. 103-104 
108 The list of EASA working arrangements can be found at: EASA, 'Working Arrangements'  
<http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/working-arrangements> [accessed 6 August 2014]. 
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‘State of Design’ responsibilities on the basis of a WA, and where EASA had to 
clarify that this is possible only on the basis of an internatio l agreement.109 
Finally, because WAs do not have a binding status under international law, 
they cannot derogate from EU law, which is in fact their main limitation. As a 
consequence, when implementing a WA, EASA must follow the provisions of EU 
law. This also means that any provision in a WA suggesting obli ations for third 
parties, such as aircraft manufacturers or designers would have to be considered 
as ultra vires, and therefore void.110  
4.4 CONTRIBUTION OF EASA TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF 
GLOBAL AVIATION SAFETY AND OBJECTIVES OF THE 
CHICAGO CONVENTION 
This section will provide an analysis of the safety functions f EASA and demon-
strate how and to what extent these functions contribute to global aviation safety 
and the Chicago Convention objectives of ensuring ‘the highest practicable degree 
of uniformity in regulations, standards, and procedures.’111  
In this context it has to be recalled that EASA is not a single EU authority 
for aviation safety, and has to work in partnership and share tasks with the NAAs 
of EU Member States. In addition, similarly to EASA’s legal status, the perfor-
mance of its safety functions is also impacted by the fact that it is part of the EU 
institutional system.  
The scope of EASA’s Basic Regulation and EASA’s mandate has gradually 
evolved, starting with airworthiness matters in 2002,112 and then extended to flight 
operations and aircrew in 2008,113 and in 2009 further extended to safety aspects 
of ATM/ANS and aerodromes.114 
The following sub-section will address three aspects of EASA’s function-
ing as a RASO: rulemaking, certification and finally oversight ande forcement. 
This should not be understood as an exhaustive study of EASA’s safety functions 
but rather as a critical analysis of those of their aspects which are most relevant 
from the perspective of this study. 
4.4.1 THE EU AVIATION SAFETY REGULATORY PROCESS 
The primary objective of the EASA Basic Regulation is to ensure ‘a high and uni-
form level of protection of the European citizen’.115 One of the means to ensure 
                                                 
109 Author was involved personally in the clarification f this case. 
110 This does not mean however that the working arrangements do not affect third parties from a 
practical point of view. For example if EASA concludes an arrangement on participation of a for-
eign authority in the EU SAFA programme, this means that this authority may have access to in-
formation on ramp inspections performed by EU Member States. 
111 'Chicago Convention', Article 37. 
112 Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002, supra note 26. 
113 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2. 
114 EU, 'Regulation (EC) No 1108/2009 of the European P rliament and of the Council of 21 
October 2009  amending Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 in the field of aerodromes, air traffic 
management and air navigation services and repealing Directive 2006/23/EC', (OJ L 309, 
24.11.2009). 
115 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, at Preamble clause 1. 
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this objective is ‘the preparation, adoption and uniform application of all neces-
sary acts.’116 
A single regulatory framework is also essential for a level playing field or 
the industry, facilitating free movement of goods, persons and services, and pro-
moting cost-efficiency in the regulatory and certification processes. Thi  harmoni-
sation is also in line with the Chicago Convention objective of nsuring ‘the high-
est practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, and procedures.’117 
It is important to recall that aviation safety rulemaking in the EU is based 
on the division of work between EASA, and the European Commission, European 
Parliament, Council and specialised regulatory committees.118 As demonstrated 
under Section 4.2.4, EASA can only adopt non-legally binding ocuments, but 
when it comes to adoption of legally binding EU regulations, its role is limited to 
assisting the European Commission.119 
The EU aviation safety regulations, unlike ICAO SARPs are not minimum 
requirements. They are directly binding in their entirety,120 and with the exception 
of conditions envisaged under Article 14 of the EASA Basic Regulation (see Sec-
tion 4.4.1.1 below) EU Member States are not allowed to derogate from them or 
to impose additional requirements. This principle of EU law, which is reflected in 
the founding treaties,121 and confirmed by rulings of the CJEU,122 is essential for 
the functioning of the single aviation market which requires uniform conditions of 
operation for undertakings. 
 
                                                 
116 Ibid. Article 2.3(a). 
117 'Chicago Convention', Article 37. 
118 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, (2011), pp. 121-141. 
119 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 19, which states that: ‘In order to 
assist the Commission in the preparation of proposals for basic principles, applicability and essen-
tial requirements to be presented to the European Parliament and to the Council and the adoption 
of the implementing rules, the Agency shall prepare drafts thereof. These drafts shall be submitted 
by the Agency as opinions to the Commission.’ 
120 TFEU, Article 288. 
121 Ibid. 
122 'Case C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL', in: [1964] ECR I-585, (CJEU,1964),  (p. 594), where 
the CJEU stated that: ‘[T]he law stemming from the Tr aty, an independent source of law, could 
not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, howev-
er framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of 
the Community itself being called into question. The transfer by the States from their domestic 
legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty 
carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilat-
eral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail.’ See also: 'Case C-26/62, 
Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen', in: [1963] ECR I-1, (CJEU,1963),  (p. 12), 
where the CJEY stated that: ‘[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law 
for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, 
and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. Independently 
of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on 
individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal herit-
age. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason 
of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon 
the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community.’ 
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4.4.1.1 BENEFITS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EU AVIATION 
SAFETY REGULATORY PROCESS 
The benefits brought about by the establishment of the EU aviation safety regula-
tory process are so far mixed. On the one hand the EU regulations are directly 
applicable and legally binding for all EU Member States, as was demonstrated in 
the preceding section.  There is thus no need to transpose them into the national 
legal systems to make them binding for individuals.123 This is the most significant 
benefit, as compared with the previous JAA system, which could only recommend 
adoption of harmonised requirements to its member authorities.124 
On the other hand the establishment of this process did not seem to r sult 
in substantial efficiencies in terms of resource savings for the EU national authori-
ties. A study conducted in 2010 for the European Parliament concluded that:  
 
More than half of the European national agencies stated that their costs had increased 
since the establishment of the EU rulemaking procedure. Only very few countries had a 
reduced workload following the change to the rulemaking process compared with the 
JAA process. Their workload is still heavy in general, as it encompasses the wider number 
of consultations. The largest NAAs who were particularly active in the JAA negotiations 
(e.g. Germany) are the ones who experienced a reduction in their workload.125 
 
The above can be attributed to two facts. Firstly, following its establish-
ment and subsequent two extensions of its mandate, EASA had to undertake a 
large number of rulemaking tasks in order to help build the system. The review of 
rulemaking deliverables of EASA for the years 2004-2013 shows that on average 
EASA  published nineteen ‘Notices of Proposed Amendment’ (NPA) a year, with 
an upwards trend towards the end of the analysed period.126 Secondly the EASA 
rulemaking process was already preceded by a regional system set up under the 
JAA, and - as far as ATM/ANS is concerned - by EUROCONTROL.127 It is likely 
that if the EASA rulemaking system had not built upon the largely harmonised 
JAA/EUROCONTROL system, but on the twenty eight different national frame-
works of EU Member States the cost savings would be more visible.  
The fact that the EU system is based on directly applicable and binding 
regulations does not mean that all regulatory differences have been elimi ated. 
                                                 
123 This is also because a general trend can be observed in the air transport sector towards replac-
ing EU Directives, which need transposition, with EU regulations, which do not need transposi-
tion. 
124 As it the case with the ‘differences’ to ICAO SARPs, the JAA authorities committed only to 
‘declare all their national regulatory differences to existing JARs … and to work towards the dele-
tion of these national regulatory differences or their embodiment in the appropriate JAR.’ See 
Cyprus Arrangements, upra note 52 in Ch.3, at Paragraph 3. 
125  Pricewaterhouse Coopers on behalf of the European Parliament's Committee on Budgets, 'The 
impact on the EU and national budgets of EU agencies: ase studies, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
study prepared for the European Parliament's Committee on Budgets', (2012), 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies> [accessed 2 March 2014], p. 82. 
126 EASA, 'Notices of Proposed Amendment (NPAs)'  <http://easa.europa.eu/document-
library/notices-of-proposed-amendment> [accessed 3 June 2014]. 
127 For an overview of the EUROCONTROL safety related rulemaking activities before the exten-




The possibility of such differences, although considered as exceptional, is envis-
aged under Article 14 of the EASA Basic Regulation, which gives to EU Member 
States the possibility to: (1) adopt additional safety measures in case they need to 
immediately react to a safety problem; (2) grant exemptions in the event of un-
foreseen urgent operational circumstances or operational needs of a limited dura-
tion, provided the level of safety is not adversely affected; and (3) issue individual 
approvals derogating from the common requirements where an equivalent level of 
protection can be achieved by other means. 
The application of Article 14 is subject to the control of the European 
Commission and EASA.128 An evaluation of the application of this Article 14 
conducted by the European Commission in 2013 shows that an increasing number 
of EU Member States are submitting a growing number of notifications under this 
article, and especially under its provisions referred to in points 2 and 3 above.129 
Another observation is that the EU civil aviation safety system does not 
encompass all aviation activities. Two examples can be given in this respect. First-
ly, so called Annex II aircraft130 are excluded, unless they are used in commercial 
air transport.131 The second exclusion concerns aerodrome safety, as the EASA 
Basic Regulation applies only to:  
Aerodromes, including equipment, located in the territory subject to the provisions of the 
Treaty, open to public use and which serve commercial air transport and where operations 
using instrument approach or departure procedures are provided, and:  
 
(a) have a paved runway of 800 meters or above; or  
(b) exclusively serve helicopters.132 
Such exclusions principally stem from the subsidiarity principle enshrined 
in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which limits EU regula-
tions to only those issues which by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, can be better achieved at Union level than at the national level.133 In prac-
tice they mean however that Member States still need to maintain and correctly 
implement national rules to the extent necessary to regulate activities fall ng out-
side the EU competence.134 
The other feature of the EU regulatory framework is that not all aviation 
safety regulations fall within the scope of the EASA Basic Regulation. This is the 
case inter alia for regulations on accident investigation,135 occurrence report-
                                                 
128 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 14. 
129 EC, 'Information Note: Handling of notifications in the context of the flexibility provisions 
under Articles 14(1), 14(4) and 14(6) of EU Regulation No 216/2008', (meeting of the EASA 
committee No 3/2013). 
130 ‘Annex II aircraft’ include a wide category rangin from amateur built or historic aircraft, to 
modern ultralight aircraft built in serial production. See: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 
81 in Ch.2, Annex II. 
131 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 4(4) and (5). 
132 Ibid. Article 4(3a). 
133 EU, 'Treaty on the European Union (TEU)', in Consolidated Treaties and Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, (2010). 
134 EASA, 'The EASA system as an integral part of the EU (Aviation) legal system', in EASA 
International Cooperation Forum Legal Workshop, (Brussels, 12-14 October 2009). 
135 Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, supra note 180 in Ch.3. 
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ing,136 or SES.137 The practical consequence of that is that they are adopted in a 
separate rulemaking process not involving EASA and their implementation is not 
necessarily monitored through the EASA standardization inspections. At the same 
time the Agency can be given certain tasks and responsibilities under such legisla-
tion.138 
While in certain cases such separation can be justified – for example acci-
dent investigation which has to be independent from EASA as a certifying au-
thority - this dichotomy is proving to be an increasing source of problems. This is 
most visible in ATM/ANS where, following the extension of EASA competences 
to this domain, safety is regulated in parallel under the SES and the EASA Basic 
Regulation. As pointed out by the European Commission, this creates duplication 
and is not efficient because it necessitates involvement of two specialis d bodies, 
meaning EUROCONTROL and EASA to deal with technical aspects of civil avia-
tion regulation.139 Although the European Commission believes that it is posible 
to ‘eradicate the overlap between SES and EASA regulations’ through better co-
ordination between EASA and EUROCONTROL,140 this study advocates a partial 
or even complete merger of these two organisations for reasons explained under 
Section 4.6. 
4.4.1.2 COMPLIANCE OF EU AVIATION SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
WITH ANNEXES TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION 
Under the EASA Basic Regulation one of the obligations of the Agency is to: 
 
[A]ssist Member States in fulfilling their obligations under the Chicago Convention, by 
providing a basis for a common interpretation and uiform implementation of its provi-
sions, and by ensuring that its provisions are duly taken into account in this Regulation 
and in the rules drawn up for its implementation.141 
 
Under the above provision EASA should be assisting EU Member States 
in identifying differences between ICAO SARPs and EU regulations. So far how-
ever the practical implementation of this function is not ideal, as EASA does not 
seem to systematically identify the differences between the rules that it proposes 
and the ICAO SARPs. 
                                                 
136 EU, 'Regulation No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on 
the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation, amending Regulation (EU) 
No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2003/42/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1321/2007 
and (EC) No 1330/2007', (OJ L 122, 24.4.2014). 
137 EC, 'Framework for creation of the Single European Sky (SES)'  
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/transport/air_tr nsport/l24020_en.htm> [accessed 29 
March 2014]. 
138 See for example: Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, supra note 180 in Ch.3, Article 8, which sets 
outs the rights and responsibilities of EASA in thecourse of an air accident investigation. 
139 EC, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Accelerating the 
implementation of the Single European Sky', (COM(2013) 408 final, 2013),  p.9. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 2(d). 
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A review of thirty opinions published by EASA between 2010 and 2013, 
shows that although EASA compares the proposed rules with ICAO S RPs, there 
is no uniform process followed by EASA in this respect, and the comparisons are 
either very general,142 or not documented in a way which would allow EU Mem-
ber States to correctly discharge their obligations under Article 38 of the Chicago 
Convention.143 In addition none of the opinions analysed presented the identified 
differences using the ICAO recommended classification methodology.144  
The closest to ideal in identifying differences with SARPs is the EU regu-
lation ‘laying down the common rules of the air and operational provisions re-
garding services and procedures in air navigation’145 which contains a list of 
‘commonly agreed differences’ to ICAO Annexes 2 and 11. This regulation also 
obliges the EU Member States to notify to ICAO the ‘commonly agreed differ-
ences’ and mandates the European Commission to update them if justified by sub-
sequent amendments to ICAO SARPs.146 The fact that the differences are com-
monly agreed is important for maintaining uniformity. As experience shows – 
knowing that a difference exists is not sufficient for the prope  assessment and 
classification of such a difference.147 This method of keeping track of the differ-
ences could be usefully extended to other ICAO Annexes, for example by mandat-
ing EASA under its Basic Regulation to develop and make available to EU Mem-
ber States an inventory of differences. 
By the end of 2013 EASA had also identified differences between EU reg-
ulations and SARPs contained in ICAO Annex 8 and, partially, in Annexes 1 and 
6, which had been undertaken for the purpose of ICAO USOAP audits of EASA 
conducted in 2005 and 2009.148 Comparison had also been done between EU reg-
ulations and the latest ICAO Annex 19 on safety management.149 
                                                 
142 Many of the EASA Opinions simply state that: ‘with the proposed changes ICAO compliance is 
ensured’ (Opinion 5/2013), that the proposed rule ‘has taken into account the development of in-
ternational law (ICAO)’ (Opinion 2/2013) or ‘the proposed rules are compliant with ICAO Stand-
ards and Recommended Practices’ (Opinion 4/2012). Some Opinions do not provide a correlation 
table indicating differences with SARPs, although the Opinion itself admits that some of the provi-
sions it proposes are below ICAO requirements (Opinion 07/2010, Opinion 03/2013).   
143 See for example EASA Opinion 11/2013 on ‘Licensing a d medical certification of air traffic 
controllers’ at: EASA, 'Agency Opinions'  <http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/opinions> 
[accessed 28 July 2014]. Although Opinion 11/2013 is a rare example of an EASA proposal con-
taining a single consolidated correlation table betwe n the ICAO SARPs and the proposed EU 
requirements, it does not identify in which ICAO category each of the differences falls. 
144 ICAO classifies the differences into three categories, that is: (1) more exacting or exceeds the 
ICAO Standard or Recommended Practice (Category A); (2) different in character or other means 
of compliance (Category B); (3) less protective or pa tially implemented/not implemented (Cate-
gory C). See: C-WP/12412, supra note 42 in Ch.2, at Appendix A (as approved by ICAO Council 
by C-DEC 177/14) 
145 EU, 'Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 of 26 September 2012 laying 
down the common rules of the air and operational provisions regarding services and procedures in 
air navigation and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 and Regulations (EC) 
No 1265/2007, (EC) No 1794/2006, (EC) No 730/2006, (EC) No 1033/2006 and (EU) No 
255/2010', (OJ L 281, 13.10.2012). The proposal for this regulation was prepared jointly by EASA 
and EUROCONTROL. 
146 Ibid. Article 5. 
147 'Interview No 1', (2013), supra note 37 in Ch.2. 
148 ICAO USOAP report on EASA (2008), supra note 92. 
149 'Interview No 4', (2014), supra note 41 in Ch.2.  
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The shortcomings concerning the identification of differences with ICAO 
SARPs need to be addressed as a matter of priority. From a legal point of view, it 
is not easy for EU Member States today to discharge their obligations under Arti-
cle 38 of the Chicago Convention without full knowledge of the differences. Sec-
ondly this hampers the ability of ICAO to rely on the EU system for the purpose 
of monitoring EU Member States under the USOAP, as envisaged under the re-
cently signed EU–ICAO Memorandum of Cooperation150. This last point will be 
further addressed under Section 4.4.3.3. 
At the same time, the fact that in addition to 28 EU Member States there is 
also a number of non-EU European States associated with the work of EASA (see 
Section 4.5) offers an opportunity for helping ICAO to standardise the application 
of Article 38 of the Chicago Convention and make it more focused, as was advo-
cated in Chapter 2. If over 30 European States came to a common interpretation of 
what constitutes a difference under Article 38 of the Chicago Convention and filed 
with ICAO such differences in a uniform and consistent manner, this would not 
only be a resource efficiency and safety benefit for ICAO and Europe but could 
also pave the way for an internationally agreed manner of interpreting Article 38 
of the Chicago Convention. 
4.4.2 THE ROLE OF THE EU SYSTEM IN CERTIFICATION OF CIVIL  
AVIATION ACTIVITIES 
The main benefit of the EU system from the perspective of certification151 f civil 
aviation activities is the principle of automatic recognition of certificates which is 
enshrined under Article 11 of the EASA Basic Regulation. This provision requires 
EU Member States to: 
 
[R]ecognise, without further technical requirements or evaluation, certificates issued in 
accordance with that regulation and related implementing rules.152 
 
` The precondition for automatic recognition of certificates is the existence 
of the common regulatory framework presented under Section 4.4.1 above. In th  
case of the EU, it is not appropriate to speak about reciprocal recognition of cer-
tificates, as the defining criteria triggering EU-wide acceptance of a certificate is 
its issuance in compliance with the applicable regulations. Making recognition 
conditional on reciprocal benefits offered by other EU Member States would not 
be allowed under the EASA Basic Regulation. 
Automatic recognition is an advantage when compared with the previous 
system of mutual recognition ‘recommendations’ under the JAA, which referred 
                                                 
150 'Memorandum of Cooperation between the European Union and the International Civil Aviation 
Organization providing a framework for enhanced cooperation', 4 May 2011, (OJ L 232, 9 
September 2011). 
151 In the EU civil aviation safety system certification is understood as: ‘any form of recognition 
that a product, part or appliance, organisation or person complies with the applicable requirements 
…, as well as the issuance of the relevant certifica e attesting such compliance.’ See: Regulation 
(EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 3(e). 
152 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 11(1). 
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to different levels of JAR amendments, and in practice lead, as the exampl  of 
aircrew licensing shows, to a patchwork of recognition arrangements.153 
The second feature of the EU system is that certain certification tasks are 
performed centrally by EASA on behalf of EU Member States. This is however an 
exception, as under the ‘[EU] institutional system, implementation of … law is 
primarily the responsibility of the Member States’, in line with the subsidiarity 
principle.154 Conceptually, this principle of implementation of EU law at the na-
tional level can be summarised as locally approved, globally accepted. 
Therefore, certification tasks were given to EASA only when this wa  
deemed to be more cost efficient and practical, or if justified by need for uniformi-
ty of action vis-a-vis third countries. In 2014 EASA was competent to issue certif-
icates in the areas of: approval of design of aeronautical products, parts and appli-
ances,155 third country organisations and operators,156 and organisations providing 
pan-European air navigation services.157 EU Member States may also delegate to 
EASA certain certification tasks on a voluntary basis – this is for example the case 
for production, and where France, United Kingdom, Spain and Germany delegat-
ed to EASA certification and oversight of the Airbus consortium.158 
The EASA certification process represents a one-stop-shop for the aero-
nautical industry. From a technical point of view, similar to the previous JAA pro-
cess, EASA conducts one technical investigation on behalf of all the EU Member 
States. However, and this is an important difference with the previous system, the 
EASA certificate is valid in all EU Member States.159 There is no need for issu-
ance of the certificate in each of the States as was the case under the JAA r-
gime.160 In addition EU Member States cannot modify the certificate or add adi-
tional conditions – something which had been possible und r the JAA.161 
Review of the available reports assessing the functioning of EASA does 
not offer a clear picture as to the cost efficiency impacts that the transfer of c ti-
fication tasks had on national authorities. The initial evaluation of the functioning 
of EASA conducted in 2007 was inconclusive on this point and stated that: 
 
                                                 
153 See for example the last version of JAA mutual recognition recommendations for aircrew li-
censing at: supra note 54 in Ch.3. 
154 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Preamble clause 13. 
155 Ibid. Article 20. 
156 Ibid. Articles 20.2(b)(iii), 21.1(b), 21.2(iii), 22a(b), 22b(b) and 23. 
157 Ibid. Article 22(a). 
158 The legal basis for such approval is: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, 
Article 20.2(b)(ii). See also: EASA, 'Agency issues fir t European Single Production Organisation 
Approval to Airbus', Press release of 21.07.2008,  
159 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 11. 
160 Sulocki and Cartier, 'Continuing Airworthiness in the framework of the transition from JAA to 
EASA', supra note 53 in Ch.1, at p. 321. See also: Günter Verhaugen, Vice-President of the 
European Commission responsible for Enterprise and Industry, 'The role of the Aviation Safety 
Agency from an industry point of view', SPEECH/04/536, (Speech at the occasion of the 
inauguration of EASA in Cologne, 2004). 
161Ramboll-Euréval-Matrix on behalf of the European Commission, 'Evaluation of the EU 
decentralised agencies: Final Report - Volume III, Agency level findings', (2009),  p. 56. 
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With detailed information on cost structures under the former system being unavailable, 
no significant cost reductions in certification procedures compared to the former system 
could be identified. 162 
 
On the other hand the evaluation performed in 2010 for the European Par-
liament, somewhat surprisingly came to a conclusion that:  
 
The expected effect of shifting both the responsibility and the execution of some tasks is 
usually a budget reduction. However, the perception-based results of our survey show 
that, all in all, the impact of the task transfer at n tional level has been toward an increase 
in budget pressure with very few exceptions. 163 
 
The available reports are more consistent about the impact of centralisation 
on the industry. The EU-wide legal value of a single EASA certifica e is identified 
as a major benefit.164 There seems to also be a consensus that the EASA certifica-
tion processes are better suited for the larger industries,165 and that the smaller 
industry faced challenges stemming from the complexity of the regulations and 
operational distance of the Agency,166 which outsources around 20% of the tech-
nical work to local NAAs when it comes to approval of aircraft design.167 
4.4.2.1 IMPLICATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE CHICAGO 
CONVENTION 
The principle of automatic recognition and centralisation of certain tasks at EASA 
level has a number of implications from the perspective of the Chicago Conven-
tion. The first one is the establishment of the international agency relationship 
between EASA and EU Member States along with the associated conseque ces 
under the USOAP, as was presented in Section 4.3.3. 
The second consequence is the separation of the functions and tasks of the 
‘State of Design’ which are related to aircraft airworthiness and investigation of 
aviation accidents, which will be presented in more detail in Chapter 5 as an ex-
ample of unintended consequences that establishment of a RASO may have on the 
responsibilities of States under the Chicago Convention. 
In addition, the following consequences were identified with respect to Ar-
ticle 32 of the Chicago Convention which deals with recognition of certificates for 
the purpose of international air navigation: 
(1) With regard to Article 32(a) of the Chicago Convention, which states 
that: 
                                                 
162 Horváth & Partners Management Consultants on behalf of the EASA management board, 
'Evaluation on the Implementation of EU Regulation 1592/2002: Final Report ', EASA evaluation 
prepared on the basis of Article 51 of Regulation (EC) 1592/2002, (2007),  p. 12. 
163 The impact on the EU and national budgets of EU agencies, supra note 125, at p. 75. 
164 Evaluation of the EU decentralised agencies (2009), supra note 161, at p. 56; EASA evaluation 
(2007), supra note 162, at p. 100. 
165 Ibid. 
166 EASA evaluation (2007), supra note 162, at p.100. 
167 Certification tasks internalisation rate on the basis of: EASA, 'Business Plan 2014-2018', EASA 
Management Board Decision Nr 12-2013, (2013). 
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The pilot of every aircraft and the other members of the operating crew of every air-
craft engaged in international navigation shall be provided with certificates of com-
petency and licenses issued or rendered valid by the S ate in which the aircraft is reg-
istered. 
 
- The EASA Basic Regulation should be considered as a mechanism 
for automatic validation or ‘rendering valid’ of aircrew licences be-
tween EU Member States. This is because under Article 11 of the 
EASA Basic Regulation, an EU ‘State of Registry’ must automatically 
accept an aircrew licence which was issued by any other EU Member 
State ‘in accordance with that regulation and related implementing 
rules’. Given that it is not possible to file differences with the provi-
sions of the Chicago Convention, this is the only possible explanation 
of consistency between Article 11 of EASA Basic Regulation and Arti-
cle 32 (a) of the Chicago Convention. 
(2) With regard to Article 32 (2) of the Chicago Convention, which pro-
vides that: 
Each contracting State reserves the right to refuse to r cognize, for the purpose of 
flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to any 
of its nationals by another contracting State. 
 
- The EU Member States have waived the possibility of such refusal of 
recognition. Exercise of the right provided in Article 32 (b) by one EU 
Member State in respect of another EU Member State would not only 
be in contradiction of Article 11 of the EASA Basic Regulation but al-
so of the principle of non-discrimination established by EU Treaties.168 
 
Finally, the EASA Basic Regulation also has consequences from the per-
spective of Article 83bis of the Chicago Convention, which provides for the pos-
sibility of a transfer of certain ‘State of Registry’ responsibilities to the ‘State of 
the Operator’.169 For such transfer to take place an agreement is needed between 
the States concerned and to make the transfer binding for third countries, they 
have to be notified about the existence of such agreement either directly or 
through ICAO.170 
                                                 
168 TFEU, Article 18. 
169 'Chicago Convention', Article 83 bis (a), which states that: 'Notwithstanding the provisions of 
Articles 12, 30, 31 and 32(a), when an aircraft regist red in a contracting State is operated pursu-
ant to an agreement for the lease, charter or interchange of the aircraft or any similar arrangement 
by an operator who has his principal place of business or, if he has no such place of business, his 
permanent residence in another contracting State, the State of registry may, by agreement with 
such other State, transfer to it all or part of its unctions and duties as State of registry in respect of 
that aircraft under Articles 12, 30, 31, and 32(a). The State of registry shall be relieved of respon-
sibility in respect of the functions and duties transferred.' 
170 Chicago Convention, Article 83bis (b), which states that: 'The transfer shall not have effect in 
respect of other contracting States before either the agreement between States in which it is em-
bodied has been registered with the Council and made public pursuant to Article 83 or the exist-
ence and scope of the agreement have been directly communicated to the authorities of the other 
contracting State or States concerned by a State party to the agreement.' 
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As observed by Manuhutu, in the EU ‘any aircraft – regardless in whch 
EU Member State that aircraft is registered – must comply with the sam  aviation 
safety rules and standards if that aircraft is operated within the territory of an EU 
Member State.’171 This study agrees that ‘as between EU Member States there is 
no need for EU Member States to conclude among them arrangements as envis-
aged under Article 83bis.’172 Such a position is supported by the arguments of 
efficiency and uniformity of safety levels which are the objectives of the EU sys-
tem. For legal certainty purposes such interpretation could be enshrined in the 
EASA Basic Regulation, and subsequently notified by EU Member States to 
ICAO to ensure the international recognition of such a multilateral Article 83bis 
agreement.173 
4.4.3 THE BENEFITS OF THE EU SYSTEM FOR OVERSIGHT AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
The EU aviation safety system has its own oversight and enforcement mecha-
nisms which complement those available in EU Member States.174 A  with rule-
making and certification, these mechanisms must be seen in the context of the EU 
as a whole, and involve multiple actors, which in addition to EASA include the 
NAAs and EU institutions, notably the European Commission – each with its own 
role, competences and responsibilities. 
The multifaceted nature of the EU system requires close cooperation be-
tween all the actors involved. This cooperation is a necessity due to legal consid-
erations, which are analysed in subsequent paragraphs, but primarily from a safety 
point of view, as none of the actors has a complete picture, or can address prob-
lems on its own. For example, while a safety issue can be identif ed at a national 
level, it may require resolution through EU legislation. Similarly a problem identi-
fied by EASA may have to be addressed by an NAA. 
4.4.3.1 EASA STANDARDISATION AND MONITORING ACTIVITIES 
Key features of the EU system are the EASA standardisation inspections and other 
monitoring activities, which constitute a regional mechanism mandated by EU 
law to control the application by EU Member States of the EASA Basic Regula-
tion and its implementing rules, as well as to verify the uniform implementation of 
these rules across the EU.175 
                                                 
171 Frank Manuhutu, 'Article 83bis (Revisited): Transfer of Safety Oversight Responsibilities Seen 
from a European’s Regulator Perspective', in: From L wlands to High Skies: A multilevel 
Jurisdictional Approach towards Air Law, ed. by Pablo Mendes de Leon (2013),  pp. 89-95. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 68, which mandates the EU 
Member States to lay down penalties for infringement of this regulation and its implementing 
rules. 
175 EU, 'Regulation (EU) No 628/2013 of 28 June 2013 on w rking methods of the European 
Aviation Safety Agency for conducting standardisation inspections and for monitoring the 
application of the rules of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 736/2006', (OJ L 179, 29.06.2013), 
Articles 1.1(a) and 3.1. 
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In a regional system, an additional level of monitoring independent from 
national continuing oversight functions is useful to ensure the consistent imple-
mentation of the common regulatory framework. This is especially important if a 
regional system is based on the principle of recognition of certificates which re-
quires trust between the Member States. A reliable, independent verification 
mechanism is a guarantor of this confidence. 
EASA standardisation inspections and monitoring activities ar  mandato-
ry.176 This is an advantage over the previous JAA system of standardisation vis ts 
which a national authority could reject.177 The mandatory nature of the EASA 
activities is justified because, while JAA was issuing only mutual recognition 
‘recommendations’, in the EU the recognition is automatically granted by law as 
Section 4.4.2 demonstrated. 
In addition, while the JAA standardisation visits were organised by the 
aviation authorities themselves and could thus be considered more as ‘peer re-
views’, the EASA process is independent from the NAAs.178 
4.4.3.2 ENFORCEMENT COMPETENCES OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
The EASA standardisation inspections and other monitoring activities are ancil-
lary to the enforcement competences of the European Commission. Their purpose 
is to assist the Commission, as the Guardian of the Treaties in monitoring the ap-
plication of the EASA Basic Regulation and its implementing rules.179 They are 
also 'without prejudice to the enforcement powers conferred by the Treaty on the 
Commission.'180  
Therefore when EASA identifies a serious non-compliance, it must report 
back to the European Commission, possibly with a recommendatio to suspend 
recognition of certificates under Article 11 of EASA Basic Regulation.181 In this 
respect the position of EASA is similar to the previous JAA which could only 
withdraw the mutual recognition recommendations, as was explained in Section 
3.4.2 of Chapter 3. 
The European Commission is not obliged to act upon a recommendatio  of 
EASA.182 The Commission may also initiate an infringement action directly 
against a Member State without a prior EASA recommendation using it  enforce-
ment competences under the EU Treaty.183 This discretion of the European Com-
                                                 
176 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Articles 24 and 54. 
177 Francesco Banal, former EASA Quality and Standardis tion Director, 'EASA Standardisation', 
in Aircraft Engineers International Conference, (Belgrade 2006). 
178 Ibid. 
179 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 54(1). 
180 Ibid. The enforcement powers are vested into the European Commission through Article 258 of 
the TFEU. 
181 In case of non-compliance or ineffective compliance, the European Commission shall require 
the issuer of a certificate to take appropriate corrective action and safeguard measures, such as 
limitation or suspension of the certificate. Moreovr, the EU-wide recognition of the certificate 
ceases to apply from the date of the notification of the Commission's decision to the Member 
States. See: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 11(2). 
182 See: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 11, which States that the 
Commission may initiate such procedure. 
183 Infringement procedures are actions taken by the European Commission under Article 258 of 
the TFEU against a Member State which is in breach of EU law, and involve judicial control by 
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mission stems from Article 11 of the EASA Basic Regulation, standardisation 
regulation,184 and is confirmed by the jurisprudence of the CJEU.185 
The fact that enforcement is dependent on the discretion of the European 
Commission could be subject to criticism. The very purpose of stablishing an 
independent safety agency was to insulate technical decisions from political con-
siderations and associated discretion. This is however an inevitabl consequence 
of the initial decision to establish EASA as an EU agency, as launching infringe-
ment actions is a discretionary competence the delegation of which to EASA 
would be incompatible with the Meroni doctrine presented in Section 4.2.4.186 
By mid-2014, with the exception of safeguard measures adopted by the 
European Commission at the time of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007,187 
there had been no cases of non-compliance with the EU safety requirements 
which necessitated an enforcement action by the European Commission under 
Article 11 of the EASA Basic Regulation.188 Whether this is an indication of a 
system which functions well, or rather a symptom of the system’  genuine inabil-
ity to deal decisively with serious deficiencies could of course be a point for dis-
cussion. 
On the one hand, the review of EASA annual reports indicates that be-
tween 20% - 34 % of the overall number of standardisation findings can be classi-
fied as ‘significant deficiencies that may raise safety concerns if not duly correct-
ed.’189 It also seems that the main cause of such findings is ‘insufficient availabil-
ity of adequate inspecting staff, in terms of qualification and/or number’,190 which 
is an important observation given that one of the main advantages of r gional sys-
tems is supposed to be enhancement of safety oversight capabilities of States. 
On the other hand, looking at the actual safety record, it is clear that the 
EU system delivers a consistently low accident rate, although now stabilised fol-
lowing the significant reductions achieved in the first half of the previous dec-
ade.191 Between 2003 and 2013 the average rate of scheduled passenger and cargo 
fatal accidents per 10 million flights, oscillated around two for the aircraft opera-
                                                                                                                            
the CJEU. Originally, they were intended to be the primary mechanism for enforcement of EU law. 
However since the development by the CJEU of the doctrines of direct effect and State liability 
which allow for enforcement of EU law by national courts, infringement procedures are only one 
element of the EU enforcement system. See in particular: 'Joint Cases C-6 and C-9/90, Francovich 
and Bonifaci v. Republic of Italy', in: [1991] ECR I-05375, (CJEU,1991). 
184 Regulation (EU) No 628/2013, supra note 175. 
185 This discretion of the Commission has been confirmed in the CJEU ruling: 'Case C-247/87, 
Star Fruit Company v. Commission', in: [1989] ECR I-291, (CJEU,1989),  (p. 301). See also: 'Case 
T-571/93, Lefebvre and Others v. Commission ', in: [1995] ECR II-02379, (CJEU,1995),  (p. 
2403). 
186 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Preamble clause 18 and Article 25. 
187 EU, 'Commission Regulation (EC) No 1962/2006 of 21 December 2006 in application of 
Article 37 of the Act of Accession of Bulgaria to the European Union', (OJ L 408, 30.12.2006). 
188 Official of the European Commission, 'Interview No9', (2014). 
189 EASA, 'Annual General Reports for the years 2010-2013'  <http://easa.europa.eu/newsroom-
and-events/general-publications> [accessed 28 July 2014]. 
190 EASA, 'Annual General Report', (2012), <http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/EASA-
Annual_General_Report_2012.pdf> [accessed 20 December 2013], at p.31. 
191 EASA Annual Safety Review (2013), supra note 2, at p. 27. 
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tors under responsibility of the States participating in the work of EASA.192 This 
is one of the best safety records in the world.193 
4.4.3.3 INTERACTION BETWEEN EASA STANDARDISATION AND 
MONITORING ACTIVITIES AND ICAO USOAP-CMA  
While EASA monitoring activities are justified by the regional ture of the EU 
system, they are also an additional layer of oversight which requires resources. In 
2012 the EASA standardisation department had in total 48 members of person-
nel,194 and a budget of 635.000 EURO.195 EASA also involves inspectors from EU 
Member States. In 2012, EU Member States provided 134 inspectors which con-
stituted 50% of all EASA standardisation inspection team members.196 The in-
spections also require preparation on the part of EU Member States and continu-
ous monitoring and follow up of results by EASA and the European Commission. 
In addition EASA conducts inspections in non-EU European St tes on the 
basis of international agreements or working arrangements concluded by EU or
EASA respectively. In 2012 EASA was involved in standardisation activities in 46 
countries.197 
Such an effort to a certain extent duplicates the ICAO USOAP-CMA mon-
itoring activities, which apply equally to States which are subject to EASA stand-
ardisation activities. The EU could eliminate this overlap and realise efficiencies 
for ICAO and EU Member States by relying on the 2011 EU-ICAO Memorandum 
of Cooperation (hereinafter the ‘EU-ICAO MoC’) which provides for the possibil-
ity of coordinating the EASA standardisation inspections and the ICAO USOAP-
CMA.198 Paragraph 7 of the safety Annex to the EU-ICAO MoC States that: 
 
In order to verify compliance by EU Member States with ICAO safety-related Standards 
and adherence to ICAO Recommended Practices …, the Parties shall establish a frame-
work for conducting, as appropriate …: ICAO oversight of the EU Standardisation In-
spections conducted by EASA of the national competent authorities of EU Member States 
regarding safety-related SARPs that are addressed by EU legislation.199 
 
Establishing such a link would allow ICAO to recognise thresults pro-
duced by the EU system, at least in those areas where the EASA standardisation 
inspections and monitoring activities and those of USOAP-CMA are deemed to be 
equivalent. This could ultimately reduce the duplication of inspection and moni-
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toring activities of EU Member States by ICAO, as is already the case in the area 
of aviation security.200 
In 2014 ICAO and EASA signed a ‘Working Arrangement on Continuous 
Monitoring Activities’, to implement the provisions of the EU-ICAO MoC and its 
safety annex related to the coordination of the ICAO USOAP and EU standardisa-
tion inspections. It is expected that such coordination will be put into effective 
operation in the near future.201 
One of the primary obstacles to realising efficiencies between ICAO 
USOAP and EASA standardisation remains the inadequate knowledge by EASA 
of the differences between EU regulations and ICAO Annexes as was demonstrat-
ed in Section 4.4.1.2. In addition, due to the split of respon ibilities between 
EASA and the European Commission, ICAO would also probably need to monitor 
the latter, notably in view of the European Commission’s legis ative and enforce-
ment competences which are related to CEs seven and eight under the ICAO safe-
ty oversight model which was presented in Chapter 2. 
4.4.3.4 INDEPENDENT EASA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
The only independent enforcement actions that EASA can take, de l ge lata, is the 
possibility to suspend, revoke or amend a certificate that EASA granted to an or-
ganisation, operator or aeronautical product.202 Such decisions can be subject to 
an appeal process, and include a judicial control by the CJEU.203 Revoking or 
suspending a certificate is however an ultimate measure. Therefore if a more ‘nu-
anced, flexible and graduated response to a breach of the rules, is warranted’,204 
the EU legislation provides the  possibility of imposing financial penalties or peri-
odic penalty payments on holders of certificates issued by EASA which have in-
tentionally or negligently breached the provisions of EU law.205  
Such penalties or payments are imposed not by EASA but by the European 
Commission upon the Agency’s recommendation.206 This is another consequence 
of EASA being an EU agency, because launching infringement actions is a discre-
tionary competence, the delegation of which to EASA would contradic  the Mer-
oni doctrine. The fact that EASA cannot impose financial penalties is a key differ-
ence with a traditional set-up, where national authorities may have competences to 
fine operators or individuals for breaches of aviation legislation.207  
                                                 
200 'Memorandum of Cooperation between the Internationl Civil Aviation Organisation and the 
European Community regarding security audits/inspections and related matters', 17 September 
2008, (OJ L 36, 5.2.2009). 
201 'Interview No 4', (2014), supra note 41 in Ch.2. 
202 See for example: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 20.1(i). 
203 Ibid. Articles 40-51. 
204 Ibid. Preamble clause 18. 
205 EU, 'Commission Regulation (EU) No 646/2012  of 16 July 2012  laying down detailed rules 
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Parliament and of the Council', (OJ L 187, 17.7.2012). 
206 Ibid. Article 10. 
207 For example in the US, the FAA has a competence to imp se civil penalty payments for viola-
tions of aviation regulations under: Title 14 CFR, Part 13 ‘Investigative and Enforcement Proce-
dures’ ('Code of Federal Regulations',  <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2014-title14-
vol1/pdf/CFR-2014-title14-vol1.pdf> [accessed 29 March 2014]. 
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By mid-2014, the European Commission had not used its competences to 
impose financial penalties or periodic penalty payments on EASA certifi ate 
holders.208 It was therefore not possible to assess the effectiveness of this instru-
ment. 
4.5 ASSOCIATION OF NON-EU EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH 
EASA 
In addition to EU Member States, non-EU European countries can also participate 
in the work of EASA and be associated with the EU aviation safety system. The 
legal basis for this association is Article 66 of the EASA Basic Regulation, which 
provides that: 
 
The Agency shall be open to the participation of European third countries which are con-
tracting parties to the Chicago Convention and which have entered into agreements with 
the European Community whereby they adopted and apply Community law in the field 
covered by this Regulation and its implementing rules.209 
 
This Pan-European dimension of the EU aviation safety system i driven 
by two developments. The first one was the closure of the JAA in 2009, which 
necessitated offering ex-JAA non-EU countries ‘an alternative forum to express 
interests regarding aviation safety matters.’210 The second one is the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)211 and its aviation component - the Common Avia-
tion Area - which is based on uniform conditions of doing business, including as 
regards aviation safety.212  
The main precondition for associating a non-EU European country wih 
the EU aviation safety system and EASA is the conclusion of an international 
agreement meeting conditions of Article 66 of EASA Basic Regulation. By mid-
2014 the EU had signed five such agreements,213 although none of them is limited 
solely to aviation safety: 214 
                                                 
208 'Interview No 9', (2014), supra note 188. 
209 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 66. 
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- Agreement on the European Economic Area;215 
- Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confedera-
tion on Air Transport;216 
- Multilateral Agreement between the European Community and its Member 
States, the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 
Bulgaria, the Republic of Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia, the Republic of Iceland, the Republic of Montenegro, the Kingdom 
of Norway, Romania, the Republic of Serbia and the United Nations Inter-
im Administration Mission in Kosovo on the Establishment of a European 
Common Aviation Area (ECAA);217 
- Common Aviation Area Agreement between the European Union and its 
Member States and Georgia;218 
- Common Aviation Area Agreement between the European Union and its 
Member States and the Republic of Moldova.219 
Under the above agreements the partner countries commit to implement 
the EU aviation safety legislation, and in exchange have the possibility of acquir-
ing status equivalent to an EU Member State, including as regards recognition of 
certificates, participation in EASA rulemaking process and other technical i itia-
tives, as well as delegation of safety functions to EASA. The main lim tation of 
                                                                                                                            
legislation but which do not create regulatory consequences under the EASA ‘Basic Regulation’ 
such as recognition of certificates or delegation of State safety functions to EASA. These are for 
example the agreements signed with Morocco, Jordan and Israel. 
214 ‘Article 66’ agreements can be: (i) aviation specific agreements, (ii) more general and free-
standing association agreements providing for the adoption and implementation by third countries 
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third countries in the work of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Commission Staff Working 
Paper', SEC(2002) 1090, (Brussels, 2002). 
215 'Agreement on the European Economic Area', 2 May 1992 (OJ L 1, 3.1.1994). Provides for 
integration of the EEA countries (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), into the EU internal market, 
including the air transport market. 
216 'Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport', 
21 June 1999, (OJ L 114, 30.4.2002). It is an aviation specific agreement providing for integration 
of the Swiss Confederation into the EU internal air transport market. 
217 'Multilateral Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, the Republic 
of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Croatia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Iceland, the Republic of Montenegro, the 
Kingdom of Norway, Romania, the Republic of Serbia and the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area', 9 
June 2006, (OJ L 285, 16.10.2006). Signed with States candidates for EU membership and provid-
ing for their gradual integration into the single EU aviation market. The agreement also covers 
Norway and Iceland. Since the signature of the agreement a number of its contracting parties (Bul-
garia, Romania, and Croatia) have become EU Member States.  
218 'EU-Georgia Common Aviation Area Agreement', supra note 123 in Ch.3. This agreement pro-
vides for implementation by Georgia of EU aviation legislation and exchange of traffic rights 
between EU Member States and Georgia. The agreement do s not provide for full integration of 
Georgia into the EU’s common aviation market. 
219 'EU-Moldova Common Aviation Area Agreement', supra note 124 in Ch.3. This agreement 
provides for implementation by the Republic of Moldova of EU aviation legislation and exchange 
of traffic rights between EU Member States and the Republic of Moldova. The agreement does not 
provide for full integration of the Republic of Moldova into the EU’s common aviation market. 
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‘Article 66 agreements’ is lack of the possibility of granting to non-EU countries 
voting rights in the EASA management board and regulatory committees aking 
legally binding decisions.220 
4.5.1 IMPLEMENTATION AND SAFETY BENEFITS OF ‘ARTICLE 66 
AGREEMENTS’ 
 
The evaluation of the implementation of the five ‘Article 66 agreements’ signed 
until mid-2014 reveals mixed results. The main problem is that most of these 
agreements take a long time to actually enter into force. Here a clear distinction 
must be made between ‘Article 66 agreements’ negotiated as mixed, which neces-
sitate ratification by both the EU and its Members States, and EU only meaning 
that EU Member States are not parties to the agreement and do not need to ratify 
it221 
Only two out of five ‘Article 66 agreements’ actually entered into force by 
mid-2014, and both of them were negotiated as ‘EU only’ agreements: the Agree-
ment on the European Economic Area222 which is not aviation specific, and the 
EU–Switzerland Air Transport Agreement.223 It took on average two and a half 
years for these agreements to enter into force.224 
The other agreements - with the Western Balkan States (ECAA), Republic 
of Georgia and Republic of Moldova - were signed as mixed, and in mid-2014 
none of them was in force, or provisionally applied, due to either lack of sufficient 
number of ratifications by EU Member States, or lack of completion by the EU 
and its Member States of procedures necessary for enabling provisional applica-
tion.225 In mid-2014, the ECAA agreement was closest to entering into force, but 
only after over seven years following signature.226 
The fact that an ‘Article 66 agreement’ is not in force, has a number of 
consequences. Firstly, it prevents a Joint Committee established under such 
agreement to update the list of EU legislation which the EU’s partner country 
must apply.227 A review of the five ‘Article 66 agreements’, including relevant 
Joint Committee decisions, shows that in the case of agreements which are not in 
                                                 
220 Any participation by a third party's representative in the decision-making process of an EU 
body must always respect the principle of EU decision-making autonomy. See: 'Opinion 1/76', 
supra note 21. Similarly: Participation of European third countries in the work of EASA 
(SEC(2002) 1090), supra note 214, at p. 4. 
221 The legal justification for ‘an EU only’ agreement is that EU’s competences cover the entire 
agreement. See: Piet Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and 
Constitutional Foundations, (2004), p. 191. 
222 In force since 1 January 1994. 
223 In force since 1 June 2002. 
224 Based on the analysis of information available in: Council of the EU, 'International Agreements 




227 In the case of the five ‘Article 66’ agreements such decisions were taken on regular basis only 
by the Joint Committees established under the EEA Agreement and the EU-Switzerland Air 
Transport Agreement. The Joint Committee established under the ECAA Agreement took only one 
such decision since the signature of the agreement. This analysis was conducted on the basis of 
information from: European External Action Service, 'Treaty Office Database' 
<http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do> [accessed 30 March 2014]. 
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force, the lists of EU aviation safety legislation are largely outdated.228 Although 
this does not prevent the partner countries from implementing the latest EU avia-
tion legislation on a voluntary basis, the present situation creates a lack of legal 
certainty and contributes to a patchwork of regulatory requirements. 
The second consequence of an ‘Article 66 agreement’ not being in force or 
provisionally applied is that even if a partner country implements EU aviation 
safety legislation, its certificates continue to be treated as coming from a third 
country. This is because activation of the recognition of certificates requires a 
formal decision by the Joint Committee to be taken under the agreement. In 2014 
only Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein had a status equivalent to an 
EU Member State, and benefited from recognition of certificates.229 
It is also legally not possible to establish a relationship of international 
agency between the EASA and the partner countries on the basis of an ‘Article 66 
agreement’ which is not in force or at least provisionally applied. As was demon-
strated in Section 4.3.4, a country cannot delegate to EASA the exercise of its 
safety functions on the basis of a working arrangement which is notbinding under 
international law. In 2014 only the countries party to the EEA agreement and EU-
Switzerland Air Transport agreement have effectively delegated to EASA the ex-
ercise of safety tasks as envisaged under the EASA Basic Regulation.230 
Last but not least, not all States parties to 'Article 66 agreements' are able 
to apply directly EU aviation safety legislation in their internal legal orders. In 
2014 this has been the case only for Liechtenstein and Switzerland, which do not 
need implementing regulations to apply the EU aviation safety standards.231 All 
other States which are parties to 'Article 66 agreements' do not consider such 
agreements as self-executing and need to enact national legislation to give effect 
to EU aviation safety regulations.232 
 
                                                 
228 International Agreements Database, upra note 224. In addition the author reviewed a registry 
of decisions of joint committees set up pursuant to an international agreement and comprising 
representatives of the signatories for the purpose of administering the agreement, at: EU, 'EUR-
Lex, International Agreements' <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/inter-agree.html> 
[accessed 30 March 2014]. 
229 'Decision No 1/2013 of the Joint European Union/Switzerland Air Transport Committee set up 
under the Agreement between the European Community a d the Swiss Confederation on Air 
Transport of 2 December 2013 replacing the Annex to the Agreement between the European 
Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport', 2 December 2013, (OJ L 12, 
17.1.2014); 'Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 179/2004 of 9 December 2004 amending 
Annex XIII (Transport) to the EEA Agreement', 9 December 2004, (OJ L 133, 26.5.2005). 
230 Ibid. Such delegation is possible when a partner country completes transitional periods under 
the relevant agreement. Successful transition is confirmed by a decision of the Joint Committee 
established under the agreement, and which also establishes the precise conditions for participation 
of the country in question in the work of EASA. 
231 Official of the Swiss Civil Aviation Authority (FOCA), 'Interview No 3', (2014). For infor-
mation about the transposition of EU law by the EEA States see: EFTA Surveillance Authority, 
'Internal Market Scoreboard No 33', (2014), 
<http://www.eftasurv.int/media/scoreboard/Scoreboard_No_33_pdf.PDF> [accessed 30 March 
2014], p. 22. 
232 In the case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) and Kosovo such transpo-
sition can also take place by reference to a specific piece of EU law. 
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4.6 EASA AS A SINGLE AVIATION AUTHORITY FOR EUROPE: 
POLITICAL FICTION OR LONG TERM VISION? 
Although sometimes compared with the FAA, EASA is today still far from be-
coming a similar authority. Of course, the main difference between the US and EU 
is that while the former is a federal State, the latter is comprised of 28 independent 
countries, each with its own airspace, interests, language and culture. EASA, 
which recently celebrated its tenth anniversary,233 is also a young organisation if 
compared with the FAA, which in 2014 had its 56th birthday.234 
Although some discussions have taken place in 2014 about the possibility 
of establishing a single European aviation (safety) agency, it does not seem that 
such a scenario would materialise soon.235 A further discussion on this subject is 
however worthwhile especially  in view of the mounting pressure on national and 
EU budgets, coupled with continuing demand for aviation transportation from the 
public, and increasing market competition from other regions of the world that 
Europe has to face.236 
In this respect a comparison with the US is not entirely inappropriate. 
While in the US all aspects of aviation safety, interoperability, deployment of 
large infrastructure programmes like NextGen,237 and even provision of ANS are 
under the responsibility of one body, the FAA, on the European side these issues 
are dealt with by multiple organisations which include the European Commission, 
EASA, NAAs, EUROCONTROL, ECAC, and various joint technology initiatives 
such as SESAR238 or Clean Sky.239 
A good illustration of the inefficiencies which this fragmentation creates is 
ATM, where the US system is capable of handling 70% more aircraft move ents 
than in Europe at a total cost that is 23% lower.240  Similarly, any significant avia-
tion initiative in Europe requires elaborate coordination to ensure that the different 
organisations contribute to it in a coherent way, and have a common understand-
ing of the objectives. This can be illustrated with the example of SESAR deploy-
ment, which requires involvement of multiple authorities and boies at both the 
                                                 
233 EASA 10th Anniversary Chronicle, supra note 4. 
234 Theresa L. Kraus, The Federal Aviation Administration: A historical perspective, 1903-2008, 
(2008), p. 9. 
235 This discussion has been undertaken in the framework of the EASA Management Board based 
on the report presented by the Finish Director General of Civil Aviation, Mr Pekka Hentu. 
236 EASA 2013 Article 62 evaluation, supra note 29 in Ch.3, at pp. 10-12. 
237 NextGen is a US project for the deployment of a Next Generation Air Transportation System in 
the national airspace. See: SESAR, 'Discover SESAR'  <http://www.sesarju.eu/discover-sesar> 
[accessed 30 March 2014]. 
238 SESAR or Single European Sky ATM Research is the EU’s equivalent of the US NextGen 
project. See: FAA, 'NextGen'  <http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/> [accessed 30 March 2014]. 
239 Clean Sky is an EU aeronautical research programme which mission is to significantly increase 
the environmental performances of airplanes and air transport. See: Clean Sky, 'About Us'  
<http://www.cleansky.eu/content/homepage/about-us> [accessed 30 March 2014]. 
240 EC, 'Single European Sky 2+, Cost and Flight effici n y'  
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single_european_sky/doc/ses2plus/cost-flight-
efficiency.pdf> [accessed 30 March 2014]. 
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EU and national levels,241 while in the US the responsibility for NextGen devel-
opment and deployment rests largely with the FAA.242 
This structural problem is well defined and recognised in Europe. Th 
2007 High Level Group for the Future European Aviation Regulatory Framework 
has already underlined that the current ‘patchwork of responsibilities and regula-
tory structures’ is a ‘major bottleneck in improving the performance of the Euro-
pean aviation system.’243  
Focusing on aviation safety, a recent evaluation of the EASA system con-
cluded that ‘there are too many actors in the System with different o overlapping 
responsibilities and roles’, which makes it ‘unsustainable in the medium to long 
term’ and that therefore:  
 
[T]he required processes to create a genuine European Aviation Safety System through 
the convergence of the various existing actors in the System towards a single entity re-
sponsible for all aviation safety regulation and oversight should be embarked upon.244 
 
The following paragraphs will try to identify the legal and inst tutional en-
ablers of such a change, and obstacles to implementation. 
4.6.1 MILESTONES TOWARDS A EUROPEAN AVIATION (SAFETY) 
AUTHORITY 
Although slow, the process of establishing a single aviation safety entity for Eu-
rope has already started. The major milestone in this respect was the transition 
from the JAA to EASA, and the closure of the former in 2009. EASA also effec-
tively took over from EUROCONTROL the development of ATM safety stand-
ards245 and inspects national authorities’ ATM oversight capabilities, as part of its 
standardisation programme.246 In 2013 the European Commission proposed re-
naming EASA as the ‘European Aviation Agency’, which is a symbolic reflection 
of these changes.247 
The next milestones that would need to be accomplished to realise the vi-
sion of ‘a single entity responsible for all aviation safety regulation and over-
sight’, would be a merger of EASA and EUROCONTROL, and a much closer 
                                                 
241 EC, 'Communication from the Commission: Governance and incentive mechanisms for the 
deployment of SESAR, the Single European Sky's technological pillar', COM(2011) 923 final, 
(Brussels, 2011). 
242 United States Government Accountability Office, 'Report to Congressional Requesters on 
NextGen Air Transportation System', GAO-13-264, (2013). 
243 'Report of the High Level Group for the Future European Aviation Regulatory Framework: A 
framework for driving performance improvement', (2007), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/doc/hlg_2007_ 7_03_report.pdf> [accessed 2 February 
2014], p.7. 
244EASA 2013 Article 62 evaluation, supra note 29 in Ch.3, at p. 29. 
245 EASA, 'Revised 4-year Rulemaking Programme 2014-2017', Annex I to EASA Executive 
Director’s Decision No 2013/029/R, (2013), <http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/rulemaking-
programmes/revised-2014-2017-rulemaking-programme> [accessed 6 August 2014], p. 5. 
246 By mid-2014, all EUROCONTROL Member States with the exception of Ukraine and Turkey 
have accepted this competence of EASA, based on working arrangements signed with the Agency. 
See: EASA, 'Working Arrangements' <http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/working-
arrangements> [accessed 6 August 2014]. 
247 COM(2013) 409 final, supra note 68. 
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integration between such a future European Aviation Authority (EAA) and the 
NAAs. 
The main challenge for a potential EASA-EUROCONTROL merger is that 
these two organisations belong to different political and legal worlds. While 
EASA is a body governed by EU public law, EUROCONTROL is an intergov-
ernmental organisation governed by public international law.248 The membership 
of EUROCONTROL is also broader than EU,249 and while ‘Article 66 agree-
ments’ enable participation of non-EU States in the work of EASA, they cannot 
grant voting rights, which the partner countries enjoy in EUROCONTROL.250 
This absence of voting rights is difficult to accept for important aviation countries 
such as Turkey,251 and underlines even more the need for efficient and prompt 
implementation of ‘Article 66’ agreements by the EU. 
Concerning the relationship between EASA and the NAAs, the fact tht 
EASA operates in an environment comprising multiple national St tes is not in 
itself an obstacle to transforming it into a single EU aviation safety authority. As 
the example of the ECCAA (see Chapter 3) showed, it is legally possible to create 
a single aviation authority spanning across multiple States, although of course the 
EU is not a small community of Caribbean islands sharing common language and 
legal heritage - issues which from a practical point of view cannot be ignored. 
The setting up of such a single authority would probably requi transfor-
mation of the EASA Basic Regulation into a much more elaborate European Avia-
tion (Safety) Act, which would need to go into much more detail concerning the 
relationship between the EAA and EU Member States and possibly also harmonis-
ing the national administrative procedures.252 Under such a scheme the NAAs 
would become local offices, or outstations of EAA.  
The main rationale for establishing EAA would be the pooling of the tech-
nical resources available at the EU and national levels, and deploying them in a 
way which would best correspond to the actual needs of the syst m. This would 
necessitate giving to the EAA the authority to close and openlocal offices-NAAs 
and to redistribute the workforce among them as necessary. The geographical 
scope of responsibility of such local offices-NAAs could span across multiple EU 
Member States, if justified by the volume of aviation activity. This structure 
                                                 
248 For an overview of EUROCONTROL’s legal status see: Pablo Mendes de Leon, 'The 
Relationship between Eurocontrol and the EC: Living Apart Together', IOLR, 4 (2008), pp. 305–
320. 
249 EUROCONTROL’s membership consists of 40 States. Except for Estonia, which is planning to 
join EUROCONTROL in January 2015, all EU Member States are also EUROCONTROL’s Mem-
ber States. See: EUROCONTROL, 'Member States'  <http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/member-
States> [accessed 3 March 2014]. 
250 Non-EU States can at best enjoy observer status in EU committees and bodies such as the Sin-
gle Sky Committee or the EASA Management Board. For details of the status given to non-EU 
States please consult the international agreements signed between the EU and such countries, as 
presented in Section 4.5. 
251 Aytaç Aras, 'European aviation safety regulatory framework and Turkey: A critical analysis', 
University of Turkish Aeronautical Association, Faculty of Business Working Papers (2011), pp. 
13, 17. 
252 In the past the JAA has been harmonising also the procedures of member authorities through 
the issuance of the Joint Implementation Procedures (JIP ). 
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would be similar to the FAA, which has a highly decentralised structure and oper-
ates with a nation-wide network of specialised local offices.253 
Irrespective of the political will to actually put such a structure in place, 
and practical difficulties, such as language differences, transformation of EASA 
and EUROCONTROL into an EAA would also pose legal challenges. It is not 
clear whether the legal form of an EU agency and the limitations that it brings 
could actually hinder the effectiveness of the EAA. For example, giv n that EU 
agencies cannot impose penalties on individuals (see Section 4.4.3.4), the en-
forcement function in such a system could become difficult to manage. 
From the perspective of the Chicago Convention, the setting up of such a 
system would require delegation by EU Member States of all safety functions and 
tasks to EAA. This could have consequences such as, for example, the setting up 
of a multinational aircraft registry managed by EAA on behalf of EU Member 
States. As Chapter 6 will demonstrate, there are limitations in respect of such far 
reaching delegations stemming from the provisions of the Chicago Convention. 
While the above scenario is an ambitious, long term vision, therear  in-
termediate steps which could make the current EU aviation safety sys em more 
resource-efficient in the short to mid-term. These include for example the xten-
sion of the possibility for EU Member States to delegate to EASA, on a voluntary 
basis, certification and oversight tasks, or to link, by means of the EASA Basic 
Regulation, the NAAs and EASA into a single EU aviation safety oversight net-
work within which all the authorities could pool their resources and share the 
oversight work more flexibly. 
4.7 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
In 2014 EASA was still the only example of a RASO which fully relies for its 
functioning on a supranational REIO. In this respect, the purpose of this chapter 
was to demonstrate how EASA contributes to the improvement of global aviation 
safety and to the objective of uniformity in civil aviation regulation and oversight, 
as set out by the Chicago Convention. In addition this chapter verified what the 
limitations of EASA are in respect to the achievement of the above mention d 
objectives. 
While initially there has been an attempt to establish EASA in the form of 
an international organisation, EASA has been ultimately set up in the form of an 
EU agency, which means a body governed by EU public law. 
The main benefit of EASA being an EU agency is the fact that it can ake 
advantage of the EU’s legally binding and directly applicable legal framework. 
This is an advantage compared with the previous legally non-binding JAA frame-
work, which could not mandate any legislation and relied on voluntary compli-
ance of participating authorities. The second benefit is that the EU law grants to 
EASA legal personality which is valid in domestic legal orders of all EU Member 
States - this is also an advantage over the previous JAA, which exercised a legal 
personality only as a foundation under the Dutch law. 
                                                 
253 This includes: nineteen Manufacturing Inspection District Offices (MIDOs), over eighty Flight 
Standards District Offices (FSDOs), ten aircraft cer ification offices (ACOs), twenty-two Certifi-
cate Management Offices (CMOs), five Aircraft Evaluation Groups (AEGs), and one aeronautical 
center and one technical center. See:  FAA, 'Offices'  <http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/> 
[accessed 12 March 2014]. 
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Being an EU agency also brings certain limitations for EASA, the main 
one being that it cannot adopt acts of general application which would be of legis-
lative nature. This in practice does not constitute a problem for the EU aviation 
safety system as a whole, because the EU Treaties allow delegation of more de-
tailed, implementing rulemakings to the European Commission, which in turn 
relies on the technical advice of EASA. On the other hand EASA can adopt cer-
tain executive measures such as Airworthiness Directives, which are leg lly bind-
ing and of general applicability. In addition, although formally non-binding, cer-
tain other measures adopted by EASA such as CS or AMC, produce legal effects 
because they determine how people will act in practice. 
Contrary to the current view expressed in most academic studies which
limit the international legal personality of EU agencies to the possibility of con-
cluding headquarters agreements, EASA also has a limited international legal per-
sonality. This chapter found that this international legal personality stems from the 
fact that EASA acts as an authorised representative of all EU Member Stat s un-
der the Chicago Convention, notably as far as the ‘functions and tasks of the State 
of design, manufacture or registry when related to design approval’ are conc rned. 
The practical benefit of this international agency relationship is that EASA has the 
powers to make decisions that are binding for EU Member States under interna-
tional law. 
The relationship of international agency which exists between EASA and 
EU Member States has been recognised by ICAO under the USOAP, as well by 
a number of non-EU States which have concluded international aviation safety 
agreements with the EU or working arrangements with EASA.  
From the point of view of the Chicago Convention, the establishment of 
the relationship of an international agency has brought benefits for EU Member 
States, which now do not need to be audited under the USOAP in those areas 
where EASA acts on their behalf. Instead ICAO is now able to conduct just one 
audit of EASA and to subsequently link its results with the USAOP reports of 
each EU Member State. This provides an example of an interaction between a 
RASO and ICAO which constitutes an important building block f the GASON 
concept which was proposed in Chapter 2.  
As far as rulemaking is concerned, the main benefit of the EU system i  
the fact that EU regulations are directly applicable and legally binding for all EU 
Member States. On the other hand the fact that the EU system is based on directly 
applicable and binding regulations does not mean that all regulatory differences 
have been completely eliminated, as there are still some possibilities of exemp-
tions.  
In addition, the EU civil aviation safety system does not encompass all 
aviation activities, which means that EU Member States still need to maintain 
national rules – and the resources to maintain them - to the extent necessary to 
regulate activities falling outside the EU competence.  
Finally a review of the EASA rulemaking proposals from the period 2010-
2013 demonstrates that EASA does not systematically identify the differences 
between the rules that it proposes and the ICAO SARPs. This is potentially an 
obstacle to ICAO relying more closely on the EU oversight system for the pur-
pose of monitoring EU Member State compliance with their obligations under the 
Chicago Convention. This discrepancy should be fully eliminated, as it is not in 
line with the GASON concept. 
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From the certification point of view, the EU created a multilateral regim  
for automatic recognition of certificates amongst all the EU Member States – 
which is a big benefit the EU system has to offer to the aviation industry. In addi-
tion, certain certification tasks are exercised centrally and in a legally binding 
manner by EASA where this has been found to be more efficient, or where the 
requirements of unity vis-à-vis third countries so justify. This is an advantage 
compared to the previous system of mutual recognition recommendations under 
the JAA.  
Although this study was not able to identify clear evidence of cost effi-
ciencies that the transfer of certification tasks had on authorities of EU Member 
States, the current system, and especially the single EASA certificate which is 
valid across the EU, is an obvious benefit for the industry, especially large aircraft 
manufacturers. This large scale, automatic recognition of certificates, the issuance 
of which is based on a uniform and legally binding legal framework is in line with 
the GASON concept. 
When it comes to oversight, the key feature of the EU system are the 
EASA standardisation inspections and other monitoring activities, which are of 
mandatory nature and are used to control, in an independent manner, the applica-
tion by EU Member States of the EASA Basic Regulation and its implementing 
rules, as well as to verify the uniform implementation of these ruls across the 
EU. This verification mechanism is important in view of the fact tha the EU sys-
tem is based on the principle of wide scale recognition of certificates which re-
quires trust between all the EU Member States.   
From the point of view of ICAO, but also the GASON concept proposed in 
Chapter 2, the EASA system of standardisation inspections and moitoring activi-
ties offers an opportunity to optimise the monitoring of EU Member States’ obli-
gations under the USOAP and the Chicago Convention. This could ultimately 
reduce the duplication of inspection and monitoring activities of EU Member 
States by ICAO, as is already the case in the EU in the area of aviation security. 
As far as enforcement is concerned, EASA, with the exception of with-
drawing, suspending or limiting a certificate that it has issued, has so far not been 
granted by the EU legislator own enforcement competences, and can only recom-
mend to the European Commission suspension of recognition of certificates in a 
given EU Member State, or recommend imposition of a fine or periodic penalty 
payment on a certificate holder. The fact that enforcement is dependent on the 
discretion of the European Commission could be subject to criticism, but the fact 
that the EU system consistently produces a good safety record, is an indication 
that overall the system works effectively. 
The EU civil aviation safety system is Pan-European in scope. Up to mid-
2014 the EU had signed five international agreements with non-EU European 
countries on the basis of which such countries can participate in the work of 
EASA and be part of the EU aviation safety system as per Article 66 of the EASA 
Basic Regulation. The analysis of these agreements shows that, as f r as legal as-
pects are concerned, the safety benefits which they offer are the greatest when 
they are negotiated as EU only, which significantly speeds up their entry into 
force. 
Although the EU partner countries can implement the EU legislation on a 
voluntary basis, the main benefits offered by the EU aviation safety system, such 
as uniform regulatory framework, automatic acceptance of certificates, and cen-
tralisation of certification tasks at the level of EASA, are possible on y on the ba-
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sis of an ‘Article 66 agreement’ which is in force or at least provisionally applied. 
The ‘Article 66 agreements’ are generally not able to provide for direct applic bil-
ity of the EU aviation safety legislation, and the majority of the EU partner coun-
tries require implementing legislation to make the EU requirements part of their 
internal legal orders. 
The EU should therefore consider making more use of ‘Article 66 agree-
ments’ negotiated as EU only, similar to the one concluded with Switzerland or 
the EEA countries. In order to overcome the political reluctance of EU Member 
States towards EU only agreements, their scope could be limited to aviation safety 
matters, leaving commercial aspects and exchange of traffic rights to more com-
prehensive Common Aviation Area type agreements to be negotiated in parallel.254 
Finally this chapter considered the feasibility of merging EASA and EU-
ROCONTROL into a single European Aviation Authority, or EAA. The main rea-
son for establishing such an entity is the fact that the current architecture of the 
EU aviation safety system is not efficient enough and maybe even not sustainable 
in the long term perspective, as some reports on the functioning f EASA argue. 
This is due to the fact that the system is institutionally fragmented and that there 
are too many actors involved. The inefficiencies in this respect have been well 
documented in the ATM sector but also affect other domains. 
Whilst establishing a single entity in Europe responsible for aviation safe-
ty, or even all technical aspects of aviation regulation and oversight, would be a 
very challenging undertaking, this possibility should not be excluded in the long 
term perspective. The main rationale for establishing such an authority w uld be 
the pooling of EU technical resources, and deploying them in a way which would 
best correspond to the actual needs of the system. 
The major steps that would need to be considered in this respect are the 
merger of EASA and EUROCONTROL and transformation of EU NAAs into 
local offices of the new EAA. In addition, while legally feasible, the setting up of 
the new EAA would need to consider the impacts from the perspective of th Chi-
cago Convention, and practical difficulties such as related to language differences. 
The legal form of an EU agency could also bring limitations for such a single au-
thority, in particular as far as enforcement of aviation safety regulations is con-
cerned.  
Irrespective of the above challenges, intermediate steps could be taken to 
make the EU system more resource-efficient. This could be achieved for exampl  
by extending the possibility for EU Member States to delegate to EASA, on a 
voluntary basis, certification and oversight tasks, or to link the NAAs and EASA 
into a single EU aviation safety oversight network within which the authorities 
could pool their resources and share the oversight work more flexibly. 
 
                                                 
254 For an overview of the reasons why EU Member States prefer ‘mixed’ agreements see: 
Eeckhout, supra note 221, at p. 198. 
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Chapter 5  
The Functioning and Evolution of Regional 
Aviation Safety Organisations 
 
 
‘To exist is to change, to change is to mature,  
to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly.’ 
 





5.1 INTRODUCTION 2 
Based on the analysis of different types of RASOs and the detailed c s  study of 
EASA presented in Chapters 3 and 4, this chapter will offer more general observa-
tions and conclusions on the extent to which the various functions of RASOs and 
the continuing evolution of these organisations contribute to the improvement of 
global aviation safety and achievement of the objectives of uniformity in regula-
tions, procedures and operations in civil aviation. 
More specifically, this chapter will first offer a classification of the differ-
ent levels of delegation arrangements that States use when creating RASOs (Sec-
tion 5.2). It will then present, in a systematic way, the different types of safety 
functions that RASO bodies may exercise and propose a methodology f r the set-
ting up of RASOs using a ‘tool-box’ approach (Section 5.3). It will also analyse 
key trends that can be observed around the world regarding the setting up and 
functioning of RASOs (Section 5.4), and finally review the functioning of RASOs 
as international actors (Section 5.5). Where relevant this chapter will also refer to 
pre-RASOs as defined in Chapter 3. 
5.2 TYPOLOGY OF DELEGATION ARRANGEMENTS 
Some of the RASOs, such as EASA or IAC have been empowered by their Mem-
ber States to exercise, in a legally binding manner, certain safety functions, nor-
mally attributed to States by the Chicago Convention. Such delegation can be a 
powerful tool, allowing States to simplify exercise a safety function in a uniform 
manner across the whole region.  
                                                 
1 Henri L. Bergson was a French philosopher and 1927 Nobel Prize laureate in literature. 
2 This Chapter is an expanded version of a paper that the author submitted to the 2011 ICAO Sym-
posium on Regional Safety Oversight Organisations. See: Mikołaj Ratajczyk, 'Features and 
Evolution of Regional Safety Oversight Organisations: Comparative Analysis', ICAO Symposium 
on Regional Safety Oversight Organizations (Montréal, 2011),  
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Delegating the exercise of State safety functions can be far reaching, and 
indeed, as was demonstrated in Section 3.6 of Chapter 3, there is on example 
today, the ECCAA, where almost all safety functions have been delegated by 
Member States to a regional body, which has de facto and de lege become a single 
civil aviation authority for all of them. However such far reaching delegations still 
remain exceptional. 
In the same way that there is no single template for establishing a RASO 
(see Section 5.4.1), the delegation of State safety functions does not follow a sin-
gle model and can take place at many levels. The analysis of the different regional 
bodies shows that this applies both to: (1) the depth of delegation, and (2) legal 
methods of delegation.  
As far as the depth of delegation is concerned, or the extent to which a 
given function is delegated to a RASO or pre-RASO, three levels of delegations 
can be identified: 
 
(1) Level 1 (Coordination level): At the basic level, States may decide to dele-
gate specific competences to individuals not employed by their national 
civil aviation authorities. Such authorisations then give the underlying au-
thority to inspectors of a regional body to perform audits, inspections and 
other oversight or investigative work on behalf of the national authority 
which gave the authorisation. The authorisations given may entailthe right 
to enter the premises of the regulated organisation and to review and in-
spect its documentation and facilities. 
In such cases, although an inspector is employed by a RASO/pre-
RASO, he or she will be working under the regulatory authority f he host 
State. This is for example the case with the AFCAC AFI-CIS, as w
demonstrated under Section 3.4.1.2 of Chapter 3, or some services provid-
ed by PASO3 and COSCAP projects.4 
Under this type of delegation, the beneficiary or host State contin-
ues to remain responsible for the issuance of certificates or other approvals 
on the basis of the technical work conducted by the inspectors of the re-
gional body.  
Current State practice indicates that, in addition to envisaging the 
possibility of such delegation/authorisation in the RASO/pre-RASO 
founding document, enabling State legislation may be also necessary to 
give authorisations the necessary legal value in domestic legal orders f 
host States. For example under the AFI-CIS programme, the State receiv-
ing services of the regional inspectors will be obliged to issue them cre-
dentials in accordance with a national civil aviation act.5 
                                                 
3 PASO inspectors, when carrying out their duties on behalf of a PASO Member State, are deemed 
to be officers of the civil aviation administration f that State, and have rights, privileges and re-
sponsibilities no less favourable than those granted to civil aviation officers of that State. See: 
'PICASST', supra note 81 in Ch.3, Article 8(2). 
4 See for example: ‘Model bilateral agreement between COSCAP South Asia and States for 
obtaining Services of Technical Experts from COSCAP South Asia to perform Safety Oversight 
functions’, supra note 15 in Ch.3. 
5 See Appendix 5 ‘Sample AFCAC AFI-CIS Inspector Credentials’ to the AFI-CIS MoU, supra 
note 39 in Ch.3, which provides that: ’The Director General of the [host State] Civil Aviation Au-
thority hereby delegates, in accordance with Article XX of the Civil Aviation Act and paragraph 4 
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(2) Level 2 (Harmonisation level): The next level, which goes beyond authori-
sation of individuals only, is a delegation to a RASO/pre-RASO, as an or-
ganisation, of the competence to perform specific technical work on behalf 
of its Member States or member authorities. In other words, this type of 
delegation means that a regional body will perform the technical findings, 
such as inspections, tests, examinations, on behalf of all or selected Mem-
ber States/aviation authorities, and then submit the results, together with 
recommendations, for further legal action at the national level(s). 
One of the most prominent examples of a regional body using this 
type of delegation has been the European JAA (see Section 3.4.2 of Chap-
ter 3), and its multinational aircraft type certification procedures.6 Another 
example of this type of delegation is the process envisaged by the 
AAMAC States in Africa (see Section 3.4.3.1 of Chapter 3) for the over-
sight of ANSPs, and in particular ASECNA.7 
Under this option, States remain legally responsible under their na-
tional legislation for the issuance of a certificate or other type of approval. 
So whilst from a technical point of view, Level 2 delegations provide for 
efficiencies by virtue of centralisation of technical work, aviation organisa-
tions are still holders of multiple approvals and have to meet legal obliga-
tions towards multiple civil aviation authorities. 
 
(3) Level 3 (Unification level): Finally States may want to delegate to a re-
gional body both the conduct of the technical work, and responsibility for 
the issuance of the certificate/approval confirming that the applicable re-
quirements have been met. Under this option efficiencies are potentially 
most significant, because it effectively results in centralisation of a given 
safety function at regional level. There is only one technical process and 
one approval issued at its end. From the perspective of the aviation indus-
try this is a one-stop-shop for obtaining the approvals that they need to 
provide services on the market. 
The most prominent example of a RASO using this type of delega-
tion is EASA in Europe which was addressed in Chapter 4. In 2014 EASA 
was carrying out the functions and tasks of the State of design, ma ufac-
ture or registry when related to design approval on behalf of 32 European 
States, including the competence to perform the technical investigations, 
as well as to issue type certificates and other aircraft design related ap-
provals. As was demonstrated in the preceding chapter, EASA also has the 
competence to issue legally binding ADs, as well as to approve certain or-
ganisations both in the EU and non-EU countries. It conducts srveillance 
                                                                                                                            
of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed betwe n the [host State] and the African 
Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) on [Date], to the holder of this credential ….’ 
6 JAA would conduct only one technical investigation t  establish compliance of an aircraft design 
with the applicable certification basis. Upon completion of the work, JAA would submit technical 
recommendations to its member authorities which remained responsible for the issuance of a type 
certificate, and were also free to add additional technical requirements. For more details see Sec-
tion 3.4.2 of Chapter 3. 
7 AAMAC is responsible for the ‘conduct for the benefit of the Parties, of the technical tasks of 
certification and surveillance of ASECNA and other providers of air navigation services ... and to 
provide recommendations for the issuance and follow-up by the Parties of corresponding certifi-
cates.’ See: 'AAMAC Treaty', supra note 62 in Ch.3, Article 6(d). 
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of approved organisations and can suspend or revoke certificates if their 
holders are no longer complying with the applicable legislation. Another 
organisation with similar competences is the IAC (see Section 3.4.3.  of 
Chapter 3). 
ECCAA is a specific case of a regional body which combines Level 
1 and 3 delegations. This is because, although it is a RASO, it is fully em-
powered to perform the functions of national civil aviation authori ies of 
all its Member States. This is reflected in the civil aviation legislations of 
ECCAA Member States, which essentially treat it as a national authority 
and grant to its inspectors the authorisations and powers as if they were na-
tional inspectors of each of the States concerned. The main difference be-
tween ECCAA and organisations like EASA or IAC is therefore not the 
depth of the delegation but its breadth which will be addressed in subse-
quent paragraphs – while EASA and IAC carry out only certain safety 
functions on behalf of their Member States, ECCAA carries out almost all 
of these functions, thus effectively becoming a civil aviation authority for 
all its Member States. 
 
Level 3 delegations currently remain the most important criteria distin-
guishing the different types of RASOs, as in the internal legal orders of the Mem-
ber States they shift responsibility for the issuance of certificate / pproval or con-
duct of accident investigation from national to regional level. At the same time it 
is important to underline, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, that from the per-
spective of the Chicago Convention, States remain ultimately responsible for the 
carrying out of these safety functions even when Level 3 delegations are u ed. 
The majority of the RASOs from the core sample selected for the purpose 
of this study enjoy Level 1 or 2 delegations and provide mainly advisory and sup-
port services to their Member States not resulting in binding legal effects. At the 
beginning of 2014 there were only three organisations with delegation actually 
granted at Level 3 (EASA, IAC and ECCAA). In addition two organis tions had 
the necessary mandate to agree Level 3 delegations with their Member States on  
bilateral basis (BAGASO and BAGAIA). 
Both the type of a safety function to be delegated and local circumstance  
have to be taken into account when taking a decision about the level of delegation 
to be used. For example, while centralisation of aircraft certification may ake 
perfect sense for regions with aeronautical production activities, it may make little 
sense for small States with limited aeronautical activity. Some functions, such as 
pilot licensing, may be, because of their local nature, better suited to remain at the 
national level, unless a single regional aviation authority, such as t e ECCAA, is 
envisaged. In such cases the establishment of RASO local offices may be a good 
solution to ensure the proximity of the service to the applicants. Alternatively, a 
regional body may be empowered to outsource some of the technical work back to 
the national authorities, especially for smaller projects, where local proximity and 
language issues may play a role.8 Table V gives an overview of the levels of dele-
gation used by some of the RASOs studied. 
                                                 
8 In the EU, the EASA is entitled, through a tendering process, to outsource the technical work it is 
doing to national aviation authorities or ‘qualified ntities’ (essentially commercial entities), if they 
meet specific safety and quality criteria which is confirmed through an accreditation process. In 
such cases the EASA continues however to be responsible for the issuance of the certificate / ap-
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As far as the method of the delegation is concerned, States use various le-
gal tools and combinations thereof.  For Level 3 delegations a legally binding in-
ternational agreement or an equivalent supranational regulation is needed, as it 
entails the shift of legal responsibility from national to regional level, and in the 
case of a safety function provided for by the Chicago Convention also results in a 
relationship of international agency between the RASO and its Member States 
(see Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4). All Level 3 RASOs that were in operation in 
2014 were based on such legally binding agreements or regulations. This means 
that in order to use Level 3 delegation a RASO will have to be set up as either an 
International Regional Aviation Safety Organisation (RASO Type I) or Suprana-
tional Aviation Safety Agency (RASO Type II), from the perspective of the typol-
ogy proposed in Chapter 3.  
With the exception of EASA in the EU, whose founding regulation is part 
of the domestic legal orders of the EU Member States, there may also be a need 
for implementing national legislation to make the Level 3 delegation effective 
(ECCAA, IAC).9 
Table V: Level of delegation of State safety functions to selected RASOs 
RASO Level of delegation 
Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority 
Level 3 and Level 1 (acting as unique 
authority for all the Member States 
European Aviation Safety Agency Level 3 
Interstate Aviation Committee 
Level 3 (on the basis of a bilateral ar-
rangement) 
Banjul Accord Group Aviation Safety 
Oversight Organisation 
Level 2 (Level 3 on the basis of a bilat-
eral arrangement) 
Banjul Accord Group Accident Investiga-
tion Agency 
Level 2 (Level 3 on the basis of a bilat-
eral arrangement) 
East African Community Civil Aviation 
Safety and Security Oversight Agency 
Level 2 
Les Autorités Africaines et Malgache de 
l’Aviation Civile 
Level 2 
Pacific Aviation Safety Office Level 1 or Level 2 
 
Some RASOs, such as IAC, BAGAIA and BAGASO, have their Level 3 
delegations made conditional upon conclusion of additional bilteral agreements. 
This may result in a patchwork of delegations, making it much more difficult to 
achieve a homogenous regional system. States may also establish specific cond -
                                                                                                                            
proval. See: EASA, 'Guidelines for the allocation of certification tasks to National Aviation 
Authorities and Qualified Entities', (Decision of the EASA Management Board No 01-2011). 
9 Non-EU European countries which participate in the work of EASA on the basis of Article 66 
agreements may also need to enact implementing legislation (See Section 4.5 of Chapter 4). 
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tions under which Level 3 delegation would take place,10 or give States the possi-
bility of opting into a Level 3 delegation if they consider it useful for them.11 
For Level 2 delegations, a legally binding legal framework can be used as 
well, but is not absolutely necessary. This means that a Pre-RASO Type II will be 
sufficient to enable this type of delegation. The JAA for example was based on a 
non-binding multilateral arrangement concluded at the authority level, but never-
theless managed to successfully conduct its technical work for many years. The 
weak point of this solution is lack of a legal obligation o the part of Member 
States to recognise the validity of the recommendations and findings made by the 
regional body. The States also need to continue to issue multiple certificates, even 
if the technical work is centralised. In the EU these drawbacks were important 
reasons behind the establishment of EASA and dissolution of the JAA, as was 
explained in Chapter 4. International agreement, on the other hand, although 
providing for delegation of technical work only, may oblige States to give uniform 
legal value to the work of a RASO and from this perspective is a better solution to 
ensure uniformity, as is the case for instance under the AAMAC Treaty, which 
was addressed under Section 3.4.3.1 of Chapter 3.  
Finally in the case of Level 1 delegations, that is authorisations of individ-
ual inspectors, a combination of a RASO/pre-RASO founding document and na-
tional legislation will be necessary. The founding document does not necessarily 
have to be a binding international agreement, as is the case with the AFCAC AFI-
CIS MoU, but there is nothing which prevents States from using this type of in-
strument, especially if functions other than sharing of inspectors are envisaged as 
well, as is the case for instance with PASO. The use of national law will also be 
necessary, because otherwise the authorisations of the regional inspectors per-
forming tasks for the national authority will not be valid in the national legal sys-
tems. 
In addition to the depth and the method of delegation, the breadth of the 
delegation can also be distinguished. This can be looked at from two perspectives: 
(1) the subject matter of the delegation, and the (2) type of the function: 
 
(1) Concerning the subject matter, States need to decide in which domains of 
civil aviation they intend to empower the regional body. This means do-
mains such as airworthiness, flight operations, personnel licensing, aero-
dromes, ATM, accident investigation, or even aviation security. The level 
of delegations, that is 1, 2 or 3, does not necessarily have to b  the same 
for each of the domains. Also, the competence of the regional body may be 
extended over time, as was the case for example with EASA. 
 
                                                 
10 In the EU, the ANSPs are, par default, under the regulatory responsibility of the national authori-
ties. However, under EU law, in case of organisations providing such services on a pan-European 
basis, the competent authority is EASA. See: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in 
Ch.2, Article 22a(c). 
11 In the EU production organisations are, par default, under the responsibility of national authori-
ties. However this responsibility may be transferred to EASA on a voluntary basis. This has been 
the case with the Airbus company which is a multinational consortium involving France, Germany, 
United Kingdom and Spain. In this case, the States concerned requested EASA to take over the 
regulatory competence. As a result, a single production organisation approval has been issued by 
EASA and covers all facilities of Airbus located in the EU and also abroad, such as in China. 
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(2) As far as the type of the function is concerned, the crucial observation that 
emerges from the analysis of the available material is that none of the f ur-
teen organisations from the core sample enjoy legislative functions. This 
shows that States essentially treat RASOs as technical agencies impl -
menting and enforcing the law but not creating it. This is an appro ch dif-
ferent from that under traditional national set-ups, where aviation authori-
ties may have a competence to enact legally binding rules of general appli-
cation.12 Even EASA in the EU, or ECCAA in the Pacific, does not enjoy 
legislative competences. 
The lack of legislative competences of RASOs also stems from the 
fact that States, as a matter of principle, very rarely vest international or-
ganisations with competence to adopt decisions or regulations which are 
legally binding for individuals.13 In those limited cases where they do del-
egate legislative competences, such as in the EU, this is done within the 
framework of a REIO with appropriate checks and balances put in place, 
such as a regional parliament and judicial control of the RASO decisions, 
if Level 3 delegations have been used. In the case of EASA in the EU and 
ECCAA in the OECS - the only two RASOs which operate within a 
framework of supranational organisations with legislative powers – the 
technical proposals developed by these RASOs have first to be submitted 
to supranational legislators, that is the European Commission, C uncil and 
European Parliament in the EU, and the OECS Authority and Assembly in 
the OECS, for adoption.14 
 
In the case of RSOOs, when executive competences are transferred, such 
as the power to deliver certificates, States should ensure the possibility of inde-
pendent judicial review of RSOO decisions. The applicants, in case they have 
been denied rights, should have the possibility of challenging the decision, simi-
larly to the rights that they would enjoy under a traditional natio al system.15 
Finally, regardless of the level, method or breadth of the delegation, the 
fundamental issue that must be ensured by States when setting up a RASO/pre-
RASO, is to clearly delineate the boundaries of responsibility between the region-
al body and the national authorities. There should be no overlap of competences 
or regulatory loopholes, as this can result in unintended consequences or even 
                                                 
12 This is the case for example in the US where the FAA Administrator has an authority to issue 
regulations. See: 49 USC, Subtitle I, Paragraph 106 at: US House of Representatives, 'US Code'  
<http://uscode.house.gov/browse.xhtml> [accessed 3 April 2014]. 
13 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at pp. 831-832 
14 When in the mid-1990s the EU debated the possibility of establishing EASA on the basis of a 
self-standing international treaty, some of the EU Member States argued that direct applicability of 
rules adopted outside the EU framework would require a change of their constitutions and possibly 
also a referendum. As a result the idea of setting up EASA in the form of an international organisa-
tion with legislative powers was abandoned (See Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4). 
15 In the EU the decisions of EASA, if challenged, are reviewed first by an internal appeal body 
within the Agency, and then if needed also by the CJEU (See: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, 
supra note 81 in Ch.2, Articles 44-51). In the OECS, the decisions of ECCAA can be subject to an 
appeal in front of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (see: 'Civil Aviation Act of Grenada', 
supra note 244 in Ch.3, at Section 39; 'Civil Aviation Regulations of Grenada', supra note 244 in 
Ch.3, at Section 92). 
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non-compliances with the international safety requirements of ICAO, as will be 
demonstrated under Section 5.4.5 below. 
5.3 THE FUNCTIONS OF RASOs: SETTING UP A RASO USING A 
‘TOOL BOX’ APPROACH 
The purpose of this section is to present, using practical experienc  of various 
RASOs/pre-RASOs,16 concrete examples of the safety functions or tasks that 
these organisations can perform to the benefit of their Member States and the 
aviation industry. 
The information in this section has been structured along the ICAO eight 
CEs of State safety oversight, which is an internationally recognised method for 
discussing safety oversight in civil aviation. It should however not be considered 
as an exhaustive list of all regional safety functions but as an illustration based on 
selected examples. 
Where relevant, the different types of potential RASO/pre-RASO func-
tions are presented taking into account the three levels of delegation as proposed 
in the preceding section. Attention is also drawn to the specific points which 
should be given particular consideration from a legal and organisatio al point of 
view, and which are based on experience from real life implementation. 
The intention of this section is to serve as a ‘tool-box’, which together with 
the typology of RASOs/pre-RASOs proposed in Chapter 3, the three levels of 
delegations developed under the preceding section, and the already existing ICAO 
RSOO and RAIO manuals could be used by States for setting up RASO/pre-
RASO type bodies. In this respect, as pointed out by ICAO:  
 
It is important that States wishing to establish an RSOO commit themselves, at the very 
beginning of the process, to a strategy that is well defined in terms of the intended pur-
pose and objectives of the organization they wish to establish. The strategy should there-
fore include a comprehensive analysis of the needs of the States involved.17 
 
The table below should help States when making such a determination, by provid-
ing them with a menu of potential options from which they could choose, taking 
into account that they should normally focus on ‘those activities that demonstrate 
a higher impact on regional safety oversight and contribute towards developing an 
effective aviation safety oversight framework.’18 Such determination will neces-
sarily involve taking into account the local circumstances and specific needs of 





                                                 
16 This section is primarily based on the analysis of material from three RASO conferences, two of 
which the author attended as a speaker: ICAO RSOO Symposium (2011), supra note 2 in Ch.3; 
ICAO/AFCAC/EASA, 'Symposium on regional civil aviation agencies', (Livingstone, Zambia, 
2009); ACAC/ICAO, 'Seminar/Workshop on Regional Safety Oversight Programmes', (Rabat, 
Morocco, 2012). 
17 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.2.1. 
18 Ibid. at Paragraph 2.2.3. 
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CE-1. Primary aviation legislation 
 
The provision of a comprehensive and effective aviation law consiste t with the environment and 
complexity of the State’s aviation activity and compliant with the requirements contained in the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
 
Possible types of regional safety functions: Points of attention: 
Level 1/Level 2:   
Harmonised aviation legislation: RASO/pre-RASO 
develops generic legislation for submission to 
States for adoption / transposition (e.g. BA-
GASOO, COSCAPs, SRVSOP, CASSOA and 
JAA); 
- Possibility of filing differences erodes the 
uniformity of the regulatory framework 
and should be avoided. 
- Uniform regulatory framework is a pre-
requisite for enabling region-wide recog-
nition of certificates. 
- RASO/pre-RASO should centrally track 
amendments to SARPs, in order to keep 
the regional regulations ICAO compliant. 
- RASO/pre-RASO should centrally identi-
fy eventual differences with SARPs and 
help States to notify ICAO in a uniform 
manner. 
Level 3:  
Common aviation legislation: Regulations can be 
adopted through a supranational regional mecha-
nism (e.g. REIO) and be directly binding in a uni-
form manner in all the participating States (e.g. 
EU/EASA); 
 
CE-2.  Specific operating regulations 
 
The provision of adequate regulations to address, at a minimum, national requirements emanating 
from the primary aviation legislation and providing for standardized operational procedures, 
equipment and infrastructures (including safety management and tr ining systems), in conform-
ance with the SARPs contained in the Annexes to the Convention o  International Civil Aviation. 
 
Possible types of regional safety functions: Points of attention: 
Level 1/Level 2:   
Harmonised operating regulations: RASO/pre-
RASO develops generic regulations for submission 
to States for adoption / transposition (e.g. BA-
GASOO, COSCAPs, SRVSOP, CASSOA and 
JAA); 
- Possibility of filing differences erodes the 
uniformity of the regulatory the frame-
work and should be avoided. 
- Uniform regulatory framework is a pre-
requisite for enabling region-wide recog-
nition of certificates. 
- RASO/pre-RASO should centrally track 
amendments to SARPs, in order to keep 
the regional regulations ICAO compliant. 
- RASO/pre-RASO should centrally identi-
fy eventual differences with SARPs and 
help States to notify ICAO in a uniform 
manner. 
- A system of ‘hierarchy of texts’ should be 
considered to enable operating regulations 
to be amended more easily than primary 
legislation. 
Level 3:  
Common operating regulations: Operating regula-
tions can be adopted through a supra-national re-
gional mechanism and be directly binding in a 







CE-3.  State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions 
 
The establishment of a Civil Aviation Authority and/or other relevant authorities or government 
agencies, headed by a Chief Executive Officer, supported by the appropriate and adequate tech-
nical and non-technical staff and provided with adequate financial resources. The State authority 
must have stated safety regulatory functions, objectives and afety policies. 
 
Possible types of regional safety functions: Points of attention: 
- Development of a regional safety pro-
gramme/plan (e.g. EASA); 
- Setting up regional aviation safety teams in part-
nership with industry (e.g. EASA, COSCAPs); 
-  Assisting States in preparation for USOAP au-
dits and addressing follow up actions (e.g. BA-
GASOO, COSCAPs, SRVSOP,  PASO); 
- Setting up common examination systems (e.g. 
CASSOA); 
- Setting up a regional centre for aviation medicine 
(e.g. CASSOA); 
- Setting up a regional system for collection and 
analysis of safety information (e.g. EASA); 
- Coordinating replies to ICAO State Letters (e.g. 
EASA, BAGASOO); 
- Separation, at least at the functional level, 
of safety oversight and accident investiga-
tion functions, and service provision from 
regulatory functions; 
- Need to take into account the interdepend-
encies between ICAO State safety func-
tions when transferring the exercise of 
some of them to the regional level (see 
Section 5.4.5 below for illustration); 
- States remain ultimately responsible under 
the Chicago Convention for safety over-
sight (see Chapter 6); 
 
CE-4.  Technical personnel qualifications and training 
 
The establishment of minimum knowledge and experience requirements for the technical personnel 
performing safety oversight functions and the provision of appropriate training to maintain and 
enhance their competence at the desired level. The training should include initial and recurrent 
(periodic) training. 
 
Possible types of regional safety functions: Points of attention: 
- Joint use and sharing of training facilities (e.g. 
BAGASOO); 
- Establishment of a regional inspector training 
programme and training criteria for inspectors 
(e.g. BAGASOO, SRVSOP, ACSA, COSCAP); 
- Common training database and training planning 
and recording system (e.g. BAGASOO, 
SRVSOP); 
- Common inspector training and qualifica-
tions should be a prerequisite for setting 
up a regional inspector sharing scheme, or 
joint surveillance initiatives such as ramp 
inspection programmes (e.g. SAFA in the 
EU); 
 
CE-5.  Technical guidance, tools and provision of safety-critical information  
 
The provision of technical guidance (including processes and procedures), tools (including facili-
ties and equipment) and safety-critical information, as applicable, to the technical personnel to 
enable them to perform their safety oversight functions in accordance with established require-
ments and in a standardized manner. In addition, this includes the provision of technical guidance 





Possible types of regional safety functions: Points of attention: 
- Production of harmonised guidance material, 
handbooks and checklists for safety inspec-
tors (e.g. EASA, SRVSOP, COSCAP, CAS-
SOA); 
- Setting up regional aviation databases of 
aircraft, AOC holders, approved maintenance 
or training organisations (e.g. BAGASOO); 
- Harmonised guidance material is important to 
standardise implementation, which in turn may 
be a pre-requisite for enabling region-wide 
recognition of certificates 
 
CE-6.  Licensing, certification, authorization and/or approval obligations 
 
The implementation of processes and procedures to ensure that personnel and organizations per-
forming an aviation activity meet the established requirements before they are allowed to exercise 
the privileges of a licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval to conduct the relevant avia-
tion activity. 
 
Possible types of regional safety functions: Points of attention: 
Level 1:  
- Regional inspector sharing schemes (e.g. AFI-CIS, 
COSCAPs); 
  
tates need to pay attention to the legal 
status of the RASO/pre-RASO inspectors, 
which may also be coming from a national 
aviation authority, during the conduct of 
safety oversight activity in a Member State. 
Typical issues to be addressed are: legal 
authority, credentials and the liability pro-
tection of the inspectors. 
Level 2: 
- Perform technical tasks of certification on behalf 
of pre-RASO/RASO States (e.g. JAA, AAMAC, 
SRVSOP); 
- Provide certification/surveillance assistance and 
advice to RASO/pre-RASO States (e.g. PASO, 
COSCAPs); 
Level 3:  
- In addition to  performing the technical tasks of 
certification/licensing, RASO can also be  author-
ised to issue the approvals/certificates on behalf of 
RASO States (e.g. EASA, IAC); 
- States can delegate to a RASO all their safety 
oversight functions, effectively creating a regional 
civil aviation authority (e.g. ECCAA); 
 
CE-7.  Surveillance obligations 
 
The implementation of processes, such as inspections and audits, to proactively ensure that avia-
tion licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval holders continue to meet the established 
requirements and function at the level of competency and safety required by the State to undertake 
an aviation-related activity for which they have been licensed, certified, authorized and/or ap-
proved to perform. This includes the surveillance of designated personnel who perform safety 
oversight functions on behalf of the CAA. 
 
Possible types of regional safety functions: Points of attention: 
Level 1:  
Regional inspector sharing schemes (e.g. AFI-CIS, 
 
States need to pay attention to the legal 
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COSCAPs); status of the RASO/pre-RASO inspectors, 
which may also be coming from a national 
aviation authority, during the conduct of 
safety oversight activity in a Member State. 
Typical issues to be addressed are: legal 
authority, credentials and the liability pro-
tection of the inspectors. 
Level 2:  
- Perform technical surveillance tasks on behalf of 
RASO/pre-RASO States (e.g. JAA, AAMAC, 
SRVSOP); 
- Provide safety oversight advice to RASO/pre-
RASO States (e.g. PASO, COSCAPs); 
- Setting up regional ramp inspection programmes 
(e.g. EASA, SRVSOP); 
- Development of regional safety oversight support 
tools/software (e.g. EASA, SRVSOP, ACSA); 
Level 3:  
- In addition to  performing the technical surveil-
lance tasks, RASO can also be  authorised to issue 
the approvals/certificates on behalf of RASO 
States (e.g. EASA, IAC); 
- States can delegate to a RASO all their safety 
oversight functions, effectively creating a regional 
civil aviation authority (e.g. ECCAA) 
 
CE-8.  Resolution of safety concerns 
 
The implementation of processes and procedures to resolve identified deficiencies impacting avia-
tion safety, which may have been residing in the aviation system and have been detected by the 
regulatory authority or other appropriate bodies. 
 
Possible types of regional safety functions: Points of attention: 
Level 1/Level 2: 
- Advise and make recommendations to States on 
actions to be taken in the event that a license or 
certificate holder fails to correct deficiencies 
within specified deadlines (e.g. COSCAP,  
PASO); 
 
In the absence of a harmonised or common 
regulatory framework RASO/pre-RASO 
inspectors may need to be familiar with the 
enforcement procedures and means of each 
of the Member States. 
Level 3:  
- States may want to delegate to a RASO the au-
thority to take enforcement action. This will be 
necessary in particular where a RASO is empow-
ered to take legally binding certification decisions 
(e.g. EASA, IAC); 
- The RASO may also rely on the enforcement 
competences already vested in a supranational 
regional organisation (e.g. EASA/EU); 
- Where States set up a regional civil aviation au-
thority, the RASO will take over enforcement 
competences normally exercised by the national 





5.4 MAIN TRENDS IN RASO FUNCTIONING AND EVOLUTION 
 
5.4.1 THERE IS NO ‘ONE SIZE FITS ALL’ APPROACH TO RASO 
ESTABLISHMENT 
The first conclusion that can be reached as regards the overall trends in the estab-
lishment of regional aviation safety bodies is that there is no ingle template that 
States use in this respect. Although RASOs/pre-RASOs can be classified into cer-
tain general types as proposed in Chapter 3, overall the legal and organisational 
frameworks of these organisations are far from being uniform. 
This diversity results in the first place from the fact that the needs of States 
differ in terms of strengthening their safety oversight and accident investigation 
capabilities, as well as providing efficiencies for the industry. As a result the RA-
SO/pre-RASO has to be tailored to the circumstances of a particular sit ation. For 
example, if there is little aeronautical manufacturing industry in a region, it may 
make little sense for the States to use their limited resources on tablishing an 
expensive type-certifying agency, and instead to focus on a RSOO which would 
help them in the oversight of airlines and AMOs. 
The solutions chosen by States when setting up a RASO/pre-RASO do not 
depend on safety considerations alone. Regulating aviation can be a highly politi-
cal issue, as it is often associated with national sovereignty and strategic inter-
ests.19 So although from a purely technical point of view a solution calling for a 
safety agency with legal personality and strong executive powers could have a lot 
of advantages, this may not always be possible because of lack of political will. 
This reluctance of States to delegate the exercise of competences to an external 
body is an issue which is brought up quite often by RASOs as an example of prac-
tical problems they experience – the 2011 ICAO symposium on RSOOs identified 
the ‘presence of strong sovereignty issues that could impede regional cooperation’ 
as one of the obstacles to RSOO establishment.20 As a result, where a RASO has a 
mandate to act on behalf of its Member States, in the majority of cases today this 
is dependent on an additional bilateral arrangement (BAGASOO, BAGAI , or 
IAC). Only EASA and the ECCAA have general mandates to act on behalf of 
their Member States.  
RASOs or regional civil aviation safety cooperation schemes more gener-
ally also have a clear tendency to evolve over time, as Section 5.4.2 below will 
demonstrate. Thus an organisation which today has legal personality a d exercises 
safety related competences on behalf of Member States, yesterday could have 
been only an informal network of civil aviation safety regulators. This evolution 
has to be taken into account when comparing different organisation  at a given 
moment in time. 
Most of the RASOs which were reviewed for the purpose of this study 
deal only with aviation safety issues. However some of them, in addition to avia-
tion safety, also deal with aviation security, as is the case for instance with PASO, 
ECCAA and CASSOA. 
Finally, so far RASOs have not replaced the national authorities but sup-
plement them. In 2014 there was only one example of a RCAA common for all its 
Member States, namely the ECCAA. 
                                                 
19 Erwin von den Steinen, National interest and international aviation, (2006), pp. 1-25. 
20 Outcomes of 2011 RSOO Symposium (C-WP/13810), supra note 4 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.3.1.  
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5.4.2 RASOs TEND TO EVOLVE INTO ‘INSTITUTIONALISED’ 
STRUCTURES 
The concept of a regional aviation safety body is not new, with JAA dating back 
to the 1970s or IAC to 1991. However, the last twelve years can be seen as real 
boom years for these organisations, especially on the African continent wh re five 
of them have been established between 2008 and 2014 (BAGASOO and BAGAIA 
in 2009, CASSOA in 2007/2008, AAMAC in 2009, and ASSA-AC in 2012). 
Overall, nine organisations have been established in the last twelve y ars 
(2003-2014), as table VI demonstrates. Even taking into account that some of 
them evolved from other organisations, this still means that six were established 
after 2004 (ENCASIA, BAGASOO, BAGAIA, CASSOA, PASO, and ASSA-
AC). Overall RASOs/pre-RASOs in existence today are therefore still relatively 
young organisations. 
In addition, in 2014 a number of additional RASO type bodies w re 
planned by States and ICAO. In particular six additional RASOs - two RSOOs 
and four RAIOs – were planned for the African region,21 and at least one RSOO 
and one RAIO were being considered for the States of the ACAC.22 There were 
also discussions about a RAIO for Latin America.23 
Although the institutional frameworks and legal basis of RASOs/pre-
RASOs are very varied, it is clear that there is a strong tendency for these organi-
sations to evolve over time into more formal entities. This is epecially true for the 
young organisations. Of the nine RASOs/pre-RASOs established ince 2003, six 
have already undergone an evolution from a less formal into a more formal st uc-
ture (Table VI).  
Some of these organisations, such as CASSOA, are considering further 
evolution in the future. ICAO also supports and encourages the transition of 
COSCAPs into RASO type bodies, although this process is till ongoing, as was 
demonstrated in Section 3.4.1.1 of Chapter 3 
Identified examples of the types of evolutions involve: moving from a 
technical cooperation project (Pre-RASO Type I) into an international regional 
safety organisation with legal personality (RASO Type I), which was the case for 
BAGASOO or ASSA-AC; or a network of aviation safety authorities (pre-RASO 
Type II) evolving into an international regional safety organisation with legal per-
sonality (RASO Type I), which was the case for AAMAC. Older organis tions 
demonstrate similar patterns of evolution – for example the JAA (pre-RASO Type 
II) evolving into EASA (RASO Type II) in Europe. 
States establishing RASOs/pre-RASOs generally seem to consider it nec-
essary, or at least useful, for these organisations to have some form of legal per-
sonality. In the case of pre-RASOs, a useful way of granting legal personality is to 
establish an association or foundation under the law of one of the Member States. 
Out of the fourteen organisations from the core sample, four were established, at a 
certain point in time, as an association or foundation under private law or evolved 
from such an association or foundation (JAA/EASA, AAMAC, EUROCON-
TROL, and Caribbean Aviation Safety and Security Oversight System (CAS-
                                                 
21 AFI Plan Steering Committee Report, AFI SC/2013/12, supra note 3 in Ch.2, at Appendix B. 
22 ACAC/ICAO seminar on regional safety oversight programmes (2012), supra note 16, at 
'Summary of Conclusions'. 
23 A38-WP/232, supra note 193 in Ch.3. 
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SOS)/Association of Civil Aviation Authorities of the Caribbean (ACAAC)). In 
2014, at least eleven organisations studied had some sort of legal personality.24 
Table VI: RASOs /pre-RASOs established since 2003 and their p edecessors 
Name of the organisation Predecessor organisation (if any) 
European Network of Civil Aviation Safety 
Investigation Authorities (2010/2011) 
Council of European Air Safety Investigation 
Authorities (2008) 
Banjul Accord Group Aviation Safety Oversight 
Organisation (2009) 
COSCAP - BAG (2004) 
Banjul Accord Group Accident Investigation 
Agency (2009) 
none 
East African Community Civil Aviation Safety 
and Security Oversight Agency (2007/2008) 
none 
Les Autorités Africaines et Malgache de 
l’Aviation Civile – international organisation 
(2009) 
Les Autorités Africaines et Malgache de 
l’Aviation Civile – association of regulators 
(2001) 
Pacific Aviation Safety Office (2004/2005) none 
Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority 
(2003/2004) 
Directorate of Civil Aviation - Eastern Caribbe-
an States (1957) 
Caribbean Aviation Safety and Security Over-
sight System (2008) 
Regional Aviation Safety Oversight System of 
the Caribbean (2001) 
Agence de Supervision de la Sécurité Aérienne 
en Afrique Centrale (2012) 
COSCAP-CEMAC (2008) 
 
ICAO supports the transition of less formalised RASOs or pre-RASOs, to 
more institutionalised regional safety bodies established on the basis of formal 
legal agreements. According to ICAO, the more formalised types gain better 
commitment from their Member States, enable better delegation of tasks and func-
tions and provide better for sustainability.25 
5.4.3 EFFICIENCIES STEMMING FROM A RASO SHOULD NOT BE 
TAKEN FOR GRANTED 
The primary purpose of this study is not to quantify the efficin ies gained by 
States as a result of the establishment of a RASO, but to identify the legal and 
institutional features of RASOs which make these organisations more efficient 
and allow them to best contribute to the improvement of aviation safety and uni-
formity of regulations and procedures in civil aviation. Nevertheless, based on a 
review of experiences involved in establishment and functioning of these organi-
sations, some general observations can also be formulated in respect of th ir ver-
all effectiveness. 
As explained in Chapter 2, the main reason behind the current RASO 
boom is the strong conviction of the international aviation community that these 
organisations provide a good way of addressing the difficulties experienced by 
States, in particular those with weak safety oversight systems. RASOs are in par-
                                                 
24 For a more detailed overview of the question of RASO legal personality see Chapter 6. 
25 ICAO Doc. 9946, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Forward. 
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ticular supposed to enable more efficient use of limited resources and be i  a bet-
ter position than national aviation authorities to attract and retain qualified avia-
tion personnel. 
Yet, the real life experiences of some of the RASOs and their Member 
States indicate that such efficiencies and benefits should not be taken for granted. 
As was demonstrated above, in the vast majority of cases a regional organisation 
does not replace the national authorities. This means that States m y have to fi-
nance a regional body in addition to their national aviation authorities. There may 
even be a need to create new functions, which did not exist before the RASO es-
tablishment, such as a regional inspection-standardisation scheme. Where a re-
gional body has not completely taken over at least some of the safetyfunc ions 
from States, both the RASO and the national authorities may be competing to at-
tract similar safety experts from the market. 
A technical and legal review of PASO conducted by external auditors in 
2007 concluded that:  
 
It should not be assumed that the engagement of PASO’s services will result in a reduc-
tion in the resources required by the States. On review of some States’ responses to 
USOAP audit findings it was noted that this assumption formed the basis of many of the 
individual finding responses. There could actually be significant additional resource im-
plications for each of the States in order to achieve the improved safety and security out-
comes intended to be achieved.26 
 
Similarly, a study conducted by the European Parliament (EP) in 2012 on 
the impact of the establishment of EASA on the EU’s and national budgets, offers, 
somewhat surprisingly, the following observation:  
 
[T]he centralisation of tasks impacted the national budget in different ways according to 
the nature of the transferred task. The expected effect of shifting both the responsibility 
and the execution of some tasks is usually a budget reduction. However, …, all in all, the 
impact of the task transfer at national level has been toward an increase in budget pressure 
with very few exceptions.27  
 
The EP study further clarifies that this has been in particular due to th  fact 
that ‘[t]o comply with the new standard defined by EU regulations …, some 
Member States had to invest more in the area of aviation safety.’28 This is a simi-
lar observation to that which was formulated in respect to PASO. 
The above indicates that if the additional costs resulting from establish-
ment of a RASO are not offset by efficiencies stemming from its operations, or 
additional revenues, States may actually be worse off in terms of their overall 
budgets. If States cannot reduce their costs, whilst at the sam time they will need 
to contribute to the financing of a RASO, this may actually lead to lack of sustain-
able funding of the latter and putting in danger its operations. Thi  has been the 
case for example with PASO, which experienced serious financial difficult es due 
to the lack of contributions from its Member States, as was presented in Section 
3.4.3.2 of Chapter 3. Similarly CASSOA reported in 2012 that te lack of a sus-
                                                 
26 PASO Legal and Technical Review Report, supra note 86 in Ch.3, at p. 70. 
27 The impact on the EU and national budgets of EU agencies, supra note 125 in Ch.4, at p. 75. 
28 Ibid. at p. 76. 
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tainable funding mechanism was affecting its ability to ‘execute the planned activ-
ities and recruitment and retention of technical personnel’.29 
The above can be especially true for RASOs which depend on donor sup-
port for functioning. As pointed out in 2011 by a representative of the U.S. De-
partment for Transport responsible for the ‘Safe Skies for Africa’ programme: 
‘RSOOs can be a solution, but much remains to be done to prove that the regional 
oversight model provides value for donor expenditures and sustainable results for 
the regions and States that wish to implement them.’30  
An interview conducted with an official of BAGASOO characterises the 
problems of African RASOs in the following way: 
 
The main challenge facing RSOOs is financing. In most cases it is contributions from 
States, yet this contribution is left to CAAs to pay. For RSOO to attract and retain quali-
fied, skilled personnel, the remuneration must be significantly higher than that of CAAs, 
otherwise it would be better to work in the CAA as there, the job is more guaranteed. To 
the extent that the CAAs are the ones paying the contributions directly to sustain the 
RSOOs ... that puts RSOOs and its Member States in competition for limited resources.31 
 
A similar opinion was expressed by ECCAA, which is, from an organisa-
tional point of view, a very efficient form of RASO: 
 
The main challenges facing the ECCAA are managing the increasing costs of providing 
effective oversight and the recruitment of qualified personnel.32 
 
Due to the above, this study recommends that RASOs should be vested, to 
the largest extent possible, with the competence to exercise safetyfunc ions on 
behalf of States. Only this solution guarantees lack of duplication between the 
national and regional levels and the desired economies of scale. As pointed ut by 
ICAO: 
 
[T]he major benefits of establishing an RSOO can be achieved only if the RSOO is ena-
bled to act on behalf of Member States, to the highest possible extent, and if States main-
tain supervisory control so that the RSOO can succeed in enabling them to effectively 
meet their international obligations.33 
 
Strong delegation arrangements are also preferable from a legal point of 
view, because they are more likely than informal arrangements to ensure uni-
formity of standards and operating procedures required by the Chicago Conven-
tion. Where States just endeavour to harmonise their regulations and procedures 
this will most likely result in national differences and will subsequently make 
standardisation and cross border recognition of certificates and approv ls more 
                                                 
29 Regional cooperation for the enhancement of safety oversight: obstacles and lessons learnt, 
supra note 155 in Ch.3. 
30 Cornelia Wilson-Hunter, 'Remarks', ICAO Symposium on Regional Aviation Safety 
Organisations 2011),  
31 'Interview No 6', (2014), supra note 133 in Ch.3. 
32 'Interview No 7', (2014), supra note 232 in Ch.3. 
33 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 4.1.35. 
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difficult. This problem was demonstrated in the case of EASA and its predecessor, 
the JAA, in Chapter 4. 
Another reason why regional safety bodies may not provide the desire  
benefits can be due to duplication between different aviation safety improvement 
initiatives. For example in Africa some States have multiple memberships in 
COSCAPs and RASOs, and additional RASO projects are planned which involve 
overlapping membership, as was demonstrated in Section 3.4.1.1 of Chapter 3. 
This situation, instead of focusing limited resources spreads them further amongst 
a number of similar initiatives. In mid-2013 several African States which had been 
members of RASOs for some years, were also subject to review by ICAO’s Moni-
toring and Assistance Review Board (MARB) which is a body set up to consider 
the situation in States experiencing serious safety oversight problems.34 As admit-
ted by AFCAC, this very fact means that ‘these regional bodies are not yet as ef-
fective as they could be.’35 
Duplication of structures and inefficiencies resulting from this fact are also 
evident in Europe, where multiple regional aviation organisations exist in parallel, 
most of them with overlapping membership, and to a certain extent ma dates, as 
was demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
The above does not mean however that delegation should be considered as 
the ultimate panacea, and used by States without prior assessment as to where this 
would yield maximum benefits. Such assessment is always necessary and its re-
sult should primarily depend on a particular situation of States in a given region. 
As pointed out by an official of BAGASOO: ‘RSOO should identify and concen-
trate its efforts on those activities that are better handled at a regional level.’36 
This has been the case in Europe, where due to the presence of a large eronauti-
cal manufacturing industry, the main impetus behind the establishment of EASA 
has been the regionalisation of certification and oversight functions incumbent 
upon a ‘State of Design’, as was demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
5.4.4 IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES FOR THE 
FUNCTIONING OF RASOs 
Legal issues, while important in their own right, generally prove not to be an ob-
stacle in the process of establishing a RASO/pre-RASO. At the samtime it is 
crucial that, when States consider establishing such an organisatio , or undertake 
its evolution, they fully understand the consequences of their legal and institution-
al choices. 
Reaching such an understanding can be greatly assisted by organising the 
whole process of establishing a regional body in a structured way. The tool-box 
approach proposed under Section 5.3 above could help to achieve the most appro-
priate combination, given the specific needs of States. A similar appro ch was 
used in the EU during the initial EASA establishment process, in which States 
first created a list of potential functions and tasks, such as rulemaking, certifica-
                                                 
34 In march 2013 these were: Benin, Cameroon, Central Af ican Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauretania (Member States of 
AAMAC); Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone (Member States of BAGASOO); and Rwanda (Member 
State of CASSOA). See: ICAO, 'ICAO plans of action f r States under the review of the MARB', 
AFI Plan-SC/2013/11-DP/02, (11th AFI Plan Steering Committee, 2013). 
35 A37-WP/166, supra note 220 in Ch.2, at Paragraph 2.2. 
36 'Interview No 6', (2014), supra note 133 in Ch.3. 
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tion, standardisation, and then considered the implications of the different institu-
tional solutions on each of them.37 
In terms of legal tools used to establish a RASO, the tendency that can be 
observed is that States are inclined, more and more often, to use legally binding 
instruments - mainly international agreements. This can be associated with the 
overall tendency of the regional safety bodies to evolve into more formal struc-
tures, as was demonstrated under Section 5.4.2 above.  
As a consequence of the trend to use legally binding instruments, organisa-
tions based on MoUs, working arrangements or private law associations have al-
most completely disappeared. In 2014 only one of the fourteen orga isations from 
the core sample was based on a non-binding legal instrument, namely the 
SRVSOP, as opposed to six in the previous decade.38 Non-binding instruments 
continue to be used for specific cooperation projects such as regional inspector 
schemes. Table VII gives an overview of the legal instruments which were used to 
establish the presently functioning RASOs/pre-RASOs. 
Table VII: Legal instruments used to establish RASOs/pre-RASOs 
Supranational regulation International agreement Working Arrangement - 
MoU 
- European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EU regulation of 
2002); 
- European Network of Civil 
Aviation Safety Investiga-
tion Authorities (EU regu-
lation of 2010 combined 
with a private law associa-
tion); 
- The European Organisation for the 
safety of air navigation: EURO-
CONTROL (agreement of 1963, 
as variously amended); 
- InterState Aviation Committee 
(agreement of 1991); 
- Banjul Accord Group Aviation 
Safety Oversight Organisation 
(agreement of 2009); 
- Banjul Accord Group Accident 
Investigation Agency (agreement 
of 2009); 
- East African Community Civil 
Aviation Safety and Security 
Oversight Agency (Agreement of 
2007); 
- Les Autorités Africaines et Mal-
gache de l’Aviation Civile 
(agreement of 2009) ; 
- Pacific Aviation Safety Office 
(agreement of 2004); 
- Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation 
Authority (agreement of 2003) 
- Caribbean Aviation Safety and 
- Regional Cooperation 
System on Safety Over-
sight in Latin America 
(ICAO – LACAC MoU 
of 1st October 1998) 
                                                 
37 Working papers tabled at the aviation working group f the Council in the context of the discus-
sions on the establishment of EASA in the years 1996-1998 (Archives of the EU Council, Brus-
sels). 
38 In addition, ENCASIA is based on a combination of a legally binding EU regulation and an 
association established under Belgian law (supra note 219 in Ch.3). 
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Security Oversight System 
(agreement of 2008); 
- Agencia Centroamérica para la 
Seguridad Aeronáutica (agreement 
of 1960, and a ministerial decision 
of 2000); 
- Agence de Supervision de la Sécu-
rité Aérienne en Afrique Centrale 
(protocol adopted by chiefs of 
CEMAC States in 2012)  
 
This study also recommends the use of legally binding instruments, such 
as appropriately internalised international agreements, or supranational acts cre t-
ing direct legal effects, due to the fact that they are essential to enable Level 3 
delegations, and by providing for legal personality of RASOs eliminate the need 
for establishing additional associations or foundations under private law. 
As was demonstrated in the preceding chapter, in Europe, the EU devel-
oped a special legal method for associating non-EU countries into its aviation 
safety framework, including EASA. Under this method, internationl agreements 
are used to extend the EU aviation safety legislation to neighbouring countries, as 
well as to enable the delegation of safety functions by those countries to EASA. 
Upon transposition of the EU aviation safety legislation into their national legal 
systems, the partner countries acquire status similar to EU Member Stats. This 
means that their certificates benefit from recognition in the EU system, they can 
participate in the work of EASA, albeit without the right to v te, and are subject 
to EASA standardisation inspections. In 2014 four non-EU States had already 
been fully associated in such a manner, while a number of others were on th  way 
to acquiring a full association status, as was explained in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4. 
5.4.5 RASOs AS  PART OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY SYSTEM 
OF THEIR MEMBER STATES 
A RASO should be considered, similar to a national civil aviation authority or 
aviation accident investigation body, as part of the civil aviation safety system of 
its Member States, and RASO functions should be fully integrated in o that sys-
tem. This is not always obvious, as at the national level all St te safety functions 
envisaged under the system of the Chicago Convention are maintained within a 
single regulatory framework and under the responsibility of one government. 
When one or more of those functions is taken out of the national framework and 
transferred to the regional level some essential links may be lost. 
For example, even after establishing a RASO, States will continue o be 
subject to ICAO USOAP, which is of a universal character. In this respect, States 
have to be mindful that even though the ICAO findings will be formally raised 
against them, it may be up to a RASO to address these findings from a practical 
point of view, which will require close coordination between States nd their RA-
SO. This coordination can sometimes be a complex undertaking, as a single State 
may not necessarily have full control over the way remedial actions are developed 
and put into effect. For example, if ICAO findings require a change in leg slation, 
a collective action of all the States may be needed, or, as is the case in the EU, the 
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additional involvement of the supranational legislator acting on the basis of 
EASA’s technical recommendation. 
In the case of certain Level 3 delegations, ICAO may have to audit a RA-
SO, in addition to its Member States. In this case, if there are any findings raised 
against the RASO, ICAO will link them with the States’ USOAP reports, based on 
the understanding that they ultimately remain responsible for compliance with 
ICAO requirements.39 
Another aspect that States have to bear in mind is the notification of differ-
ences to ICAO in case of non-compliance with SARPs. Such notification is an 
obligation of every State party to the Chicago Convention, as Ch pter 2 explained. 
If a regional system is based on a harmonised or single set of regulations, such 
notifications will only make sense if they are done in a uniform manner for all the 
States concerned. In such case, States should ensure that their RASO plays a co-
ordinating role, reviewing ICAO SARPs on a regular basis and providing Member 
States with recommendations for notification. 
5.4.5.1 UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES RELATED TO THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A RASO 
The necessity to look at RASOs holistically and as an integral part of States’ civil 
aviation safety system can be very well illustrated with a practical example taken 
from the EU, and which is related to the functions assigned by ICAO Annexes to 
the ‘State of Design’. 
With the establishment of EASA in 2003, EU Member States delegated to 
this agency the functions and tasks of the ‘State of Design’ as enviaged under the 
system of the Chicago Convention.40 This was however not a complete transfer of 
all the functions of the ‘State of Design’, but only of those related to aircraft air-
worthiness, including aircraft design approval and follow up of its continuing air-
worthiness, as addressed in Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention. Given the fact 
that EASA is not an air accident investigation agency, the functions of the ‘State 
of Design’ associated with air accident investigations, which are cov red by An-
nex 13 to the Chicago Convention, remained at the national level. This relation-
ship is illustrated by Figure XIV. 
Figure XIV: Transfer of State safety functions from a national to a regional level 
‘Before’ EASA  ‘Post’ EASA integration 
National Level  National Level  Regional Level 
‘State of Design’ 
1. Airworthiness Functions 
(Annex 8) 
2. Investigation Functions 
(Annex 13) 
 
‘State of Design’ 
Accident Investiga-












                                                 
39 See for example: ICAO USOAP report on EASA (2008), supra note 92 in Ch.4, at Paragraph 
1.1.9. 
40 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 20(1). 
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When in 2008 ICAO assessed EASA under USOAP it raised a finding 
against the agency in respect to lack of formal agreements with EU Member 
States regarding: 
 
[T]he modalities and status of participation of representatives of EASA and representa-
tives of Member States’ bodies in accident and serious incident investigations involving 
aircraft whose type certificate is delivered by EASA.41  
 
This finding was resolved only after the adoption by the EU of a regulation 
defining the rights and obligations of EASA as a participant in air accident inves-
tigations.42 The regulation was adopted following unsuccessful attempts by EASA 
and EU Member States to address this issue through non-legislative measures, and 
in the wake of a number of cases where EASA had been denied the right to par ic-
ipate in an investigation by some of the EU air accident investigation authorities.43 
Follow-up of safety recommendations resulting from air accident investi-
gations is yet another example where a vital link may be lost when State safety 
functions are moved from a national to regional level. This is becaus  when a 
RSOO, such as EASA, has been vested with actual regulatory competences, acci-
dent investigation bodies should consider it as a potential addressee of safety rec-
ommendations, and the RSOO should be bound by Annex 13 responsibilities ap-
plicable to such addressees, including as regards the obligation to a alyse and 
reply to a safety recommendation within a prescribed deadline.44  
At the same time, the implementation of safety recommendations coming 
from air accident investigation bodies may become more complex at the regional 
level. This is because where States have agreed that their rulemaking competences 
will be exercised collectively, they may need to activate the regional machinery in 
order to address a particular recommendation.45 
5.5 RASOs AS INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
RASOs actively participate in international aviation relations, icluding ICAO 
sponsored activities, international conferences and symposia.46 Especially after 
the adoption by ICAO of its new policy on cooperation with regional organisa-
tions and bodies, the international aviation community has become well aware of 
RASOs’ existence. At the same time RASOs cannot, at present, be parties to the 
Chicago Convention which is open for membership of States only.47 
                                                 
41 ICAO USOAP report on EASA (2008), supra note 92 in Ch.4, Audit Finding ORG/01. 
42 Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, supra note 180 in Ch.3, Article 8. 
43 EC Impact Assessment COM(2009) 611 final, supra note 171 in Ch.3, at Paragraph 3.4.1.1. 
44 Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 6.10.  
45 For example on 1 April 2011 EASA initiated a rulemaking task concerning airworthiness and 
operational aspects for maintenance check flights (Ta k No MDM.097 (a)&(b)), which results 
from recommendations issued by Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses in the aftermath of an accident 
of Airbus A320-232 aircraft operated by XL Airways Germany and which occurred on 27 Novem-
ber 2008 off the coast of Canet-Plage (France). See: EASA, 'Terms of Reference (ToRs) and 
Group Compositions (GCs)'  <http://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/terms-of-reference-
and-group-compositions/rmt0589> [accessed 10 August 2014]. 
46 Supra note 16. 
47 'Chicago Convention', Articles 92-93. 
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From an international law point of view, as was demonstrated under Sec-
tion 5.4.4, the majority of RASOs are set up by international agreements or supra-
national law. Even though not all the treaties explicitly provide for it, those RA-
SOs that are created by international agreements can be considered as internatio -
al organisations, or in some cases as treaty organs,48 as they are governed by in-
ternational law. EASA is a specific case of an EU agency, and is not cosidered as 
an international organisation but as a body governed by public EU law, as was 
explained in Chapter 4.49 
The international agreements establishing RASOs are not always clear 
whether the organisation in question is vested with international legal personality. 
This is not a unique situation, as ‘constitutions of most international organizations 
lack explicit provisions on the legal status of the organization under international 
law.’50 In the core sample of RASOs, only two out of eleven internationl agree-
ments, that is the AAMAC Treaty and PICCAST, explicitly provide that the RA-
SO has international legal personality. In practice this may not be a significant 
problem as ‘many organisations can be seen to perform international legal activi-
ties despite the absence of an explicit grant of personality.’51 What is important 
therefore is to analyse internationally relevant RASO activities, which means ac-
tivities which derive their origin or have consequences under international law. 
The first observation that has to be made in this respect is that ome RA-
SOs enjoy a limited degree of treaty making powers, which are functionally ori-
ented. Most often RASOs are authorised to conclude headquarters agreements.52 
In addition, as was already explained above, some RASOs, such as IAC, BA-
GASOO or BAGAIA can conclude delegation agreements with their Member 
States. 
Only organisations enjoying ‘Level 3’ delegations are designated by their 
Member States for the purpose of executing international agreements. Two exam-
ples can be given in this respect: (1) Agreement between the Government of the 
Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America for the 
Promotion of Aviation Safety of 1998,53 and (2) the Agreement between the Unit-
ed States of America and the European Community on cooperation in the regula-
tion of civil aviation safety.54 Under these agreements the IAC and EASA were 
designated as technical agents of the Russian Federation and of the EU respective-
ly, for the purpose of the implementation of these agreements. In the first case, the 
                                                 
48 This is the case for example with IAC, which is a ‘ t nding executive body’ of the 'Minsk 
Agreement', supra note 103 in Ch.3, Article 8. IAC considers itself as an international organisa-
tion, see: AIG/08-WP/22, supra note 189 in Ch.3, at Paragraph 2.1. In practice the distinction 
between an international organization and a treaty organ is not so important, as demonstrated by: 
Klabbers, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at p.9. 
49 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 28. 
50 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at p. 988. 
51 Klabbers, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at p. 51. 
52 The conclusion of headquarters agreements are explicitly envisaged in the constituent docu-
ments of BAGASOO, BAGAIA, AAMAC and CASSOS. However headquarters agreements can 
be sometimes concluded also by RASOs which do not have this competence explicitly envisaged 
in their founding documents, which is the case for example with IAC. 
53 'Agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
United States of America for the promotion of aviation safety', (Moscow, 1998), 
<www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/international/bilateral_agreements/baa_basa_listing/media/RussiaE
A.pdf> [accessed 10 August 2014]. 
54 'EU-US BASA', supra note 97 in Ch.2. 
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agreement explicitly States that ‘the IAC shall act under the authority and on be-
half of the Government of the Russian Federation.’55  
Under both of the above mentioned agreements, EASA and IAC are au-
thorised to conclude with the FAA more detailed implementation pr cedures. Un-
der these implementation procedures ‘the IAC designates the Aviation Register of 
the IAC as its executive agent to carry out these Implementation Procedu es.’56 
This was possible because of the independent legal standing of the different IAC 
committees under the Minsk Agreement, which in this case extends to internation-
al law.57 
As was demonstrated on the case of EASA in Chapter 4, where States
grant to a RASO Level 3 delegations in respect of aviation safety functions which 
are governed by the Chicago Convention, this will result in the establishment of 
an international agency relationship between a RASO and its Member Stat s. As a 
consequence, Level 3 RASOs will enjoy a degree of international legal p rsonali-
ty which is necessary to exercise these delegations. 
In addition to executing international agreements, RASOs can also be au-
thorised to conclude, within the scope of their competence, technical working ar-
rangements. Such working arrangements are of a technical nature only and do not 
create legally binding effects for third parties. As a result, their scope of applica-
tion is limited to issues which concern the working procedures of the RASO. The 
2004 working arrangement between IAC and EASA can be given as an exampl  
of an arrangement concluded by two RSOOs carrying out executive tasks on be-
half of their Member States.58 
5.6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that States do not follow a one-size-fits-all approach to establishing 
RASOs. This results from the fact that the needs of States in trms of strengthen-
ing their safety oversight or accident investigation capabilities differ, and there-
fore regional cooperation initiatives have to be tailored to the circumstances of a 
particular situation.  
Political considerations also play a role when decisions are taken by States 
regarding the form of the RASO to be set-up. 
Although the RASO concept is not entirely new, based on the analysis of 
the latest information, it is evident that the last twelve years h ve been real boom 
years for these organisations. Of the core sample of fourteen RASOs reviewed for 
the purpose of this study, nine have been established in the last twelve years. Even 
taking into account that some of them evolved from other organisation , this still 
                                                 
55 US-Russian Federation BASA, supra note 53, Article 1.D. 
56 'Implementation procedures for design approval, production activities, export airworthiness 
approval, post design approval activities, and technical assistance between authorities, done under 
the  Agreement between the Government of the United S ates of America and  the Government of 
the Russian Federation  for Promotion of aviation safety', (1998), 
<https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/international/bilateral_agreements/baa_basa_listing/media/
RussiaIPA.pdf> [accessed 10 August 2014], Section I (1.0). 
57 See Section 3.4.3.3 of Chapter 3. 
58 EASA, 'Working Arrangement on Airworthiness between the European Aviation Safety Agency 
and the Interstate Aviation Committee', (St. Petersburg, 2004), 




means that six of the fourteen were only established after 2004. In addition, based 
on the available information about the projects which were being co sidered in 
2014 by States and ICAO, more of such organisations can be expected to be set up 
in the coming years. According to ICAO, in Africa alone it is envisaged to have an 
additional six RASO type organisations established in the coming years. 
This clear trend towards increasing regionalisation of civil aviation safety 
oversight and accident investigation functions is a demonstration of the strong 
conviction of the international civil aviation community about RASOs’ contribu-
tion to the improvement of civil aviation safety, worldwide harmonisation of 
standards, and cost-effectiveness of regulatory functions. 
This study argues that, because of the above mentioned trend, it is im-
portant to collect and analyse the experience coming from RASO functioning so 
that it can be used to optimise their performance and help future organisations in 
avoiding some of the mistakes made by their predecessors. In this respect, whilst 
the findings of this chapter in principle confirmed that RASOs can bring benefits 
expected from them by the international aviation community, it is also clear from 
the existing experience that such benefits should not be taken for granted. Some of 
the RASOs experienced problems related to their sustainability and this aspect of 
RASOs functioning clearly requires further research in the future. 
One of the principal reasons why RASOs which are in operation todayare 
probably not as efficient as they could be is the fact that, in a vast majority of cas-
es, they do not replace national authorities but supplement them. In 2014 there 
was only one example of a true RCAA, which acts as an aviation authority for 
multiple States. 
The fact that RASOs generally do not replace national authorities, means 
that there may be additional costs for States deriving from their establishment 
which need to be offset by economies of scale and more efficient regulatory pro-
cesses. Existing experience also shows that RASOs may be competing with States 
for aviation experts, especially if State safety functions continue to be exercised 
by the national authorities with parallel support of a RASO. This c apter identi-
fied at least two sources stating that ‘these regional bodies are not y t as effective 
as they could be’. 
Whilst it would not be realistic to expect that many RASOs be et up in the 
form of a RCAA due to the strong sovereignty issues which States associate with 
civil aviation oversight and regulatory functions, existing State experience and 
ICAO guidance shows that RASO efficiencies are strongest when safety func ions 
are pooled at a regional level. This is because such pooling allows duplication 
with the national level to be avoided and makes functions such as ertification or 
rulemaking more cost efficient through economies of scale. At the same time, reg-
ulatory centralisation at regional level is not an obstacle to localimplementation, 
as the example of ECCAA, which operates with a network of local outstations, 
shows. 
In order to assist States in choosing the best method and type of delega-
tion, this chapter proposed to classify delegation arrangements into three levels:  
(1) Level 1 (Coordination level), under which States authorise individual 
inspectors of a regional body to perform audits, inspections and other
oversight or investigative work on their behalf;  
(2) Level 2 (Harmonisation level) which goes beyond authorisation of in-
dividuals only, and entails a delegation to a regional body, as an organ-
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isation, of the competence to perform specific technical work on behalf 
of its Member States or member authorities; 
(3) Level 3 (Unification level) under which States delegate to a regional 
body both the conduct of the technical work, and responsibility for the 
issuance of the certificate/approval confirming that the applicable re-
quirements have been met. 
This chapter found that, despite the benefits of centralisation of safety 
functions at RASO level, the delegation of not only technical work but also legal 
responsibility (Level 3) is still quite rare. In 2014 there were only three RASOs 
which enjoyed such a level of delegation, while the majority of the RASOs stud-
ied provided mainly advisory and support services to their Member States which 
do not result in legally binding legal effects. 
At the same time a tendency can be observed of RASOs gradually evolv-
ing into more institutionalised structures, which means towards o ganisations set 
up on the basis of international agreements and having legal personality. I  2014, 
twelve of the fourteen RASOs studied had some sort of legal personality, and only 
one of the fourteen organisations was based on a non-binding legal instrument as 
opposed to six in the previous decade. 
The fact that RASOs evolve over time into organisations based on inter a-
tional law and having legal personality strengthens their mandate and allows them 
to accept more advanced levels of delegations of safety functions from their 
Member States. This is a an important trend from the point of view of civil avia-
tion safety and regulatory efficiency, given the identified correlation between the 
level of delegation of safety oversight tasks to RASOs and the resulting dividends 
for States in terms of efficiency of the regulatory processes and the effective use 
of resources. From the perspective of the main proposition of this study, that is the 
proposal for a GASON, this evolution also means that RASOs are overall moving 
towards forms which make them better suited to take the role of effective GASON 
building blocks. 
In order to assist States in setting up RASO type bodies, this chapter re-
viewed practical examples of the different safety functions that these bodi s per-
form and structured them along the eight ICAO CEs of State safety ovrsight. 
This tool-box approach provides States with a menu of potential options from 
which they could choose, taking into account that, as advocated by ICAO, when 
setting up RASOs, States should focus on ‘those activities that demonstrate a 
higher impact on regional safety oversight and contribute towards developing an 
effective aviation safety oversight framework’.59  
When analysing the different safety functions exercised by RASOs, this 
chapter also found that none of the organisations enjoy legislative functions. This 
demonstrates that States essentially treat RASOs as technical agencies implement-
ing and enforcing the law but not creating it. 
Another finding of this chapter was that a RASO should be considered as 
part of the overall civil aviation safety system of its Member States, nd that RA-
SO functions should be fully integrated into that system. This is because when one 
or more State safety functions is taken out of the national framework and trans-
ferred to the regional level, some essential safety links may be lost, as was 
                                                 
59 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.2.1. 
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demonstrated by the example of the transfer of ‘State of Design’ functions in the 
context of EASA in the EU. 
Finally this chapter addressed the role of RASOs as international actors. In 
this respect it was found that RASOs are now well-established and recognised on 
the international level, and that some of them may enjoy competences to act under 
international law. In particular RASOs can have treaty-making powers, includ g 
the competence to conclude headquarters and delegation agreements with their 
Member States. In addition, organisations enjoying Level 3 delegations can be 
authorised to act as authorised representatives of States for the purpose of execut-
ing international aviation safety agreements. 
The legal standing of RASOs under international law and the delegation of 
the exercise of State safety functions to RASOs may also have conseque c s in 
terms of international responsibility and civil liability for wrongful acts in relation 
to the Member States of the RASO, third countries, as well as the regional body 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The success of the GASON proposed in Chapter 2, measured by more effective 
and uniform implementation of ICAO SARPs and efficiencies in terms of the use 
of resources by ICAO and its Member States, will to a large degree depend on 
whether the RASOs which form GASON’s building blocks are appropriately em-
powered by their Member States to exercise civil aviation safety functions - either 
on behalf of these Member States or in RASOs own name.  
Chapter 5 analysed and classified the various RASO delegation arrange-
ments from an operational point of view. However such delegations also r ise 
questions related to the legal consequences, in terms of international responsibility 
and civil liability, for the RASO Member States and the regional body itself.2 The 
precise legal source and nature of these consequences, which are the subject mat-
ter of this chapter, will depend on the legal form of the RASO, its relationship 
with Member States and third countries, the applicable international legal frame-
work and finally the domestic legislation of the States concerned. 
In order to resolve the above issues, this chapter will first clarify nd sys-
tematise the general principles and concepts concerning the attribution and dele-
gation of State safety functions to aviation authorities from the perspective of do-
mestic and international law (Section 6.2). It will then verify if there are any pro-
visions in the Chicago Convention or its Annexes which could limit the possibility 
of delegating State safety functions to RASOs, or more generally to exercising 
these functions on a non-national basis (Section 6.3). Following on from that, this 
                                                 
1 Francisco V. García Amador was the UN International Law Commission first special rapporteur 
on State responsibility. 
2 In this Chapter the term ‘responsibility’ is used when referring to obligations stemming from 
international law, while the term ‘liability’ is used when referring to situations where a breach of a 
legal obligation results in damages the recovery of which is being pursued in national courts. 
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chapter will address the issue of RASO and State responsibility for internationally 
wrongful acts (Sections 6.4 and 6.5), and domestic civil liability (Section 6.6). 
Finally this chapter will examine the need to amend the Chicago Convention in 
view of the emergence of RASOs (Section 6.7). 
6.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND DELEGATION OF STATE 
SAFETY FUNCTIONS IN CIVIL AVIATION 
 
6.2.1 ATTRIBUTION OF COMPETENCES TO CIVIL AVIATION 
AUTHORITIES UNDER DOMESTIC LAW 
State organs can only act within the scope of the competences which have been 
attributed to them, which is a reflection of the principle of legality, as applied in 
the general context of administrative law.3 This principle of attribution is also val-
id for civil aviation authorities dealing with aviation safety matters, and where the 
constituting acts of such bodies specify in detailed manner thei competences, 
functions and duties.4 
In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, the civil aviation authori-
ties are established as an independent agency.5 In other countries, such as the 
Netherlands, they are part of the organisational framework of one of the minis-
tries.6 Sometimes, such as in Poland, the competences are shared, with the minis-
try having competences for the legislation, and the civil aviation administration 
for its execution. Finally, in some jurisdictions, such as Germany, more than one 
administrative body was given the competence to exercise the certification and 
oversight tasks placed upon a State by the Chicago Convention a d its Annexes.7 
                                                 
3 Hofmann, Rowe, and Türk, supra note 116 in Ch.2, 148-151; Michael Nierhaus, 'Administrative 
Law', in: Introduction to German Law, ed. by Mathias Reimann and Joachim Zekoll (2005),  pp. 
88-89; Philippos K. Spyropoulos and Théodore Fortsakis, Constitutional Law in Greece, (2009), p. 
180; Lionel N. Brown and John Bell, French Administrative Law, (2003), pp. 213-215. 
4 For example, for the competences, functions and duties of the UK civil aviation authority see: the 
Civil Aviation Act of 1982, Chapter 16; For the competences, functions and duties of the Polish 
Civil Aviation Authority see: Civil Aviation Act (Ustawa ‘Prawo Lotnicze’) of 3 July 2002 (Con-
solidated text in: Official Journal of the Republic of Poland of 28 November 2013, Item 1393). 
5 The UK CAA is a body corporate which is not considered to be a servant or the agent of a Crown 
in accordance with the Civil Aviation Act of 1982. 
6 In the Netherlands, the Minister of Transport is considered as the national aviation authority and 
is supported by Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT) which is an integral part of 
the Ministry of Transport. 
7 In Germany, which is a federation of sixteen States (Länder), the competence has been split be-
tween the federal aviation authority and the Länder authorities, with the latter being responsible in 
particular for general aviation policing activities and for administration and licensing of aero-
dromes; Source: ICAO, 'Final Report on the safety oversight audit of the civil aviation system of 
the Federal Republic of Germany', (2005), 
<http://cfapp.icao.int/fsix/AuditReps/CSAfinal/Germany_CSA_%20Final_Report.pdf> [accessed 
21 July 2014]. The UK also has more than one civil a iation authority, this however stems from 
the fact that in addition to the mainland, the UK is also composed of the Overseas Territories. Alt-
hough from the perspective of the Chicago Convention the UK Overseas Territories are an integral 
part of the UK, the aviation activities in the Overs as Territories are under the responsibility of 
their Governors, which in practice either establish their own aviation safety administrations or can 
rely on the Air Safety Support International,  which s a subsidiary company of the UK Civil Avia-
tion Authority charged with supporting the development of civil aviation safety regulation in the 
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Whether a national civil aviation authority or an administrative body in 
general can delegate its statutory responsibilities to other entities or individuals is 
in the first place a matter of domestic law, in line with the above mentioned prin-
ciple of legality.8 
In practice, it is not rare for States to delegate the conduct of some of their 
civil aviation safety tasks outside governmental structures. A study conducted in 
2010 by the NLR Air Transport Safety Institute on 32 of the 44 ECAC States 
showed that in 2008 sixteen ECAC States were making use of inspecting staff 
contracted from external organisations.9 The study also showed that fifteen States 
sub-contracted or delegated specific tasks to a separate organisation.10 In the EU, 
legislation was even adopted setting out requirements that should be met by such 
qualified entities when contracted by EU Member States’ aviation authorities or 
by EASA.11 
In some cases, entities which are not part of the governmental structures 
are not only authorised to provide technical oversight services, but may also be 
authorised to issue certificates on behalf of States. This is the case, for example, in 
the Czech Republic, where the Light Aircraft Association is a competent authority 
for certification of microlight aircraft and licensing of persons involved in their 
operation.12 In Austria, Austrocontrol GmbH was set up in 1994 as a limited lia-
bility company with 100% shares owned by the State13 and is responsible for 
providing, on behalf of the Austrian government, air navigation services as well 
as, through a separate division, regulatory tasks including certification nd inspec-
tion of aircraft, supervision of maintenance and flight operations, the performance 
of ramp checks on foreign aircraft, the issuance of civil aviation p lots’ licenses 
and certification and oversight of pilot schools.14 
Some jurisdictions envisage the concept of approved organisation which, 
in addition to being commercial enterprises, are also given privileges to make 
statements which under the Chicago Convention are the responsibility of States. 
This is the case, for example, with the approved design organisations in the EU, 
which have privileges to approve certain changes to aircraft design.15 Under An-
                                                                                                                            
Overseas Territories; for further details see: 'About ASSI',  <http://www.airsafety.aero/about/> 
[accessed 15 March 2014]. 
8 In addition to manuals concerning RSOOs and RAIOs, CAO has also published guidelines con-
cerning the establishment of State safety oversight ystem, which follows the logic of the eight 
CEs which were presented in Chapter 2. See: ICAO Doc. 9734, Part A, supra note 67 in Ch.3. 
9 NLR Air Transport Safety Institute, 'Safety Oversight Comparative Analysis Study', NLR-CR-
2009-260, (2010),  pp. 20-21. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, at Annex V. 
12 Light Aircraft Association of the Czech Republic,  <http://en.laacr.cz/about-laa.htm> [accessed 
20 July 2014]. See also the case of Austrian Aeroclub (Österreichischer Aeroclub), a non-profit 
organization, which acts as an official body in areas such as: licensing of companies which main-
tain or design and manufacture parachutes, hang-gliders and paragliders; licensing of glider, hang 
glider and paraglider pilots; maintaining the register for gliders, balloons, microlights, hang gliders 
and paragliders. 
13 Austrocontrol, 'Company Profile', (on file with author, 2012). 
14 Austrocontrol, 'Annual Report', (2011), 
<http://www.austrocontrol.at/jart/prj3/austro_control/data/uploads/pdfs/report_11.pdf> [accessed 
12 August 2014]. 




nex 8 to the Chicago Convention, approval of aircraft design is o e of the respon-
sibilities of the ‘State of Design’.16 
Finally, in the US and some other countries which have their civil aviation 
safety regulatory system based on the American one, the national legal system 
envisages the concept of authorised designees. These individuals, which are not 
employees of the national aviation authority, may be authorised, on the basis of 
provisions of law, to conduct regulatory tasks. For example in the US regulatory 
system, such individuals, when authorised by the FAA administrator,17 can per-
form tasks such as ‘determining whether aircraft designs, manufacturing, and 
maintenance meet specific safety standards and certifying the competency of per-
sons that operate aircraft.’18 
The main benefit of delegation arrangements, such as the ones described 
above, is to leverage resources and to allow the aviation authority t  focus on 
most important tasks, while leaving routine or low-risk activities to approved or-
ganisations, designees, or external contractors. For example in the US, the design-
ees and designated organisations at a certain point performed ‘more than 90 per-
cent of FAA’s certification activities, thus greatly leveraging the agency’s re-
sources.’19 On the other hand, such delegation arrangements, especially when they 
involve delegating State tasks to commercial organisations or their employees, can 
sometimes face political criticism for supposedly allowing industry to self-
regulate.20 
While it is therefore clear that a civil aviation authority does not have to 
discharge all of its statutory responsibilities through in-house re ources, a question 
arises as to what are the legal pre-requisites to enable such delegations, s well as 
what are their legal consequences.  
In the case of two main jurisdictions which were reviewed for the purpose 
of this study, that is the EU and US, the delegations are allowed only on the basis 
of a clear statutory provision.21 In the EU, the principle is that national aviation 
authorities can delegate only the exercise of certification and oversight tasks, but 
cannot delegate the responsibility for the final regulatory decision, that is the issu-
ance or revocation / suspension of an approval.22 Only in limited cases which are 
clearly envisaged under the EASA Basic Regulation, an EU Member State can 
delegate to EASA the whole regulatory responsibility, including the audits and 
inspections, as well as the competence to issue a certificate.23 
                                                 
16 Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention, Paragraph 1.3.4. 
17 Title 14 CFR Part 183 ‘Representatives of the Administrator’ (see: Code of Federal Regulations',  
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2014-title14-vol1/pdf/CFR-2014-title14-vol1.pdf> [accessed 
29 July 2014]. 
18 US GAO, 'FAA Needs to Strengthen the Management of Its Designee Programs', GAO-05-40, 
(2004),  at p. 7. 
19 Ibid. at p. 3. 
20 Reuters, 'Will Dreamliner drama affect industry self-inspection?'  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/02/us-boeing-787-oversight-
idUSBRE92104W20130302> [accessed 20 July 2014]. 
21 For the US this authorisation is contained Title 14 CFR Part 183 ‘Representatives of the Admin-
istrator’, supra note 17. For the EU the authorisations for EASA and EU Member States are con-
tained in: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2. 
22 Ibid. Article 13, which States that 'qualified entities shall not issue certificates'. 
23 This is the case for organisations responsible for pr duction of aeronautical products, and flight 
simulation training devices. See: Article 20.2 (b)(ii) and Article 21.2 (b)(ii) of Regulation (EU) No 
216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2. 
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This numerus clausus of delegation scenarios in the US and EU aviation 
law is a reflection of the general principle applicable to delegation arragements 
in administrative law according to which delegation cannot be presum d and must 
be clearly authorised by law. This means that ‘[a]n administrative agency with 
statutory responsibility for an exercise of powers cannot delegate them without 
statutory authorization.’24 This principle, which is also expressed by a Latin max-
im delegatus non potest delegare,25 had been confirmed in the EU in the Meroni 
rulings, which were addressed in Chapter 4,26 and in the US, through extensive 
case law.27  
6.2.2 ATTRIBUTION AND DELEGATION OF CIVIL AVIATION 
STATE SAFETY FUNCTIONS UNDER PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Having looked at the general principles concerning attribution and delegation of 
civil aviation safety functions under domestic law, this section will address the 
question of delegation of such functions to RASOs from the perspective of public 
international law. This analysis is an essential pre-requisite for the subsequent 
discussion about States’ and RASOs’ potential responsibility for wrongful acts 
under public international law. 
As is the case in the domestic legal systems, where competences have to 
be clearly attributed to State organs by law, also in the case of international organ-
isations the competence to act is governed by a principle of attribution. This prin-
ciple means, as explained by Blokker, that ‘international organizations are compe-
tent to act only as far as powers have been attributed to them by the Member 
States.’28 This principle can also be referred to as the principle of speciality,29 or 
the principle of conferral of powers.30 Such attribution can be either explicit, or, 
although not explicitly envisaged in the constituent instrument of the organisation, 
implied ‘as being essential to the performance of its duties.’31 
The most comprehensive analysis of the methods by which States attribute 
or confer powers on international organisations was conducted by Sarooshi, who 
distinguishes, at the basic level, between the attribution by means of the constitu-
ent treaty and ad hoc conferrals.32 This basic distinction is valid also for RASOs, 
                                                 
24 Neil Hawke and Neil Parpworth, Introduction to Administrative Law, (1996), p. 138. 
25 Stephen H. Bailey, Cases materials and Commentaty on administrative law, (2005), pp. 463-464. 
26 'Case C-9/56, Meroni', supra note 35 in Ch.4, (p. 151), which states that: ‘A delegation of pow-
ers cannot be presumed and even when empowered to dlegate its powers the delegating authority 
must take an express decision transferring them.’ See also: 'Case T-311/06, FMC Chemical SPRL 
v. European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)', in: [2008] ECR II-88, (CJEU,2008),  (Paragraph 66). 
27 For an overview of the delegation doctrine in US administrative law see: William F. Funk and 
Richard H. Seamon, Administrative Law: Examples andexplanations, (2009), pp. 30-43. 
28 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at p. 157. 
29 See: 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion', in: [1996] ICJ 
Reports 66, (ICJ,1996),  (p. 78). In this ruling the ICJ stated that: ‘[I]nternational organizations are
subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess a general competence. Interna-
tional organizations are governed by the ‘principle of speciality’, that is to say they are invested by 
the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common inter-
ests whose promotion those States entrust to them.’ 
30 Sarooshi, supra note 19 in Ch.2. 
31 'Reparation for Injuries', supra note 74 in Ch.4, (p. 182). 
32 Sarooshi, supra note 19 in Ch.2, at p. 18. 
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where, as was demonstrated in Chapter 5, in case of RASOs which are established 
by international agreements or, in the case of EASA, by supranational law, com-
petences are granted either in the RASO founding document or specific d legation 
agreements which can be concluded between a RASO and its Member States. 
When it comes to a further typology of attribution of competences to inter-
national organisations, the situation is more complicated. Thisis because, as 
pointed out by Sarooshi: 
 
[T]here is a considerable lack of clarity and consistent usage in the conceptual labels used 
to describe different types of conferrals by States of powers on international organiza-
tions. Such terms as ‘ceding’, alienation’, ‘transfer’, ‘delegation’ and ‘authorization’ are 
used interchangeably by international and domestic courts as well as by commentators, 
often to refer to the same type of conferral of powers or the same conceptual label is used 
in a general way to refer to different types of conferrals. However not all conferrals of 
powers are the same, and there are important differenc s that flow from the types of con-
ferrals for the legal relationship that is thereby established between States conferring 
powers and organizations.33 
 
Based on the analysis of RASOs’ founding documents this study found 
that where competences are allocated to regional aviation safety bodies, Stat
rather than using terms such as transfer, delegation or authorisation, prefer to 
simply list the different competences and refer to them as RASO functions or ob-
jectives.34 The term delegation appears only in the case of one of the organisations 
studied, that is BAGAIA.35 Therefore, rather than relying on a specific term, in 
order to determine the legal consequences of a conferral by a State of competenc-
es on a RASO it is necessary to assess all the circumstances of a particular case, 
including the provisions of the RASO founding agreement, as well as State, ICAO 
and RASO practice. 
Referring back to the theory of international delegations, academic writers 
generally tend to classify the different arrangements using as the main criterion 
the degree to which the State powers have been given away to an international 
organisation. Sarooshi, for example, distinguishes three types of conferrals, that is, 
agency relationships, delegations, and transfers, depending on the criteria such as 
the revocability of the conferral, the level of control exercised by a State over the 
organisation, the possibility to exercise a given power in parallel by a State and 
the organisation, and other criteria.36 He also specifies the consequences that each 
of these three types of conferrals may have for a State and international organisa-
tion from the perspective of international responsibility for wrongful acts.37 
Similarly, Bradley and Kelly propose a typology of what they call interna-
tional delegation, according to criteria related to the legal effect that the delega-
tion has and the degree of independence of the international body to which a dele-
                                                 
33 Ibid. at p. 28. 
34 This is the case for example for PASO (see: 'PICASST', supra note 81 in Ch.3, Article 7), 
AAMAC (see: 'AAMAC Treaty', supra note 62 in Ch.3, Article 3), ECCAA (see: 'ECCAA 
Agreement', supra note 226 in Ch.3, Articles 5-6), or BAGASOO (see: 'BAGASOO Agreement', 
supra note 128 in Ch.3, Article 5). 
35 'BAGAIA Agreement', supra note 179 in Ch.3, Article 5(k). 
36 Sarooshi, supra note 19 in Ch.2, at pp. 28-31. 
37 Ibid. at pp. 33-104. 
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gation is given.38 They rightly point out that ‘delegations that allow international 
bodies to create binding legal obligations are more extensive than similar delega-
tions of only advisory or agenda-setting authority.’39 This is in line with the find-
ings of this study, which, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, found that delegations to 
RASOs which create legally binding effects (Level 3 delegations), are in practice 
much more difficult to achieve and implement than more simple delegations 
which concern advisory and technical assistance functions, and which do not cre-
ate legally binding effects for RASO Member States or aviation undertakings. 
While the typologies of international delegation arrangements proposed in 
the existing literature are useful for this study in the sense that they allow the dif-
ferent types of RASOs to be put in the more general context of discussions on 
conferrals of powers to international organisations or bodies, this study came to 
the conclusions that these typologies need adaptation before they can be applied in 
the specific context of RASOs. For this reason it has been decided that the 3-
Level typology of delegation arrangements that was proposed in Chapter 5, alt-
hough of an operational nature, is also a good starting point for discussing RASO 
delegation arrangements from the perspective of public international law. 
The first conclusion that was reached in this respect, is that a disinction 
has to be made, as is the case under the domestic law, between the d legation of 
tasks and the delegation of the competence to take a decision. The theory of inter-
national law and the practice of international organisations recognise the possibil-
ity of delegating the exercise of tasks only, or using outside exp rts. In such cases, 
although the exercise of tasks is allocated to outside experts, the competence to 
take a decision remains with the delegating organisation,40 r in our case with a 
RASO Member State. Level 1 and 2 delegations, as proposed in Chapter 5, are 
considered as delegation of tasks, while Level 3 delegations also entail the compe-
tence to take a decision. For example, RASOs may be given the task of preparing 
proposals of legislative measures, but the actual adoption of these measures is the 
responsibility of States, as is clear from the cases reviewed for the purpose of this 
study.  
The second conclusion is that a distinction has to be made between (1) the 
delegation of State safety functions and duties which are created by the Chicago 
Convention, and (2) functions and duties which are not dealt with under this inter-
national law instrument.  
In the first case, regardless of the term used, we will be talking about a re-
lationship of an international agency, as was demonstrated on the example of 
EASA in Chapter 4. This is because, when the delegation concerns a function 
which is already envisaged under the Chicago Convention, a State is only mandat-
ing a RASO to exercise, on its behalf, the functions for which this State is already 
responsible under international law. This conclusion is also supported by ICAO 
practice concerning registration of aircraft by RASOs as will be shown in Section 
6.3.1.1 below.  
In the second case, we will be talking about an attribution of a new com-
petence to an international organisation. This distinction is important from the 
                                                 
38 Bradley and Kelley, 'The concept of international delegation', supra note 81 in Ch.4, at pp. 17-
25. 
39 Ibid. at p. 17. 
40 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at pp. 339-340. 
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perspective of international State responsibility, as will be demonstrated in Sec-
tions 6.4 and 6.5. 
6.3 THE OBLIGATION TO ESTABLISH AVIATION AUTHORITIES, 
AS ENVISAGED IN THE CHICAGO CONVENTION AND ITS 
ANNEXES 
Before addressing the question of international responsibility of States and RA-
SOs for wrongful acts, the final point which needs to be resolved is whether either 
the Chicago Convention or its Annexes establish any restrictions or conditions 
with regard to the delegation to RASOs of State safety functions. In order to re-
solve this issue, the provisions of the Chicago Convention, as well as all safety-
related ICAO Annexes and ICAO interpretative manuals concerning RSOOs and 
RAIO were reviewed. 
When it comes to the provisions of the Chicago Convention, most of them 
are formulated in a way which establishes obligations at State level only and do 
not provide further details as to the nature or structure of the authority which 
should be actually tasked by a State with discharging these obligations. However 
some of the articles of the Chicago Convention make a more specific reference to 
the appropriate authorities of each of the contracting States (Article 16 – Search 
of Aircraft), State own authorities (Article 25 – Aircraft in Distress), appropriate 
authorities of the State (Article 30 - Aircraft radio equipment), appropriate na-
tional authorities for certification (Article 41 - Recognition of existing standards 
of airworthiness), or authorities of the other contracting State or States (Article 
83bis - Transfer of certain functions and duties).  
Similarly the review of the safety related Annexes to the Chicago Conven-
tion reveals a mosaic of different formulations and solutions with regard to the 
authorities and entities through which ICAO allows or requires States to discharge 
their obligations. Depending on the technical domain, the Annexes us  formula-
tions such as licensing authority,41 appropriate authority,42 competent authority,43 
appropriate national authority,44 issuing authority,45 appropriate certifying au-
thority,46 appropriate airworthiness authority,47 State authority,48 common mark 
registering authority,49 and responsible authority.50 
                                                 
41 See: Annex 1 to the Chicago Convention, at 'Definitio s'. 
42 See: ICAO, 'Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention: Rules of the Air', (2005),  'Definitions'; ICAO, 
'Annex 10 to the Chicago Convention: Aeronautical Telecommunications, Volume I - Radio 
Navigation Aids', (2006),  Paragraph 12.13.11; Annex 14 to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 
1.2.1. 
43 See: ICAO, 'Annex 4 to the Chicago Convention: Aeronautical Charts', (2009),  Paragraph 
11.10.15; Annex 10, Volume I to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 3.1.7.1. 
44 See: Annex 6, Part I to the Chicago Convention, at 'Note' to Paragraph 6.12; Annex 8 to the 
Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 10.3.1; ICAO, 'Annex 18 to the Chicago Convention: The Safe 
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air', (2011),  at Paragraph 2.7. 
45 See: Annex 6, Part I to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 4.2.1.5 (a). 
46 Ibid. at Appendix 8, Paragraph 1.5. 
47 Ibid. at Attachment F, Paragraph 7. 
48 See: ICAO, 'Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention: Operation of Aircraft, Part II - International 
General Aviation with Aeroplanes', (2008),  at Paragraph 2.3.1.1. 
49 See: ICAO, 'Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention: Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks', 
(2012),  at 'Definitions'. 
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The most recently adopted Annex 19, which deals with safety manage-
ment, contains a Standard, which obliges every State to: 
 
[E]stablish relevant authorities or agencies, as appropriate, supported by sufficient and 
qualified personnel and provided with adequate financial resources. Each State authority 
or agency shall have stated safety functions and objectives to fulfil its safety management 
responsibilities.51 
 
An explanatory note to the above cited Annex 19 Standard clarifies that: 
 
The term “relevant authorities or agencies” is used in a generic sense to include all au-
thorities with aviation safety oversight responsibility which may be established by the 
State as separate entities, such as: Civil Aviation Authorities, Airport Authorities, ATS Au-
thorities, Accident Investigation Authority, and Meteorological Authority (emphasis add-
ed).52 
 
Based on the analysis of the context in which the above and other f rmula-
tions are used, as well as the analysis of ICAO and State practice, the following 
conclusions were reached: 
(1) Although there is no consistency in the way the different formulations 
regarding aviation authorities are used in the ICAO Annexes, the vast 
majority of the ICAO SARPs use broad formulations which refer to a
State53 and/or to an authority in a generic sense without specifying that 
it has to be a national authority. Annex 6 for example, distinguishes 
between the ‘State of the Operator’ which is the ‘State in which the 
operator’s principal place of business is located or, if there is no uch 
place of business, the operator’s permanent residence’, and the issuing 
authority which is specifically responsible, on behalf of the ‘State of 
the Operator’ for the determination that the operator complies with the 
provisions of Annex 6 and the issuance of an AOC.54 
 
(2) In the rare cases where an ICAO Annex uses the term national, the rel-
evant State and ICAO practice demonstrates that this term is actually 
also interpreted as covering RASO type authorities. This is for exam-
ple the case with aircraft design certification, where Annexes 6 and 8 
refer in this context to appropriate national authority,55 but where in 
practice RASOs have been established, such as EASA, which approve 
                                                                                                                            
50 See: ICAO, 'Annex 12 to the Chicago Convention: Search and Rescue', (2004),  Paragraph 
2.1.1.2. 
51 Annex 19 to the Chicago Convention, at Appendix 1, Paragraph 3.1. 
52 Ibid. Appendix 1, Note 2. 
53 ICAO uses broad concepts such as: ‘State of the Operator’ (The State in which the operator’s 
principal place of business is located or, if there is no such place of business, the operator’s perma-
nent residence), ‘State of Registry’ (The State on whose register the aircraft is entered), ‘State of 
Design’ (The State having jurisdiction over the organization responsible for the type design) or 
‘State of Manufacture’ (The State having jurisdiction over the organization responsible for the 
final assembly of the aircraft). 
54 Annex 6, Part I to the Chicago Convention, at Appendix 6. 
55 Ibid. at Paragraph 6.3.1.2.8; Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention, at Part 11, Paragraph 1.1.1.  
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aircraft design on behalf of States and this has been found acceptable 
to ICAO.56 Similarly with respect to the transport of dangerous goods 
by air, where Paragraph 2.7 of Annex 18 explicitly requires eachICAO 
Member State to designate ‘an appropriate authority within its admin-
istration to be responsible for ensuring compliance with this Annex 
(emphasis added)’, the ECCAA discharges these responsibilities on 
behalf of the OECS States, and this had been accepted by ICAO.57 
 
(3) Many of the ICAO Annexes explicitly envisage that a State has an ob-
ligation to designate an authority, which is to discharge on its behalf 
relevant safety related responsibilities or provide services which are 
necessary for international air navigation. This is for example the cas , 
in addition to the above mentioned issuing authority under Annex 6, 
for: aircrew licensing,58 publication of aeronautical information publi-
cation,59 provision of meteorological information,60 international aero-
nautical telecommunications services,61 air traffic services,62 and 
search and rescue.63 These provisions are general in nature and do not 
explicitly limit the authority to be designated as having a national sta-
tus. 
In addition, as was mentioned under Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2, Annexes 
13 and 19 explicitly refer to RASOs. A more detailed review of these r ferences 
                                                 
56 ICAO USOAP report on EASA (2008), supra note 92 in Ch.4. 
57 ICAO USOAP report on OECS (2007), supra note 248 in Ch.3, at Paragraph 3.3.8 (used with 
the permission of the ECCAA). 
58 Annex 1 to the Chicago Convention uses the term ‘Licensing Authority’ which means: ‘The 
Authority designated by a Contracting State as respon ible for the licensing of personnel’. 
59 A State may provide the aeronautical information itself, agree with one or more other Contract-
ing State(s) for the provision of a joint service, or delegate the authority for the provision of the 
service to a non-governmental agency, provided the S andards and Recommended Practices of this 
Annex are adequately met (see: Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention, at Paragraph 2.1.1). 
60 Under Paragraph 2.1.4 of Annex 3 to the Chicago Convention, each ICAO Member States ‘shall 
designate the authority …, to provide or to arrange for the provision of meteorological service for 
international air navigation on its behalf.’ 
61 Under Paragraph 2.4.1 of Annex 10 – Volume II to the Chicago Convention, each ICAO Mem-
ber State has an obligation to ‘designate the authority responsible for ensuring that the internation-
al aeronautical telecommunications service is conducted in accordance with the procedures of this 
Annex.’ 
62 Under Paragraph 2.1.1 of Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention each ICAO Member State has an 
obligation to arrange for air traffic services ‘to be established and provided in accordance with the 
provisions of this Annex, except that, by mutual agreement, a State may delegate to another State 
the responsibility for establishing and providing air traffic services in flight information regions, 
control areas or control zones extending over the territories of the former.’ An explanatory note to 
this provision further clarifies that: ‘If one State delegates to another State the responsibility for 
the provision of air traffic services over its territo y, it does so without derogation of its national 
sovereignty. Similarly, the providing State’s responsibility is limited to technical and operational 
considerations and does not extend beyond those pertaining to the safety and expedition of aircraft 
using the concerned airspace …’. 
63 Under Paragraph 2.5.1 of Annex 12 to the Chicago Convention each ICAO Member State has an 
obligation to ‘designate as search and rescue unitselements of public or private services suitably 
located and equipped for search and rescue operations.’ 
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reveals however that ICAO still struggles somewhat with the use of this concept. 
In the case of Annex 19, ICAO explains in the ‘Forward’ that: 
 
Certain State safety management functions required in Annex 19 may be delegated to a 
regional safety oversight organization or a regional accident and incident investigation 
organization on behalf of the State. 
 
The above formulation and especially the use of the word ce tain suggests 
that there may be limitations as to the scope or depth of the subj ct matter delega-
tion. Unfortunately however Annex 19 does not offer further guidance in this re-
spect.  
Even more confusing are the provisions of Annex 13, which is the only 
Annex which actually contains SARPs referring to RASOs. Althoug  Standard 
5.1 of this Annex gives to the ‘State of Occurrence’ the possibility to: ‘delegate 
the whole or any part of the conducting of such investigation to another State or a 
regional accident investigation organization (emphasis added)’, the explanatory 
note which accompanies this provision does not mention a RAIO when clarifying 
the consequences of the whole delegation: 
 
When the whole investigation is delegated to another State or a regional accident investi-
gation organization, such a State is expected to be responsible for the conduct of the in-
vestigation, including the issuance of the Final Report and the ADREP reporting. When a 
part of the investigation is delegated, the State of Occurrence usually retains the responsi-
bility for the conduct of the investigation (emphasis added).64 
 
Similarly, the ICAO manual on RAIOs seems to suggest that the possibil-
ity of delegating investigative functions to a regional body does not relieve a State 
from establishing a national investigation authority: 
 
In a more complex regional organization, the national accident investigation authorities 
may delegate the whole or part of their functions ad responsibilities concerning accident 
and incident investigation to the RAIO, which would conduct the actual investigation on 
behalf of Member States. Such investigations would be based on common regional regu-
lations, policies and procedures, while Member States would retain responsibility for the 
oversight of the system, in accordance with the Chicago Convention (emphasis added).65 
The above interpretation in the RAIO manual seems to be shared by the
ICAO ANC, which at the end of 2013 discussed a proposal for an amendment to 
Annex 13 introducing an obligation for States to establish an independent accident 
investigation authority,66 and where the team which developed the proposed 
amendment ‘felt that a regional accident and incident investigation organization 
(RAIO) was not an alternative to the national accident and incident nvestigation 
authority.’67 
                                                 
64 Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, at explanatory n te to Paragraph 5.1. 
65 ICAO Doc. 9946, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 3.10.1.5. 
66 ICAO, 'Final review of proposed amendment to Annex 13 relating to independence of accident 
and incident investigations', AN-WP/8803, (Air Navigation Commission, 2013). 




This study does not agree with such a restrictive approach. As was demon-
strated above, the vast majority of the ICAO Annexes do not oblige States to es-
tablish national authorities as a means of discharging their safety related obliga-
tions, and in those rare cases where such limiting language was included in the 
SARPs the subsequent State practice has demonstrated that such limitations are 
not sensible.  
In addition, as was pointed out by an official of one of the RAIOs, there 
are at present between 50 and 60 States which do not have resources and expertise 
to establish permanent accident investigation authorities.68 For such countries a 
requirement to establish a permanent investigation authority would probably re-
sult in filing of differences - which is not an answer - or establishing a one person 
authority to satisfy the ICAO requirement from a formal point of view, but which 
in practice would not have, on its own, the resources necessary to effectively in-
vestigate aviation accidents.69 
To conclude, ICAO Annexes should be drafted in a way which recognises 
that it is perfectly acceptable for a State to discharge its safety related obligations 
under Annex 13 or any other safety related Annex to the Chicago Convention by 
relying either on a national authority(ies) or, in part or even entirely, on a RASO 
type body as long as the State concerned can demonstrate that the relevant SARPs 
are effectively implemented. 
6.3.1 ‘STATE OF REGISTRY’ AND ‘STATE OF THE OPERATOR’ IN 
THE CONTEXT OF ESTABLISHING RASOs: LIMITATIONS OF 
THE CHICAGO CONVENTION 
The analysis of the legal consequences of establishing RASOs from the perspec-
tive of State responsibility under the Chicago Convention would not be complete 
without also addressing the concepts of the ‘State of Registry’ and ‘State of the 
Operator’, which are linked to basic State responsibilities in the context of inter-
national air navigation and stem directly from the provisions of the Chicago Con-
vention. 
6.3.1.1 RASO AS A ‘STATE OF REGISTRY’ 
The ‘State of Registry’ is one of the fundamental concepts in the Chicago Conven-
tion, and the one with which the Convention associates a number of legal conse-
quences, such as the obligation to issue certificates of airworthiness,70 to validate 
pilot licenses,71 or the right to appoint observers to an accident investigation.72 
There are also numerous other rights and obligations which are attached o the 
‘State of Registry’ through the technical Annexes of the Chicago Convention.73 
                                                 
68 'Interview No 10', (2014), supra note 210 in Ch.3. 
69 Ibid. 
70 'Chicago Convention', Article 31.  
71 Ibid. Article 32. 
72 Ibid. Article 26. 
73 See for example Annexes 6, 8 and 13 to the Chicago Convention. 
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A contracting State to the Chicago Convention acquires the status of the 
‘State of Registry’ when an aircraft is entered on its national aircraft regist y.74 
This act of registration also creates a unique link between the aircraft and its 
‘State of Registry’ which the Chicago Convention refers to as nationality of air-
craft.75 Under the Chicago Convention, the general principle is that an ircraft can 
have a nationality of only one State – the ‘State of Registry’.76 
In the context of this study the question emerges whether there are any le-
gal limitations as to the ability of a RASO to carry out on behalf of a State the 
functions of a ‘State of Registry’. The general answer to this question i  that such 
a delegation is legally acceptable. Relevant State and ICAO practice demonstrates 
that it is possible to establish, in compliance with the Chicago Convention, a RA-
SO which would discharge the functions of a ‘State of Registry’ with respect to, 
for example, aircraft design (IAC, EASA) or accident investigation matters (IAC).  
It is also possible to have a RASO discharging on behalf of States the 
functions associated with aircraft registration, including the issuance of certifi-
cates of registration and airworthiness. In 2014 there was one RASO (ECCAA), 
having such competences. In such cases however aircraft still have the nationality 
of the State on behalf of which they are registered in accordance with Article 17 
of the Chicago Convention. For example, in the case of aircraft registered by EC-
CAA, each OECS Member State retains its national registration marks as assigned 
by ICAO.77 It is not possible to overcome this limitation without an amendment to 
the Chicago Convention. 
A limited exception to the general principle of registering aircraft on a na-
tional basis is contained in Article 77 of the Chicago Convention.  This exception 
is available only to aircraft operated by an international operating agency, which 
is an airline established by two or more of the ICAO Member States on the basis 
of an international treaty.78 According to an ICAO Council determination made in 
1967 on the basis of Article 77 of the Chicago Convention, aircraft of internation-
al operating agencies can be registered either jointly by the States constituting the 
agency or on an international basis.79 In both cases all aircraft of an international 
operating agency which are registered on other than a national basis will bear the 
same common registration mark.80 
The only practical example of application of the possibility of n n-national 
aircraft registration has so far been the case of Arab Air Cargo, which is an inter-
national operating agency set up in 1983 by Iraq and Kingdom of Jordan and still 
functioning today.81 Although all aircraft of Arab Air Cargo have a common non-
                                                 
74 The Annexes to the Chicago Convention define the ‘State of Registry’ as ‘The State on whose 
register the aircraft is entered’. For further commentary on legal aspects of aircraft registration and 
nationality from aviation safety perspective see: Huang, supra note 29 in Ch.1, at pp. 24-32. 
75 'Chicago Convention', Article 17. 
76 Ibid. Article 18. 
77 'Interview No 7', (2014), supra note 232 in Ch.3. 
78 Pablo Mendes de Leon, Cabotage in Air Transport Regulation, (1992), pp. 128-134. 
79 ICAO, 'Resolution on Nationality and Registration of Aircraft Operated by International 
Operating Agencies', (Reproduced in ICAO Doc. 9587 'Policy and Guidance Material on the 
Economic Regulation of International Air Transport'). 
80 Ibid. at Paragraph 1. 
81 For an overview of this case see: Michael Milde, 'Nationality and registration of aircraft 
operated by Joint Air Transport Operating Organizations or International Operating Agencies', 
AASL, X (1985). For a critical analysis of the ICAO Council resolution see: Khairy El - Hussainy, 
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national registration mark assigned by ICAO (4YB), the actual registation tasks 
are performed by the Kingdom of Jordan, which also carries out the functions of 
the ‘State of Registry’ on behalf of Iraq,82 and is considered as a ‘Common mark 
registering authority’ from the perspective of Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention 
which deals with aircraft registration.83 Furthermore according to the ICAO de-
termination concerning Arab Air Cargo, the governments of Iraq and Jordan are: 
 
[J]ointly and severally bound to assume the obligations and responsibilities which under 
the Convention on International Civil Aviation attach to the State of registry; any com-
plaints by other contracting States will be accepted by both the Governments of Jordan 
and Iraq.84 
 
The example of Arab Air Cargo represents a case of a j int aircraft regis-
tration by a number of ICAO Member States. However, from the perspective of 
this study of greater relevance is the second possibility envisaged by the ICAO 
Council, namely that of international aircraft registration. So far however there 
have been no cases of using this possibility in practice.  
The above mentioned ICAO resolution of 1967, defines international air-
craft registration as: 
 
[T]he cases where the aircraft to be operated by an international operating agency would 
be registered not on a national basis but with an international organization having legal 
personality, whether or not such international organiz tion is composed of the same States 
as have constituted the international operating agency.85 
 
The ICAO has further clarified in its Resolution that: 
 
[I]n arriving at its determination [the Council], shall be satisfied that any system of inter-
national registration devised by the States constituting the international operating agency 
gives the other Member States of ICAO sufficient guarantees that the provisions of the 
Chicago Convention are complied with.86 
 
Finally, according to the subject matter Resolution, the following criteria 
have to be met, as a minimum, by States envisaging international aircraft registra-
tion: 
                                                                                                                            
'Registration and Nationality of Aircraft operated by International Agencies in Law and Practice', 
Air Law, X (1985), pp. 15-27. 
82 A similar solution is envisaged under Article 18 of the Convention on offences and certain other 
acts committed on board aircraft, signed at Tokyo, on 14 September 1963 (Tokyo Convention) 
which provides that: ‘If Contracting States establish joint air transport operating organizations or 
international operating agencies, which operate aircraft not registered in any one State those States 
shall, according to the circumstances of the case, designate the State among them which, for the 
purposes of this Convention, shall be considered as the State of registration and shall give notice 
thereof to the International Civil Aviation Organization which shall communicate the notice to all 
States Parties to this Convention.’ 
83 Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention, at 'Definitions' and at Paragraph 3.5. 
84 Milde, 'Nationality and registration of aircraft operated by Joint Air Transport Operating 
Organizations or International Operating Agencies', supra note 81, at p. 149. 
85 Resolution on International Operating Agencies, supra note 79, at 'Appendix 1'. 




(1) The States constituting the international operating agency shall be jointly and sever-
ally bound to assume the obligations which, under th  Chicago Convention, attach to 
a State of registry; 
 
(2) The operation of the aircraft concerned shall not give rise to any discrimination 
against aircraft registered in other Contracting States with respect to the provisions of 
the Chicago Convention; 
 
(3) The States constituting the international operating agency shall ensure that their laws, 
regulations and procedures as they relate to the aircraft and personnel of the interna-
tional operating agency when engaged in internationl air navigation shall meet in a 
uniform manner the obligations under the Chicago Convention and the Annexes 
thereto.87 
 
According to Milde ‘in the discussions leading to the Council Resolution, 
it has been suggested that even ICAO itself or the United Nations or other interna-
tional organizations could become such a registering authority.’88 This leads to the 
conclusion that a RASO could be considered as an international aircraft register-
ing authority subject to the following conditions and limitations: 
 
(1) The RASO should be established as an entity with a separate legal person-
ality. This requirement set by the ICAO Council is also in line with the 
findings of this study, according to which the establishment of a relation-
ship of an international agency requires the organisation which acts on be-
half of States to possess a separate international legal personality (see Sec-
tion 4.3.2 of Chapter 4); 
 
(2) The international registration functions of a RASO would be applicable 
only to aircraft of joint operating agencies as envisaged under Article 77 of 
the Chicago Convention. This is the main practical limitation of the Chi-
cago Convention with regard to non-national aircraft registration. In re-
spect to aircraft operated by operators not having status of joint operating 
agencies a RASO can only carry out, on behalf of States, the national re-
sponsibilities of the ‘State of Registry, as is the case today with ECCAA; 
 
(3) From the perspective of Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention a RASO car-
rying out international registration functions should be considered as a 
common mark registering authority, and in this respect would be obliged 
to establish and maintain a dedicated ‘non-national register or, where ap-
propriate, a part thereof, in which aircraft of an international operating 
agency are registered.’89 
 
Finally it has to be reiterated that the ICAO Council Resolution c ncerning 
non-national aircraft registration is clear that the setting up of an international 
                                                 
87 Ibid. 
88 Milde, 'Nationality and registration of aircraft operated by Joint Air Transport Operating 
Organizations or International Operating Agencies', supra note 81, at p. 150 
89 Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention, at 'Definitions'. 
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aircraft registration scheme does not relieve the States participating in such a 
scheme from the responsibilities that the Chicago Convention attaches to the 
‘State of Registry’, and that the States concerned shall be jointly a d severally 
responsible for assuming these obligations.90  
Given the fact that so far there has been no practical case of application of 
international aircraft registration, it is not clear what the position of the ICAO 
Council would be as to the possibility of joint and several responsibility of the 
States and the international aircraft registering authority. This study argues that 
such possibility should not be excluded, given the fact that the international air-
craft registering authority would be exercising on behalf of States safety critical 
tasks such as the issuance of certificates of airworthiness.  
Should such parallel responsibility of the international registering authority 
be allowed, this would be the only case of an international orgnisation directly 
bound by the provisions of the Chicago Convention.91 The legal basis for such 
responsibility would then be the determination of the ICAO Council made in ac-
cordance with Article 77 of the Chicago Convention. 
6.3.1.2 RASO AS A ‘STATE OF THE OPERATOR’  
The second basic State safety function under the Chicago Conventio is the ‘State 
of the Operator’, which was introduced through Article 83bis of the Convention, 
and is defined as ‘the State where the operator has his principal place of business 
or, if he has no such place of business, his permanent residence’.92 As is the case 
with the ‘State of Registry’, the details of the tasks and responsibilities of the 
‘State of the Operator’ are defined in the technical Annexes to the Chicago Con-
vention, and notably Annex 6. 
There is no doubt that under the current international legal framework a 
RASO can discharge on behalf of a State the functions of a ‘State of thOpera-
tor’. As was already mentioned above, Annex 6 clearly distinguishes between the 
‘State of the Operator’ and the authority responsible for the issuing of the AOC. 
This gives States the possibility of designating a RASO as the latter. ECCAA is 
the only example of a RASO which in 2014 was discharging ‘State of he Opera-
tor’ functions on behalf of its Member States. 
However, there are certain legal pitfalls that States should be aware of 
when deciding to discharge their ‘State of the Operator’ responsibilities on other 
than a national basis. 
The first point of attention is the fact that ICAO does not readily accept all 
schemes where several States act jointly as the ‘State of the Operator’. This is, for 
example, presently the case with the Scandinavian Airline System (SAS), which is 
a consortium established in 1951 by Sweden, Norway and Denmark under an in-
ternational agreement.93 For the purpose of safety oversight of SAS, the three par-
ticipating States concluded an agreement under which they share oversight re-
sponsibilities, including through the establishment of a joint Scandinavian Flight 
Safety Office (STK), and joint issuance of approvals and certificates for this com-
                                                 
90 Resolution on International Operating Agencies, supra note 79, at Appendix 2, Part 1. 
91 For cases where an international organisation could be bound indirectly by the provisions of the 
Chicago Convention see Section 6.5.4 below. 
92 'Chicago Convention', Article 83 bis (a). 
93 Mendes de Leon, supra note 78, at pp. 125-127. 
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pany, which means in practice that the approvals are granted on one document 
issued jointly by the civil aviation authorities of these three States.94 In relation to 
this arrangement the ICAO USOAP audit of Norway conducted in 2006 has raised 
a finding according to which: 
 
[N]o evidence was provided to show that there was appropriate legal basis for such an 
oversight mechanism and that Norway had established a means to ensure that its national 
and international obligations for safety oversight in the delegated areas were fulfilled.95 
 
As a result ICAO has recommended to Norway to: 
 
[E]nsure that there is an appropriate legal basis for it to assume responsibility on the over-
sight of SAS International and for the delegation of oversight tasks to STK.96 When and if 
applicable, Norway should also establish a means to ensure that its national and interna-
tional obligations for safety oversight in the delegated areas are fulfilled.97 
 
The above demonstrates that ICAO seems to accept that a number of its 
Member States could act jointly as a ‘State of the Operator’, provided that there is 
a clear legal basis for the delegation of safety oversight tasks to a joint safety 
oversight office, and the States concerned can demonstrate that national nd inter-
national obligations for safety oversight are met. However, this sudy argues, that 
the fact that three ICAO Member States jointly sign an AOC of the airline dilutes 
the ‘State of the Operator’ responsibilities and does not allow c ear identification 
of which authority is responsible, from a practical point of view, for safety over-
sight of the operator. It could be argued that in schemes such a  this, either: 
 
(1) the principles similar to those which were developed by the ICAO 
Council for joint aircraft registration should be applicable, that is 
designation of a single ‘State of the Operator’ which should act on 
behalf of all the States concerned, or  
 
(2) the States concerned should delegate the exercise of the functions 
of ‘State of the Operator’ to a RASO. 
 
The second point to which States should pay attention is the plit between 
the ‘State of Registry’ and the ‘State of the Operator’. Such a scenario is possible 
under Article 83bis of the Chicago Convention, which in such cases provides for 
                                                 
94 The SAS is under oversight of OPS-Utvalget (Scandinavian Surveillance System), which is an 
entity established by an Agreement signed on 20 December 1951 by the Foreign Ministers of 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway for the purpose of promoting cooperation among Scandinavian 
flight safety authorities. The OPS-Utvalget agreement also establishes the STK which is designat-
ed as a joint inspection office to perform relevant pproval and oversight tasks with respect to 
SAS. The AOC of SAS is signed by the Directors General of the three authorities on behalf of 
OPS-Utvalget (Source: ICAO, 'Final report on the safety oversight audit of the civil aviation 
system of the Kingdom of Norway', (2006), 
<http://cfapp.icao.int/fsix/AuditReps/CSAfinal/Norway_USOAP_Final_Audit_Report.pdf> 
[accessed 12 August 2014]. 





the possibility of transferring all or part of the functions and duties of the ‘State of 
Registry’ to the ‘State of the Operator’. Such transfers allows the exercise of all 
safety functions related to international air navigation to be kept under the respon-
sibility of a single State, which then has a holistic view of the safety performance 
of both the operator and its aircraft. However, given the fact that international 
organisations cannot be party to the Chicago Convention, the conclusion of Arti-
cle 83bis agreements is only possible between States. From a RASO perspective 
this has two consequences: 
 
(1) Where a RASO exercises on behalf of its Member States the functions and 
duties of the ‘State of the Operator’ or ‘State of Registry’ it will not be 
able to conclude Article 83bis with third countries, at least in its own 
name;98 
 
(2) Where a RASO exercises on behalf of its Member States only the func-
tions and duties of the ‘State of Registry’, while the RASO Member States 
continue to exercise the functions and duties of the ‘State of Operator’, 
any agreement concerning the transfer of responsibilities which may be 
concluded between the RASO and its Member States, may not be recog-
nised by third countries.99 
 
6.4 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
6.4.1 ACT OR OMISSION ATTRIBUTABLE TO A STATE UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The starting point for analysing the implications of establishing regional aviation 
safety bodies for international State responsibility is the basic prin i le of interna-
tional law according to which every internationally wrongful act of a St te entails 
the international responsibility of that State. This principle was applied in a num-
ber of cases by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the ICJ,100 
and is reflected in Article 1 of the International Law Commission’ (ILC) ‘Draft 
                                                 
98 It could be envisaged however, that a RASO is authorised to conclude Article 83bis agreements 
on behalf of its Member States. 
99 It cannot be excluded however that a RASO which is designated by its Member States as a joint 
registering authority under Article 77 of the Chicago Convention could be a party to a transfer 
agreement which could be recognised as valid under the Chicago Convention. Indeed, Article 
83bis (c) of the Chicago Convention provides that its provisions of paragraphs a) and b) shall also 
be applicable to cases covered by Article 77 of the C icago Convention. The deliberations of the 
legal committee which led to the formulation of theArticle 83bis considered this issue, but finally 
decided not to go into more details as it was believ d that it would be difficult to ‘consider all 
different cases of transfer of functions and duties from joint and international operating organiza-
tions to the contracting States which were not members of such organizations’. For further details 
see: Burkhart von Erlach, 'Public law aspects of lease, charter and interchange of aircraft in 
international operations', in: Master Thesis, (McGill University: Institute of Air and Space Law, 
1990),  (pp. 84-87). 
100 'Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v France), Judgement', in: [1938] PCIJ Series A/B-No 74, 
(PCIJ,1938),  (p. 28); 'Corfu Channel, Judgement', in: [1949] ICJ Reports 4, (ICJ,1949),  (p. 23); 
'Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America)', in: [1986] ICJ Reports 14, (ICJ,1986),  pp. 142-143). 
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Articles on State Responsibility’ (DASR).101 It essentially means that if a State 
breaches an obligation created by international law, this entails that S ate’s re-
sponsibility and as a consequence an obligation of reparations.102 The reparations 
can take the form of restitution, compensation or satisfaction.103 
An internationally wrongful act occurs when there is an act or omission 
which is attributable to a State under international law, and which constitutes a 
breach of an international obligation of that State.104 The notion of attribution in 
this sense is a different concept from empowering a body or organisatio  to act 
under administrative or international law, as was addressed under Section 6.2 
above, and denotes ‘an operation of attaching a given action or omissi n to a 
State.’105 
Firstly the notion of an act or omission has to be considered. In the context 
of this study these would be primarily acts or omissions related to the conduct of 
safety oversight activities, such as certifications, inspections, or the taking of en-
forcement actions to address identified non-compliances. Legislative ctivities 
could also be considered as a potential act or omission triggering international 
State responsibility. This could be the case for example where a State has an obli-
gation stemming from the Chicago Convention to adopt a rule, and does not fulfil 
this obligation in due time or fulfils it incorrectly.106 
Concerning the attribution aspects, as was demonstrated under Section 6.2, 
States discharge their civil aviation safety responsibilities either through govern-
mental departments, but also through private entities such as subcontractors or 
authorised organisations and persons. When it comes to the civil aviat on authori-
ties, the situation is straightforward, as regardless of a particular setup, all these 
agencies and ministries constitute parts of a State’s government and therefore the 
acts of their civil servants, acting within their official capacity, will be the acts of 
the State itself, and thus attributable to the State. As stated by the ICJ: 
 
According to a well-established rule of international law, the conduct of any organ of a 
State must be regarded as an act of that State. This rule … is of customary character.107 
                                                 
101 UN, 'Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts (DASR)', 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Volume II, Part 2 (2001). For further commentary 
see: James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries, (2002), p. 77. The DASR do not have a status of an interna-
tional treaty, and have been only noted by the UN General Assembly, and commended to the atten-
tion of States (UN General Assembly Resolution 65/19 of 6 December 2010). It is however con-
sidered that the DASR is largely a codification of customary international law; see: James 
Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part, (2013), pp. 42-44. 
102 UN, 'DASR (2001)', supra note 101, Article 31. See also: 'Case concerning the Factory at 
Chorzów (Germany v Poland), Judgement', in: [1928] PCIJ Series A-No 17, (PCIJ,1928),  (p. 29). 
In this case the PCIJ stated that: ‘it is a principle of international law, and even a general concep-
tion of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation.’ 
103 UN, 'DASR (2001)', supra note 101, Articles 34-37. 
104 Ibid. Article 2. See also: 'Phosphates in Morocco (1938)', supra note 100, (p. 28); 'United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgement', in: [1980] 
ICJ Reports 3, (ICJ,1980),  pp. 29-31). 
105 Crawford, supra note 101, at p. 84. 
106 For example when a State fails to transpose a particular ICAO SARP into its national legal 
order and does not notify a difference under Article 38 of the Chicago Convention. 
107 'Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the 




When it comes to international State responsibility for actions u dertaken 
by entities which are not part of the governmental structures, the case of ATM and 
provision of ANS offers a useful analogy, given that many States provide such 
services today through corporatized or privatised ANSPs.108 
 
As pointed out by Van Antwerpen: 
 
[N]otwistanding the organizational format, the underlying State in whose airspace ... air 
navigation services are being provided is ultimately r sponsible for the conduct of the air 
navigation service provider that is involved with the service provision, whether or not 
through its agents or through an entity outside its governmental structures.109 
 
The above stems from the fact that under Article 28 of the Chicago Con-
vention, a State has a general responsibility towards other contra ti g parties to 
provide in its territory ANS and facilitates, and to ensure that these meet the min-
imum standards as established under the Chicago Convention.110 According to 
ICAO, the territorial State remains responsible to fulfil these obligations, even 
when it has decided to delegate their practical implementation to anoher State.111 
Does a similar principle apply in the case of delegation by State of civil 
aviation safety oversight, regulatory and enforcement activities outside of gov-
ernmental structures?  
From the perspective of the Chicago Convention the reply to the above 
question is affirmative, which means that the acts and omissions of corporate law 
entities which exercise elements of governmental authority can be attributed to 
States from an international law point of view. This is clear bothfr m the general 
principles of international law of State responsibility, and the provisions of Chica-
go Convention and its Annexes. 
In this respect, the main guidance is offered by Article 5 of the DASR 
which clarifies that: 
                                                                                                                            
Also as pointed out by Crawford (supra note 101, at p. 83): ‘Under many legal systems, the State 
organs consist of different legal persons (ministrie  or other legal entities), which are regarded as 
having distinct rights and obligations … . For the purposes of international law of State responsi-
bility the position is different. The State is treat d as a unity, consistent with its recognition as a 
single legal person under international law.’ 
108 CANSO, 'Guide to Separation of Service Provision and Regulation', (2011),  at p. 36. 
109 Van Antwerpen, supra note 52 in Ch.1, at p. 115.  
110 Some treaties explicitly provide for attribution to States of actions undertaken by operational 
entities. For example the ‘Outer Space Treaty’ in its Article VII attributes to a State responsibility 
for any damage caused to other States-parties, includi g their nationals, by objects launched from 
its territory or facilities, and it is irrelevant if the launch is performed by a governmental or non-
governmental entity. See: 'Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies', London, 
Moscow and Washington, 27 January 1967, 610 UNTS 205. 
111 See: ICAO, 'Assembly Resolution A38-12: Consolidate  Statement of continuing ICAO 
policies and associated practices related specifically to air navigation', (38th ICAO Assembly, 
2013),  which States, at Appendix G that: ‘[A]ny delegation of responsibility by one State to an-
other or any assignment of responsibility over the high seas shall be limited to technical and opera-
tional functions pertaining to the safety and regularity of the air traffic operating in the airspace 
concerned.’ Similarly: ICAO, 'Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention: Air Traffic Services', (2001), 




[T]he conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under Article 4 but 
which is empowered by the law of that State to exercis  elements of the governmental au-
thority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person 
or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance. 
 
As explained by Crawford, the entities referred to in Article 5 of the DASR 
may include: 
 
[P]ublic corporations, semi-public entities, public agencies of various kinds and even pri-
vate entities, provided that in each case the entity is explicitly empowered by the law of 
the State to exercise functions of a public characte  normally exercised by State organs.112 
 
However, it has to be underlined that, in accordance with Article 5 of the 
DASR, actions of corporate entities will be attributable to States only in those 
cases where they ‘exercise elements of the governmental authority.’ This point is 
important in view of the fact that such entities may provide similar services to 
governments as well as to other companies on the market. For exampl , some 
airlines may wish to contract certification services with a view to helping them to 
prepare for audits conducted by aviation authorities.113 Such commercial services 
will not be considered as falling with the scope of Article 5 of DASR. 
In addition, as was demonstrated under Section 6.3, most of the ICAO An-
nexes actually explicitly envisage the possibility for a State to designate authori-
ties or organisations which are tasked to exercise, on its behalf, the various re-
sponsibilities and tasks codified in these Annexes. From the perspective of the 
Chicago Convention it does not matter if such organisations or bodies are set up 
under public or private law of the State concerned. It is up to the S ate to decide 
how best to organise the discharge of its safety related responsibilitie . However 
States have to be aware that if such organisations are empowered by law to exer-
cise elements of the governmental authority, their acts may be attributable to 
States under international law. 
6.4.2 BREACH OF AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION 
Up to 2014 there had been very limited number of cases considered, even prelimi-
narily, from a perspective of international State responsibility under the Chicago 
Convention.114 Most of the cases which emerged did not reach the stage of the 
ICJ, and were usually settled through negotiations between the Stat s con-
cerned.115 However, it is also true that the ICAO Council had, on a number of oc-
casions, determined that certain State actions constituted infractions of the Chica-
go Convention within the meaning of its Article 54(j)-(k). These cases concerned 
                                                 
112 Crawford, supra note 101, at p. 100. 
113 For example Austrocontrol, which is a corporatized entity authorized by law to conduct civil 
aviation certification and oversight tasks in Austria, has also established a subsidiary company - 
Austro Control GmbH International – which provides training, consultancy and project support 
services to civil aviation industry. 




aviation security, and more precisely the shoot-down or interception of civil air-
craft.116 
As far as the concept of the breach of an international obligation is con-
cerned, the first point that has to be made is that such a breach does not have to 
result in damage in order to trigger the responsibility.117 This is a different formu-
lation from that in domestic law, where the responsibility and resulting civil liabil-
ity typically occurs when there is damage resulting from an act, based on 
fault/negligence or abnormally dangerous activity, attributable to a person and 
with a clear causal link between the damage and the act.118  
The breach of an international obligation which is attributable to a State is 
sufficient to trigger the responsibility under international law. In practice however, 
when it comes to aviation safety, cases involving questions of State responsibility 
are not likely to arise unless they involve material damages.  
It is also irrelevant what the origin or source of the legal obligation is, be-
cause international law does not distinguish between responsibility ex contractu or 
ex delicto.119 
There is also a clear distinction between State responsibility under interna-
tional law and domestic liability , which is addressed under Section 6.6. In general, 
liability has a broader meaning and may also involve acts that are not unlawful 
under international law, but which cause damage or injury, and which on this basis 
create an obligation of compensation.120 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, the system of the Chicago Convention 
establishes a number of safety related obligations for States, including, the obliga-
tion to implement SARPs or to notify the differences (Article 37 and 38), to issue 
or validate the certificates of airworthiness and pilot licences (Article 31 and 32), 
to licence the usage of on-board radio equipment (Article 30), to enforce rules 
related to the flight and manoeuvre of aircraft (Article 12), or to investigate acci-
dents occurring it its territory (Article 26). States can potentially be found in 
breach of any of them. 
In addition, as was demonstrated by Huang in his study of international 
obligations related to safety and security of civil aviation, it could be argued that 
failure by a State to establish an effective safety oversight system is a breach of an 
obligation which every State owes towards all other States, hence a breach of an 
obligation effective erga omnes.121 This could occur especially if the deficiencies 
in a State’s safety oversight system were confirmed by ICAO in an objective 
manner.122 Such a breach could arguably lead to State responsibility, as interna-
                                                 
116 ICAO, 'Infractions of the Convention on International Civil Aviation', C-WP/11186, (185th 
session of the ICAO Council, 1999). 
117 Crawford, supra note 101, at p. 84. 
118 European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law: text and commentary, (2005). 
119 ‘[A]ny violation by a State of any obligation, of whatever origin, gives rise to State responsibil-
ity and consequently, to the duty of reparation’; See: 'Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v France)', 
in: [1990] RIAA, Volume XX, (New Zealand-France Arbitral Tribunal,1990),  (p. 251). 
120 For further discussion see: Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at p. 1006; Crawford, 
supra note 101, at p. 75. 
121 Huang, supra note 29 in Ch.1, at p. 231. 
122 This would be for example the case when ICAO, following the USOAP monitoring activities, 
issues a Significant Safety Concern (SSC) in respect to one of its Member States. 
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tional law does not limit State responsibility to breaches of obligations established 
by treaties only.123 
The above leads to the conclusion that a breach of an obligation of effec-
tive civil aviation safety oversight, including resulting from acts or omissions 
conducted by non-governmental entities acting on behalf of a State, can result in 
an international responsibility of that State, and subsequently a  obligation of rep-
arations if the breach has resulted in an injury.124 However, as underlined by 
Crawford in his commentary to DASR, ‘there is no such thing as breach of an 
international obligation in the abstract’,125 which means that each case has to be 
analysed separately taking into account, in the first place, the obligation of the 
State concerned, the substance of the conduct required, the standard to be ob-
served, the result to be achieved and relevant circumstances and facts of a particu-
lar case.126 
The question that now needs to be addressed is whether the above princi-
ples also apply when States delegate their State safety functions to a RASO. 
6.5 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF RASOs AND THEIR 
MEMBER STATES 
 
6.5.1 DETERMINING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF 
RASOs 
The international law regarding responsibility of international organisations is still 
not settled and many issues are open to interpretation or even disputes.127 Leckow 
and Plith characterise the current situation in this respect in the following way: 
While it is recognised that States should be held rsponsible for their actions, the rules 
governing responsibility of international organizatons are less clear. As a general princi-
ple, there is little doubt that international organiz tions should bear responsibility for 
wrongful acts. But the international legal jurisprudence and practice governing the cir-
cumstances in which responsibility will be imposed on international organizations is not 
extensive or well-defined.128 
 In 2011 the UN ILC presented to the UN General Assembly ‘Draft Articles 
on the Responsibility of International Organizations’ (DARIO)129 with associated 
commentary, 130 which is a result of ten years of work by the ILC on this subject. 
                                                 
123 'Rainbow Warrior', supra note 119, (p.251). 
124 Injury includes any damage, whether material or not, caused by the internationally wrongful act 
of a State. See: UN, 'DASR (2001)', supra note 101, Article 31(2). 
125 Crawford, supra note 101, at p. 124. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Int r ational Law of International 
Organisations, (2005), p. 384. 
128 Ross Leckow and Erik Plith, 'Codification, Progressive Development or Innovation? - Some 
Reflections on the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations', in: 
Responsibility of international organizations: essay  in memory of Sir Ian Brownlie, ed. by 
Maurizio Ragazzi (2013),  p. 225. 
129 UN, 'Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations (DARIO)', Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, Volume II, Part 2 (2011). 
130 UN, 'Commentary to draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations', 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Volume II, Part 2 (2011). 
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The ILC in its general commentary to DARIO recognised the difficulties in 
codifying this area of law by referring to limited availability of pertinent practice 
and limited use of procedures for third-party settlement of disputes to which inter-
national organisations are parties.131 As a result, DARIO constitutes more of a 
progressive development of international law than its codification.132 
Regardless of the above controversies, there are a number of principles, 
which are considered as of customary character in relation to responsibility of 
international organisations under international law.  
First of all, the very principle that an international organisation can be held 
responsible for breaches of international law is of customary character,133 and was 
confirmed in the rulings of the ICJ.134 
It is also clear that in accordance with international law, only organisations 
vested with international legal personality have a legal existence separat  from 
their Member States, and thus can have their international responsibility potential-
ly engaged, or can demand responsibility of other international persons. This has 
been confirmed both by the ICJ,135 and the ILC, which in Article 2(a) of DARIO 
provided the following definition of an international organisation: 
 
[I]nternational organization means an organization established by a treaty or other instru-
ment governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personali-
ty. International organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other enti-
ties (emphasis added).136 
 
A contrario therefore, if an organisation does not possess international le-
gal personality separate from its Member States, then it constitute  merely an ex-
tension of States and thus when an organisation acts, it is as if the States were act-
ing themselves.137 For the purpose of this study the latter would be the case with 
the pre-RASOs established in the form of national foundations / associ tions and / 
or on the basis of MoUs or working arrangements. 
As pointed out by Schermers and Blokker, ‘today it is generally ecognised 
that international organizations have international legal personality, unless there is 
clear evidence to the contrary.’138 They further point out, that the prevailing 
school of thought at present is that: 
 
                                                 
131 Ibid. at 'General Commentary', Paragraph 5. 
132 In 2011 the UN General Assembly took note of the articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations, presented by the International Law Commission and commended them to the atten-
tion of the governments and international organizations without prejudice to the question of their 
future adoption or other appropriate action (see: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
66/100 of 9 December 2011).  For a more general discussion about the relevance of DARIO see: 
Maurizio Ragazzi, 'Responsibility of international organizations: essays in memory of Sir Ian 
Brownlie', (2013). 
133 UN, 'DARIO commentary (2011)', supra note 130, at p.13. 
134 'Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process', upra note 107, (p.88-89). 
135 'Reparation for Injuries', supra note 74 in Ch.4, (pp. 178-179, 184-185). 
136 UN, 'DARIO (2011)', supra note 129, Article 2(a). 
137 This has been confirmed by the ICJ in the case: 'Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru', supra note 
10 in Ch.3, (p.258). See also: Sarooshi, upra note 19 in Ch.2, at p. 34. 
138 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at p. 991. 
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[International] organizations are international legal persons not ipso facto, but because the 
status is given to them either explicitly, or if there is no constitutional attribution of this 
quality, implicitly. If organizations are empowered to conclude treaties, to exchange rep-
resentatives, and to mobilize international forces … how can such powers be exercised 
without the organization having the status of an international legal person?139 
 
In view of the above, for the purpose of the present analysis, only RASOs 
proper will be taken into account, with a caveat that – as was demonstrated under 
Section 5.5 of Chapter 5 – only a few of the agreements constituti g RASOs ex-
plicitly provide for their international legal personality.  
The presumption of existence of international legal personality is particu-
larly strong in case of RASOs which have been vested with the competence to 
issue regulatory documents on behalf of their Member States (Level 3 delegation). 
This presumption follows from the relationship of an international agency, which 
was presented under Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4, and which is created b tween a 
RASO and its Member States in cases where the former is empowered to act un-
der international law with legally binding effects. In addition many of the RASOs 
have also concluded headquarters agreements with their host States. This treaty 
making activity is also an indication of an international legal personality. 
As Sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.4 will explain, distinction has to be made be-
tween the attribution of the international legal personality to an organisation in 
relations with the Member States of that organisation, and vis-à-vi third coun-
tries. In the latter case, the question of recognition of the organisation as an inter-
national legal person becomes relevant. Finally a distinction has to be made be-
tween international legal personality and domestic legal personality (the latter will 
be dealt with in Section 6.6.4.1). 
Overall, at least nine RASOs from the core sample can be considered as 
having a certain degree of international legal personality, either because it has
been explicitly envisaged in its founding treaty (AAMAC, PASO), because the 
organisation has been granted or has the legal competence to accept Level 3 d le-
gations (EASA, IAC, ECCAA, BAGASOO, BAGAIA), or because it has con-
cluded or has the competence to conclude headquarters agreements (BAGASOO, 
BAGAIA, AAMAC, CASSOS, IAC, ECCAA). 
Table VIII below presents a summary of possible indicators for determin-











                                                 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.5.2 THE SUBSTANCE OF RASOs RESPONSIBILITY UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
6.5.2.1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
When discussing the substance of RASOs’ international responsibility a distinc-
tion has to be made, on the one hand, between such international responsibility of 
a RASO towards its Member States and, on the other hand, towards thir -
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countries. This distinction is important in view of the principle pacta tertiis nec 
nocent nec prosunt, which does not permit an imposition of an obligation on a 
State, or international organisation, without its consent.140  
The relationship between a RASO and its Member States will in the first 
place be regulated by the constituent treaty and other relevant documents, such as 
the headquarters / host State agreement,141 or bilateral delegation agreements. 
These documents, as well as general rules of international law can be a source of 
rights and obligations in the bilateral relations between a RASO and its Member 
States. If such obligations are breached, international responsibility could, in prin-
ciple, be invoked by the organisation142 or its Member States.143 The main diffi-
culty in such cases would of course be the fact that ‘there is no compulsory sys-
tem for review of the acts of international organizations by external bodies’.144 In 
the case of RASOs only some of their constituent documents explicitly provide 
for such mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms,145 which from the perspective 
of DARIO could be referred to as special rules of international law, or lex special-
is.146 
The question of international responsibility of a RASO vis-à-vis the non-
Member States is even more complicated in view of the above invoked principle 
pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, and the consequent lack of a third party ef-
fect of the RASO founding documents. This issue is probably most relevant from 
                                                 
140 'Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties', supra note 63 in Ch.2, Articles 35-36.  
141 The conclusion of headquarters agreements is explicitly envisaged in: 'BAGASOO Agreement', 
supra note 128 in Ch.3, Article 17; 'BAGAIA Agreement', supra note 179 in Ch.3, Article 15; 
'AAMAC Treaty', supra note 62 in Ch.3, Article 7; 'Agreement establishing the Caribbean 
Aviation Safety and Security Oversight System', (2008),  Article XVI. 
142 In the ‘Reparations for Injuries’ case, the ICJ stated that ‘it cannot be doubted that the Organi-
zation has the capacity to bring an international claim against one of its Members which has 
caused injury to it by a breach of its international obligations towards it’; see: 'Reparation for 
Injuries', supra note 74 in Ch.4, (p. 180). 
143 The RASO Member States have various ways of exerting influence on the functioning of the 
organisation, notably through the control of its budget and work programme, so an international 
action would be used as a means of a last resort. 
144 Crawford, supra note 71 in Ch.4, at p.196. 
145 For example CASSOA, if it fails to resolve any dispute with a Member State through a dispute 
resolution mechanism can bring the case to the East African Court of Justice, whose decisions are 
final; see: CASSOA Protocol, supra note 150 in Ch.3, Article 18. Similarly the ECCAA can be  
party to the proceedings in front of arbitration tribunals in cases involving its disputes with Mem-
ber States; see: 'ECCAA Agreement', supra note 226 in Ch.3, Article 24. Also EUROCONTROL 
can be a party in dispute resolution proceedings with its Member States, and which involve a pos-
sibility of arbitration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, as provided in: 
'Consolidated version of the EUROCONTROL international Convention relating to co-operation 
for the safety of air navigation of 13 December 1960, as variously amended', Brussels, 27 June 
1997, Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference. The position of EASA is specific, as eventual dis-
putes related to the implementation of the EU legisation are resolved between EU institutions and 
EU Member States in front of the CJEU. 
146 See Article 64 of DARIO, supra note 129, which states that: ‘These articles do not apply where 
and to the extent that the conditions for the existnce of an internationally wrongful act or the 
content or implementation of the international responsibility of an international organization, or a 
State in connection with the conduct of an international organization, are governed by special rules 
of international law. Such special rules of international law may be contained in the rules of the 




the perspective of the Chicago Convention and the safety related obligati ns that 
it establishes for the vast majority of the States around the world. 
At present, the safety related obligations established by the Chicago Con-
vention and its Annexes, including in particular the obligation  transpose and 
apply the SARPs are applicable to the 191 Contracting Parties to the Convention. 
Currently no RASO can accede to the Chicago Convention, because this ins ru-
ment is not open for the participation of international organisations.147 Some prac-
tice of ICAO and its Member State is emerging which gives RSOOs a status simi-
lar to States, but today this practice is still not consistent and thus far away from 
constituting a rule of customary international law.148 
6.5.2.2 ULTIMATE STATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CHICAGO 
CONVENTION 
Based on the fact that only States can be parties to the Chicago Convention, ICAO 
has formulated the principle of ultimate State responsibility, which is expressed in 
the following formulation: 
 
Responsibility/accountability: The State of being responsible for an undertaking, person, 
thing or action and for which an organization or individual or both are liable to be called 
to account. An ICAO Contracting State and its respectiv  civil aviation authority are ulti-
mately responsible for the implementation of ICAO SARPs within their State. A State 
may either perform these obligations or, through mutual agreement, have another organi-
zation perform and be accountable for these functios; however, the State retains the re-
sponsibility under its duties of sovereignty.149 
 
The principle of ultimate State responsibility under the Chicago Conven-
tion was further elaborated by ICAO in the specific context of RASOs. The ICAO 
Safety Oversight Manual explains that ‘only the State has responsibility for safety 
oversight, and this responsibility may not be transferred to a regional body ...,’150 
and that this principle applies ‘regardless of the level of authority delegated to the 
RSOO.’151 
The above approach is also followed by ICAO under the USOAP, where 
even when a State discharges certain of its safety oversight functions through a 
RASO, ICAO links the findings made during audits of such a RASO with the 
USOAP audit results of the State concerned.152  
                                                 
147 'Chicago Convention', Articles 92-93. 
148 So far only one Assembly resolution has been adopte  which States that, where applicable: 
‘word “States” … should be read to include RSOOs’; see: Assembly Resolution A37-5, supra note 
71 in Ch.2. 
149 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Page xi. 
150 Ibid. at Paragraph 2.1.8. 
151 Ibid. at Paragraph 4.1.35. 
152 For example, following the USOAP audit of EASA, ICAO linked the findings of this audit with 
the results of the USOAP audits of EU Member States nd clarified that: ‘ICAO Contracting States 
that are members of EASA will always maintain their individual responsibility for such competen-
cies and, hence, for all audit results that are derived from the audit carried out on EASA. Once an 
EASA Member State’s audit is completed, the latest EASA safety oversight audit report will be 
linked to the final safety oversight audit report of he State concerned.’ See: ICAO USOAP report 
on EASA (2008), supra note 92 in Ch.4, at Paragraph 1.1.9. 
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In the domain of ATM the principle of non-transferability of responsibility 
has even been confirmed by an ICAO Assembly Resolution A38-12 which states, 
that: 
 
[A]ny delegation of responsibility by one State to another or any assignment of responsi-
bility over the high seas shall be limited to techni al and operational functions pertaining 
to the safety and regularity of the air traffic operating in the airspace concerned.153 
 
The principle of ultimate State responsibility has also been raised in the initial 
process of establishing EASA in the form of an international organisation, and 
where the report of the Expert Group on Legal Issues stated that: 
 
[T]he group took the view that the Chicago Conventio  does not prevent Member States 
from delegating such certification and/or licensing tasks to EASA, provided that it is 
clearly established that, for the purpose of the Chicago Convention, the ultimate responsi-
bility remains with the Member States.154 
 
The principle of non-transferability of responsibilities under the Chicago 
Convention applies not only in relations between States and RASOs but also in 
between the States themselves. This means that the Chicago Convention does not 
allow, through an act of delegation, a State to be relieved from ulti ate legal re-
sponsibility associated with the obligation towards other States-parties to the Chi-
cago Convention – so in other words, to transfer such responsibility. 
De lege lata the only exception in the Chicago Convention from the prin-
ciple of non-transferability of responsibilities is its Article 83bis, which allows a 
‘State of Registry’ to be ‘relieved of responsibility in respect of the functions and 
duties transferred’ to a ‘State of the Operator’.155 The crucial issue is the third par-
ty effect of Article 83bis, which means that any transfer agreement sig ed be-
tween States party to Article 83bis will have to be recognised by other States 
bound by Article 83bis,156 on condition that the transfer agreement had been duly 
notified to them.157 The implications of Article 83bis from the perspective of RA-
SOs were addressed under Section 6.3.1.2. 
In view of the above, even in the case of RASOs which enjoy Level 3 d -
egations, the transfer of Chicago Convention related safety tasks and associated 
                                                 
153 Assembly Resolution A38-12, supra note 111. Similar principle is expressed in: Annex 11 to 
the Chicago Convention, at Note to Paragraph 2.1. 
154 Report on the Work of the Expert Group on Legal Issues (AER/98/17), supra note 20 in Ch.4, 
at p. 11. 
155 For more information on practical implementation of Article 83bis see: ICAO, 'Guidance on the 
Implementation of Article 83 bis of the Convention  International Civil Aviation', Circular 295, 
(2003). 
156 Article 83bis was introduced into the Chicago Conve tion through an amending protocol 
adopted by the ICAO Assembly on 6 October 1980, and in force since 20 July 1997; see: ICAO, 
'Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Article 
83bis)', ICAO Doc 9318, (1980). 
157 See: Chicago Convention, Article 83bis (b), which states that: ‘The transfer shall not have ef-
fect in respect of other contracting States before either the agreement between the States in which 
it is embodied has been registered with the Council and made public pursuant to Article 83 or the 
existence and scope of the agreement have been directly communicated to the authorities of the 
other contracting State or States concerned by a State party to the agreement.’ 
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responsibilities takes place only inter se, which may have relevance for civil lia-
bility of Member States of a RASO in their internal relations (an issue which is 
addressed under Section 6.4), but does not create effects vis-à-vis third countries 
from the perspective of the Chicago Convention. In such cases we should be 
speaking essentially about an gency relationship, whereby the regional body is 
acting on behalf of and in the name of its Member States. 
The above understanding seems to be confirmed by the intention of States 
expressed in RASO founding documents. In those cases where safety functions 
have been delegated, even potentially, at Level 3, the founding documents speak 
about RASOs acting ‘on behalf of its Member States’ or ‘upon delegation’. This is 
the case even in the EU, where the tasks and responsibilities of the ‘State of De-
sign’, ‘State of Registry’ and ‘State of Manufacture’ when related to design as-
pects, have been transferred to EASA on an exclusive basis, but where nev the-
less the EASA’s Basic Regulation speaks about it as acting ‘on behalf of Member 
States’.158 Similar language can be found in constituent documents of BA-
GASOO,159 BAGAIA,160 and ECCAA.161 
In addition, when the governments of the EU Member States162 notified 
ICAO about the establishment of EASA, the text of the diplomatic note, coordi-
nated at the EU level, referred to EASA as an ‘authorised representativ for the 
fulfilment of governmental obligations as State of design or manufacture, as spec-
ified in Part II of Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention.’163 These notifications were 
recognised by ICAO, which subsequently conducted two USOAP audits of 
EASA.164 
In view of the above, the most obvious conclusion to be drawn with regard 
to international responsibility of RASOs is an analogy with Article 28 of the Chi-
                                                 
158 See: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 17(2)(e), which states that: 
‘For the purposes of ensuring the proper functioning a d development of civil aviation safety, the 
Agency shall: … in its fields of competence, carry out, on behalf of Member States, functions and 
tasks ascribed to them by applicable international conventions, in particular the Chicago Conven-
tion.’ See also: ibid. Article 20(1), which states hat: ‘With regard to the products, parts and appli-
ances referred to in Article 4(1)(a) and (b), the Agency shall, where applicable and as specified in 
the Chicago Convention or its Annexes, carry out on behalf of Member States the functions and 
tasks of the State of design, manufacture or registry when related to design approval.’ 
159 See: 'BAGASOO Agreement', supra note 128 in Ch.3, Article 5(e) which states that: ‘The func-
tions of the BAGASOO shall be to: Perform certificat on and surveillance tasks on behalf of 
Member States CAAs, as required.’ 
160 See: 'BAGAIA Agreement', supra note 179 in Ch.3, Article 5(k), which states that: ‘The func-
tions of the BAGAIA shall be to: Conduct, either in whole or any part of, an investigation into an 
aircraft accident or serious incident upon delegation by a State of Occurrence in the BAG Sub-
Region, by mutual arrangement and consent between the State of Occurrence and the BAGAIA.’ 
161 See: 'ECCAA Agreement', supra note 226 in Ch.3, Article 5(k), which states that: ‘For the at-
tainment of its purposes the Authority may regulate civil aviation in the Participating States on 
behalf of and in collaboration with Participating States.’ 
162 In addition to EU Member States, the notification was made also by Norway, Iceland and Swit-
zerland, which are associated with the EU aviation safety system on the basis of separate interna-
tional agreements and for which EASA also acts as an authorised technical agent. 
163 See: Template for EU Member States démarche to ICAO on the transfer of regulatory tasks to 
EASA, supra note 77 in Ch.4, which states that: ‘The ... Government has therefore the pleasure to 
thereby notify to ICAO and its Contracting States that the European Aviation Safety Agency is 
now its authorised representative for the fulfilment of its obligation, as State of design or manufac-
ture, as specified in Part II of Annex VIII to the Chicago Convention.’ 
164 ICAO USOAP report on EASA (2008), supra note 92 in Ch.4, at Paragraph 1.1.8. 
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cago Convention. This means that even when a State decides to discharge all or 
some of its safety related responsibilities through a regional safety body, it has to 
be aware that, from the Chicago Convention point of view, it has not relieved it-
self from potential international State responsibility, and the actions of a RASO 
can be attributed to it. 
The non-transferability of legal responsibility in case of an agency rela-
tionship is in line with the theory of this legal concept under international law. 
Sarooshi comments on this issue as follows: 
 
An important consequence of an agency relationship i  that the principal is responsible for 
its agent’s acts that are within the scope of the conferred powers. Accordingly where an 
organization acts as an agent for certain States then t e States concerned are responsible 
for any unlawful acts committed by the organization n the exercise of conferred pow-
ers.165 
 
Similarly Amerasinghe observes that: 
 
[I]t is also clear that where such agency is proved to exist the liability of the members 
would not really be for the obligations of the organiz tion but a direct liability for their 
own obligations which have been incurred by the organization acting as their agent ....166 
 
 The principle of ultimate State responsibility under the Chicago Conven-
tion probably contributes to an overall reluctance of States in establishing RASOs 
with far reaching regulatory and oversight competences (Level 3 RASOs). Indeed 
the question of national sovereignty and responsibility has been m ntioned in this 
context by many of the RASO officers interviewed for the purpose of this s udy. 
This reluctance to establish an organisation for the actions of which t ey could be 
held responsible is something not specific to RASOs, but rather  manifestation of 
a more general attitude of States towards international organisations. Using the 
words of Nakatani: 
 
The reasons why member States resist accepting responsibility for an act of an interna-
tional organization are twofold. Firstly, within the general context of State responsibility, 
what States fear most is the loss of their dignity, and this seems to be the main reason why 
States are reluctant to admit responsibility or even the facts leading to the attribution of 
responsibility. Secondly, within the particular context of the responsibility of member 
States, States consider it irrational, or at least unconvincing, the proposition that they 
should incur responsibility for another entity, even if it has been constituted by their will. 
Overcoming these selfish concerns does not appear to be easy.167  
On the other hand the fact that States remain ultimately responsible under 
the Chicago Convention also means that they have a stronger incentive to make 
sure that their RASO is appropriately equipped to discharge the functions and 
duties the consequences of which may at the end of the day be attriuted to them.  
                                                 
165 Sarooshi, supra note 19 in Ch.2, pp. 50-51. 
166 IIL Yearbook, supra note 89 in Ch.4, at p.354. 
167 Kazuhiro Nakatani, 'Responsibility of Member States towards Third Parties for an 
Internationally Wrongful Act of the Organization', in: Responsibility of international organizations: 
essays in memory of Sir Ian Brownlie, ed. by Maurizio Ragazzi (2013),  p. 301. 
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From an international law point of view, the non-transferability of safety 
responsibilities which States have under the Chicago Convention can also be de-
fended using an argument that States should not be allowed to r lease themselves 
from international obligations by hiding behind another internatio l legal per-
sonality.168 
To conclude, while the point of departure in international law is that Mem-
ber States should not be held responsible for wrongful acts committed by interna-
tional organisations,169 it is also true that international organisations are governed 
by the principle of speciality, which was invoked in Section 6.2.2, and which may 
provide for specific rules of attribution and wrongfulness. In this respect, when 
analysing RASOs it is of fundamental importance to carefully scrutinise the un-
derlying relationship which exists between the organisation and its Member 
States. This was very aptly underlined by ILC in its commentary to DARIO: ‘the 
diversity of international organizations may affect the application of certain arti-
cles, some of which may not apply to certain international organizations in the 
light of their powers and functions.’170 
 In fact, in the case of an agency relationship between a State and an inter-
national organisation or body, one should apply in the first place the rules con-
cerning the international responsibility of States rather than of international organ-
isations. In this respect, this study very much agrees with Brownlie, who summa-
rised this problem as follows: 
 
The literature tends to focus upon the existence or not of a distinct legal personality – an 
international organization – and then to assume that the terms of the constituent instru-
ment are not only relevant but represent a legal regim  which third States must accept. 
The appropriate analysis is to treat the organization (or the joint agency of States) simply 
as a part of the factual elements, which, upon analysis, may lead to the responsibility of 
the member States, or some of them, to a third State. On this view the applicable legal 
category is that of State responsibility, and not the law of international organizations.171 
 
 The above approach will be especially pertinent in the case of organisa-
tions such as ECCAA, which, although separate from its Member States from an 
international law point of view, has been so deeply integrated into the national 
legal orders of the OECS Member States, that it has, from that internal law per-
spective, become an organ of these States, as was explained in Sectio  3.6.2.2 of 
Chapter 3. 
 Similarly, a clear distinction has to be made between the Level 3 and other 
RASOs. In the latter case, it is the RASO Member States which continue taking 
decisions, such as issuing or revoking a certificate, from a legalpoint of view, 
                                                 
168 Dan Sarooshi, 'International Organizations and State Responsibility', in: Responsibility of 
international organizations: essays in memory of Sir Ian Brownlie, ed. by Maurizio Ragazzi 
(2013),  p. 84; Ian Brownlie, 'The responsibility of States for the acts of international 
organizations', in: International Responsibility today: Essays in the Memory of Oscar Schachter, 
ed. by Maurizio Ragazzi (2005),  p. 362. 
169 Jean d'Aspremont, 'Abuse of the Legal Personality of International Organizations and the 
Responsibility of Member States', IOLR,  (2007), pp. 95-96; UN, 'DARIO commentary (2011)', 
supra note 130, at p. 96. 
170 UN, 'DARIO commentary (2011)', supra note 130, at 'General Commentary', p.3. 
171 Brownlie, supra note 168, at p. 360. 
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although they may be assisted in this process, to a greater or lesser extent, by their 
RASO. 
Finally, the above discussion about ultimate State responsibility under the 
Chicago Convention should be separated from the question of eventual parallel 
responsibility of a RASO under international law, an issue which is dealt with in 
Section 6.5.4. 
6.5.3 RELEVANCE OF RASOs OVERSIGHT BY ITS MEMBER 
STATES 
As the involvement of international organisations in global governance increases 
so do the calls for their increased accountability for actions. In this sense the term 
accountability is necessarily broader than responsibility and liability. Leckow and 
Plith characterise it in the following way: 
 
[A]ccountability generally refers not only to the political process of ensuring that institu-
tions live up to their promises vis-à-vis its member States and other interested stakehold-
ers, but also to the responsibility to comply with applicable duties and obligations, and to 
accountability in other senses of the word, including moral accountability.172 
 
In the context of this study the question of RASO oversight by i s Member 
States is particularly relevant. ICAO addresses this issue briefly in its RSOO 
manual, where it is clarified that: 
 
[A]lthough the State may delegate specific safety oversight tasks and functions to an 
RSOO ..., the State must still retain the minimum capability required to carry out its re-
sponsibilities under the Chicago Convention. States mu t always be able to properly and 
effectively monitor the safety oversight functions delegated to the RSOO.173  
 
The oversight issue, in the context of delegation of ANS provisi n, is also 
raised by Van Antwerpen, who attaches important legal consequences to it: 
 
In the event of an act or omission of ... privatised air navigation service provider it turns 
out that the State has failed to keep the appropriate egulatory oversight or has failed to 
verify the compliance of the air navigation service provider to rules and regulations im-
posed by the State, this could trigger the ultimate State responsibility. At the same time, if 
the State has met its obligations and has not failed to perform audits or regulatory over-
sight, the act or omission ... should not trigger State responsibility.174 
 
Oversight of RASOs is very much linked with the principle of ultimate 
State responsibility, as States will generally want to exercis  a certain degree of 
control over organisations upon which they confer civil aviation safety related 
competences. Especially when a RASO is exercising Chicago Convention related 
safety functions and duties on behalf of its member States, the lat er may feel a 
particular need to exercise a certain degree of oversight, given States’ ultimate 
                                                 
172 Leckow and Plith, supra note 128, at p.226. 
173 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.1.8. 
174 Van Antwerpen, supra note 52 in Ch.1, at p. 165. 
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responsibility under the Convention. As was pointed out by a former Chairman of 
the EASA Management Board: 
 
In the event of an accident in a State's territory, a Minister in that State cannot, for politi-
cal reasons, simply shrug off regulatory responsibility to EASA. At the very least the 
Minister would need to demonstrate to his/her public and Parliament that the State has 
done what it can to monitor the effectiveness of the Agency.175 
 
This study agrees that States need to exercise oversight over a RASO they 
create. However, in this case one should not require the same method of oversight 
as in respect of a service provider, which should be subject to the same safety re-
quirements regardless of its organisational or corporate structure, and where ac-
cordingly the level of oversight should also always be the same. 
The level of RASO oversight required from its Member States should not 
lead to the need to control in detail every aspect of the regional bdy’s actions or 
to the replication of expertise at national and regional levels, as this would effec-
tively defeat the very purpose of establishing regional safety bodies.  
The proper approach should be rather to look at a State and all entities 
working on its behalf as a system which, taken together, should guarantee the lev-
el of safety oversight required by the Chicago Convention and its safety related 
Annexes. Under this approach, oversight of a RASO could be organised by rely-
ing on mechanisms similar to those used by States to control the functioning of 
national agencies. This includes regular reporting by a RASO on its activities, the 
setting up of a supervisory or management board, and most importantly the regu-
lar and ad hoc auditing of RASO operations, accounts and administrative practic-
es.176 In this respect a distinction has to be made, between oversight, and direction 
or operational control.177 
As to the consequences - from an international law point of view - of a 
lack of proper oversight over a RASO, this study argues that, in such cases, the 
eventual RASO Member States’ responsibility is not a question related to the at-
tribution of actions, which stems from the underlying legal relationship between a 
RASO and its Member States, but rather a matter of the required stan ard of con-
duct, which has to be assessed on a case by case basis in the light of all the rele-
vant facts and circumstances. By standard of conduct is meant here the overall
effectiveness of the safety oversight system of the RASO Member State.This 
overall effectiveness will also depend on the robustness of the oversight that the 
Member States exercise over the RASO. For example, it will be more difficult for 
a State to defend itself if an aviation accident resulted from the fact that it has not 
notified ICAO of a difference with applicable international safety requirements 
because ‘its’ RASO did not have a system for identifying such differences, than in 
a situation where an accident happened despite all the relevant requirements hav-
ing being complied with and effectively implemented. 
                                                 
175 Former Chairman of the EASA Management Board, 'Interview No 12', (2014). 
176 For example in the EU, the EASA is subject to regular audits by the European Court of Audi-
tors. See: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 60. 
177 See in this respect also the commentary to DARIO which explains that from the perspective of 
the law of international responsibility oversight is in principle not to be identified with either di-
rection or control (UN, 'DARIO commentary (2011)', supra note 130, at p.38). 
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As is the case with engaging international responsibility of a RASO, this 
study did not identify court cases related to engaging international responsibility 
of States for the actions of their RASOs. In practice engaging such responsibility 
could be complicated due to the fact that a RASO acts as an agent representing 
multiple principals. Which State to engage may not be so obvious, while engaging 
more than one may not always be practical. 
At the same time, liability cases involving questions of aviation safety and 
oversight responsibilities are usually associated with accidents and resulting dam-
ages. Thus, while maintaining ultimate State responsibility is important from the 
perspective of the improvement of the overall international system of aviation 
safety, from the perspective of the victims of aviation accidents and their families, 
the more relevant are questions concerning civil liability of a RASO under domes-
tic law and the duty to compensate damages. These issues are addressed in Sec-
tion 6.6. 
6.5.4 PARALLEL RESPONSIBILITY OF RASOs VIS-À-VIS NON-
MEMBER STATES 
Whilst the principle of ultimate State responsibility under th Chicago Convention 
answers the question concerning the consequences that the establishment of a 
RASO may have for its Member States, this principle does not fully explain the 
question of a possible parallel responsibility of a RASO vis-à-vis the non-Member 
States. 
‘Although it may not frequently occur in practice, dual or even multiple at-
tribution of conduct [in international law] cannot be excluded’,178 and the juris-
prudence confirms that.179 In the specific aviation context, the ICAO Council 
Resolution on non-national aircraft registration which was reviewed under Section 
6.3.1.1 also suggests that multiple attribution of conduct is possible not only in 
situations involving States but also an international organisation. 
Although this study did not identify any case of a State trying to engage in-
ternational responsibility of a RASO in respect to safety functions envisaged un-
der the Chicago Convention, such possibility should therefore nt be completely 
excluded. What conditions would need to be met, in order for such responsibility 
to be engaged? 
First of all, as was pointed under Section 6.5, it is an established principle 
of international law that the responsibility of an organisation can be engaged only 
if that organisation is vested with a separate legal personality under i ternational 
law.180 Such international legal personality would be effective vis-à-vis non-
Member States only if they have explicitly or implicitly recognised a RASO.181 
Such international recognition ‘is implied when a State (or an organization) is 
admitted as a member, when an agreement is entered into with a State (or n or-
ganization), or when the State is invited to a session or a conference.’182 
                                                 
178 Ibid. at p.16. 
179 For an overview of the international case law where multiple attribution took place see: 
Francesco Messineo, 'Multiple Attribution of Conduct', Research Paper 11 (2012), The Research 
Project on Shared Responsibility in International Lw (SHARES) 2012), available at: 
www.sharesproject.nl. 
180 UN, 'DARIO (2011)', supra note 129, Article 2(a). 
181 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at p. 990. 
182 Ibid. at p. 1183. 
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With regard to the above, this study found that most of the RASOs are 
regularly invited by ICAO to international symposia and conferences, in addition 
some of them, such as IAC or EASA, have either concluded numerous working 
arrangements with third-countries, or have been designated as authorised agents 
of their Member States under BASAs concluded with third countries. Some of 
them, such as EASA or ECCAA, have also been subject to ICAO US AP audits, 
which too is a sign of recognition in international relations.183 
In addition, the present study found that third countries recognise the legal 
effects that the currently operational Level 3 RASOs, that is EASA, IAC and EC-
CAA, take on behalf of their Member States. In the case of IAC, thirdcountries 
readily accept that this RASO acts on behalf of, for example, the Russian Federa-
tion in aviation accident investigations.184 Airlines certified by the ECCAA are 
able to operate to third countries, meaning that the AOCs and Certificates of Air-
worthiness issued by this RASO are considered as valid under the Chicago Con-
vention.185 
The case of EASA is quite specific and one could argue that in fact the re-
lationship of international agency that exists between this RASO and EU Member 
States is globally recognised. This is because EASA acts as a ‘State of Design’ for 
one of the leading aircraft manufacturers in the world, namely Airbus. Airbus air-
craft can be found on registries of many countries around the world.186 This means 
that such third country ‘States of Registry’, readily accept Type Certificates issued 
by EASA on behalf of EU Member States,187 and exchange with EASA infor-
mation which is necessary for ensuring the continuing airworthiness of the air-
craft.188 
The second element which would need to be established before engaging 
international legal responsibility of a RASO is a breach of an international legal 
obligation incumbent on a RASO. In the case of RASOs’ internatio l responsi-
bility vis-à-vis the non-Member States, this means in practice that one would have 
to demonstrate that a RASO is effectively bound by the provisions of the Chicago 
                                                 
183 ICAO USOAP report on EASA (2008), supra note 92 in Ch.4; ICAO USOAP report on OECS 
(2007), supra note 248 in Ch.3. 
184 See for example: Accident Investigation Board Norway, 'Report concerning aviation accident 
on the Cape Heer heliport, Svalbard, Norway, 30 March 2008 with MIL MI-8MT, RA-06152, 
operated by SPARK+ AIRLINE LTD.', Report, SL 2013/06, (2013); National Transportation 
Safety Committee of Indonesia, 'Aircraft Accident Ivestigation Report, Sukhoi Civil Aircraft 
Company, Sukhoi RRJ–95B; 97004, Mount Salak, West Java, Republic of Indonesia, 9 May 2012', 
KNKT.12.05.09.04, (2012); Ministry of Infrastructure Development Tanzania, 'Report on the 
accident to Ilyushin IL-76TD aircraft registration ER-IBR which occurred on 23 March 2005 in 
lake Victoria near Mwanza, Tanzania', Civil aircraft ccident No. CAV/ACC/3/05. 
185 In 2006 the ECCAA has obtained Category 1 under the US FAA IASA programme. This gave 
to the ECCAA certified airlines the possibility to fly to the US. In 2014 the LIAT international 
airlines, an ECCAA certified operator incorporated in Antigua and Barbuda was operating sched-
uled flights to Puerto Rico (US). 
186 At the beginning of May 2014 Airbus aircraft were operated by 398 operators coming from all 
the regions of the world. For a detailed overview se: Airbus, 'Airbus for analysts'  
<http://www.airbus.com/tools/airbusfor/analysts/> [accessed 10 May 2014].  
187 For a list of working arrangements between EASA and non-EU countries concerning the vali-
dation of EASA Type Certificates see: EASA, 'Working Arrangements'  
<http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/working-arrangements> [accessed 6 August 2014]. 
188 For obligations concerning interactions between ‘State of Design’ and ‘State of Registry’ see 
Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention.  
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Convention. Given the fact that RASOs cannot be parties to this Convention, the 
existence of such an obligation would have to be demonstrated through other 
means. 
Sarooshi argues that even in the relationship of an international agency 
there is a ‘general presumption that an organization retains a joint responsibility 
for any unlawful acts committed’,189 although this study was not able to identify 
other authorities which explicitly share this view. 
Another way of making such a determination would be to argue that some 
provisions of the Chicago Convention, and more generally the obligation to pro-
vide effective safety oversight is an obligation erga omnes, as was already demon-
strated by Huang.190 This would mean that RASOs are bound by these obligations, 
because as was stated by the ICJ: 
 
[I]nternational organizations are subjects of interational law and, as such, are bound by 
any obligation incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their 
constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties. 191 
 
The above argument is especially relevant in case of RASOs enjoying 
Level 3 delegations, which are expected to carry out their safety functions in 
compliance with Chicago Convention and its Annexes. The obligation to respect 
the Chicago Convention and its Annexes has been for example explicitly stated in 
the EASA Basic Regulation.192 Similarly ICAO, when auditing RASOs, takes the 
Chicago Convention and its Annexes as reference standards, and expects the RA-
SOs, as agents of States, to be compliant with relevant provisions of these instru-
ments.193 
Finally, some third countries, such as the US, Canada or Brazil, have rec-
ognised, on the basis of BASAs, that RASOs, such as EASA or I C, can carry out 
Chicago Convention related safety functions on behalf of their Member States, 
meaning that they have recognised such RASOs as authorised agents of their 
Member States. Under these BASAs bilateral partners of RASO Member Stats 
expect these regional organisations to carry out the relevant safety func ions in 
compliance with the SARPs, and thus to be bound by them. 
The proposition made in this section, namely the recognition that some of 
the RASOs could be bound by the provisions of the Chicago Convention, can of 
course be controversial. However, this study would not be complete without con-
sidering this issue, even if on a preliminary basis. Level 3 RASOs in particular 
have both the legal capacity, being an international legal person, and operational 
competences such as safety certification, which can be discharged neglige tly. 
Outright rejection of the possibility of holding such RASOs responsible for their 
acts, which at the end of the day create binding effects under the Chicago Conven-
tion, could effectively amount to putting these organisations n a legal vacuum, 
                                                 
189 Sarooshi, supra note 19 in Ch.2, at p.51. 
190 Huang, supra note 29 in Ch.1, at p. 231. 
191 'Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between WHO and Egypt, Advisory 
Opinion', in: [1980] ICJ Reports 73, (ICJ,1980),  pp. 89-90). 
192 Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, at Preamble clause No 7, Article 20(1), 
and Article 27. 
193 ICAO USOAP report on EASA (2008), supra note 92 in Ch.4; ICAO USOAP report on OECS 
(2007), supra note 248 in Ch.3. 
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especially if there is also no mechanism allowing individuals to engage RASOs’ 
non-contractual liability. 
The possibility of holding an organisation responsible or liable for its ac-
tions generally contributes to this organisation exercising more due diligence, or 
better duty of care in the performance of its functions. This would be relevant es-
pecially in cases where a State has delegated the exercise of all or most f its afe-
ty functions to a RASO and has to rely to a very large extent on such an organisa-
tion for demonstrating compliance with the Chicago Convention and its Annexes. 
At the same time, it is not expected that the question of international re-
sponsibility of a RASO would readily arise in front of international courts or tri-
bunals. In the history of the Chicago Convention, there has not been a single case 
heard by international judicial bodies and related to breach of international obliga-
tions directly involving State safety oversight responsibilit es.194 Also, ‘as in the 
case of international claims against States, claims against international organiza-
tions can be brought as international claims only when the local remedies have 
been exhausted.’195 This means bringing the claim first before the competent or-
gan of the organisation or ‘before arbitral tribunals, national courts or administra-
tive bodies when the international organization has accepted their competence to 
examine claims.’196  
In this respect, the question of civil liability of RASOs, which is the sub-
ject matter of the next section, is probably of greater practical relevanc . 
6.6 CIVIL LIABILITY OF RASOs FOR NEGLIGENT SAFETY 
OVERSIGHT UNDER DOMESTIC LAW 
 
6.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Liability of regulators and supervisors for non-contractual damages is a topic of 
recurrent debate in law.197 As pointed out by Gisen and Bell, this can in part be 
attributed to the fact that modern societies can increasingly be characterised as 
service-providing societies, with greater focus on the citizen as a consumer, and 
the emergence of supervision as a service offered by a State to protect the interests 
of the general public.198 
The other reason highlighted in academic writings is the alleged mer-
gence of the compensation culture, where victims may be seeking compensation 
                                                 
194 The shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines aircraft, flight MH17, in July 2014 could change 
that however, if the accident investigation (ongoin at the moment of writing this study) would 
reveal serious deficiencies in the safety management system of the ANSP which was responsible, 
on behalf of the Ukrainian State, for taking decision  related to the management of the airspace in 
which the shooting down took place. 
195 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at p. 1192. 
196 UN, 'DARIO commentary (2011)', supra note 130, at pp.72-74. 
197 For a good overview see: Mads Andenas, Duncan Fairgrieve, and John Bell, Tort Liability of 
Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective, (200); Cherie Booth QC and Dan Squires, The 
Negligence Liability of Public Authorities, (2006). 
198 Ivo Gisen, 'Regulating regulators through liability: the case for applying normal tort rules to 
supervisors', Utrecht Law Review, 2 (2006), p. 8; John Bell, 'Governmental Liability: some 
comparative reflections', InDret, 1 (2006), p. 3. 
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not only from the primary tortfeasor, but also from other deep pockets, including 
the State.199 
Regardless of the policy discussions, the fact is that courts recognise the 
possibility of holding regulators liable for damages stemming from their negligent 
actions. An overview of case law from EU Member States shows that uch liabil-
ity can be established in cases involving areas as diverse as: damages caused by 
police, fire-fighting brigades, unsafe road infrastructure, food safety uthorities, 
motor vehicle inspections, and financial regulation.200 
The above is also true in respect to aviation safety regulation – although, 
fortunately, the cases involving liability of aviation safety regulators and supervi-
sors are not numerous. However, the available, aviation related, case law comes 
mainly from the common law jurisdictions, so it is not certain if the civil law 
countries would adopt a similar approach. 
6.6.2 NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF CIVIL AVIATION 
SAFETY REGULATORS: REVIEW OF CASE LAW 201 
The analysis of the available case law, which, as underlined above, com s mainly 
from the common law jurisdictions, allows the conclusion to be reached that gen-
erally two conditions need to be demonstrated by a plaintiff in order to establish 
civil liability involving an aviation safety regulator, that is a breach of a duty of 
care, and damages resulting from the breach.202  
In the reviewed cases the courts recognised that aviation safety regulators 
owe a duty of care to the general public, including individual airline passengers: 
 
- In Perrett v. Collins, the claimant was injured as a result of an airworthiness 
problem which was not detected by an inspector acting on behalf of the UK 
Civil Aviation Authority. The court found that the defendants owed a duty of 
care to the claimant: 
 
An injured passenger’s sole remedy may be against the person who has certified the air-
craft to fly. The denial of a duty of care owed by such a person in relation to the safety of 
the aircraft towards those who may suffer personal injuries, whether as passengers in the 
aircraft or upon ground, would leave a gap in the law of tort (Lord Justice Hobhouse).203 
 
                                                 
199 Gisen, 'Regulating regulators', upra note 198, at p. 13. 
200 Cees C. van Dam, 'Aansprakelijkheid van Toezichthouders, Een analyse van de 
aansprakelijkheidsrisico’s voor toezichthouders wegens inadequaat handhavingstoezicht en enige 
aanbevelingen voor toekomstig beleid', Text primarily in English, (British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, 2006), <www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/aansprakelijkheid-van-
toezichthouders-met-publieke-taken.aspx#publicatiegeg vens> [accessed 7 August 2014]. 
201 For further commentary on some of these cases see: John Korzeniowski, 'Liability of Aviation 
Regulators: Are the floodgates opening?', ASL, XXV (2000), pp. 31-34. 
202 More generally, in the EU case law it was established that when an action for damages against 
an act of EU institution is brought to the CJEU, the elements that have to be demonstrated are a 
wrongful or illegal act, damage, and causation. These lements can be considered as general prin-
ciples of tort liability in EU Member States; see: 'Case C-4/69, Lütticke v. Commission', in: [1971] 
ECR I-325, (CJEU,1969),  (p. 337). 
203 'Perrett v Collins', in: [1998] 2 Lloyd's LR 255, (p.259). 
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- Similarly in Swanson v. Canada, which involved negligent safety oversight 
and lack of enforcement action in respect of a small airline which suffered an 
accident involving passenger casualties, the Federal Court of Appeal of C na-
da stated that:  
 
The Aeronautics Act [RSC 1985, c A-2 (Canada)] and [the] Regulations made thereunder 
if not explicitly imposing a duty of care of the general public, at least do so by implication 
in that this is the very reason for their existence. The flying public has no protection 
against avaricious airlines, irresponsible or inadequately trained pilots, and defective air-
craft if not [for] the Department of Transport and must rely on it for enforcement of the 
law and regulations in the interest of public safety.204  
 
And thereafter:  
 
Transport Canada’s failure to take any meaningful steps to correct the explosive situation 
which it knew existed at Wapiti amounted to a breach of the duty of care it owed the pas-
sengers.205 
 
- Finally in another UK case, Philcox v. The Civil Aviation Authority, Lord Jus-
tice Millet argues as follows:  
 
It is clear to my mind that the risk which the scheme of the legislation is designed to pre-
vent is the risk that the owner or operator of an aircr ft will fly the aircraft even when it is 
unfit to fly; and that the persons for whose protection the scheme has been established are 
the passengers, cargo owners and other members of the public likely to be harmed if an 
unfit aircraft is allowed to fly.206 
 
As far as the breach of the duty of care is concerned, the standard of con-
duct required by the courts in the abovementioned cases was negligence: 
 
- In Perrett v. Collins, the court found that the duty of care was exercised negli-
gently which resulted in liability for damages:  
 
Lord Justice Hobhouse stated:  
 
[A]n inspector exercising reasonable care would not have certified that the aircraft was in 
an airworthy condition. 
 
Similarly Lord Justice Bruxton observed that:  
 
A person who has the misfortune to suffer these consequences (death or injury) should 
surely be able to look to the organisation that has certified the plane as fit to fly, and that 
exists in order to enable the plane to fly, if that certification was made negligently. 
                                                 
204 'Swanson et al v The Queen in right of Canada', in: [1991] 80 DLR (4) 741, (Federal Court of 
Appeal of Canada,  (p. 750). For a more general commentary on this case see: Ewa M. Swiecicki, 
'Liability of the Canadian Government for the Negligent Enforcement of Aviation Safety 
Legislation', AASL, XVIII/I (1993), pp. 275-308. 
205 'Swanson v Canada', supra note 204, at pp. 756-757.  




Finally Lord Justice Swinton Thomas concluded:  
 
[A] member of the public would expect that a person who is appointed to carry out these 
functions of inspecting aircraft and issuing permits would exercise reasonable care in doing 
so.207 
 
- Similarly, in Swanson v. Canada, the court found that an agency charged with 
the regulation of the safety of commercial airlines was liable for negligently 
permitting an airline to continue unsafe practices. The agency had issued 
warnings to the airline in question but failed to take any further enforcement 
proceedings to require compliance with safety standards. In the wordsof the 
court:  
 
Transport Canada officials negligently performed the job they were hired to do; they did 
not achieve the reasonable standard of safety inspection, and enforcement which the law 
requires of professional persons similarly situated. It was not reasonable to accept empty 
promises to improve where no improvement was forthcming. It is incomprehensible that 
a professional inspector of reasonable competence and skill would choose not to intervene 
in a situation which one of his own senior staff predicted was virtually certain to produce 
a fatal accident. 208 
 
A different approach seems to exist in the US, where the FAA may enjo
immunity from claims under the so called discretionary function exception of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act.209 Two cases are of relevance here: United States v. Varig 
Airlines, and United States v. United Scottish Insurance Company, which were 
considered jointly by the US Supreme Court.210 The circumstances of the cases 
were very similar, and involved aspects related to airworthiness c rtification of 
aircraft. In both cases, following appeals, the lower instance courts f nd that the 
US government, acting through the FAA, was liable for negligently certifying the 
design of an aircraft or its modification. 
  Both of the above cases were ultimately referred to the US Supreme 
Court which reversed the decisions on the basis of statutory exception wh ch ex-
cludes from the scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act: 
 
[A]ny claim based upon … the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of 
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.211  
 
The US Supreme Court came to the conclusion that: 
 
                                                 
207 'Perrett v Collins', supra note 203. 
208 'Swanson v Canada', supra note 204, at pp. 756-757. 
209 Federal Tort Claims Act, Title 28 of USC, Part IV,Paragraph 2680(A). 
210 US Supreme Court, United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines) et al., Certiorari to the United States Court f Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 82-1349. 
Together with No. 82-1350, United States v. United Scottish Insurance Co. et al., also on certiorari 
to the same court; 467 US 797 (1984), 19 June, 1984. 
211 Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 209. 
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The FAA's implementation of a mechanism for compliance review is plainly discretionary 
activity of the ‘nature and quality’ protected by 2680(a). Judicial intervention, through 
private tort suits, in the FAA's decision to utilize a ‘spot-checking’ program as the best 
way to accommodate the goal of air transportation safety and the reality of finite agency 
resources would require the courts to ‘second-guess’ the political, social, and economic 
judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory function.212 
 
No other circumstances of the case were analysed by the US Supreme 
Court. 
6.6.3 REVIEW OF CASE LAW: CONCLUSIONS 
All of the above cases were considered in a domestic, common law context. In 
addition, in all these cases, both the claimant and the defendant had the same na-
tionality. 
With the exception of the cases of US origin, where the US Supreme Court 
has excluded FAA responsibility for negligent certification of aircraft airworthi-
ness on the basis of a statutory exemption, all of the other cass recognise the pos-
sibility of holding aviation regulators liable for damages. 
 In particular, the cases cited are unanimous in recognising that the avia-
tion regulators owe a duty of care towards the travelling public, and set negligence 
as a threshold beyond which the regulator may be held liable. 
6.6.4 APPLICATION OF TORT LIABILITY PRINCIPLES TO RASOs 
There is at present no international instrument which would harmonise the domes-
tic civil liability regimes of States in respect to damage caused throug  the con-
duct of civil aviation safety regulatory and oversight tasks. Such instruments exist 
for example as regards the carriage of passengers and cargo by air,213 d mage 
caused by aircraft to third parties,214 or, going beyond aviation, the launching of 
objects into outer space.215 
In view of the above, the possibility to engage civil liability of a regional 
aviation safety body would depend on the provisions of the RASO founding doc-
ument and relevant national law, and in the first place on the recognition of sepa-
rate legal personality of such a body under domestic law. Here the situation is 
slightly clearer than in the case of international legal personality, s this study 
found that the domestic legal personality is usually explicitly provided for in the 




                                                 
212 US Supreme Court, supra note 210, at Section IV. 
213 'Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air', Montreal, 28 
May 1999. 
214 'Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties', Montreal, 2 
May 2009, (not yet in force). 
215 'Outer Space Treaty', supra note 110. 
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6.6.4.1 RECOGNITION OF RASO LEGAL PERSONALITY IN 
DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS 
In the case of RASOs, that is organisations established on the basis of internation-
al agreements or supranational law, in nine out of ten cases studied, the legal in-
struments concerned explicitly recognise the domestic legal personality of the 
organisations including their right to be a party to legal proceedings or to sue and 
be sued.216 Of course such recognition is granted only for the purpose of domestic 
proceedings in the territories of the Member States of the organisation and may be 
conditional upon incorporation of the agreement into the national leg system.217 
Amerasinghe argues that even when the constituent document does not 
provide for domestic legal personality, Member States of the organisation are un-
der an obligation to grant it based on the principle of good faith.218 Similarly 
Blokker and Schermers point out that national courts usually ‘see no reason to 
deny the legal personality of organizations in which their own State partici-
pates.’219 This would mean that even when domestic legal personality of a RASO 
is not explicitly envisaged under its founding document, it should not prevent 
Member States from recognising such personality if needed. 
As far as third countries are concerned, the recognition of a legal personal-
ity of a RASO is not certain but also not entirely excluded. Some States, such as 
Switzerland, may recognise legal personality of an organisation in its ternal le-
gal system on the basis of the fact that the organisation has iternational legal per-
sonality.220 Others, such as the UK, may recognise the personality of an interna-
tional organisation of which they are not members if executive organs of their 
government have had previous dealings with the organisation, that is, already rec-
ognised it, or if the organisation has personality in one or mre of the foreign 
States that are its members.221 
6.6.4.2 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY OF RASOs IN DOMESTIC 
PROCEEDINGS 
The question of immunity from jurisdiction may also have to be considered. In 
nine out of ten cases studied, RASO constituent documents contain provisions on 
privileges and immunities although the scope of these rights varies considerably.  
Some of the agreements explicitly provide for almost complete immunity 
of a RASO from legal proceedings. This is the case for ECCAA and its employ-
ees, which are immune from ‘legal process with respect to acts performed by them 
                                                 
216 For EASA see: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 28(2); For IAC 
see: 'IAC Statute', supra note 107 in Ch.3, Article 6; For BAGASOO see: 'BAGSOO 
Agreement', supra note 128 in Ch.3, Article 2(3); For CASSOA see: CASSOA Protocol, supra 
note 150 in Ch.3, Article 3(3); For AAMAC see: 'AAMAC Treaty', supra note 62 in Ch.3, Article 
7(2); For PASO see: 'PICASST', supra note 81 in Ch.3, Article 4.3; For ECCAA see: 'ECCAA 
Agreement', supra note 226 in Ch.3, Article 5; For CASSOS see: CASSO Agreement, supra note 
141, Article V; For  EUROCONTROL see Articles 34-35 of: 'EUROCONTROL consolidated 
Convention (1997)', supra note 145. 
217 Amerasinghe, supra note 127, at p. 70. 
218 Ibid. at p. 76. 
219 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at p. 1023. 
220 Amerasinghe, supra note 127, at p. 71. 
221 Ibid. at p. 75. 
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in their official capacity except when such immunity is waived by the [EC-
CAA].’ 222 Other agreements may simply require RASO Member States to accord 
to the organisation and its personnel privileges and immunities as may be neces-
sary for the fulfilment of their objectives and the exercise of theirfunctions, which 
is the case for BAGASOO,223 BAGAIA,224 and CASSOS.225  
In the case of a RASO established under the aegis of a REIO, its priv leges 
and immunities may derive from the REIO founding treaty, as in the cas  for 
EASA,226 and CASSOA.227  
Finally special protocols may be attached to a RASO founding agreement 
specifying in detail the immunities and privileges granted, which is the case for 
AAMAC. 228 
A number of RASO founding documents also envisage conclusion of 
headquarters or host-State agreements where further privileges and immunities 
may be granted, as is the case for instance with BAGASOO, BAGAIA, AAMAC, 
and CASSOS.  
Some RASOs, such as IAC or ECCAA, have concluded headquarters 
agreements, which contain privileges and immunities, although the conclusion of 
such agreements is not explicitly envisaged in the founding documents of these 
RASOs.229 
A review of the recent practice of domestic courts’ cases concerning im-
munity of international organisations, demonstrates that generally courts are not 
willing to uphold immunity of organisations in absence of a clear treaty provision 
in this respect.230  
In addition, at least in Europe, before upholding immunity of an interna-
tional organisation the courts will normally check if the organistion has provided 
for an alternative mechanism which ensures an aggravated individual’s right to an 
effective remedy. Where this is not the case, some courts may decide to deny an 
international organisation the right to immunity if granting t would put its State in 
breach of the constitution or international law obligations related to human 
rights.231 
In view of the above it is important to verify to what extent the RASOs 
provide individuals with effective means for reviewing and satisfying their even-
tual claims. The results of this review are presented in the following section. 
                                                 
222 'ECCAA Agreement', supra note 226 in Ch.3, Article 25(7). 
223 'BAGASOO Agreement', supra note 128 in Ch.3, Article 7(2). 
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6.6.4.3 TORT LIABILITY PROVISIONS IN RASO FOUNDING 
DOCUMENTS 
As far as tort liability is concerned, only a limited number of RASO founding 
documents contain any provisions dealing explicitly with thisissue. This limited 
treatment of tort liability in founding documents is a general trend for internation-
al organisations.232 Of the ten RASO agreements studied only three contain liabil-
ity provisions.233 This is the case for EASA, EUROCONTROL and AAMAC. 
These three organisations have very similar principles applicable to th m:234 
(1) The contractual liability is governed by the law applicable to the contract 
in question; 
 
(2) In the case of non-contractual liability, the organization shall, in accord-
ance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member 
States, make good any damage caused by its services or by its servant  in 
the performance of their duties (EASA, AAMAC); or, make reparation for 
damage caused by the negligence of its organs, or of its servants in the 
scope of their employment, in so far as that damage can be attributed to 
them (EUROCONTROL). 
The case of PASO is also worth mentioning. This organisation only assists 
its Member States in the performance of safety oversight duties. PASOinspectors, 
when performing their tasks are treated as inspectors of the Member States con-
cerned (Level 1 delegation). Accordingly, while the PASO founding agreement 
does not contain liability provisions, it obliges the Member States to ‘indemnify 
inspectors from any pertinent legal suit arising out of the appropriate performance 
of their duties.’235 
What is therefore clear from the above analysis is that RASO founding 
documents do not follow a particular pattern as far as civil liability provisions are 
concerned. European States seem to accord greater importance to clarity here, but 
this can be partly attributed to the fact that both EASA and EUROCONTROL 
have operational and executive functions - that is provision of ANS in the case of 
EUROCONTROL, and certification of aircraft in case of EASA - the neglig nt 
exercise of which may result in damages to the general public. The AAMAC trea-
ty is an exception as far as other parts of the world are concerned, but it was large-
ly inspired by the EASA Basic Regulation.236 
This study proposes that, from a policy point of view, the treatment of 
RASOs regarding civil liability should chiefly depend on the type of delegations 
and competences they have been granted by States. This means that: 
                                                 
232 Klabbers, supra note 73 in Ch.4, at p. 272. 
233 In addition the Minsk Agreement, which establishes the IAC, contains provisions on the liabil-
ity of the States – Contracting Parties to this Agreement ('Minsk Agreement', supra note 105 in 
Ch.3, Article 16). 
234 For EUROCONTROL see: 'EUROCONTROL consolidated Convention (1997)', supra note 
145, Article 28; For EASA see: Regulation (EU) No 216/2008, supra note 81 in Ch.2, Article 31; 
For AAMAC see: 'AAMAC Treaty', supra note 62 in Ch.3, Article 8. 
235 'PICASST', supra note 81 in Ch.3, Article 8(3). 




- In case of ‘Level 1’ delegations - authorisation of individual inspectors on-
ly - the approach taken by PASO seems to be reasonable. Given that in
such cases the regional inspectors act under the control and in the name of 
the national authority and execute national law, there would be littl  
grounds for holding a RASO liable for their actions. In such cases, indem-
nification by the Member States of regional inspectors should be sufficient 
should they be found liable by national courts. ‘Level 1’ RASOs should 
therefore require that an indemnification clause is included in the service 
contracts and ensure that insurance policies of the national authorities for 
which they work, if used, also cover their inspectors; 
 
- The situation is different with Level 2 delegations - where the performance 
of technical work is delegated to a RASO - and especially Level 3 delega-
tions - where a regional authority also takes legally binding decisions. In 
Level 2, but especially in Level 3 delegations, the treatment afforded to 
RASOs should not be significantly different to the one applicab e to na-
tional aviation authorities. This is because in both cases the RASO will be 
conducting – within the scope of delegation – actual tasks of safety ov r-
sight, including certifications, inspections etc.  
In the EU, during the discussions on the establishment of EASA, there had 
also been no doubt about the necessity of a liability regime ‘to nsure that EASA, 
including its staff, would be liable for its own wrongdoings.’237 The legal experts 
who studied the various options for the setting up of EASA observed that the need 
for such a liability regime would be justified on the grounds that EASA would 
have rulemaking and certification competences.238 
The possibility of a liability action encourages regulators and supervisors 
to exercise their operational tasks diligently and with care, meaning that the risk 
of damage to be caused by the supervised or regulated entities is also reduced. In 
addition, if a public body has been given regulatory tasks, it should perform them 
properly and if it fails to do so and this results in damages, th re should be a pos-
sibility to hold it liable, just as any other person would be held accountable for an 
improper performance.  
The availability of appropriate mechanisms allowing individuals to claim 
damages from a RASO in case of non-contractual liability becomes particularly 
important in the case of RASOs which enjoy Level 3 delegations. Given that, to a 
large extent, such RASOs will be acting as agents of States under the Chicago 
Convention, a liability mechanism may in practice be the only wa to recover 
damages from a RASO that it may have caused as a result of potentially negligent 
performance of its regulatory functions. 
Where the possibility of holding a RASO liable for negligent oversight is 
envisaged, or at least not excluded, the regional body can arrange for an insurance 
policy or other scheme covering such potential liability exposure.239 
                                                 
237 Report on the Work of the Expert Group on Legal Issues (AER/98/17), supra note 20 in Ch.4, 
at p. 11. 
238 Ibid. 
239 In the EU the liability exposure of EASA for negligent safety oversight or certification work is 
entirely covered by the EU budget; see: EASA, 'Opinion of the EASA Management Board on the 
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6.7 ASSESSING THE NEED FOR AN AMENDMENT OF THE 
CHICAGO CONVENTION 
The emergence of RASOs, especially those with Level 3 competences, could also 
trigger questions as to the eventual need to amend the Chicago Conventi  in or-
der to clearly enable these organisations to exercise safety related competences in 
their own name, and thus to take full responsibility, from the international law 
point of view, for the work they are doing. 
 While this study does not believe that there would be, at present, sufficient 
interest amongst the ICAO Member States in opening a discussion on this subject, 
should such a debate be launched in the future, two main possibilitie  could be 
further explored.  
 The first option could be a limited amendment of the Chicago Convention, 
altering the scope of its current Article 83bis in a way to allow transfer of safety 
functions not only to other States but also to international rganisations.  
Another option would be through the inclusion of the so called REIO 
clause, which provides for the possibility of adherence to an internatio l treaty of 
a REIO, such as the African RECs or the EU.240  
The consequence of adding a REIO clause to the Chicago Conventio 
would be the recognition by all ICAO Member States of the possibility of trans-
ferring certain competences from States to a REIO. This would, de lege, reverse 
the direction of attribution of conduct from the perspective of the Chicago Con-
vention. Such a situation exists, for example, in the context of World Trade Organ-
isation (WTO), in which the EU participates as a REIO, and where th actions of 
EU Member States implementing EU law and constituting a bre ch of WTO obli-
gations are attributed to the EU in the WTO dispute settlement process.241 At the 
same time, adding a REIO clause to the Chicago Convention would n t cover the 
RASOs which are established outside of a REIO framework, so this solution also 
has its shortcomings. 
This study recognises of course that the actual need for an amendment of 
the Chicago Convention, putting aside the political willingness of the States to 
actually do that, could be a point of moot. On the one hand, the principle of ulti-
mate responsibility for safety oversight may discourage States from establishing 
‘Level 3’ RASOs which ‘provide the best dividend in terms of efficiency and the 
effective use of resources’.242 On the other hand, States could take less interest in 
aviation safety, if they were to be allowed to release themselves from ultimate 
responsibility and hide behind a regional body – which is why ICAO puts so 
much emphasis on individual State responsibility it its manual on RSOOs.243 
                                                                                                                            
2010 Annual Accounts, Annex 1, Non-contractual liabi ties', (EASA Management Board Decision 
07-2011, 2011). 
240 For example by 2011, EU had acceded to over 70 interna ional treaties by virtue of a REIO 
clause. See: CEPS, 'Upgrading the EU's role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the 
Restructuring of European Diplomacy', (2011),  p. 5. 
241 Jose Manuel Cortés Martin, 'European Exceptionalism in International Law? The European 
Union and the System of International Responsibility', in: Responsibility of international 
organizations: essays in memeory of Sir Ian Brownlie, ed. by Maurizio Ragazzi (2013),  pp. 194-
195. 
242 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 3.1.1. 
243 Ibid. at Paragraph 4.1.35. 
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In view of the above - should an amendment to the Chicago Convention be 
seriously considered - a reasonable compromise to reflect the most far reaching 
delegations to RASOs would probably be not to release States from responsibility, 
but rather to clearly establish in the Chicago Convention a principle of joint and 
several responsibility of a RASO and its Member States. There are precedents for 
using such solutions in international treaties. This is the case for example under 
the ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’244 Another solu-
tion could be to establish a subsidiary responsibility of the RASO Member States, 
which is a solution used under Article XI of the ‘Operating Agreement on the In-
ternational Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)’.245 
6.8 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The success of the GASON proposed in Chapter 2, measured by more effective 
and uniform implementation of ICAO SARPs and efficiencies in terms of the use 
of resources by ICAO and its Member States, will to a large degree depend on 
whether the RASOs which form GASON’s building blocks are appropriately em-
powered to exercise civil aviation safety functions and duties – either on behalf of 
their Member States or in RASOs own name. In this respect the clarity of con-
cepts, limitations, conditions and consequences of attributing and delegating safe-
ty functions to RASOs is of fundamental importance for the feasibility of the 
GASON. 
This chapter has therefore, first of all, clarified and systematised the gen-
eral principles concerning the attribution and delegation of civil aviation safety 
functions, both in domestic and international law context. Secondly, it has verified 
to what extent the Chicago Convention and its safety related Annexes establish 
limitations or conditions concerning the attribution and delegation of such func-
tions. Finally this chapter has analysed the consequences that the establishment of 
RASOs can have for States and the regional body itself from the perspective of 
their international responsibility and liability under domestic law.  
 
In this respect the following conclusions have been reached: 
 
While a State has numerous safety related responsibilities under the Chi-
cago Convention and its Annexes, it does not necessarily have to discharge all 
these responsibilities through governmental departments. This chapter has identi-
fied numerous examples of Chicago Convention related responsibilities being 
exercised through non-governmental entities, including sub-contractors, n t-for-
profit associations, approved organisations, individual designes, and even, as in 
the case of Austria, aviation authorities established in a form of a limited liability 
company.  
                                                 
244 See in particular the last sentence of Article VI of that treaty (supra note 110), which provides 
that: ‘When activities are carried out in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
by an international organization, responsibility for c mpliance with this Treaty shall be borne both 
by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organ-
ization.’ 
245 'Operating Agreement on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)', 
London, 3 September 1976, 15 ILM 233. 
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In accordance with the principle of legality, the competence of a non-
governmental entity to exercise civil aviation regulatory or oversight tasks has to 
be clearly identified, or in other words attributed to such entity by law. In addi-
tion, given that delegation cannot be presumed, a national civil av ation authority 
can delegate to other entities the exercise of tasks which have been attributed to it 
only on the basis of a clear statutory authorisation. Finally, a review of the Chica-
go Convention and its safety related Annexes has demonstrated that: 
(1) Although there is no consistency in the way the different formulations re-
garding aviation authorities are used in the Annexes, the vast majority of 
the ICAO SARPs use broad formulations which refer to a State and/or to 
an authority in a generic sense without specifying that it has to be a na-
tional authority; 
 
(2) In the rare cases where an ICAO Annex uses the term national, the rele-
vant State and ICAO practice demonstrates that this term is actually inter-
preted as covering also RASO type authorities; 
 
(3) Many of the ICAO Annexes explicitly envisage that a State has an obliga-
tion to designate an authority, which is to discharge on its behalf relevant 
safety related responsibilities, or provide services necessary for interna-
tional air navigation. 
In 2014 there were only two ICAO Annexes, that is No 13 and No 19, 
which explicitly refer to RASOs, although only Annex 19 actually contains Stand-
ards and Recommended Practices in this respect. Analysis of the relevant provi-
sions of these two Annexes revealed that ICAO is still strugglin  somewhat with 
accepting that a RASO could completely replace a national aviation authority. 
Based on the above, it was concluded that ICAO should ensure that 
SARPs more clearly reflect that it is perfectly acceptable for a State to discharge 
its safety related obligations under Annex 13 or any other safety related Annex to 
the Chicago Convention by relying in part or even entirely on a RASO type body, 
as long as the State can demonstrate that the relevant SARPs are effectively im-
plemented. 
Similar to the domestic law context, from the perspective of international 
law, the competence of an international organisation to act is governed by the 
principle of attribution, or speciality. There is however today ‘considerable lack 
of clarity and consistent usage in the conceptual labels used to describe different 
types of conferrals by States of powers on international organizations.’246  
Nevertheless, having reviewed and analysed the provisions of RASO 
founding documents, relevant ICAO documentation, State and international courts 
practice, as well as academic writings, this chapter came to the following conclu-
sions: 
(1) From the international law point of view, nothing today prevents a State 
from delegating the exercise of its State safety functions, as envisaged 
under the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, to a RASO. However, 
given the fact that de lege lata, only States can be parties to the Chicago 
                                                 
246 Sarooshi, supra note 19 in Ch.2, pp. 28-31. 
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Convention, such delegation does not relieve a State from ulti ate re-
sponsibility of compliance. Even when States establish Level 3 RASOs, 
as was proposed under Chapter 5, the transfer of responsibility in such 
cases takes place only inter se, not vis-à-vis other ICAO Member States. 
 
(2) Furthermore, three general types of delegations of powers to RASOs were 
distinguished: agency relationships, delegations proper, and tr sfers. Alt-
hough this typology corresponds to the general theory of conferrals of 
powers on international organisations as proposed by Sarooshi, it was also 
adapted in order to take into account the specificities of the international 
aviation law context: 
 
(a) An agency relationship occurs, when States use Level 3 delegations in 
respect to functions for which they are responsible under the Chicago 
Convention. In such cases a RASO will be exercising such functions 
on behalf of the State concerned, meaning that it can change its rights 
and obligations under international law; 
 
(b) Delegation proper occurs when States give to a RASO functions 
which are not created by the Chicago Convention. In such case we can 
in fact speak about an attribution of a competence which a RASO will 
be carrying out in its own name. An example of such a delegation 
would be the establishment of a regional inspection scheme like the 
EASA standardisation programme which was presented in Chapter 4; 
 
(c) Transfer of responsibilities results in releasing a State from an obliga-
tion of compliance. Today transfers are envisaged only under Article 
83bis of the Chicago Convention. Given the fact that RASOs cannot 
be parties to the Convention, Article 83bis transfers are in principle 
possible only between States. This study has identified a potential, but 
very limited, possibility of a RASO concluding Article 83bis agree-
ments in the case when it would be designated as common mark regis-
tering authority under Article 77 of the Chicago Convention dealing 
with aircraft of international operating agencies. 
When it comes to potential responsibility of RASOs under international 
law, the basic premise stemming from case law of the ICJ and the provisions of 
DARIO is that such responsibility can be engaged only in respect to those RASOs 
which have a recognised separate international legal personality. This chapter 
concluded that, as few RASO founding agreements explicitly provide for it, the 
existence of such a separate legal personality has to be assessed on a case by case 
basis. 
In the case of RASOs analysed for the purpose of this study, it was found 
that the majority of them can be considered as having legal personality and thus 
having their international legal personality potentially engaged. The substance of 
such responsibility in the first place depends on the underlying relationship which 
exists between a RASO and its Member States in accordance with the principle of 
specialty. Given the fact that RASOs cannot be parties to the Chicago Convention, 
the main source of their international law obligations are their founding agree-
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ments. The obligations stemming from such founding agreements are directed 
towards RASO Member States. 
This chapter demonstrated that, from the perspective of international re-
sponsibility for the exercise of functions created by the Chicago Convention, the 
actions of RASOs would normally be attributed to its Member States. This is be-
cause, in such cases, the RASO acts as an agent of States.
This chapter also considered whether the international legal responsibility 
of a RASO could be engaged by a non-Member State in respect to the provisions 
of the Chicago Convention. This question is especially relevant in respect to Level 
3 RASOs which are expected to carry out their delegated safety functions in com-
pliance with the Convention and its safety related Annexes. While realising that 
arguing in favour of such responsibility is a controversial issue in view of the fact 
that RASOs cannot be a party to the Chicago Convention, this study nevertheless 
came to the conclusion that such possibility should not be excluded a priori, espe-
cially in the case of RASOs which have operational responsibilities, such as air-
craft certification, the negligent exercise of which could contribute to accidents. 
This chapter argued that, from a legal point of view, RASO responsibility 
vis-à-vis third countries could be justified by the fact that some of the safety over-
sight obligations can be considered as erga omnes, as was demonstrated by other 
studies. In addition, such responsibility could be considered at least in relation to 
those countries which explicitly recognised a RASO and their safety competences 
by concluding BASAs with RASO Member States. 
Irrespective of the above, this study did not identify any cases heard by in-
ternational courts or tribunals and related to breach by either a State or a RASO of 
international safety oversight or regulatory obligations. In practic l terms it is 
therefore more likely that, rather than international responsibility of RASOs being 
engaged by States, potential victims of aviation accidents would rather try to en-
gage RASOs civil liability for damages. In this respect thisstudy concluded as 
follows: 
(1) There is at present no international instrument which harmonises the do-
mestic civil liability regimes of States in respect to damage caused by neg-
ligent conduct of civil aviation safety regulatory and oversight tasks. Ac-
cordingly such civil liability would depend primarily on provisions of the 
RASO founding documents and applicable domestic law; 
 
(2) A limited number, that is three, founding documents of the RASOs studied 
explicitly provide for the possibility of holding them liable for non-
contractual damages. In addition this study has identified case law - albeit 
entirely from domestic, common law jurisdictions - where courts con-
firmed that national aviation regulators owe a duty of care towards the 
travelling public and set negligence as a threshold beyond which the regu-
lator may be held liable. Similar principles could be applied to RASOs; 
 
(3) The possibility to engage civil liability of a RASO would in the first place 
depend on the recognition of its separate legal personality under domestic 
law. This should normally not be a problem as far as the jurisdictions of 
the RASO Member States are concerned, but could be more difficult in 
case of non-Member States. The question of jurisdictional immunity in 
domestic proceedings would also have to be considered. In this respect the 
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study concluded that most of the RASO founding documents studied con-
tain provisions on privileges and immunities, although the scope of the 
rights granted vary considerably; 
 
(4) It is recommended that the treatment of RASOs, from a civil liability point 
of view, should chiefly depend on the type of delegations and competences 
they have been granted by their Member States. The more operational 
competences have been given to a RASO, the exercise of which can result 
in damages to third parties, the more stringent the liability regim  should 
be. In this respect, it was advocated that States should promote in the RA-
SO founding agreements clear provisions on their liability, especially in 
the case of organisations enjoying ‘Level 3’ delegations. 
Overall, this chapter found no evidence that any particular provision or 
principle of international law would be a serious obstacle for the establishment or 
functioning of RASOs. It was concluded that States are even able to establish or-
ganisations vested with power to issue certificates on their behalf. 
From the perspective of the Chicago Convention, and as was pointed 
above, the main limitation to RASO functioning is the fact that only States can be 
a party to the Convention. This means that, from the perspective of th  Chicago 
Convention, RASOs can only act as agents of States and the latter c nnot be re-
leased from their ultimate responsibility for compliance with the requi ments of 
the Convention and its safety related Annexes by establishing a RASO. 
In addition, three more specific limitations were identified from the per-
spective of the Chicago Convention concerning the delegation of State safety 
functions to a RASO. These limitations are related to the exercise by a RASO of 
the functions and duties of the ‘State of Registry’ and ‘State of the Operator’: 
(1) Although a RASO can act as a ‘State of Registry’ with respect to individu-
al States, meaning registering aircraft on their behalf, such aircraft would 
still have the nationality of the State on behalf of which they w re regis-
tered in accordance with Article 17 of the Chicago Convention. There is 
thus today no possibility for a RASO to register aircraft on a multinational 
basis. The only exception to this rule could be aircraft operated by interna-
tional operating agencies under Article 77 of the Chicago Convention. To 
date however there has been only one case of an international operating 
agency having its aircraft registered on a non-national basis (Arab Air 
Cargo), but this scheme involved a number of States acting jointly as a 
‘State of Registry’ rather than delegating registration functions to an inter-
national organisation; 
 
(2) Where a RASO exercises on behalf of its Member States the functions and 
duties of the ‘State of the Operator’ or ‘State of Registry’ it will not be 
able to conclude Article 83bis with third countries in its own name. This 
stems from the fact that only States can be parties to the Chicago Conven-
tion and thus benefit from its Article 83bis; 
 
(3) Where a RASO exercises on behalf of its Member States the functions and 
duties of the ‘State of Registry’, while the RASO Member States continue 
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to exercise the functions and duties of the ‘State of Operator’, agreements 
concerning the transfer of responsibilities which may be concluded be-
tween the RASO and its Member States, may not be recognised by third 
countries. Similar to point (2) above this limitation result  from the fact 
that RASOs cannot be party to the Chicago Convention. 
This chapter also considered the need to amend the Chicago Conventi in 
order to clearly enable RASOs to exercise safety tasks in their own name. While 
realising that such an amendment is not a realistic prospect for the time being, two 
suggestions have been put forward for consideration. The first option could be a 
limited amendment of the Chicago Convention, altering the scope of its current 
Article 83bis in a way to allow transfer of safety functions not only to other States 
but also to international organisations. The second option could be to introduce 
into the Chicago Convention a REIO clause, which provides for the possibility of 
adherence to an international treaty of a REIO, such as the African RECs or the 
EU.247 The latter option would however not cover the RASOs which are estab-
lished outside of a REIO framework. 
This chapter recognised that the actual need to amend the Chicago Con-
vention, putting aside the political willingness of the States to actually do that, 
could be a point of moot. On the one hand, it was argued, ultimate responsibility 
for safety oversight discourages States from establishing ‘Level 3’ RASOs which 
‘provide the best dividend in terms of efficiency and the effective us  of re-
sources’.248 On the other hand, it was argued, States could take less interest in 
aviation safety, if they were to be allowed to release themselves from ultimate 
responsibility and hide behind a regional body – which is why ICAO puts so 
much emphasis on individual State responsibility it its manual on RSOOs.249 
While not excluding the possibility of amending the Chicago Convention 
in the long term, this chapter argued that what is needed in the short term is a 
much clearer policy from ICAO on the role of States in the supervision of RA-
SOs. It was proposed that such a policy could be included in one of the future 
editions of the ICAO RSOO and RAIO manuals, or the new Annex 19 which, as it 
applies to safety management in general, has a horizontal application.  
This chapter further advocated that such supervision policy should be 
based on the principle that States and RASOs working on their behalf must be 
seen as a system which, taken together, should guarantee the level of saf ty over-
sight required by the Chicago Convention. Such oversight policy should not lead 
to the need to control in detail the actions of a regional body, r create a risk of 
duplication of expertise at national and regional levels. 
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This study has been a first comprehensive attempt to analyse, from the legal and 
institutional points of view, how regional cooperation and more specifically RA-
SOs can contribute to the improvement of civil aviation safety and the achieve-
ment of the objectives of ‘uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and 
organization’ as formulated in Article 37 of the Chicago Convention. 
Aviation safety has traditionally been regulated at the global level by 
ICAO, while aviation regulations are implemented and enforced at the national 
level by competent aviation authorities of ICAO Member States. Thoug  this is 
still largely the case today, the last twelve years have seen the emergence and rap-
id development of RASOs, which form an intermediate level between ICAO and 
individual States. 
RASOs are not an entirely new concept, as Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5 has 
explained. However, the increasing reliance on these organisations is a clear 
demonstration of a growing conviction of the international aviation community, as 
was demonstrated under Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2, that they can significantly 
help States in enhancing their safety oversight capabilities in a cost efficient way, 
and contribute to the achievement of the Chicago Convention objectives of uni-
formity of regulations, procedures and requirements which are essential for the 
global aviation industry. 
With a view to reaching the primary objective of verifying the extent o 
which RASOs meet the expectations vested in them by the international aviation 
community, Chapter 1 formulated seven specific research questions: 
 
(1) What should be the role of RASOs in global governance of civil aviation 
safety? 
(2) Can the optimal RASO model be identified from a legal point of view? If 
yes, how can it best be defined and structured? 
                                                 




(3) In which domains can RASOs yield maximum safety benefits, and under 
which legal conditions? 
(4) For which States are RASOs most relevant? 
(5) What is the expected future evolution of RASO type bodies? 
(6) Are there any shortcomings in the current international legal framework 
that pose an obstacle to further development of RASOs?  
(7) What are the international responsibility and civil liability implications re-
sulting from RASOs establishment and functioning? 
 
This final chapter will now draw on the analysis and conclusions reached 
in the preceding parts of the present study in order to answer these res arch ques-
tions. 
7.2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD 
TO SPECIFIC RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
(1) What should be the role of RASOs in global governance of civil av ation 
safety? 
This study has demonstrated in Chapter 2 that despite past criticism of ICAO re-
garding its effectiveness in ensuring the implementation and enforcment of avia-
tion safety standards at the global level, States have consistently managed to im-
prove the level of effective implementation of USAOP protocols.  
Chapter 2 also concluded that States with completely deficient safety ov r-
sight systems constitute only 0.3% of the worldwide internatio l air traffic, 
which is a marginal risk to aviation safety. Overall, aviation safety, in particular in 
commercial air transport, stands at present at a very high level. 
Notwithstanding the above, Chapters 1 and 2 have also demonstrated th t 
the current global aviation safety framework, as established by the Chicago Con-
vention, faces a number of important challenges: 
(1) The first one is that not all of the States, in particular in Africa, have as yet 
been able to build safety oversight systems to at least the minimum level 
of effectiveness required by ICAO, mainly due to lack of financial re-
sources or technical capability. In 2014, 43% of ICAO Member States hd 
below-average level of effective implementation of the eight CEs of safety 
oversight system as defined by ICAO. The current financially challenging 
times are equally putting pressure on aviation authorities who traditionally 
did not have problems with resources, such as in Europe or the Unit d 
States; 
 
(2) Secondly, aviation safety levels and the levels of effective implementatio  
of the eight CEs of safety oversight vary significantly between States 
around the world, as well as within ICAO regions. As air traffic continues 
to grow, there is also a concern that absolute numbers of accidents could 
increase if the current improvement rates stagnate. It has been demonstrat-
ed in Chapter 1 that two of the three ICAO regions which between 2005
and 2012 experienced the highest rate of traffic growth (Latin America and 
the Caribbean: 17%; Africa: 20%; Asia: 38%), also demonstrate the lowest 
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level of effective implementation of the eight CEs (Latin America and the 
Caribbean: 68%; Africa: 44%; Asia: 71%). 
 
(3) Finally in order to further reduce accident rates, which will be necessary in 
view of the ongoing traffic growth, more sophisticated methods of over-
sight will be needed, including pro-active and even predictive safety man-
agement tools as rightly advocated by GASP. Chapter 1 argued that not all 
the States individually may be able to deploy such methods in an effective 
manner. 
The current system also suffers, as Section 2.2.4 of Chapter 2 has shown, 
from a death by audit syndrome, which stems from redundant regulatory oversight 
and repetitive certifications of the same aviation activities conducte within juris-
dictions of different States. In addition some jurisdictions f the world, such as the 
EU or US, have implemented unilateral auditing schemes which to a large extent 
replicate the objective of ICAO USOAP, namely verification of effective compli-
ance of States with minimum ICAO SARPs. These repetitive certifications and 
auditing schemes, although necessary, currently represent one of the major ineffi-
ciencies of the global aviation safety system, which according to Article 37 of the 
Chicago Convention, should be based on ‘the highest practicable degree of uni-
formity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to air-
craft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services.’ 
Chapter 2 of this study has reached the conclusion that, whilst there are el-
ements which can be further improved, such as more standardisation and uni-
formity in application of Article 38 on the filing of differences (see Section 2.2.2 
of Chapter 2), the main challenge for ICAO and the global aviation community in 
the years to come will be to achieve the required harmonisation of the global regu-
latory framework and effective implementation of the new proactive and predic-
tive safety management techniques called for by GASP, by continuing to rely ex-
clusively on national safety oversight systems. 
Chapter 2 has also concluded that, with ICAO membership standing at 191 
States in 2014 and based on the principle of individual State responsibility for 
safety oversight, it has become unavoidable that the level of implementation of 
SARPs and eight CEs will be variable across the world. In this respect it was ar-
gued that, to effectively standardise this large number of States, ICAO will not be 
able to continue working as it did in the past with the limited resources available. 
The recent shift to the USOAP-CMA methodology, which was mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.2.4 of Chapter 2, is a very telling demonstration of that new reality. 
Based on the above considerations, Chapter 2 has argued that ICAO needs 
to find a way which would allow it, in addition to monitoring State safety perfor-
mance, helping States in addressing the detected deficiencies and enforcing global 
standards, to also address more decisively the ongoing erosion of the present avia-
tion safety system in terms of redundant regulatory oversight and waste of re-
sources deriving from duplicate certifications. Chapter 2 has proposed that the 
way forward to achieve these objectives is to build a GASON, with RASO type 
organisations as its main building blocks. 
With respect to the proposed GASON, this study has proposed (se  Sec-
tion 2.5 of Chapter 2) that its architecture should be based on ICAO relying on 
and working closely with a number of strong RASOs, which could ensure harmo-
nised implementation of SARPs and organise enforcement mechanisms. Such a 
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system, it was argued, would not only allow ICAO to be more efficient in its use 
of limited resources, but would also contribute to a more uniform implementation 
of SARPs, as instead of a multitude of national regimes the systm could ultimate-
ly provide for a more limited number of regional schemes which would be easier 
for ICAO to standardise and monitor. The regional approach would also contrib-
ute to harmonisation of actual safety performance through regional safetyperfor-
mance planning, at the RASGs level, in consistent with the globally agreed safety 
targets. 
Based on the above considerations, Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 has propo ed 
the following definition of the GASON: 
 
A worldwide system for the standardisation and monitoring of ICAO Member States’ lev-
el of effective implementation of eight Critical Elements of State safety oversight, relying 
on information generated by Regional Aviation Safety Organisations; which are empow-
ered, through international agreements or supranational law, to ensure uniform compli-
ance of their Member States with the Chicago Convention and Standards and Recom-
mended Practices laid down in the Annexes to this Convention. 
 
Having proposed the GASON, this study, in Chapter 3, looked in more de-
tail at the very notion of a RASO and more generally at regional avi tion safety 
cooperation initiatives.  It has been noted in this respect (see Section 3.4 of Chap-
ter 3) that RASOs are already a positive reality. By mid-2014, over 100 ICAO 
Member States were members of such organisations, if looked at from the per-
spective of a broad interpretation of this term as currently followed by ICAO. In 
addition a number of ICAO Member States have been considering or are in th  
course of setting up similar organisations, as was explained under Section 5.4.2 of 
Chapter 5. 
 The RASO concept has already been reflected in a number of ICAO As-
sembly Resolutions, and one of them even puts RASOs on equal t rms with States 
(see Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2). References to RASOs are also present in ICAO 
Annexes 13 and 19 (see Section 6.3 of Chapter 6). In addition ICAO has pub-
lished two manuals dedicated entirely to RASOs’ establishment and functioning 
(see Section 3.4.3 of Chapter 3). 
This study has also found in Section 3.4.1.1 of Chapter 3 that the recent 
boom of RASOs has resulted, in particular in Africa, in the establi hment of a 
significant number of such organisations, but unfortunately sometimes with an 
overlapping membership. Similar duplications exist to a certain extent in Europe 
where a number of regional aviation organisations, that is EASA, EUROCON-
TROL and ECAC, continue to function in parallel, as Chapter 4 has demonstrated. 
While this study did not analyse in detail the consequences of these overlaps and 
duplications, it was argued that they are likely to result in inefficiencies and 
should be further studied. 
Finally, while arguing that RASOs should be more closely integrated into 
global governance of aviation safety through the GASON, this study also 
acknowledged, in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2, that this would require a high level of 
confidence by ICAO in the robustness of the regional systems. This in turn would 
necessitate strong and appropriately empowered RASOs which at present is rarely 
the case. This is because, as Section 5.2 of Chapter 5 has found, the majority of 
present RASOs provide mainly advisory and coordination services, without carry-
ing out safety functions with legally binding effects. 
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Recommendation No 1: 
 
ICAO and its Member States should give consideration to the development of a 
Global Aviation Safety Oversight Network (GASON). Building a GASON would 
require appropriately empowered RASOs, which is at present still rarely the case. 
The GASON should therefore be treated as a long term strategy for integrating 
RASOs into the global governance for civil aviation safety management. 
 
(2) Can the optimal RASO model be identified from a legal point of view? If 
yes, how can it best be defined and structured? 
 
Despite RASOs having been a positive reality for many years, there is at present 
still no definition of RASO agreed at the international level, as Section 3.2 of 
Chapter 3 has explained. The international aviation community recommended in 
2011 the development of such a definition, but so far this recommendation has not 
been implemented. In this respect, as a first step, this study has classified these 
organisations (see Section 3.2 of Chapter 3) into two broad categories, that is 
RSOOs and RAIOs, depending on whether their function is safety regulation and 
oversight, or investigation of aviation accidents. 
The common denominator which is used today by ICAO and States to de-
fine an organisation or form of cooperation as a RSOO or a RAIO is its general 
objective of strengthening safety oversight/investigation capabilities of States lo-
cated in the same geographical region rather than a particular institut onal or legal 
setup. This was discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
Based on the above, this study has concluded, in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3, 
that developing a RASO definition would be advantageous for tw main reasons: 
(1) Firstly, because the notions of RSOO and RAIO are being increasingly 
used in ICAO documentation, including Assembly Resolutions a d An-
nexes to the Chicago Convention, such definition would help in ensuring 
clarity as to who exactly is an addressee of these documents, especially 
where they give to a RSOO or a RAIO a right to carry out functions or du-
ties so far normally exercised only by States. 
 
(2) Secondly, there is a need for a definition which would promote the most
efficient forms of RASOs, and notably those which have the competence 
to carry out, on behalf of States, safety related functions and duties se  out 
by the Chicago Convention, in a legally binding manner. 
The objective of a RASO definition should be therefore, in addition o 
clarifying the roles of States and RASOs, to promote those forms of RASOs 
which are able to accept the most advanced forms of delegations. This capability 
will make RASOs more suitable to constitute strong building blocks of the 
GASON. In this respect Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the 
competence of a RASO to exercise civil aviation safety functions with legally 
binding effects presupposes the possession by a RASO of a separate international 
legal personality. 





An organisation established by States from the same geographical region, which has legal 
personality under international law and whose principal purpose is the provision of sup-
port for the carrying out of safety-related functions and duties set out by the Chicago 
Convention and its Annexes, and preferably the actual carrying out of some or all of such 
functions and duties on behalf of its participating States. 
 
This study has also concluded in Section 5.4.1 of Chapter 5 that there is no 
single template that States use when setting up regional aviation safety bodies, 
and that the organisational and legal frameworks of these organisatio s re far 
from being uniform. Nevertheless for the purpose of this study a typology of re-
gional aviation safety bodies has been proposed, in Chapter 3, which distinguishes 
between two main categories: (i) pre-RASOs and (ii) RASOs. 
 While pre-RASOs do not strictly speaking fall within the scope f the pro-
posed RASO definition because of their lack of international legal personality, 
they have however been included in the proposed typology for the sake of com-
pleteness, and because such pre-RASOs have a tendency to evolve into RASOs 
proper, as Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5 has demonstrated. 
In addition to proposing a RASO typology, this study has also reviewed, 
analysed and categorised, in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5 the various types of delega-
tion arrangements commonly used by States when setting up RASOs and pre-
RASOs. In this respect three levels of delegations have been distingui hed from 
an operational point of view: 
 
(1) Level 1 (Coordination level): At the basic level, States may decide to dele-
gate specific competences to individuals not employed by their national 
civil aviation authorities. Such authorisations then give the underlying au-
thority to inspectors of a regional body to perform audits, inpections and 
other oversight or investigative work on behalf of the national authority 
which gave the authorisation; 
 
(2) Level 2 (Harmonisation level): The next level, which goes beyond authori-
sation of individuals only, is the delegation to a RASO/pre-RASO, as an 
organisation, of the competence to  perform specific technical work on be-
half of its Member States or member authorities. In other words, this type 
of delegation means that a regional body will perform the technical find-
ings, such as inspections, tests, examinations, on behalf of l  or selected 
Member States/aviation authorities, and then submit the results, together 
with recommendations, for further legal action at the national level(s). 
 
(3) Level 3 (Unification level): Finally States may want to delegate to a re-
gional body both the conduct of the technical work, as well as responsibil-
ity for the issuance of the certificate/approval confirming that the applica-
ble requirements have been met. Under this option efficiencies are poten-
tially most significant, because it effectively results in centralisation of a 
given safety function at regional level. There is only one technical process 
and one approval issued at its end. From the perspective of the aviation in-
dustry this is a one-stop-shop for obtaining the approvals that they need to 
provide the services at the market. 
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While this study did not recommend, a priori, any particular level of dele-
gation, as this choice should be based on a thorough assessment of the needs and 
policies of the States concerned and their aviation industries, Chapter 5 has con-
cluded that Level 3 delegations can offer the following advantages: 
 
- Centralisation of a particular safety function at the regional level, which 
allows for economies of scale and better pooling of resources; 
- Less risk of duplication between the national and regional levels, as in this 
case the safety function normally ceases to be exercised at the national 
level; 
- From a regulatory point of view, Level 3 delegations offer a fully unified 
action, be it a single certificate valid throughout the region, or a single rule 
applicable, in a uniform manner, to all aviation organisations under the ju-
risdiction of the RASO. 
 
Whilst Level 3 RASOs offer the above advantages which make them very 
well placed to form effective building blocks of the GASON, this study also 
found, in Chapter 5, that Level 3 RASOs are still very rare. In mid-2014 there 
were only three RASOs, that is EASA in the EU, IAC in the CIS, and ECCAA in 
the OECS, which effectively possessed such powers.  
One of the reasons behind this still low number of Level 3 RASOs is the 
presence of, as also identified by ICAO, strong sovereignty issues that impede 
regional cooperation.2 In this respect, this study recalled in Section 2.2.1 of Chap-
ter 2, that a distinction should be made between the principle of State sovereignty 
in aviation law, which is indivisible, and the exercise of this sovereignty which 
can be delegated to other States or international organisations, as is the case for 
example in the ATM sector with the provision of ANS. 
 
Recommendation No 2: 
 
a) ICAO is invited to consider the definition of RASO proposed in this study as a 
basis for developing a corresponding definition for inclusion in subsequent 
editions of its RSOO and RAIO manuals. 
 
b) States are invited to take note of the conclusions reached by this study with 
respect to the different levels of delegations available for RASOs. In particular 
they are invited to consider the benefits that this study has demonstrated as 
regards Level 3 delegations. 
 
(3) In which domains can RASOs yield maximum safety benefits, and under 
which legal conditions? 
Chapter 3 found that the RASOs in existence today have broad mandates and do 
not specialise in any single domain of aviation safety. RAIOs, which were ad-
dressed in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3, could be expected to be such specialised RA-
SOs, but so far there is still little experience with RAIO functioning. In practice, 
until mid-2014 there was only one RAIO, that is IAC, which was fully operation-
al, but it functions within a broader organisational framework of a RASO which 
                                                 
2 Outcomes of 2011 RSOO Symposium (C-WP/13810), supra note 4 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.3.1. 
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also performs other functions (see Section 3.4.3.3 of Chapter 3). It was also found 
in Chapter 3 that some RASOs, such as PASO, CASSOA, or ECCAA in addition 
to aviation safety deal also with aviation security.  
The fact that RASOs have rather general mandates can be considered a 
good thing from a safety point of view, given the interrelatedness of the different 
components of the aviation system which makes it difficult to consider one do-
main in isolation from the others. 
In order to assist States in setting up RASOs, based on analysis of case 
studies of these organisations from around the world, as well as review of practi-
cal examples of the different safety functions that these bodies perform, this study 
proposed, in Chapter 5, a practical ‘tool-box’ for the setting up of RASOs. Struc-
tured around the eight ICAO CEs of safety oversight, this ‘tool-bx’ provides 
States with a menu of potential options from which they could choose, taking into
account that, as advocated by ICAO, when setting up RASOs States should focus 
on those activities that demonstrate a higher impact on regional safety oversight 
and contribute towards developing an effective aviation safety oversight frame-
work.’3  
A similar approach to the proposed ‘tool-box’ method was used in the EU 
during the initial establishment process of EASA, and when States first created a 
list of potential functions and tasks, such as rulemaking, certifi ation, standardisa-
tion, and considered the implications of the different institutional solutions on 
each of them. 
With respect to the establishment of the GASON, there are a number of 
safety functions to which States should pay particular attention: 
 
(1) Existence of a harmonised regulatory framework without, in principle, na-
tional differences, although, as Section 4.4.1.1 of Chapter 4 has demon-
strated, this is an ideal objective which in practice may be difficult to 
achieve even for supranational systems such as the EU; 
 
(2) Existence of a regional mechanism, similar to EASA standardisation in-
spections and other monitoring activities (see Sections 4.4.3.1 and 4.4.3.3 
of Chapter 4), which would allow a RASO to feed the ICAO USOAP-
CMA programme, and thus enable ICAO to rely on a RASO for monitor-
ing its Member States’ compliance with the Chicago Convention and rele-
vant SARPs (existence of a harmonised regulatory framework is a pre-
requisite to achieve this synergy). 
 
With regard to point (1) above, this study found (see Section 5.2 of Chap-
ter 5) that while a RASO may be involved in the development of aviation safety 
regulations from a technical point of view by preparing drafts thereof, the actual 
adoption of aviation safety legislation is very unlikely to be given to a RASO. 
This study did not identify a single RASO which enjoys legislative functions. This 
demonstrates that States essentially treat RASOs as technical agencies implement-
ing and enforcing the law but not creating it. 
Finally, this study found (see Section 5.4.5 of Chapter 5) that there may be 
unintended consequences when transferring the exercise of safety functions from 
a State to a regional level. This is because, when one or more State safe y func-
                                                 
3 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 2.2.1. 
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tions are taken out of the national framework and transferred to the regional level, 
some essential safety links may be lost. This was demonstrated in Section 5.4.5.1 
of Chapter 5 by the example of the transfer of ‘State of Design’ functions in the 
context of EASA in the EU. For this reason this study has recommended in Sec-
tion 5.4.5 of Chapter 5 that every RASO should be considered as part of the over-
all civil aviation safety system of its Member States, and that RASO functions 
should be fully integrated into that system. 
 
Recommendation No 3: 
 
a) States are invited to use a ‘tool-box’ approach when setting up RASOs. This 
method structures the RASO development process along the eight CEs of State 
safety oversight and assists States in choosing the safety functions and levels 
of delegations which are best suited to the particular situation of the States in 
the region, and the needs of their aviation industry. 
 
b) States should treat RASOs as part of their overall civila iation safety system, 
and to ensure that RASOs are fully integrated into that sys em. This helps to 
avoid breaking essential safety links between the different ICAO requirements 
when transferring the exercise of a given safety function from a State level to a 
regional level. 
 
(4) For which States are RASOs most relevant? 
The analysis of ICAO documentation, including Assembly Resolutions and RASO 
manuals which was conducted in Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2 and Section 3.2 of 
Chapter 3, revealed that at present the primary focus of ICAO is on seei g RASOs 
as tools for assisting States in raising their safety oversight capabilities, in particu-
lar by allowing them to pool resources and achieve economies of scale. 
While the above is certainly a very valid RASO function, such organisa-
tions can equally offer benefits for States which do not face pressing problems 
with establishing effectively functioning safety oversight systems. This is the case 
for example in Europe, where States have historically enjoyed a high level of 
aviation safety, underpinned by effective levels of oversight, but where the prima-
ry reason, at least initially, behind the establishment of, first JAA, and subsequent-
ly EASA was to achieve regulatory efficiencies for the aeronautical industry a  
Chapter 4 has demonstrated. 
Similarly with regard to the proposed GASON, as Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 
highlighted, the main RASO function would be to ensure regulatory harmonisa-
tion and standardisation at regional levels, and to allow ICAO, instead of monitor-
ing directly 191 Member States, to rely in this respect on a more limit d number 
of regional systems. This in turn means that any ICAO Member State should be 
seen as a potential candidate for participating in a RASO-based system. Indeed, 
this is already largely the case today. This study has found in Chapter 3, that in 
2014 over 100 ICAO Member States were members of RASOs, if looked at from 
the perspective of a broad interpretation of this term as currently followed by 
ICAO. 
The findings of this study however also bring a note of caution with regard 
to the expectations vested into RASOs by the international avition community. 
This stems from the fact that some of the regional initiatives reviewed have expe-
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rienced or reported difficulties in relation to financing their activities or attracting 
and recruiting sufficient numbers of qualified technical personnel. For example 
the experiences of the AFI-CIS and of ECCAA demonstrate that it may be diffi-
cult to recruit or to pool aviation safety inspectors at a regional level, if they are 
simply not available in sufficient numbers. These difficulties were summarised in 
Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5. 
Similarly, in the vast majority of cases RASOs functioning today o not 
replace the national aviation authorities but function in parallel to them, as was 
highlighted in Section 5.4.1 of Chapter 5. This suggests that if the additional costs 
resulting from establishment of a RASO are not offset by efficiencies stemming 
from its operations or by additional revenues, States may actually be worst off in 
terms of their overall budgets. Although this issue was not studied in detail, based 
on examples of financial and resource related difficulties reported by some of the 
RASOs (see Section 5.4.3 of Chapter 5) it was argued that if States cannot reduce 
their costs, while at the same time will need to contribute to the financing of a 
RASO, this may actually lead to lack of sustainable funding of the latter and put-
ting in danger its operations. Such a negative scenario materialised in the case of 
one of the RASOs studied, that is PASO which was addressed in Section 3.4.3.2 
of Chapter 3. 
Overall, whilst different examples of RASOs were reviewed and analysed 
in the study, two of them merit particular highlighting in these final conclusions: 
(1) The first one is the RCAA model, which was presented and discussed in 
Section 3.6 of Chapter 3. In 2014 there was just one example of such an 
authority actually functioning in practice - the ECCAA. This is a unique 
organisation which acts as a single aviation authority for all its Member 
States. While experiencing its own challenges, ECCAA enabled its Mem-
ber States ‘to achieve effective civil aviation safety oversight at a fraction 
of the cost of establishing their own civil aviation authorities.’4 This RA-
SO model should be particularly considered by large groupings of small 
States with limited resources and/or States with low level of aviation activ-
ities which are unable to generate revenues big enough to support fully 
fledged national civil aviation authorities; 
 
(2) The second model worth highlighting in these final conclusions s a supra-
national RASO, meaning a RASO which evolves within the broader legal 
and institutional framework of a REIO, and relies on the latter for its func-
tioning. In 2014, there were still very few such organisations. The most 
notable example of such a RASO is EASA in the EU. Its case study, pre-
sented in Chapter 4, has demonstrated that combining the supranation l 
legal competences of a REIO, with the technical capabilities of a RASO 
can offer substantial benefits. These include the possibility of creating a 
harmonised, legally binding and directly applicable legal framework, 
large-scale recognition of certificates and approvals, and possibility of 
Level 3 delegations which are exercised in a uniform manner in all the 
RASO Member States.  
 
                                                 
4 'Interview No 7', (2014), supra note 232 in Ch.3. 
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Recommendation No 4: 
 
a) Regional groupings of small States with limited resources and/or States with 
low level of aviation activity which are unable to generate revenues big 
enough to support fully fledged national civil aviation authorities, are recom-
mended to consider establishing RASOs in the form of a single regional civil 
aviation authority. 
 
b) States which are members of supranational regional integraion organisa-
tions, similar to the EU, are recommended to set up their RASOs within the le-
gal and institutional framework of such supranational organisations. 
 
(5) What is the expected future evolution of RASO type bodies? 
 
Although the institutional frameworks and legal basis of RASOs and pre-RASOs 
are very varied, this study also found in Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5 that there is a 
strong tendency for these organisations to evolve over time into more formal enti-
ties. Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5 has demonstrated that out of the nine organisations 
established since 2003, six have already undergone such evolution, while some of 
the other are considering it in the future.  
The key characteristic feature of the above identified RASO/pre-RASO 
evolution trend is transition into organisations established by international agree-
ments and having a legal personality, if not under international law, then at least 
under the domestic law of one of the Member States. ICAO also has a general 
policy of transitioning COSCAPs into RASO type bodies, although this process is 
still ongoing as was demonstrated in Section 3.4.1.1 of Chapter 3. 
Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5 has identified the following typical ex mples of 
evolutions: from a technical cooperation project (Pre-RASO Type I) into a  inter-
national regional safety organisation with legal personality (RASO Type I); or a 
network of aviation safety authorities (pre-RASO Type II) evolving into an inter-
national regional safety organisation with legal personality (RASO Type I). In 
Europe a network of aviation safety authorities (pre-RASO Type II) evolv d into a 
supranational aviation safety agency (RASO Type II). 
Based on the trend identified above, it can be expected that RASOs/pre-
RASOs will continue to evolve in the years to come towards organisations estab-
lished under international law and having a legal personality separate from its 
Member States. Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5 has found that the evolution trend 
characterises especially young RASOs. Given the fact that a large number of such 
organisations were established only in the last decade, and that additional RASO 
organisations are in the planning, in particular in Africa and Middle East, the ex-
pectation of further evolutions can be formulated with a relatively highdegree of 
confidence. 
The fact that regional aviation safety bodies have an overall tendency to 
evolve into organisations with legal personality hopefully means that it is likely in 
the future that there will be more RASOs vested with delegations of safety func-
tions at Level 3. Such RASOs would further contribute to the development of the 
GASON as proposed in Chapter 2. 
Following on from the above, this study recommends the setting up of re-
gional aviation safety bodies in the form of RASOs, that is organisations estab-
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lished by international agreements or supranational acts which create direct legal 
effects and enable Level 3 delegations (see Section 5.2 of Chapter 5). This legal 
form, by also providing for legal personality of RASOs under domestic law of its 
Member States, eliminates the need for establishing additional associ tions or 
foundations under private law (see Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 and Section 5.4.4 of 
Chapter 5).  
 
Recommendation No 5: 
 
States and ICAO should consistently support the evolution of regional aviation 
safety bodies, into more institutionalised types of organisations established on the 
basis of international agreements or supranational law and having international 
and domestic legal personality. 
 
(6) Are there any shortcomings in the current international legal framework 
that pose an obstacle to further development of RASOs?  
Overall, this study found no evidence that any particular provision or principle of 
international law is a serious obstacle to the establishment of RASOs. States have 
even been able to establish organisations vested with power to issue certificates on 
their behalf, as Section 5.2 of Chapter 5 has demonstrated.  
From the perspective of the Chicago Convention the main limitation is the 
fact that only States can be a party to the Convention. This means that, from the 
perspective of the Chicago Convention, RASOs can act only as agents of States 
and the latter cannot transfer to a RASO their ultimate responsibility for compli-
ance with requirements of the Convention and its safety related Annexes. This 
conclusion, which has been reached in Chapter 6 of the study, is further elaborated 
in a summary related to the research question No 7 below.  
In addition, this study has identified three more specific limitations from 
the perspective of the Chicago Convention concerning the delegation of State 
safety functions to a RASO. These limitations are related to the exercise by a RA-
SO of the responsibilities and tasks of the ‘State of Registry’ (see Section 6.3.1.1 
of Chapter 6), and ‘State of the Operator’ (see Section 6.3.1.2 of Chapter 6): 
(1) Although a RASO can act as a ‘State of Registry’ with respect to individu-
al States, meaning registering aircraft on their behalf, such aircraft would 
still have the nationality of the State on behalf of which they were regis-
tered in accordance with Article 17 of the Chicago Convention. It is thu  
not possible today for a RASO to register aircraft on a multinational basis. 
The only exception to this rule could be aircraft operated by international 
operating agencies under Article 77 of the Chicago Convention. Until
2014 there has only been one case of an international operating agency 
having its aircraft registered on a non-national basis (Arab Air Cargo), but 
this scheme involved a number of States acting jointly as a ‘State of Regis-
try’ rather than delegating registration functions to an international rg ni-
sation; 
 
(2) Where a RASO exercises on behalf of its Member States the functions and 
duties of the ‘State of the Operator’ or ‘State of Registry’ it will not be 
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able to conclude Article 83bis with third countries in its own name. This 
stems from the fact that only States can be parties to the Chicago Conven-
tion and thus directly use its Article 83bis; 
 
(3) Where a RASO exercises on behalf of its Member States only the func-
tions and duties of the ‘State of Registry’, while the RASO Member States 
continue to exercise the functions and duties of the ‘State of Operator’, 
any agreements concerning the transfer of responsibilities which may be 
concluded between the RASO and its Member States, may not be recog-
nised by third countries. Similar to point (2) above this limitation results 
from the fact that RASOs cannot be party to the Chicago Convention. 
Chapter 6 also explored the need to amend the Chicago Convention in or-
der to clearly enable RASOs which enjoy the most far reaching regulatory powers 
to exercise them in RASOs own name, and thus to take full responsibility, from 
international law point of view, for the work they are doing. 
While this study argued that at present there is insufficient interest 
amongst the ICAO Member States in opening a discussion on amending the Chi-
cago Convention, should such a debate be launched in the future, two main possi-
bilities could be further explored: (1) The first option could be a limited amend-
ment of the Chicago Convention, altering the scope of its current Article 83bis in 
a way to allow transfer of safety functions not only to other States but also to in-
ternational organisations; (2) Another option would be through the inclusion of the 
so called REIO clause, which provides for the possibility of adherence to an inter-
national treaty of a REIO, such as the African RECs or the EU. 
The study highlighted that the actual need to amend the Chicago Conven-
tion, putting aside the political willingness of the States to actually do that, could 
be a point of moot. On the one hand it can be argued that the principle of ultimate 
State responsibility for safety oversight discourages ICAO Member States from 
establishing ‘Level 3’ RASOs which ‘provide the best dividend i terms of effi-
ciency and the effective use of resources’.5 The fact that there are very few Level 
3 RASOs can be used as an argument to support such a claim. On the other hand, 
and this is a point of view this study supports, it can be argued that States would 
take less interest in aviation safety, if they were to be allowed to release them-
selves from responsibility and hide behind a regional body – which is why ICAO 
puts so much emphasis on individual State responsibility in s manual on RSOOs. 
As far as the safety related Annexes to the Chicago Convention are con-
cerned, a detailed analysis of their provisions conducted in Section 6.3 of Chapter 
6 has revealed the following: 
(1) Although there is no consistency in the way the different formulations re-
garding aviation authorities are used in the Annexes, the vast majority of 
the SARPs use broad formulations which refer to a State and/or to an au-
thority in a more general sense without specifying that it has to be a na-
tional authority; 
 
                                                 
5 ICAO Doc. 9734 Part B, supra note 3 in Ch.1, at Paragraph 3.1.1. 
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(2) In the rare cases where an ICAO Annex uses the term national, the rele-
vant State and ICAO practice demonstrates that this term is actually inter-
preted as covering also RASO type bodies; 
 
(3) Many of the ICAO Annexes explicitly envisage that a State has an obliga-
tion to designate an authority, which is to discharge, on its behalf, relevant 
safety related responsibilities or provision of services necessary for inter-
national air navigation. 
In 2014 there were only two ICAO Annexes, that is No 13 and No 19, 
which explicitly refer to RASOs, although only Annex 19 actual contains Stand-
ards and Recommended Practices in this respect. Analysis of the relevant provi-
sions of these two Annexes which was conducted in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6 re-
vealed that ICAO is still struggling somewhat with accepting hat a RASO could 
completely replace a national aviation authority. In particular Section 6.3 of Chap-
ter 6 found that, although Annex 19 suggests that there may be limitations regard-
ing the safety management functions which may be delegated to a RSOO or a 
RAIO, that Annex does not offer further guidance in this respect. 
 
Recommendation No 6: 
 
a) ICAO Annexes should be drafted in a way which recognises that it is perfectly 
acceptable for a State to discharge its safety related obligations under the 
Chicago Convention and related Annexes by relying either on a national au-
thority(ies) or, in part or even entirely, on a RASO type body, as long as the 
State concerned can demonstrate that the relevant SARPs are effectiv ly im-
plemented. 
 
b) Should the possibility for an amendment of the Chicago Convention arise in 
the future, it is recommended that consideration is given to either  adjusting its 
Article 83bis in a way which would allow the transfer of sa ety functions and 
duties not only between States but also to RASOs, or incorporating a REIO-
type clause into the Convention. It is further recommended not to relieve 
States from their responsibility for safety regulation and oversight but rather 
provide for a joint and several responsibility of States and RASOs. 
 
(7) What are the international responsibility and civil liability implications re-
sulting from RASOs establishment and functioning? 
The success of the GASON proposed in Chapter 2, measured by more effective 
and uniform implementation of ICAO SARPs and efficiencies in terms of the use 
of resources by ICAO and its Member States, will to a large degree depend on 
whether the RASOs which form its building blocks are appropriately empowered 
by its Member States to exercise civil aviation safety responsibilities and func-
tions – either on behalf of these Member States or in RASOs own name.  
In order to facilitate successful empowerment of RASOs, Section 6.2 of 
Chapter 6 has first of all clarified and systematised the general principles and con-
cepts concerning the attribution and delegation of civil aviation safety responsibil-
ities and functions both in domestic, and international law context. 
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Having clarified the concepts and principles, Chapter 6 has, building on 
the general theory of conferrals of powers on international organisation, reached 
the following conclusions (see Sections 6.2.2 and 6.5 of Chapter 6): 
(1) From the international law point of view nothing prevents a State from 
delegating the exercise of its State safety functions, as envisaged und r 
the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, to a RASO. However, gi n the 
fact that only States can be parties to the Chicago Convention, such dele-
gation does not relieve a State from ultimate responsibility of compliance. 
Even when States establish Level 3 RASOs, the transfer of responsibility 
in such cases takes place only inter se, but not vis-à-vis other ICAO 
Member States. 
 
(2) Furthermore, three general types of delegations of powers to RASOs can 
be distinguished, that is agency relationships, delegations proper, and 
transfers: 
 
(a) An agency relationship occurs when States use Level 3 delegations in 
respect to functions for which they are responsible under the Chicago 
Convention. In such cases a RASO will be exercising such a function 
on behalf of the States concerned, meaning that it can change their 
rights and obligations under international law. 
 
(b) Delegation proper occurs when States give to a RASO functions 
which are not created by the Chicago Convention. In such cases Stat
attribute to a RASO a new competence, which the RASO will be car-
rying out in its own name and for which it will be responsible. 
 
(c) Transfer of responsibilities results in releasing a State from an obliga-
tion of compliance. Transfers are at present envisaged only under Ar-
ticle 83bis of the Chicago Convention. Given the fact that RASOs 
cannot be parties to the Convention, in principle Article 83bis trans-
fers are only possible between States. 
When it comes to the potential responsibility of regional aviation safety 
bodies under international law, Section 6.5 of Chapter 6 has concluded that this 
will depend, in accordance with ICJ case law, whether a RASO has a separate 
international legal personality. Whether such legal personality exists has to be 
assessed on a case by case basis, as few RASO founding agreements explicitly
provide for it.  
Section 6.5 of Chapter 6 has found that the majority of current RASOs can 
be considered as having international legal personality and thus having their inter-
national legal responsibility potentially engaged. This conclusion was reached 
based on considerations such as: explicit provisions to this end in the RASO 
founding agreements, conclusion by RASO of headquarters agreements, or exist-
ence of a relationship of an international agency between a RASO and its Member 
States. 
The substance of such responsibility in the first place depends o  the un-
derlying relationship which exists between a RASO and its Member States in ac-
cordance with the principle of specialty. Given the fact that RASOs cannot be 
257 
 
parties to the Chicago Convention, the main source of their international law obli-
gations are their founding agreements. The obligations stemming from such 
founding agreements are directed towards RASO Member States (see Section 6.5 
of Chapter 6). 
This study also considered, in Section 6.5.4 of Chapter 6, whether interna-
tional responsibility of a RASO could be engaged by a non-Member State in re-
spect to the provisions of the Chicago Convention. That question is especially 
relevant for Level 3 RASOs which are expected to carry out their delegated func-
tions in compliance with the Convention and its Annexes. The present study came 
to the conclusion that such possibility should not be excluded a priori, especially 
in the case of RASOs which have operational responsibilities, such as aircraft 
certification, the negligent exercise of which could contribute to accidents. From a 
legal point of view, such responsibility vis-à-vis third countries could be justified 
by the fact that some of the safety oversight obligations can be considered as erga 
omnes, as was demonstrated by other studies. In addition, such responsibility 
could be considered in relation to those countries which explicitly recognised a 
RASO and their safety competences by concluding BASAs with RASO Member 
States. 
However, the international legal personality of a RASO would be effective 
vis-à-vis non-Member States only if it has been explicitly or implicitly recognised 
by such third States. In this respect Section 6.5.4 of Chapter 6 has found that most 
of the RASOs are regularly invited by ICAO to international symposia and con-
ferences, in addition some of them, such as IAC or EASA, have either concluded 
working arrangements with third-countries, or have been designated as authorised 
agents of their Member States under BASAs concluded with third countries. Some 
of them, such as EASA or ECCAA, have been subject to ICAO USOAP audits, 
which is also a sign of recognition in international relations. 
In addition, this study demonstrated in Section 6.5.4 of Chapter 6 that third 
countries recognise the legal effects that the currently operational Level 3 RASOs, 
that is EASA, IAC and ECCAA, take on behalf of their Member States. In the 
case of EASA the relationship of international agency that exists between this 
RASO and EU Member States is even globally recognised. This is because 
EASA, as was also demonstrated in Section 6.5.4 of Chapter 6, acts as a ‘State of 
Design’ for one of the leading aircraft manufacturers in the world, namely Airbus. 
This means that third country ‘States of Registry’ readily accept Type Certificates 
issued by EASA on behalf of EU Member States, and exchange with EASA in-
formation which is necessary for ensuring the continuing airworthiness of the air-
craft under Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention. 
Irrespective of the above, this study did not identify any cases heard by in-
ternational courts or tribunals and related to breach by either a State or a RASO of 
international safety oversight or regulatory obligations (see Section 6.5.4 of Chap-
ter 6). On this basis it was concluded that it is more likely that, rather than the 
international responsibility of RASOs being engaged by States, victims of avia-
tion accidents would be trying to engage RASOs civil liability n domestic courts. 
In this respect this study concluded as follows: 
(1) There is at present no international legal instrument which would harmo-
nise the domestic civil liability regimes of States in respect to damage 
caused through the conduct of civil aviation safety regulatory and over-
sight tasks. Accordingly such civil liability would depend primarily on 
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provisions of the RASO founding documents and applicable domestic law 
(see Section 6.6.4 of Chapter 6); 
 
(2) Only three RASOs founding documents explicitly provide for the possibil-
ity of holding RASOs liable for non-contractual civil damages (see Section 
6.6.4.3 of Chapter 6). In addition this study has identified case law - albeit 
entirely from domestic, common law jurisdictions - where courts con-
firmed that national aviation regulators owe a duty of care towards the 
travelling public and set negligence as a threshold beyond which the regu-
lator may be held liable. Similar principles could be applied to RASOs 
(see Section 6.6.2 of Chapter 6); 
 
(3) The possibility to engage civil liability of a RASO would in the first case 
depend on the recognition of its separate legal personality under domestic 
law. This should normally not be a problem as far as the jurisdictions of 
the RASO Member States are concerned, but could be more difficult in 
case of non-Member States. The question of jurisdictional immunity in 
domestic proceedings would also have to be considered. In this respect the 
study concluded that most of the RASO founding documents studied con-
tain provisions on privileges and immunities, although the scope of the 
rights granted vary considerably (see Section 6.6.4.2 of Chapter 6); 
 
(4) This study advocates that treatment of RASOs from a liability point of 
view should chiefly depend on the type of delegations and competences 
they have been granted by States. The more operational competences were 
given to a RASO, the exercise of which can result in damages to third par-
ties, the more stringent the liability regime should be (see Section 6.6.4.3 
of Chapter 6); 
Finally this study has concluded in Section 6.7 of Chapter 6, that there is a 
need for a clear ICAO policy on the role of States in the supervision of RASOs, 
which could be included in one of the future editions of the ICAO RSOO and 
RAIO manuals, or the new Annex 19 which, as it applies to safety management in 
general, has a horizontal application. It was argued that ICAO should in particular 
offer more guidelines on how such supervision should be organised depending on 
the level of delegation effectuated. It was recommended that the supervi ion poli-
cy should be based on the principle that States and RASOs working on their be-
half are seen by ICAO and its Member States as a system which, taken together, 













Recommendation No 7: 
 
a) It is recommended that ICAO develops guidance and/or SARPs on how States 
should be organising oversight of RASOs. The supervision policy should be 
based on the principle that States and RASOs working on their behalf are seen 
by ICAO and its Member States as a single system which, taken og ther, 
should guarantee the level of safety oversight required by the Chicago Con-
vention. 
 
b) States should also promote in the RASO founding agreements cl ar provisions 
on RASO civil liability for non-contractual damages, especially in the case of 
organisations enjoying ‘Level 3’ delegations. 
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This has been the first comprehensive study of legal and institutional aspects re-
lated to RASOs’ establishment and functioning, and their role in supporting global 
aviation safety. As such it necessarily focused, in the first place, on mapping this 
new area of international cooperation and identifying key elements of RASO 
functioning which are most essential for enhancing global aviation safety and 
achievement of ICAO objectives of regulatory harmonisation and standardisation.  
The author hopes that this topic, including the findings and recommenda-
tions of this particular study, will be subject to further review, analysis and critical 
discussion. In this respect, the issues meriting further research are related, in par-
ticular, to the following questions: 
- Delegation arrangements, in particular those needed for establishing 
RCAA; 
- International responsibility of RASOs and their Member States; 
- Domestic civil liability of RASOs for negligent exercise of regulatory and 
oversight functions; 
- Sustainability of RASOs, including possibly the development of a meth-
odology for measuring their effectiveness; 
- How different RASOs could best cooperate with each other to harmonise 
their activities and achieve efficiencies within the GASON. 
The author would also like to invite practitioners and academics to onduct 
further, detailed case studies of different RASOs, similar to the cas study of 
EASA in Chapter 4, and to present the resulting conclusions and recommenda-
tions. 
It would also be worthwhile in several years’ time to conduct a follow-up 
study in order to verify whether the RASO evolution trends which were identified 
in Chapter 5 will continue. 
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands (Summary in Dutch) 
Doelstelling van het onderzoek: 
 
Veiligheid van de luchtvaart is van oudsher op mondiaal niveau geregeld door de 
Internationale Organisatie voor de Burgerluchtvaart (International CivilAviation 
Organisation (ICAO)) waarbij de internationale regelgeving door de lidstaten 
wordt toegepast. De afgelopen twaalf jaren hebben de opkomst en snelle ontwik-
keling van regionale organisaties voor de veiligheid van de burgerluchtvaart ge-
kend (Regional Aviation Safety Organisations (RASOs)), die een positie innemen 
tussen het internationale ICAO niveau en het nationale niveau van de individuele 
staten. Halverwege 2014 namen meer dan 100 van de ICAO-lidstaten deel aan 
zulke RASOs of soortgelijke organen. Dit aantal staten zal naar verwachting 
groeien omdat meer organisaties van dit type worden opgezet in vele delen van de 
wereld. Toch is er tot op heden geen volledige wetenschappelijke analyse van 
deze trend ondernomen. 
Het belangrijkste doel van deze studie is dan ook de kennis over RASOs 
nauwkeurig in kaart te brengen en om, vanuit een juridisch en institutioneel oog-
punt, te verifiëren hoe regionale samenwerking en de RASOs kunnen bijdragen 
tot de verbetering van de veiligheid van de burgerluchtvaart en de harmonisering 
van voorschriften, normen en procedures, zoals geformuleerd in artikel 37 van het 
Verdrag inzake de Internationale Burgerluchtvaart (Verdrag van Chicago).  
 
Belangrijkste bevindingen en conclusies:  
 
De studie plaatst in eerste instantie de regionale samenwerking op het gebied van 
de luchtvaartveiligheid in het kader van het Verdrag van Chicago en gaat na in 
hoeverre dit Verdrag nog steeds effectief is in de aanpak van de hedendaagse vei-
ligheidproblematiek in de burgerluchtvaart (hoofdstuk 2). De studie toont aan dat, 
ondanks de kritiek in het verleden op ICAO’s effectiviteit in het waarborgen van 
de uitvoering en de handhaving van de normen inzake luchtvaartveiligheid, staten 
er steeds in geslaagd zijn om het niveau van de daadwerkelijke uitvoering van de 
internationale normen en de aanbevolen praktijken (SARPs) te verbeteren. D  
studie wijst ook uit dat landen met schrijnende gebreken in de veiligheidstoezicht-
systemen slechts 0,3% van het wereldwijde internationale luchtverkeer vertegen-
woordigen.  
Ongeacht het bovenstaande blijkt uit de studie dat het huidige mondiale 
kader voor de luchtvaartveiligheid met belangrijke uitdagingen wordt geconfron-
teerd. Deze hebben vooral betrtekking op: (1) het ondermaatse  niveau van de 
daadwerkelijke implementatie van SARPs door (43% van) de ICAO-lidstaten, 
voornamelijk te wijten aan een gebrek aan financiële middelen en tech ische be-
kwaamheid; (2) aanzienlijke verschillen in het aantal ongevallen en inhet iveau 
van de daadwerkelijke uitvoering van de acht kritische ICAO elementen (Critical 
Elements (CE)) van het veiligheidstoezicht, zowel tussen individuele ICAO-
lidstaten als binnen ICAO regio's; (3) de noodzaak om de wereldwijde ongeval-
lenratio te verminderen met het oog op de aanhoudende groei van het verke r, dat 
naar verwachting zal verdubbelen in de komende vijftien jaar.  
De studie kwam ook tot de conclusie dat de globale veiligheid van het 
luchtvaartsysteem lijdt aan een “death by audit syndrome”. Dit  vloeit voort uit 
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overbodig regelgevend toezicht en repetitieve certificeringen van dezelfde lucht-
vaartactiviteiten, uitgevoerd binnen jurisdicties van verschillende stat n.  
Op basis van bovenstaande overwegingen stelt de studie dat ICAO een in-
novatieve manier zou moeten bedenken waarop deze organisatie, in aanvulling op 
het toezicht op de veiligheidsprestaties van de staten en het helpn van staten bij 
het oplossen van de geconstateerde tekortkomingen, ook het probleem van het 
teveel aan regelgevend toezicht en de verspilling van middelen door de dubbele 
certificering meer slagvaardig zou kunnen aanpakken. De belangrijkste stelling 
van de studie om deze uitdagingen aan te pakken is het bouwen van een “We-
reldwijd Netwerk van Luchtvaarttoezicht” (Global Aviation Safety Oversight 
Network (GASON)), waarbij het type organisaties zoals RASOs als belangrijkste 
bouwstenen zouden dienen.  
De studie stelt voor dat de architectuur van het GASON zou moeten uit-
gaan van een situatie waarbij ICAO zou vertrouwen op, en nauw samenwerk 
met, een aantal sterke RASOs. Die zouden kunnen zorgen voor een geharmoni-
seerde uitvoering van SARPs en handhavingsmechanismen organiseren. De studie 
betoogt dat een dergelijk systeem niet alleen ICAO in staat zou stellen om effici-
enter te zijn in het gebruik van haar beperkte middelen, maar ook zou bijdragen 
tot een meer uniforme toepassing van SARPs. Immers, in plaats van een veelheid 
van nationale regelingen, zou het GASON-systeem uiteindelijk tot een beperkt 
aantal regionale verbanden leiden, die makkelijker door ICAO te standaardiseren 
en te controleren zouden zijn. De studie erkent echter dat het GASON-concept p 
dit moment ver van de werkelijkheid staat. De meerderheid van RASOs in wer-
king hebben slechts adviserende en coördinerende bevoegdheden.  
De studie analyseert vervolgens in detail de notie van een RASO (hoofd-
stuk 3). Zij merkt op dat RASOs momenteel al functioneren, en dat het RASO-
begrip tot uiting komt in een aantal Resoluties van de driejaarlijkse ICAO Alge-
mene Vergadering (Assembly). Eén van deze Resoluties zet RASOs zelfs op ge-
lijke voet met nationale staten. Verwijzingen naar RASOs zijn ook aanwezig in de 
ICAO-Bijlagen 13 en 19. Daarbuiten heeft ICAO twee handboeken gepubliceerd 
die geheel gewijd zijn aan het ontstaan en de werking van RASOs. 
Ondanks het feit dat RASOs reeds vele jaren bestaan, blijkt uit deze studi
dat er tot op heden nog geen internationaal aanvaarde definitie van het begrip
RASO bestaat. Toch is een dergelijke definitie noodzakelijk, gelet op het feit dat: 
(1) de verwijzingen naar dit type van organisaties in toenemende mate gebruikt 
worden in ICAO-documentatie; (2) een gepast geformuleerde definitie de meest 
efficiënte vormen van RASOs zou bevorderen.  
De studie toont aan dat de bevoegdheid van een RASO tot het uitvoeren 
van veiligheidsfuncties, ingesteld door het Verdrag van Chicago, namens staten 
op een juridisch bindende wijze en het beschikken over eigen bevoegdheden inza-
ke regelgeving en handhaving belangrijke onderscheidende kenmerken tussen 
RASOs en andere vormen van regionale luchtvaartveiligheidsorganisaties zijn. 
Dergelijke bevoegdheden maken RASOs bijzonder geschikt als bouwstenen voor 
het GASON.  
In het licht van het bovenstaande stelt de studie een typologie v or van re-
gionale organen voor de luchtvaartveiligheid, alsook een definitie van een RASO.  
Terwijl ICAO momenteel RASOs in de eerste plaats ziet als instrumenten 
ter ondersteuning van staten in de verbetering van hun veiligheidsto zichtcapaci-
teiten, in het bijzonder door hun middelen te bundelen en schaalvoordelen te reali-
seren, kunnen deze organisaties eveneens andere voordelen bieden aan landen die 
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op dit moment geen dringende problemen hebben in verband met het organiseren 
van goed functionerende systemen voor veiligheidstoezicht. Dit wordt aangetoond 
in het geval van de EU waar de staten in het verleden een hoog niveau van lucht-
vaartveiligheid hebben bereikt, ondersteund door effectief toezicht, waarbij effici-
entie in regelgeving voor de luchtvaartindustrie de voornaamste reden was achter 
de oprichting van RASOs (Joint Aviation Authorities, European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA)) (hoofdstuk 4).  
De studie toont ook met behulp van het voorbeeld van EASA en de EU 
aan hoe een RASO kan worden ingebed in het institutionele en juridische kader 
van een regionale organisatie voor economische integratie (Regional Economi  
Integration Organisation (REIO)). Ook de voordelen van een dergelijke aanpak 
voor de veiligheid in de luchtvaart worden belicht.  
Na een analyse van RASOs van over de hele wereld, extrapoleert de studie 
de resultaten van de analyse en formuleert een aantal meer algemene opmrkingen 
over het functioneren van RASOs en de richting waarin deze zich ontwikkelen 
(hoofdstuk 5).  
In dit opzicht overziet, analyseert en categoriseert de studie de verschillen-
de soorten van delegatieregelingen die staten vaak gebruiken bij het opzetten RA-
SOs. De studie komt tot de conclusie dat de keuze van het niveau en de aard van 
de delegatieregelingen van een RASO moet worden gestoeld op een grondige eva-
luatie van de behoeften en het beleid van de betrokken staten. Toch toont ze ook 
aan dat het delegeren van taken die de centralisatie van een bepaalde veiligh ids-
functie op regionaal niveau mogelijk maken, een aantal voordelen biedt, zoals:  
- Schaalvoordelen en een betere bundeling van middelen; 
- Minder risico op duplicatie tussen het nationaal en regionaal niveau;  
- Mogelijkheid tot volledig geharmoniseerde actie, zoals één enkel certifi-
caat dat geldig is in de gehele regio, of één enkele regel die van toepassing 
op alle luchtvaartorganisaties.  
De studie toont ook aan dat RASOs die op een juridisch bindende wijze de 
bevoegdheid kregen om veiligheidsfuncties uit te oefenen ten behoeve van de sta-
ten, nog steeds zeer zeldzaam zijn. In augustus 2014 waren er slechts drie van 
dergelijke RASOs in de wereld: EASA in de EU, de Interstate Aviation C mmit-
tee (IAC) in het Gemenebest van Onafhankelijke Staten (Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS)), en de Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority (EC-
CAA).  
Om de lidstaten te helpen bij het opzetten van RASOs, stelt de s u ie een 
praktische 'gereedschapskist' voor, die is opgebouwd rond de acht CE’s van ICAO 
betreffende het veiligheidstoezicht door een staat. De studie identific ert ook de 
RASO karakteristieken die vooral belangrijk zijn vanuit het perspectief van het 
opzetten van het GASON. Deze zijn het bestaan van een geharmoniseerd regelge-
vend kader en van mechanismen voor regionale controle, die het moglijk maken 
dat de RASO ICAO voorziet van informatie over hoe haar lidstaten de SARPs 
naleven. 
De bevindingen van deze studie wijzen ook op de nood om voorzichtig-
heid aan de dag te leggen met betrekking tot de verwachtingen die de internatio-
nale luchtvaartgemeenschap koestert jegens RASOs. Dit vloeit voort uit het feit 
dat sommige geanalyseerde RASOs moeilijkheden hadden ervaren met de finan-
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ciering van hun activiteiten of met de werving van voldoende gekwalificeerd 
technisch personeel.  
Hoewel het institutionele kader en de juridische grondslag van de regiona-
le organen voor de luchtvaartveiligheid zeer gevarieerd zijn, bleek uit dit on er-
zoek dat deze organisaties een sterke neiging vertonen om in de tijd te evolueren 
naar meer formele entiteiten. Het belangrijkste kenmerk van deze trend  is de
overgang naar organisaties die zijn opgericht door middel van internationale ver-
dragen en het verkrijgen van afzonderlijke rechtspersoonlijkheid. Gezien het feit 
dat een groot aantal van dergelijke organisaties alleen in de laatste tien jaar wer-
den opgericht en dat nieuwe RASOs gepland worden, in het bijzonder i  Afrika 
en het Midden-Oosten, komt de studie tot de conclusie dat deze evoluti  zich 
waarschijnlijk zal voortzetten in de toekomst  
Dit onderzoek kijkt ook naar vragen over internationale verantwoordelijk-
heid en civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid die de werking van RASOs met zich 
meebrengen (hoofdstuk 6). In dit opzicht verduidelijkt en inventarisee t de studie 
eerst de algemene beginselen en concepten met betrekking tot de toekenning en de 
delegatie van verantwoordelijkheden en taken in de burgerluchtvaartveiligheid, 
zowel in een nationale als in een internationale juridische context. Voortbouwend 
op de algemene theorie van de verwijzing van bevoegdheden naar internationale 
organisaties onderscheidt de studie, en kenmerkt ze vanuit het oogpunt van het 
internationaal recht, drie hoofdtypen van delegaties die staten gebruik n om RA-
SOs te machtigen: agentschaprelaties, delegatie in de eigenlijke zin, n over-
dracht.  
Op basis van de analyse van de bepalingen van het Verdrag van Chicago 
en haar Bijlagen, alsmede relevante ICAO-, staats- en RASO praktijken komt 
deze studie tot de conclusie dat het ‘de lege lata’ perfect aanvaardbaar is voor een 
staat om zijn verplichtingen op veiligheidsgebied gedeeltelijk of zelfs volledig aan 
een RASO toe te vertrouwen, zolang de staat kan aantonen dat de desbetreffend  
SARP effectief uitgevoerd wordt. Echter, de studie komt tot de conclusie dat deze 
mogelijkheid niet altijd duidelijk tot uiting komt in de formulering van de ICAO 
SARPs.  
De studie formuleert en analyseert ook het principe van de ultieme staats-
verantwoordelijkheid voor veiligheidsregelgeving en -toezicht , zoals die voort-
vloeit uit het Verdrag van Chicago. Dit principe, dat voortkomt uit het feit dat 
alleen staten verdragsluitende partij kunnen zijn tot het Verdrag van Chicago, is 
momenteel de belangrijkste beperking met betrekking tot de delegati van de vei-
ligheidsfuncties door een staat aan RASOs. De studie legt uit dat, hoewel RASOs 
kunnen fungeren als vertegenwoordigers van de staten krachtens internationaal 
recht, staten hun uiteindelijke verantwoordelijkheid voor de naleving an de ver-
eisten van het Verdrag van Chicago en haar veiligheidsgerelateerde Bijlagn niet 
kunnen overdragen aan een RASO.  
In aanvulling op het principe van de ultieme verantwoordelijkheid van een 
staat voor het veiligheidstoezicht, identificeert deze studie een aantal meer speci-
fieke beperkingen met betrekking tot de delegatie van veiligheidsfuncties door een 
staat aan een RASO vanuit het perspectief van het Verdrag van Chicago. 
Als het gaat om de mogelijke verantwoordelijkheid van RASOs volgens 
het internationaal recht, blijkt uit deze studie dat de meerderheid van de RASOs 
kan worden beschouwd als organen met rechtspersoonlijkheid. Hun inter ationale 
wettelijke verantwoordelijkheid kan dus mogelijk op het spel staan. De studie 
heeft ook vastgesteld dat, omdat RASOs vanuit het perspectief van Verdrag van 
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Chicago hooguit kunnen fungeren als vertegenwoordigers van staten, de acties 
van RASOs krachtens internationaal recht normaliter zullen worden toegeschre-
ven aan staten.  
Gezien het feit dat RASOs geen partij kunnen zijn bij het Verdrag van 
Chicago, zijn de oprichtingsovereenkomsten de belangrijkste bron voor hun inter-
nationaalrechtelijke verplichtingen. De verplichtingen die voortvloeien uit deze 
oprichtingsovereenkomsten zijn gericht aan de RASO lidstaten. Echter, deze stu-
die beschouwt de mate waarin ook een niet-lidstaat de internationale juridische 
verantwoordelijkheid van een RASO zou kunnen vatten. De studie komt tot de 
conclusie dat een dergelijke mogelijkheid a priori niet kan worden uitgesloten, in 
het bijzonder in het geval waarin RASOs operationele verantwoordelijkheden 
dragen, zoals vliegtuigen certificeren, waarvan de nalatige uitoefening tot onge-
vallen kan bijdragen. 
Wat de civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van RASOs betreft, heeft deze
studie gevonden dat slechts een beperkt aantal oprichtingsactes van RASOs bepa-
lingen bevatten, die deze kwestie behandelen. Als gevolg daarvan, en in afwezig-
heid van een internationaal verdrag inzake de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid van e 
luchtvaarttoezichthouders, wordt deze vraag in eerste instantie gereguleerd door 
de oprichtingsactes van de RASO en binnenlandse (of regionale) wetten. De stu-
die beschouwt de voorwaarden voor die aansprakelijkheid, met inbegrip van de 
erkenning van rechtspersoonlijkheid van RASOs volgens het nationale recht en de 
gerechtelijke immuniteit, die een aantal RASOs genieten. 
De studie besteedt ook aandacht aan de eventuele noodzaak tot wijziging 
van het Verdrag van Chicago in het licht van de gevonden beperkingen die voort-
vloeien uit het feit dat op dit moment alleen staten bij dit Verdrag partij kunnen 
zijn. Hoewel de inschatting is dat het zeer onwaarschijnlijk is dat  eze wijzigin-
gen kunnen worden gerealiseerd, beschouwt de studie twee soorten wijzigingen 
die het mogelijk maken dat RASOs, in eigen naam veiligheidsfuncties in kader 
van het Verdrag van Chicago en de Bijlagen zouden kunnen uitoefenen: 
- Wijziging van artikel 83bis van het Verdrag van Chicago op een wijze die 
de overdracht van veiligheidsfuncties niet alleen naar andere landen, maar 
ook naar internationale organisaties mogelijk maakt; 
- Opneming in het Verdrag van Chicago van de zogenaamde REIO clausule, 
die voorziet in de mogelijkheid van toetreding tot een internationaal ver-
drag of een REIO, zoals de Afrikaanse Regionale Economische Gemeen-
schappen (Regional Economic Communities (RECs)) of de EU. 
Zonder de mogelijkheid van een toekomstige wijziging van het Verdrag 
van Chicago uit te sluiten, stelt deze studie dat op korte termijn een veel duidelij-
ker beleid van ICAO nodig is over de rol van staten bij het to zicht op RASOs. 
De studie toont aan dat een dergelijk toezicht gebaseerd moet zijn op het principe 
dat het toezichtsbeleid van  staten, en RASOs namens hen, , het niveau van het 
veiligheidstoezicht zoals vereist door het Verdrag van Chicago garandeert. Zulk 
toezichtsbeleid zou niet mogen leiden tot de noodzaak om de acties van een regi-
onale instantie in detail te controleren of tot een risico op een ovrlap van deskun-
digheid op nationaal en regionaal niveau.  
De studie wordt afgesloten met een aantal aanbevelingen die voortvloeien 
uit de algemene analyse van het onderzoeksmateriaal, en formuleert aanbevelin-
gen voor verder onderzoek (hoofdstuk 7). De aanbevelingen betreffen in het bij-
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zonder de oprichting van het GASON, de vaststelling van een RASO definitie, de 
specifieke voordelen van de verschillende niveaus van RASO delegatieregeling n, 
een betere afspiegeling van het RASO concept in de ICAO-Bijlagen, de oodzaak 
van de lidstaten om toezicht op hun RASO uit te oefenen, de bevordering van 
duidelijke bepalingen in de oprichtingsdocumenten van een RASO inzake de aan-
sprakelijkheid voor schade, en tot slot mogelijke toekomstige wjzigingen van het 






Core sample of organisations selected for the study 
 
1) European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
 
2) European Organisation for the safety of air navigation (EUROCONTROL) 
 
3) European Network of Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities 
(ENCASIA) 
 
4) Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) 
 
5) Banjul Accord Group Aviation Safety Oversight Organisation (BAGASOO) 
 
6) Banjul Accord Group Accident Investigation Agency (BAGAIA) 
 
7) East African Community Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency 
(CASSOA) 
 
8) Les Autorités Africaines et Malgache de l’Aviation Civile (AAMAC) 
 
9) Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO) 
 
10) Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority (ECCAA)  
 
11) Caribbean Aviation Safety and Security Oversight System (CASSOS) 
 
12) Regional Cooperation System on Safety Oversight in Latin America 
(SRVSOP) 
 
13) Agencia Centroamérica para la Seguridad Aeronáutica (ACSA) 
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